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ABSTRACT 
The Tenth Cruiser Squadron provided a vital element to the Blockade of Germany, 
patrolling the seas between northwest Scotland, Iceland and Greenland. It was the 
longest continuous naval operation of the war lasting from 1914-1917. 7KH6TXDGURQ¶V
resources were armed merchant cruisers manned by Naval Reservists and Mercanti le 
Marine ratings all commanded by a Flag Officer and Royal Naval Commanding 
Officers. The thesis follows the Royal Navy¶V GHOLEHUDWLRQV to establish its Reservist 
elements and how the Navy assumed the men of the Mercantile Marine could be 
brought into naval service.  A parallel debate in Parliament considered the viability of 
taking up ocean liners for conversion to armed merchant cruisers. Both sets of 
discussions lasted nearly fifty years. 
 
Most existing Squadron literature is chronological, drawing heavily on official reports 
of proceedings. This thesis concentrates on analysing personal diaries and biographies 
and is focused on the FUHZV¶ daily work to reveal a broad picture of life in the 
Squadron. Topics included are pay, accommodation, feeding scales, daily routines, 
promotion, pastoral and medical welfare, and recreation.  These issues were in addition 
to the daily threats from surface and submarine attack and the constant debilitating bad 
weather.  
 
Although deemed successful, the thesis concludes, the blockade could have been 
tightened sooner if the Government had used statistics already held on imports and 
H[SRUWV7KHFRQFOXVLRQLVDOVRPDGHWKDWWKH5R\DO1DY\¶VIDLOXUHWRXQGHUVWDQGIXOO\
WKHVKLSSLQJLQGXVWU\¶VXQLTXHIDFHWVDQGWKHPHUFKDQWVHDPDQFUHDWHGSUREOHPVWKDW
could have been avoided. 
 
7KH 6TXDGURQ¶V RSHUDWLRQDO DFKLHYHPHQW ZDV LQWHrcepting nearly 13,000 suspect 
vessels. Its patrols performed a constabulary function which encouraged ships to call 
voluntarily at examination ports to be searched effectively.  Less tangible, but equally 
praiseworthy, was the successful cohesion built amongst crews of widely differing 
experience.     
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1 
On August 2, 1914, two days before the First World War began; Rear Admiral Dudley 
de Chair boarded his flagship, H.M.S. 
Crescent, and assumed command of the 
Tenth Cruiser Squadron.1 The Squadron 
comprised the eight ageing cruisers Edgar, 
Hawke, Endymion, Royal Arthur, Crescent, 
Grafton, Gibraltar and Theseus.  Built 
under the 1889 Naval Defence Act between 
1893 and 1894, their silhouette epitomised 
the late Victorian warship. Displacing 
between 7000 and 7350 tons, they were 
ILWWHGZLWKHLWKHU WZR´guns and teQ´
RU RQH ´ DQG WZHOYH ´ guns.2  Coal 
burners, with a bunker capacity of 1250 
tons, they had a maximum speed of 19.5      
  Fig.1 Rear-Admiral Sir Dudley de Chair R.N      knots.   In 1914, they were still   described   
DVµH[FHOOHQWVWHDPHUV¶RULQWKHFDVHRI Royal Arthur and CrescentµVWLOOVWHDP very 
ZHOO¶3  These ships with low freeboard were now twenty years old.      
 
                                                 
1
 Born in Canada in 1864, Dudley de Chair came from a family with a military background.  He joined the Royal 
Navy as a cadet aboard H.M.S Britannia at Dartmouth in January 1878.   'H&KDLU¶VWHUPLQFOXGHG3ULQFH*HRUJH
later King George V, and Prince Edward, his elder brother.  Friendships formed at Dartmouth often last a lifetime 
and such an early contact with the Royal Family would certainO\KDYHEHHQ WRGH&KDLU¶VDGYDQWDJH LQKLVIXWXUH
naval career.   January 1880 saw de Chair appointed to his first sea going ship, H.M.S. Alexandra, flagship of the 
Mediterranean fleet.  He was present when Alexandria was bombarded in 1882, then taken prisoner after 
volunteering to carry despatches to a desert fort.  He was brought before the rebel leader Arabi Pasha but after a 
series of close shaves he escaped.   +LVUHVFXHZDVUHSRUWHGLQWKH*2&¶VGHVSDWFKDQQRXQFLQJWKDW&DLURKDGEHHQ
re-taken, endLQJZLWKWKHZRUGVµ0LGVKLSPDQGH&KDLULVVDIH¶  4XHHQ9LFWRULD¶VUHTXHVWIRUSUD\HUVIRUKLVVDIHW\
had been rewarded and de Chair was on the path to an eventful career after being required by Fisher to recount his 
Egyptian experiences.  After passing hLV OLHXWHQDQW¶V H[DPLQDWLRQ KLV ELRJUDSK\ UHYHDOV D VHULHV RI µSOXP¶
appointments both afloat and ashore, such as being asked by Jellicoe to join him as Assistant Controller and after 
promotion to captain being appointed as Naval Attaché to the United States.   During these years he came in contact 
with Royalty both in Britain and from abroad as well as wealthy families such as the Vanderbilts.    De Chair moved 
in high social circles. In November 1912 de Chair, now a rear-admiral, was invited by Churchill and persuaded by 
Beatty to become Naval Secretary.  Although he accepted, he had mixed feelings about the post and clearly 
GLIILFXOWLHV HPHUJHG  ,Q 0D\  KH ZDV DVNHG E\ &KXUFKLOO WR WDNH FKDUJH RI WUDLQLQJ WKH 1DY\¶V \RXWK +H
reminded Churchill of an earlier promise of command of the Second Battle Squadron.  Nevertheless, he courteously 
accepted the training post but by August 1914, his Training Squadron of eight ageing Edgar class cruisers was re-
designated the Tenth Cruiser Squadron and ordered to patrol the northern entrance to the North Sea.  Although de 
&KDLUKDGVXUYLYHG&KXUFKLOO¶VDXWRFUDWLFZKLPVKHZDVGLVDSSRLQWHGRYHUQRWUHFHLYLQJWKHSURPLVHGFRPPDQGRI
the Second Battle Squadron.  He was one of many admirals who felt anger over Jellicoe¶VUHSODFHPHQWLQDQG
perhaps this was the reason why he required his auto biography not to be released until after his death in 1958. 
De Chair, D.R., The Sea is Strong  (London,1961) 160 
2
 Hampshire, A. C., The Blockaders  (London,1980)  18 
3
 Jane, F., -DQH¶V)LJKWLQJ6KLSVRI:RUOG:DU, (London,2001 Edn.)   54 
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The Squadron was part of the Third Fleet and tasked with training duties. When de 
Chair telegraphed with his orders the ships were located at their home ports of 
Portsmouth, Devonport, Chatham and Queenstown.   As soon as possible, they were to      
rendezvous at Scapa Flow where de Chair and the ships would be under the   
operational control of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe.   During the afternoon of August 4, 
1914, the Admiralty gave warning that hostilities against Germany would commence 
at midnight.                                          
                                                               Fig.2 An Edgar Class Cruiser 
The war plans required the northern exit of the North Sea  to be patrolled by the Tenth 
Cruiser Squadron (10CS) - to be NQRZQDVµ&UXLVHU)RUFH%¶RUµ7KH1RUWKHUQ3DWURO¶
Their objective was to intercept and sink or capture German warships and merchant 
vessels. In addition all neutral vessels proceeding to German ports were to be stopped 
and the enemy denied access to any harbour or anchorage in the Orkneys and 
Shetlands. The Grand Fleet, operating from Rosyth and later Scapa Flow, was 
interposed between the Northern Patrol and the enemy bases to provide potential 
support.4 
 
Three Key Elements of the Blockade 
There were three key components at work to operate the blockade.  Firstly, the Tenth 
Cruiser Squadron blocked the waters to the north west of Scotland to prevent entry and 
exit from the North Sea. The subject of this thesis is this element. The Squadron 
                                                 
4
 
 
  De Chair,  The Sea is Strong   167 
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started with the eight Edgar Class cruisers which proved inadequate in both quantity 
and quality to survive the weather in the huge area to be covered.  After the amount of 
pre war consideration to this problem, it is surprising that the weak and meagre 
resources as the ageing Edgars were judged sufficient.  There would seem to have 
been a failure to understand the continuous punishment these ships would receive from 
the weather and ignorance of the number of merchant ship movements to be 
intercepted.  
 
Secondly, an examination service operated in the vicinity of Dover and Deal 
employing auxiliary vessels, reservists and customs officers to examine neutrals using 
the southern entrance to the North Sea.   This force enjoyed the support of the anti 
submarine nets and a mine barrage in the Dover Straits as well as benefiting from the 
limited area to be covered, more kindly weather conditions and easier communications 
with the Foreign Office.5   
 
Thirdly, there were economic and political pressures brought to bear on the neutral 
countries and foreign ship-owners seeking to continue trading with Germany. This 
element of the blockade was under the control of the Foreign Office and the Board of 
Trade. It was very much a backroom operation that quickly learnt to exploit the 
µFRPPHUFLDO LQWHOOLJHQFH¶ PDLQWDLQHG E\ RUJDQLVDWLRQV VXFK DV WKH %DOWLF ([FKDQJH
WKHFRPPRGLW\H[FKDQJHV/OR\GV¶LQVXUDQFHPDUNHW and the many British worldwide 
business and diplomatic relationships.  Whenever a neutral ship was detained at Deal 
or Kirkwall, reference was made to the Foreign Office for a final decision as to its fate.  
 
Objective and Aims of this Thesis 
Most literature connected with the blockade of Germany relates to diplomatic, political 
and economic issues.  In contrast, this thesis has a prime focus on the daily operations 
and challenges faced by the first component, the Tenth Cruiser Squadron, particularly 
the period when it was reliant on the Armed Merchant Cruisers.6                                                                                                           
The diplomatic and political issues are first examined before reviewing the historical 
development of both armed merchant cruisers and the creation of Naval Reserves.  
These two resources were essential for the Squadron after many decades of 
deliberation they were combined in the Tenth Cruiser Squadron. The daily boarding 
                                                 
5
 See Appendix 2 for details of the Downs anchorage activity. 
6
  See Appendix 4.  
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tasks, threats from surface and underwater attack and the available countermeasures 
which were developed are explored.  Squadron social and employment issues are 
H[DPLQHG)LQDOO\DQDWWHPSWWRHYDOXDWHWKH6TXDGURQ¶VSHUIRUPDQFHFRQFOXGHVWKH
paper. 
 
The study emphasises issues from the perspective of challenges aboard the ships 
contrasting with the national and international viewpoints usually featured in   
µblockade¶ OLWHUDWXUH  For a full understanding, the study touches upon the law 
concerning contraband, prize courts and the practical and technical issues of 
converting and operating merchant vessels as warships. In addition, some seamanship 
DQGQDYLJDWLRQDO WHFKQLTXHVRI WKHGD\DUH FRQVLGHUHG3HUFHLYHGDV D µVHFRQG WHDP¶
task not ranking with µSUHPLHUOHDJXH¶ZDUZRUNLt will review how the Navy adapted 
to carry out this maritime part of the blockade.  
 
Basics of the Declaration of London 1909, Blockade and Contraband of War. 
Britain was ideally placed to the west of mainland Europe to control access to the 
North Sea from both the north and south.  The Allies decided that a blockade of 
Germany would be an important a part of their war strategy. A legal blockade can only 
be established by a belligerent government and its creation must be announced by 
declaration to the governments of all states - neutral, allied or enemy and also to local 
coastal or port authorities.7 To effect a legal blockade would have required control 
over the Baltic coasts and this was never done. However, it became convenient to refer 
to the actions taken by the British as a blockade, albeit technically incorrect, since it 
only affected part of the German coast.  Under international law, neutral ships are 
permitted to trade freely with belligerents. They must be prepared to submit to the right 
of visit and search, and may be brought before a Prize Court if they offer resistance to 
search, carry contraband, render aid to the enemy or attempt to infringe the blockade.8   
 
However, in the main, the rules laid down by the Declaration of London, 1909, were 
observed in the First World War.9 A key outcome from the Declaration was the setting 
XS WKUHH OLVWV RQHRI µDEVROXWH FRQWUDEDQG¶QDPHO\ DUWLFOHVZKLFKZHUHFOHDUO\ZDU
materials and another deHPHG µFRQGLWLRQDO FRQWUDEDQG¶ ZKLFK FRPSULVHG DUWLFOHV
capable RIXVH LQHLWKHUZDURUSHDFH  7KLV µFRQGLWLRQDO¶ OLVW LQFOXded controversial 
                                                 
7
    Green, L.C.,   The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict  (Manchester,1993) 171 
8
    Guichard,  The Naval Blockade  7 
9
    Green,    Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict  35 
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items such as ore, chemicals and rubber, all of which were becoming increasingly 
important to any modern war effort. 7KHUHZDVDOVRDµIUHH/LVW¶FRQWDLQLQJDUWLFOHVWKDW
could never be deemed contraband.10  
 
7KH FRQFHSW RI ZDU EHLQJ FRQGXFWHG RQ D EHOOLJHUHQW¶V EHKDOI LQ VRPH UHPRWH
battlefield or country changed in the twentieth century. The reliance on factories 
employing numbers of civilians to produce a widening range of warlike weapons and 
material, made the idea of total war a reality. This realisation that caused the 
DeFODUDWLRQWRDOORZWKHµDEVROXWH¶DQGµFRQGLWLRQDO¶OLVWVWREHYDULHGDVDEHOOLJHUHQW
saw fit.  Notices of any changes were promulgated by Orders in Council.  This meant 
neutral shipping had a problem keeping up to date with the contraband lists, if it was to 
avoid being stopped by blockading ships and becoming embroiled with the Prize 
Courts.  The Squadron¶VERDUGLQJRIILFHUVDOVRQHHded to keep up to date with changes 
LQWKHOLVWV7KH)RUHLJQ2IILFH¶VSUREOHPLQVHWWLQJWKHFRQWUDEDQGOLVWVZDVWRDYRLG
damaging trade and relations with influential neutrals, particularly the United Stares of 
America. 
 
Close Blockade Abandoned  
The development of submarines, mines, long-range coastal artillery and aircraft 
coupled with the complex shoal waters of the German Bight and the Baltic, a 
traditional close blockade were abandoned and a distant blockade would have to be 
implemented. The Grand Fleet, was based at Scapa Flow to cover the North Sea in 
conjunction with a line of cruisers from Shetlands to Norway. The Channel Fleet 
blocked off the southern approach into the North Sea via the Dover Strait.11   Many 
accounts of the First World War leave readers concluding this was the entire blockade 
effort. In reality these arrangements served to guarantee that the Tenth Cruiser 
Squadron, could perform its part in a µdistant¶ blockade, which in itself was only part 
of an economic war against Germany.  
 
Early Patrols of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron 
Vessels on passage to and from Germany could use the Norwegian coast and remain in 
WKDWFRXQWU\¶VWHUULWRULDOZDWHUVXQWLOODWLWXde 62° North before emerging into  
 
                                                 
10
    Consett, M.W.W.P., The Triumph Of Unarmed Forces (1914-1918) (London,1923)  12 
      See Appendix 2 for further details 
11
   Halpern,   A Naval HLVWRU\«22 
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                                 Fig. 3 Tenth Cruiser Squadron ± Sphere of Operations. 
 
international waters.12  Therefore, de Chair set up a Norwegian Patrol around this 
latitude and a Shetlands patrol in a north-easterly direction from the Outer Skerries 
expecting to make interceptions. Some British armed merchant cruisers were already 
patrolling from the most northern point of the Shetlands in a north westerly direction. 
Significantly, de Chair records the view that: 
              These ships [the armed merchant cruisers] had considerable speed  
              and small fighting value;  their duty is to report and shadow enemy  
              war vessels and stop and examine all merchant shipping. 
 
Clearly he did not regard them as real warships. However, in the same paper he 
acknowledges a key limitation of the Edgars was their slow speed and the time needed 
to reach full speed.   Four Edgars were disposed to both the Norwegian and the 
Shetlands patrols but in each area, one cruiser would be away coaling at any one 
time.13 These were inadequate resources for such large sea areas and no doubt de Chair 
felt vulnerable with, at best, only six ships on station at a time. 
                                                 
12
  De Chair,   The Sea is Strong 167 
13
  TNA  ADM 137/185 Revised Arrangement for Cruiser Force B 19 August 1914  24-5 
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Additional Duties and Offensive Sweeps 
Initially, the ships were frequently detached for duties other than visit and search. 
Often the Squadron worked in cooperation with the Third Cruiser Squadron and other 
groups. The Squadron was often moved by the Commander-in-Chief to different patrol 
areas at short notice. Nevertheless, visit and search activities developed and as early as 
August 20, 1914, an encounter was made with the Norwegian-$PHULFD OLQH¶V
Bergensfjord.14 The Bergensfjord and her sister-ships would tangle repeatedly with the 
Squadron¶V patrols in the future. By the August 19, 1914, the Armed Merchant 
Cruisers Alsatian, Mantua and Oceanic were placed under de &KDLU¶V FRPPDQG EXW
were treated as a separate unit.  On August 25, 1914, de Chair inspected Mantua¶V 
fighting arrangements and WKH6KLS¶V&RPSDQ\+HZDV impressed with the extent of 
accommodation available to transport wounded after a fleet action.15 
 
At this time, De Chair was also responsible for preventing enemy access to any 
harbours in the Orkneys and Shetlands.  He contacted Lieutenant-Colonel H.C.Evans 
R.M.L.I., who was responsible for organising an R.N.R. Force to defend the islands. 
De Chair landed three field guns and by August 24, 1914, discussed the possible 
berthing of two seaplanes in the harbour as part of the defences. Clearly he had in mind 
the possible value of naval aviation to the Squadron.  
 
The R.N.R. Force of 70 men and a local Territorial Detachment meant some 240 men 
were available.  On the November 3, 1914, de Chair met with the Senior Naval 
Officer, Lerwick, Commander J. Startin R.N.R., to discuss positioning of lookout huts 
and booms to defend the base.16  Two colliers were positioned in Lerwick on the 
eastern side of the Shetlands and two others in Busta Voe on the western side. These 
reduced the (GJDU¶V steaming distance for coaling but the Armed Merchant Ships still 
had to return to the Clyde or Liverpool. 
 
During these early weeks of the Squadron¶VH[LVWHnce, the Army was mobilised for the 
British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and sent to support Belgium and France. The Battle 
of Mons was conceded when the BEF and French Army retreated on 29 August 1914. 
During the year volunteers were called for at home and from Australia, Canada and 
                                                 
14
  TNA  ADM 137/185 de Chair to Admiralty 27 August 1914 11-21 
15
  TNA  ADM 137/185 de Chair to Admiralty 27 August 1914 11-21  This raises the   
     question whether de Chair, at this stage, realised the accommodation was there  for  
     boarding and prize crews or the extent to which these activities would develop.  
16
  TNA  ADM 137/185  de Chair to Admiralty 3 December 1914   74-80 
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Newfoundland.  Germany brought food supplies and allocations under Government on 
'HFHPEHU,WZDVQRZFOHDULWZDVQRORQJHUJRLQJWREHDµVKRUW¶ZDU17   
 
Changes in the Weather Foreshadow Changes in the Squadron 
When autumn arrived the weather started to take its toll.  Reports emerged of weather 
being too bad for boarding to take place.  Continuous running of the Edgars brought 
on a spate of engineering problems.   First to suffer was Gibraltar, with the 
combustion chamber of one boiler nearly closed and everything clinkered including the 
lowest tube. Gibraltar was sent to the Tyne for docking. Soon Royal Arthur and 
Crescent needed defects repaired when next in for coaling.  On October 29, 1914, 
Grafton reported the main condenser leaking and fear that the copper expansion ring at 
the back of the port High Pressure Slide had fractured as well as funnels showing signs 
of weakness. Next to succumb was Theseus on the evening of the same day.  She had 
broken down whilst in general chase with Endymion. On Saturday, 31 October, 
Theseus again reported defects. A rupture of the inner bottom above the reserve feed 
water tanks, bilge water leaking into feed tanks and the water density of boilers rapidly 
increasing. Theseus was ordered to Swarbacks Minn to make good her defects. 
Endymion had reported her arrival at Scapa Flow and also the need to stay there with 
serious defects in the engines and fore bridge. Crescent reported a leaky condenser. 18 
 
On the October 15, 1914, the Squadron suffered its first enemy loss when Hawke was 
torpedoed.  After transferring of mails from Endymion she was hit abreast the forward 
funnel and sunk by the U-9.  Grainger states in a footnote, that it was the attack on 
Hawke that persuaded Admiral Jellicoe to withdraw the Grand Fleet from the North 
Sea.  On October 17, 1914 the Commander-in-Chief issued an order that required to 
the Northern Patrol to be confined to intercepting trade to the North Westward of the 
Shetlands.19 
 
On the November 11, 1914, Edgar reported serious engine defects and was ordered 
back to base for repairs when the weather moderated.  The Squadron then encountered 
a severe gale with heavy seas and µhove to¶ whilst the wind veered from W to NW.  
Crescent shipped heavy seas over the forecastle which wrecked the fore bridge, 
                                                 
17
 Winter, J.M., The Experience of World War 1 (London,1988) 2000 Edition  72,114 and 164 
18
  TNA  ADM 137/185  de Chair to Admiralty 1 November  1914  49-62 
19
  Grainger, J.D.  (Ed.), The Maritime Blockade of Germany in the Great War   
     Navy Records Society (Aldershot, 2003)  54 
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sweeping overboard WKH $GPLUDO¶V6HD&DELQ FDUU\LQJ DZD\ WKHYHQWLODWLQJFRZORI
the foremost stokehold which caused a considerable amount of water to get below and 
put fires out, breaking hammock nettings and damaging beyond repair the Port Cutter  
Even though turned in, removing bodily a whaler at davits abaft the cutter; various 
hawser reels and other deck fittings fastened to the deck were torn away from their 
seating due to rotten woodwork.  
                                                                                                                                           
Edgar also reported an Able Seaman and a cutter swept overboard and other items 
damaged.20    Crescent, Royal Arthur and Grafton were ordered to the Clyde for survey 
and repairs, these were put in hand, the aim being to have the ships seaworthy by 
December 7, 1914.  Discussions were held with the Director of Dockyards (Sir James 
Marshall, KCB) but on November 20, 1914, the Admiralty ordered the seven Edgars 
of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron to return to their Home Ports forthwith, to be paid off.  
Even when there might be a respite from the gales, the frequent fogs brought their 
particular tests for the navigators. The constant harsh weather in these near Arctic 
waters proved to be a perpetual background challenge for the Squadron¶VYHVVHOV  It 
had proved too much for the Edgars and would be no help to the replacement Armed 
Merchant Cruisers.  
 
Understandably in the first months, when the Edgars comprised the Squadron, Jellicoe 
perceived these vessels as warshiSVDYDLODEOHWRKLPIRUµVZHHSVµRI the North Sea and 
Norwegian waters. If nothing else, they looked like warships. This meant when they 
were off station the blockade was ineffective. The first severe gale of the winter had 
put an end to these old cruisers on the Northern Patrol, nevertheless in their brief 
operations they had boarded over 300 ships and intercepted many more in rough 
weather.21 Fortunately, in these months there had been little traffic in the North Sea 
since most German merchant ships were interned in neutral ports abroad. Jellicoe 
became frustrated by the fact that since the beginning of October, of some twenty five 
neutrals sent to Kirkwall and several others to northern ports, only one had been 
permanently detained.22  This was perhaps the moment of realisation that there would 
be constant frustrations stemming from political or commercial considerations, the 
precise nature of which was often known only to the Foreign Office.   
                                                 
20
  TNA  ADM 137/185   74-80 
21
  Hampshire, A.C., The Blockaders 34 
22
  Hampshire,  The Blockaders  33 
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Different Threats 
The First World War brought the reality of mines, submarines and torpedoes to the top 
of the Navy¶VDJHQGD$Q\GRXEWVDERXWWKHHIIHFWLYHQess of submarines and torpedoes  
had been dispelled with the destruction by the German U-9, of the cruisers Aboukir, 
Hogue and Cressy in less than one hour on 
September 22, 1914.23                                                                                                                               
Submarines were a constant threat to the 
Squadron since they were avoiding the shallow 
waters of the Dover Strait, with its submarine 
nets and mine barrage, and taking the northern 
route to their patrols as well as laying mines in 
the Irish Sea.  
 
Another threat was attack by German surface 
raiders. Germany chose to use surface raiders 
and before the Squadron was in position, the  
Fig.4 Vice Admiral Sir Reginald Tupper   battleship Kaiser Wilhem der Grosse and the 
German armed cruiser 0ĘZH had passed into the Atlantic.24  In addition to the naval 
UDFH DJDLQVW %ULWDLQ WKH .DLVHU KDG DOVR FKRVHQ WR H[SDQG *HUPDQ\¶s liner shipping 
and open up the potential for armed merchant cruisers for herself.  This fact later 
impinged on the Squadron. The Tenth Cruiser Squadron¶s ships were armed but not 
armoured. The Squadron was very vulnerable if it met a well armed surface raider a 
fact always recognised by both de Chair and his successor, Vice Admiral Tupper.25 
                                                 
23
  Hough, R.,  The Great War at Sea 1914-1918 (Oxford, 1983)  62 
24
  De Chair,  The Sea is Strong  169 
25
 Born in London in OcWREHU5HJLQDOG7XSSHU¶VIDPLO\ZHUH+XJXHQRWVZLWK ORQJVWDQGLQJFRQQHFWLRQV LQ
the Channel Island of Guernsey.  He had been attracted to the Navy whilst convalescing in Portsmouth and in 
January 1873 he joined H.M.S. Britannia at Dartmouth to start hLVQDYDOFDUHHU +LVIDWKHU¶VIULHQGVKDGZDUQHG
that as the Navy was at a low ebb, there were few prospects for a boy barely thirteen at that time.   In March 1875 
he joined his first ship, H.M.S. Undaunted then being commissioned at Sheerness as flagship of the  Commander-
in-Chief,  East Indies Station.    After service in Australian and Pacific waters he was specially selected for service 
in the Royal Yacht Victoria and Albert as a sub-lieutenant in July 1882.  Clearly there was an agreeable social life 
aboard this ship on such occasions as Cowes Week and it would not be the last time that he mixed with Royalty. 
After being promoted lieutenant and qualifying as a gunnery officer he was appointed to H.M.S. Northumberland.  
Promoted to captain in 1901, Tupper was a member of a committee looking at the issues involved in taking up 
liners from trade in order to convert them to armed merchant cruisers.   He records that he learnt much about the 
shipping industry and merchant seafarers in this post.   After commanding H.M.S. Prince of Wales in the 
Mediterranean, Tupper was appointed captain of the gunnery school H.M.S. Excellent, a key achievement for a 
gunnery officer.  He was promoted to Rear-Admiral in September 1910, after which he was involved in diplomatic 
and committee work. In March 1912, the First Lord, Mr. Churchill proposed that Tupper should be head of the 
Mission to the Turkish Navy, the purpose being to prevent that Navy coming under German influence. Despite 
assurances of subsequent high command anGDZHHN WR WKLQN LWRYHU7XSSHUGHFOLQHG&KXUFKLOO¶VEODQGLVKPHQWV
preferring to serve in the British Navy. Consequently he was left wondering about his future employment but later 
returned to command of the Prince of Wales.  In January 1915, Tupper was recalled from retirement and appointed 
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Armed Merchant Cruisers and Naval Reservists Converge 
In order to continue the blockade the Admiralty turned to Armed Merchant Cruisers 
manned by Naval Reservists and Mercantile Marine personnel for whom there would 
be challenges aplenty.  The vessels deployed were coal burners and thus needed regular 
visits to coaling stations on the Clyde or at Liverpool. The regular passages to and 
from coaling, usually as a single ship, left the Squadron¶V FRQYHUWHG OLQHUV                 
vulnerable to underwater and surface threats.  As the war progressed there was a need 
to establish a coaling base and other support in the Shetlands.                                                                          
 
 A particular challenge for de Chair, Tupper and the Royal Naval Commanding 
Officers of the armed merchant cruisers was the moulding of a disparate mix of 
seafarers into effective teams. Each armed merchant cruiser had typically only three or 
four Royal Navy officers aboard. The remaining officers and ratings came from the 
Royal Naval Reserve (R.N.R.), and later the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve 
(R.N.V.R.), the Royal Fleet Reserve (R.F.R.), the Royal Marines (R.M.), Royal Navy 
Boy Seaman and various Mercantile Ratings.  Additionally, each ship had a number of 
ratings from the Newfoundland Royal Naval Reserve (N.R.N.R.).  
 
Research Literature and Sources 
At the time, the public knew little of the Squadron¶VHQdeavours even though the task 
was the longest continuous naval operation of the war. In most books on the naval 
activity in World War 1, dominant themes are the Fisher revolution, the naval arms 
race and technological change. In particular the Battle of Jutland features, being the 
long awaited decisive fleet action, left the perceptions that the Navy¶V SHUIRUPDQFH
there was not an unqualified success.  The Grand Fleet, stationed in northern waters, 
was perceived in the public mind as µthe blockading force¶ rather than a fleet in being 
giving support to the Tenth Cruiser Squadron, if it should be needed.  Post war the 
public came to believe that solely DVDUHVXOWRIWKH1DY\¶Vblockading squadrons the 
German population reached the point of starvation and surrendered.      
 
                                                                                                                                             
Rear-Admiral for the West Coast of Scotland and the Hebrides. On 28th February1916, he was offered and accepted 
command of the 10th Cruiser Squadron in succession to Sir Dudley de Chair. Tupper considered this appointment 
the most important of his career.  Tupper, R.  Reminiscences 
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 PRVWZDUOLWHUDWXUHVORZO\UHYHDOHGWKH6TXDGURQ¶VZRUNDQGWKHEORFNDGHin its wider 
sense, which continues to inspire academic study in 2012. The literature has been 
grouped by topic but there is inevitably a degree of crossover in some cases. 
 
Strategic, Tactical and Planning      
CRUEHWWDQG1HZEROW¶Vtwo part Official History of the War: Naval Operations did not 
appear until 1923 and 1931 respectively.26 Dealing with all naval operations in the 
widest sense, it is unsurprising there is only a brief mention of the Tenth Cruiser 
Squadron and focussed on the action between Alcantara and Greif; the fortitude of the 
merchant seafarers involved is praised.  Likewise MarGHU¶V  ILYHYROXPHZRUN From 
Dreadnought to Scapa Flow DQG+DOSHUQ¶V  A Naval History of World War 1 both deal 
with the wide ranging naval activity and so are only able to give limited space to the 
Tenth Cruiser Squadron.27    
 
 In 1920 the three volume publication, Seaborne Trade, was written by C.Ernest 
Fayle.28 This was intended to show how seaborne trade was affected by naval 
operations, complementing the work of Corbet.  Fayle gives a very detailed account of 
shipping operations for each area of the world, listing the effects on ship owners, their 
trade and particular vessel type. Fayle also examines WKHHIIHFWVRQ%ULWDLQ¶V allies as 
well as German\¶V shipping.  The work is split further into two main periods. First 
µ7KH&UXLVHU3HULRG¶ZKHQ*HUPDQ\PDGe use of its warships and converted liners as 
VXUIDFHFRPPHUFHUDLGHUVIROORZHGE\µ7KH6XEPDULQH3HULRG¶ZKHQ*HUPDQ\PDGH
full use of the U-boats for commerce raiding.  Fayle was the first author to explain that 
the pHUFHLYHGµEORFNDGH¶VKRXOGEH more accurately defined as µHFRQRPLFZDUIDUH¶,WV
intention was to disrupt trade in the fullest sense, seeking to deprive the enemy of 
essential materials, eliminate ships to prevent transportation of goods, disrupt the 
payments and exchange systems as well as bank credit. Germany embarked on 
commerce raiding throughout the war, however, her ability to import food and 
materials had been thwarted by much of her merchant fleet being interned. Instead she 
was forced to rely on neutral shipping where possible. To help thwart this approach, 
%ULWDLQ¶V blockade relied on the Tenth Cruiser Squadron and the Downs Examination 
                                                 
26
 Corbett, J.S. and Newbolt, H.,  Official History of the War: Naval Opertaions 5  Vols. (London, 1923 and 1931) 
27
  Marder A.J., From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow (London,1961) Vols. 1-5 
     Halpern, P.G., A Naval History of World War 1 (London, 1994) 
28
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Service at sea to support WKH :KLWHKDOO OHJDO DQG GLSORPDWLF FRQWURO RI *HUPDQ\¶V 
imports.  Extensive appendices provide a welter of economic data. For the purpose of 
this thesis, VRPHXVHIXOILJXUHVRQWKH7HQWK&UXLVHU6TXDGURQ¶VDFWLYLWLHVDUHLQFOXGHG
in the )D\OH¶V text.    
 
The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation, by Avner Offer was published in 
1989 and as the title suggests brings the approach of an agricultural economist. A key 
explanation is given that both Britain and Germany were well developed countries and 
whilst each was able to produce some food for home consumption both had to rely on 
food and raw material imports.  Offer gives a wide ranging cover of the main food 
commodities from around the world and their importance to the survival of both sides. 
Britain and Germany both feared the effects of blockade and the potential for civil 
XQUHVW2IIHUDOVRWHQGVWRXVHWKHZRUGVµHFRQRPLFSURMHFW¶DVDQLQGLFDWRURIWKHWUXH
effects of a blockade. Modern Germany had a new dependence on imports whilst 
Britain had the larger merchant fleet to meet its own requirements.  Offer devotes a 
chapter to the work of nutritionists and dieticians, making reference to many surveys in 
Germany as to calories needed and calories actually consumed by German society. A 
degree of conflict exists between the surveys but WR WKH TXHVWLRQ µ'LG *HUPDQ\
6WDUYH"¶Offer gives the following answer: 
µ7KH *HUPDQ SHRple were often cold and hungry. But,whatever their complaints,     
*HUPDQ\GLGQRWVWDUYH¶29 
Much of the book is concerned with political and diplomatic issues as well as pre-war 
planning. 
Note must be made of the work of Professor Niall Ferguson in his book The Pity of 
War  1914-1918 first published in 1998. Known for his confrontational approach, he 
posed the question was Germany starved into defeat? His conclusion was: 
The idea is one of the most tenacious in modern European historiography. Yet it is 
almost certainly wrong. In aggregate terms, of course, the average German suffered  
more than the average Briton, for the simple reason that the real per capita income fell 
in Germany - by around 24 per cent - during the war, while in Britain it actually rose.30 
 
Ferguson then, echoes the conclusion from Offer but declares a different cause to 
2IIHU¶VGietetics and nutritional approach.  However, Fayle (a witness to the period) 
whilst also providing calorie counts, describes the more traditional view of the 
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  Offer, A.,  The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation (Oxford, 1991) 53 
30
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hardships suffered, especially on women and children, and the decline in health 
coupled with an increased death rate. 31  
 
1LFKRODV/DPEHUW¶V  Planning Armageddon: Economic Warfare and the First World 
War recounts the usual issues of close versus distant blockade.32   He points out that 
WKHUH KDG EHHQ H[WHQVLYH SODQQLQJ SULRU WR  DQG D µEORFNDGH¶ ZDV UHDG\ IRU
implementation. However, very quickly there was back tracking in the political spheres 
and tight measures were delayed.  Lambert, quite rightly, queries what was meant by 
WKHZRUGµEORFNDGH¶VLQFHLWPHDQWGLIIHUHQWWKLQJVWRGLIIHUHQWSOD\HUV+HDOVRUHFRUGV
that even the best works on World War 1 give only limited details of the Squadron. 
The work of Bell, mentioned below, is challenged and support is shown for the work 
and diligence of Captain Consett, our attaché in Stockholm, which was roundly set 
aside by the Foreign Office and politicians. This is a most detailed work which lays 
aside many long held beliefs about the true HIIHFWVRI µEORFNDGH¶ZKich in its fullest 
VHQVHLVPRUHSURSHUO\FDOOHGµHFRQRPLFZDUIDUH¶       
 
Two other recent books, devoted to research on planning and strategy, both of which 
came to be relevant to the Squadron.  Critics have argued that long term planning and 
staff work was given little or no attention by the Navy but the research work of these 
books overturn that viewpoint.    
 
The British Naval Staff in the First World War by Nicholas Black of Dulwich College 
has corrected the long held belief that only officers of limited ability (either 
intellectually or physically) were involved with naval staff work.33  The War Office 
had seen a General Staff established in 1904 after lessons learnt in the Boer War, so 
WKH 1DY\ ZDV D µODWH VWDUWHU¶  Black examines personnel records and reveals that 
officers of high calibre were steadily recruited to the naval staff as it grew from 
nothing to an effective organisation. By 1914 the naval staff was established but not 
without LQWHUIHUHQFHDORQJWKHZD\E\SROLWLFLDQVDQGVRPHµLQKRXVH¶ factions. Issues 
considered by the staff included convoy, economic blockade, the need for ships taken 
from trade and new technology such as radio.  Black records that significant reliance 
fell on officers co-opted for their special skills and given R.N.V.R commissions. The 
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Trade Division came to be almost the controlling lever which operated the Squadron 
from the outbreak of war.  Another revelation is that after Admiral de Chair was 
attached to the Foreign Office, he became more sympathetic to its view on how the 
blockade should be managed. This somewhat annulled the purpose of his transfer 
ZKLFKZDVDPRQJVWRWKHUWKLQJVWRFKDPSLRQWKH$GPLUDOW\¶VFDVH34           
 
'U 0DWWKHZ 6HOLJPDQQ¶V The Royal Navy and the German Threat 1901-1914 deals 
with the Admiralty plans to protect British Trade in a war against Germany. 35  For 
over twelve years the Admiralty had been deeply concerned at the prospect of a 
German guerre de course being conducted by surface raiders against British maritime 
commerce and it examined several policies to meet this threat.36  In addition to 
expanding its fleet of battleships, Germany started to arm some of its most modern and 
fastest passenger liners and selected cargo ships. It was one of the latter vessels which 
found itself in a surfDFH DFWLRQZLWK6TXDGURQ¶VAlcantara. Whilst the threat did not 
materialise to the extent feared, Seligmann reveals the full extent of expense in time 
and other resources committed by the Admiralty to prepare countermeasures. The 
works of Black and Seligmann provide  unique insights into pre-war planning 
activities not previously examined..  
 
Operational and Technological  
Earliest, in 1920, was ³7KH5R\DO0DLO´:DU%RRN commissioned  by the Royal Mail 
Steam Packet Company (RMSPC), gave prominent attention to the                                                                                                                                        
Tenth Cruiser Squadron in which seven RMSPC ships served.  In the same year the 
Peninsula and Oriental Steam Navigation Company (P&O) published its book 
Merchant Adventurers 1914-1918.  P&O had three vessels in the Squadron, but many 
of its larger vessels were employed as ocean escorts, transports and hospital ships. The 
books were intended to impress readers with the wartime contributions made by these 
well known British shipping companies. No doubt some copies became complimentary 
publicity material within the shipping world.  
 
Archibald +XUG¶VWKUHHYROXPHZRUNThe Merchant Navy had already been published 
in 1921, and this was considered the official history of the Merchant Service in the 
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war.37  ,Q +XUG¶VKLVWRU\ WKH 6TXDGURQ¶VZRUN LV JLYen prominent space with many 
details and charts; details of patrols and tactics are shown. Possibly official sources 
considered this work a more appropriate place to record the endeavours of the 
Squadron with predominantly merchant service crews.   
                                                                                                                      
Two key officially commissioned publications followed the First World War but were 
not immediately available to the public. The Naval Historical Branch delivered The 
Tenth Cruiser Squadron During The Command Of Admiral De Chair 1914-1916 in 
1921. 38  This monograph gives an accurate aFFRXQW RI WKH 6TXDGURQ¶V ZRUN ZKLOVW
XQGHU GH &KDLU¶V FRPPDQG $ VLPLODU PRQRJUDSK covering the period when Vice 
Admiral Tupper was in command was planned but never started.  Such omission may 
have spurred Tupper to give a post war lecture to the Royal United Services Institution 
(R.U.S.I.) and write his autobiography, Reminiscences. 39  7KH 7UDGH 'LYLVLRQ¶V A 
History Of The Blockade Of Germany And The Countries Associated With Her In The 
Great War, Austria, Bulgaria And Turkey 1914-1919 thought to be printed in 1920 it 
was a detailed SWDII5HYLHZVWLOOFODVVLILHGµconfidential¶ LQWKHODWH¶V 40   Written 
by Bell, it deals with the blockade from the Foreign Office viewpoint. It lists some 
details of µThe Blockade Squadron¶ and the µNaval Control Service¶ not found 
elsewhere. Also reviewed are the practicalities of blockade in a modern world where 
close blockade cannot be mounted. The publication is predominantly the view of the 
Foreign Office and the Board of Trade, departments which jointly saw the blockade as 
their responsibility.   Since much of the doctrine was revived on the outbreak of World 
War II, this may explain the reluctance to release its contents earlier.   
                                                                                                                                            
E. Keble Chatterton, a former Lieutenant R.N.V.R., was a prolific naval and maritime 
author during the inter-war years.   In 1932, his book The Big Blockade was 
published.41 It is a comprehensive volume devoted solely to the Squadron, covering its 
work and the politics affecting it. Chatterton claimed access to original documents but 
gave no references. He had the advantage of interviewing former Squadron personnel. 
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6RPH RI WKH SKRWRJUDSKV DUH GHILQLWHO\ WDNHQ IURP 7XSSHU¶V SULYDWH FROOHFWLRQ
Chatterton had the tone of D %R\¶V Own Paper story. However, with further 
understanding of the Squadron and a second reading he gives a good all round account 
of the Squadron, the politics and law at the time.  
 
In the inter-war years, SXEOLFDWLRQV VXFK DV $GPLUDO &RQVHWW¶V The Triumph of 
Unarmed Forces DQG/LHXWHQDQW*XLFKDUG¶VThe Naval Blockade appeared, concerned 
with the political, legal and economic aspects of the blockade but had no real mention 
of the Squadron. 42 The importance of Consett and Guichard is that their accounts are 
from two naval officers, although serving ashore, were involved in blockade issues.  
Their revelations about the blockade¶s limitations provided little comfort to those who 
had served at sea in the Squadron.  
 
3DUPHOHH¶VBlockade and Sea Power published in 1924 gives a good account of the 
political issues leading up to the point when United States of America joined the 
Allies.43  It leans towards the American viewpoint. So, by 1932 there had been a steady 
stream of writing about the Squadron for the public to read, making up for the lack of 
wartime publicity.  
 
Post World War II, the first author to return to the blockade subject was Marion Siney 
in 1957 with her work The Allied Blockade of Germany 1914-1916.44  It is confined to 
political and diplomatic issues and gives the only scant mention of the 10CS vessels.  Many 
official records had not been made available at the time and her work stops at 1916. The 
author A. Cecil Hampshire wrote The Blockaders published in 1980. 45 Hampshire 
RIWHQZURWHDERXWµCinderella VKLSV¶ and turned attention to armed merchant cruisers of 
both world wars. The part devoted to the Tenth Cruiser Squadron is interesting but 
without the depth of Chatterton. 
                                                                                                                                         
In 2003, the Navy Records Society published The Maritime Blockade of Germany in 
the Great War edited by J.D.Grainger.46  This provides an authoritative chronological 
                                                 
42
    Consett, M.W.W.P., The Triumph Of Unarmed Forces (1914-1918) (London, 1923) 
       Guichard, L., The  Naval Blockade 1914-1918  (New York,  1930)  
43
    Parmalee, M., Blockade and Seapower (London, 1924) 
44
    Siney, M.C., The Allied Blockade of Germany 1914-1916 (Ann Arbor, 1957) 
45
    Hampshire, A.C., The Blockaders  ( London, 1980) 
46
    Grainger, J.D.,  (Ed.) The Maritime Blockade of Germany in the Great War  Navy Records Society  
       (Aldershot, 2003) 
 
Introduction.                                                                                                  Chapter 1. 
            
 
 
  
18 
account of the Squadron¶VGDLO\EORFNDGHDFWLYLWLHVE\GUDZLQJKHDYLO\RQWKH5Hports 
of Proceedings by both de Chair and Tupper. These are found in the primary sources 
under the ADM 137 series, held at The National Archives (TNA). After a 
comprehensive introduction, each chapter has a summary for the period covered by the 
FKDSWHU¶VTNA extracts.  The book is enhanced by diary extracts from Able Seaman 
Style, a signalman aboard Alcantara and notes from Dr. Shaw , a Surgeon Lieutenant 
R.N.R., serving with the Squadron. It barely deals with the political and diplomatic 
aspects. 
 
%ULWDLQ¶s Economic Blockade of Germany 1914-1919 by Eric W. Osborne, published 
in 2004 provides the most comprehensive account of the blockade covering the legal, 
diplomatic and political matters.47  In this respect Osborne is most useful. Whilst the 
ships of the 1&6DUHPHQWLRQHGWKLVµnaval¶DVSHFWRIWKHblockade receives much less 
attention. Omissions from his bibliography are &RQVHWW¶V The Triumph Of Unarmed 
Forces  and  GH&KDLU¶Vautobiography The Sea Is Strong.48 
                                                                                                                                 
The recent publication from The World Ship Society by Messrs, Osborne, R., Spong, 
H., Grover, T., Armed Merchant Cruisers 1878 ± 1945 published 2007 provides a 
wealth of tHFKQLFDOGHWDLODERXW WKH6TXDGURQ¶VVKLSV and armed merchant cruisers in 
general. 49  Thus the years 2003 to 2012 have seen a valuable new supply of authorship 
on this subject. 
 
Social    
A key part of this thesis, not found in other blockade texts, is devoted to the 
experiences of the personnel in the Squadron. The autobiographies and a clutch of 
wartime diaries of both Flag Officers and others are important sources. They reveal the 
perceptions of two flag officers, one commanding officer, two experienced second in 
command officer  and three young midshipmen and others providing an excellent cross 
section; WKH\ UHYHDO WKH µRQ ERDUG¶ SURFHGXUHV WUDLQLQJ DV ZHOO DV HPSOR\PHQW DQG
man management approaches of the time. Off watch recreational activities and the 
tensions between RN, RNR and Mercantile Ratings, topics not covered in existing 
texts, which concentrate on the diplomatic and political issues of blockade. 
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$GPLUDO7XSSHU¶VDXWRELRJUDSK\Reminiscences was published in 1929 in which fifty 
four pages, as well as a chart and diagrams, give a detailed, firsthand account of 
controlling the Squadron: he also admitted that command of the Squadron was his 
most important career appointment.  $GPLUDO GH &KDLU¶V The Sea Is Strong was 
published in 1961 after his death in 1958.50  He had written his memoirs between 1931 
and 1947 but they were not to be published until after his death. Perhaps it was his 
experience of working closely with Churchill and his anger at the way Jellicoe was 
relieved of his post.  
 
Thus it is possible to compare the views and experiences of de Chair and Tupper.  
Their service careers had had much in common and both gave their total dedication to 
the Squadron, in the closing years of their naval careers.   
 
The next to be considered are the diaries. A privately published book entitled Tenth 
Cruiser Squadron Northern Patrol from the Diaries and Letters of Captain H.C.R.Brocklebank 
July 1914-August 1917 appeared in 1974.51 (GLWHGE\&DSWDLQ%URFNOHEDQN¶VGDXJKWHU, it is an 
important element in Squadron literature. Brocklebank was in continuous command of the 
Changuinola from her take up by the Admiralty to the Squadron¶VGLVSersal. The photographs 
VKRZ XVHIXO HYLGHQFH RI WKH VHDPDQVKLS LQYROYHG DQG %URFNOHEDQN¶V OHWWHUV WR FROOHDJXHV
reveal his own feelings about the Squadron and some of the promotions given to Squadron 
officers.  %URFNOHEDQN¶Vdiary along with others is in the Imperial War Museum (IWM). Of 
these, two are by officers serving as second in command, namely, John Shuter aboard  
H.M.S. Changuinola and Commander F.H.Grenfell RN aboard H.M.S. Cedric whose 
commanding officer was second in command of the Squadron.52  The museum also holds 
journals or diaries for the Midshipmen Poole and McKeag RNR, formerly apprentices in the 
Mercantile Marine.53  6FULPJHRXU¶V 6PDOO 6FULEEOLQJ 'LDU\ -1916 was reprinted in 
2008.54  Originally privately printed LQ WKH HDUO\ ¶V WKLV LV DQ DFFRXQW RI 0LGVKipman 
Alexander Scrimgeour R.N. who served aboard the Flagships Crescent and Alsatian under 
Admiral de Chair. This young man came from a very privileged background and his diary, 
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particularly the letters to his mother, tells as much about his social life, as it does about the 
Navy.    
 
The National Archives                                                                                                                                                                                 
The National Archives ADM 137 series provides a primary source covering the 
Historical Section Records used for the Official History of the First World War. It 
includes a wealth of topics having direct or associated relevance to the Tenth Cruiser 
Squadron such as the Squadron Orders, wireless telegraphy, Grand Fleet Secret Orders  
and Home Waters Telegrams.  SKLS¶VORJERRNVhave been claimed as the first drafts of 
history: it is fortunate then, that the navigational logs of the Squadron¶V DUPHG
merchant cruisers are intact at The National Archives and can be found in the ADM 53 
series.  The vessels taken up at the end of 1914 have thick hardback logs capable of 
KROGLQJSHUKDSVWZR\HDUV¶HQWULHV%\0DUFK1915 the Navy changed to using logs of  
PRQWK¶VGXUDWLRQLQFDUGEDFNHGIRUPDW(DFKFRPpleted month was to be sent to the 
Admiralty by first available means. The Clan MacNaughton was an early casualty 
when she foundered on February 3, 1915. No logs are held for her and her loss may 
have triggered the monthly submission of logbooks thereafter.  Many of the logbooks 
DUH PDUNHG DV ¶&ORVHG XQWLO ¶ ZKLFK LV SX]]ling. The National Archives do not 
record reasons why documents are closed, except for standard retention rules or 
specific dates ordered, often ordered, by the Government department releasing 
documents.  The logbooks hold the minutae of HDFK VKLS¶V GDLO\ URXWLQH DQG
navigation. They provide a salutary reminder of how often navigation was labour 
LQWHQVLYH DQG D PXFK OHVV FRQYHQLHQW VNLOO WR XVH FRPSDUHG ZLWK WRGD\¶V HOHFWURQLF                     
age. In addition to all the routine matters which are punctuated with unexpected events 
to provide a view of life aboard a Squadron ship.  
 
Since the Squadron was so dependent on commissioned merchant ships together with 
reliance on Naval Reservists in conjunction with Mercantile Ratings, there are many 
more National Archive sources that are relevant.  The less-often quoted MT 23 series, 
and BT 13 series covering the dates 1901 to 1918 (Transport Departments) and reveal 
how deeply the Registrar-General of Shipping and Seamen (RGSS), was involved with 
the R.N.R. and the armed merchant cruisers (AMCs). The ADM 1 series are of 
particular interest, revealing many documents dealing with the plans for the take up of 
armed merchant cruisers in the event of an emergency.  Considerable detail can be 
found as to wage rate negotiations, victualling, uniform allowances, and engineering 
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issues as well as correspondence with several shipping companies. The                     
R.N.V.R. and R.N.R. have many sources including the ADM 1 series in particular, but 
other references are also relevant to both reserves including the Treasury in the T  
series. The Newfoundland Royal Naval Reserve provided the skilled boat crews for the 
Squadron and it is referred to in the ADM 128 and ADM 171 series. The political and 
commercial aspects of the blockade have archive coverage in the FO 382 series 
(Foreign Office). This series includes the General Correspondence for the Foreign 
Office, Contraband Department and the Ministry of Blockade for the period 1915-
1920. 
 
National Maritime Museum, Greenwich 
The large RMSPC and P&O Collections held by the National Maritime Museum 
(NMM) are important.  From these, the reaction of the Company to the requisitioning 
of its ships can be gleaned, particularly the quarterly charter fees paid by H.M. 
GovernmHQW,QERWKFDVHVWKH'LUHFWRUV¶0LQXWHVthrow more light on the attitude of 
ship-owners, towards the strains on their commercial services when vessels were taken 
up. Both these Companies had always supported their officers joining the permanent 
R.N.R., and with the start of the war they would come to realise the full effect of that 
commitment. 
 
The Squadron¶VZRUN and personalities did not have the flamboyance associated with 
Admiral Beatty nor the visual appeal of battleships and battle cruisers.  It was boring, 
repetitive work, constantly beset with danger from the enemy and the sea. No doubt 
both de Chair and Tupper would have preferred posts with a greater opportunity for 
more spectacular contact with the enemy. However, they accepted their orders as 
professionals and each brought a different approach to the success of the Squadron¶V
work.  
 
Sir Eric Geddes, when First Lord of the Admiralty, is on record as saying: 
 
The blockade was exercised by a little-advertised power, the Tenth Cruiser  
Squadron. That  Squadron from 1914 to 1918 held the 800mile stretch of grey  
sea from the Orkneys to Iceland «««««,IDQ\WKLQJPRUHVWULNLQJO\  
             demonstrating the value of sea power can be given, I do not know of it. 55  
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At the end of 1914, the Navy turned to the challenge of converting passenger/cargo 
liners into armed merchant cruisers. Manned mainly with Naval Reservists and 
Mercantile Ratings, the early months of 1915 saw the Squadron replenished by twenty-
four ships taken up from trade.  It then set about its patrols with a new will and a 
sharper focus.   
------------ 
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Introduction. 
After the war started Parliament, the nation and the press developed strong and 
differing views on the rights and wrongs of the blockade as well as its conduct and 
effectiveness. The nation divided itself LQWR µGRYHV DQG KDZNV¶  This chapter will 
review the pertinent legal, political and diplomatic constraints which most affected the 
part the Navy and the Tenth Cruiser Squadron played in the blockade. 
 
The Squadron was tasked WRµvisit DQGVHDUFK¶ neutral shipping entering or leaving the 
North Sea via the North of Scotland.1   In the minds of those who were even aware of 
its existence, the Squadron was often perceived to be the total blockade effort against 
Germany and deployed the entire resources of the Fleet.  Aged only seventeen, 
Midshipman Scrimgeour¶V diary captured the circumstances accurately: 
 Monday 9th November, 1914. 
After reading the treatises and observations of several prominent civilian so-called 
experts in naval matters on the naval situation at the present, it seems to them to be an 
established fact, of which they are all so convinced, that our Fleet is conducting a close 
blockade of the Helgoland Bight and German North Sea coast. In fact, a blockade of 
the type which Nelson exercised before Toulon preceding the Trafalgar campaign. 
,WZRXOGVXUSULVHWKHPWRNQRZWKDWWKHEORFNDGHLVRI WKH³RSHQ´ W\SHDGYRFDWHGE\
/RUG+RZHRUHYHQPRUHVR/RUG+RZH¶VUHDVRQIRUIDYRXULQJWKLVW\SHZDVWKDWWKH
HIILFLHQF\RIKLVPDWHULDOPLJKWEHNHSWXS-HOOLFRH¶VUHDVRQLVWKDWLQIDFHRIhostile 
submarines to keep capital ships before Heligoland would be sheer folly.2  
 
In fact, LWRQO\SURYLGHGWKHµQRUWKHUQPDULWLPHFRQWULEXWLRQ¶WR Guichard¶VµHFRQRPLF
HQFLUFOHPHQW¶3 Rear-$GPLUDO GH &KDLU¶V Squadron was on station by 9 August 1914 
and on the same day it was complemented in the South by the examination 
arrangements in the Downs Anchorages under the control of the Downs Boarding 
Squadron. This monitored neutral shipping using the Dover Strait to enter or leave the 
North Sea.4  Together thHVHWZRHOHPHQWVIRUPHGWKHµmaritime aspect of the EORFNDGH¶ 
Placing routes to Germany and northern Europe were under observation. Later, a 
further examination anchorage was established in Weymouth Bay.5  
 
In Whitehall, the Foreign Office (FO), with assistance from the Admiralty and other 
government bodies, provided the third HOHPHQW RI WKH µEORFNDGH HIIRUW¶. In this way 
Britain, together with the French, set the rules and framework to operate an µHFRQRPLF¶
blockade.  The FO sought to control or influence the trade arrangements between 
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Germany and the neutral neighbours on its borders as well as its more distant trading 
partners such as America. National legislation, politics and international diplomacy 
were the weapons of these µ:KLWHKDOO:DUULRUV¶  
 
GeUPDQ\¶V1HHGIRU6HD7UDGH. 
In the two decades preceding the war, Germany was transformed from being a self-
supporting agricultural nation into an industrial economy needing to import raw 
materials. Germany¶V SRSXODWLRQ JUHZ to 70 million and increasingly relied on food 
imports. The raw materials Germany needed were: cotton, wool, copper, lead, rubber, 
paraffin, nickel, oils, fats, wheat, rye, barley and cattle.6   In 1913, German imports 
exceeded exports by £100,000,000 in respect of foodstuffs, and by £172,000,000 in 
respect of raw material for industry. The export of finished goods, which exceeded the 
imports by £248,000,000, more or less created equilibrium.7   
 
Germany needed fertilisers of which potash, phosphates and nitrates were essential. 
Deposits at Salzig supplied unlimited quantities of potash but 50% of the phosphate 
fertilisers came from the United States and North Africa whilst Chile supplied more 
than half German requirements for nitrates.  Turning to corn, Germany imported 1½ 
million tons of wheat from the United States because she had increased the cultivation 
of rye at home, for which her soil was better suited; at the same time she exported 2 
million tons of rye, thus her corn situation was reasonable. She consumed 6 million 
tons of barley but only produced 3 million tons; the balance came from Russia, together 
with one fifth of her fodder requirements. Finally, Germany produced an average of 40 
million tons of potatoes for her needs. A small quantity of meat was imported.  
 
Clearly, German\¶VLPSRUWRIUDZPDWHULDOVmeant sea trade was essential.  The United 
6WDWHV VXSSOLHG QHDUO\ DOO *HUPDQ\¶V FRWWRQ WKUHH ILIWKV RI KHU FRSSHU DQG WKUHH
quarters of her mineral oils.  Argentina supplied her with wool and hides, whilst British 
India was the source of textile plants and oleaginous grain. Also imported by sea were 
rubber, manganese, tin and all rare metals essential to industry. Sixty percent of her 
overseas commerce was carried under the German flag and remainder in foreign hulls. 8 
 To the east, Germany had land access to adjoining neutrals for imports; but in the west, 
the sea traffic had to be transhipped via the Baltic through Scandinavian countries or 
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Rotterdam in the Netherlands. Once the German flag was cleared by the internment, her 
incUHDVHGUHOLDQFHRQQHXWUDOVKLSSLQJPDGHµEORFNDGH¶DQDWWUDFWLYH weapon for Britain 
and France. The structure RI *HUPDQ\¶V RYHUVHDV trade needed to be analysed in 
relation to modern war. This took time to carry out which explains why the FO seemed 
to be µVKXIIOLQJ¶ LWHPV EHWZHHQ WKH absolute and conditional contraband lists in the 
early months.  
 
Rapid positioning of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron, meant the Admiralty had to some 
extent been better prepared than the FO.  From the outset, reports from intercepting 
Squadrons were sent to the Trade Division of the naval staff. This Division had been 
formed to watch the movements of British trade, and to recommend measures for its 
protection. Although not directly ordered to deal with contraband matters, the officers 
of the division assumed these tasks were part of their duties. Throughout the war all 
orders to boarding Squadrons were issued from Trade Division and thus by default, it 
spawned the Contraband Committee, explained below.9  
          
The Declaration of London, 1909 ± Further Background. 
The issue RI µFRQWUDEDQG of war¶ ZDV woven into the Declaration of London, 26th 
February 1909.     Under international law, neutral ships are permitted to trade freely 
with belligerents. They had to submit to visit and search, and could be brought before a 
prize court if they resisted search, carried contraband, rendered aid to the enemy or 
attempted to infringe the blockade.10  However, belligerents often defined the content 
of contraband lists by their own interests, depending on their sea power. Earlier, 
Emperor Nicholas II had called forty-four States to a conference in The Hague between 
15th June and 18th October 1907. The aim was to agree terms on the eight conventions 
concerning maritime war mentioned in Chapter One. The Declaration stemmed from a 
German proposal to institute an international prize court to look after the interests of 
neutrals in wartime.11  
 
The Declaration had been the latest in a series of meetings, conferences and agreements 
stretching back half a century. It sought to establish a set of workable rules for the 
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conduct of war and remove the anomalies, contradictions and confusion which had 
surrounded blockade and contraband.  
       It was necessarily a compromise between conflicting opinions, principles, and politics of  
       the governments and countries represented. It was inspired by a desire to safeguard 
       the respective rights of neutrals and belligerents in time of war.12     
 
It was considered the most authoritative statement in international law affecting 
blockade to date. After signing there followed strong political debate in Britain on 
some of its proposals. This culminated in the House of Lords throwing out part of the 
Declaration in December 1911.  Thus the failure of Britain to ratify the Declaration left 
it as dead.13  In the same year the Admiralty was debating the practicalities of a close or 
distant blockade of Germany.14  Meanwhile the Foreign Secretary remained committed 
to support neutral rights in contrast to the House of Lords seeking to retain belligerent 
rights considered crucial to Britain. Even though blockade was discussed and naval 
research carried out pre-war, a lack of coordination meant when war was declared, 
Britain was not ready to conduct the blockade with the vigour which many believed 
was needed.  Not only was the wrong type of vessel allocated in the first months of the 
Northern Patrol but the FO clearly had little understanding of the extent of the 
bureaucracy and staff  finally needed to control an economic blockade from Whitehall 
desks.  Bell recorded in his history: 
 From the outset, therefore, it was evident to everyone concerned, that our rights 
of interception would be more exercised from Whitehall than at sea; that the   
fleet would be little but constables and controllers of neutral traffic, and that it 
would rest with the central authorities to ascertain those facts about cargoes and 
their consignees, which would determine what rights of detention we could 
legally exercise. 15 
 
This view was less evident to those in the Fleet and ashore whose perceptions of 
blockade sprang from earlier centuries. As stated earlier, the initiative for Whitehall 
FRQWURO FDPH IURP WKH $GPLUDOW\¶V 7UDGH 'LYLVLRQ LQ IRUPLQJ WKH QXFOHXV RI D
contraband committee. This consisted of a Mr. Leverton Harris, a volunteer in the 
$GPLUDOW\¶V VHUYLFH &DSWDLQ /RQJGHQ ± of the Trade Division and Mr.Flint, an 
$GPLUDOW\ FLYLO VHUYDQW 7KHVH PHPEHUV PHW µDV RFFDVLRQ UHTXLUHG¶ LQ WKH 2OG
Admiralty Building. They scrutinised the reports of detentions from the Downs and 
Kirkwall.  They soon realised the guidance of the FO would be necessary and asked a 
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member of it to attend their meetings. Together they formed a committee which 
became known as the Contraband Committee.  When the blockade expanded, the 
µUHTXLUHGRFFDVLRQV¶ became daily and often for ten or twelve hours a day.  Thus the 
Contraband Committee sought to combine the expertise of the Admiralty and the 
)RUHLJQ2IILFHWRIRUPWKHµH[HFXWLYHFRUH¶ZKLFKVXEPLWWHGPDWWHUVWRWKH3UL]H&RXUW 
for adjudication.    
 
Blockade and Contraband. 16 
The subjects of blockade and contraband were at the heart of the Declaration of 
London.  A maritime blockade to stop entry or exit to an enemy port or coast, serves to 
prevent both the import and export of supplies by sea. The blockade must be real and 
effective and not just a paper declaration that in a certain area, vessels may be subject 
to interception. This meant a concentration of warships in a specified area known as a 
µFORVH¶EORFNDGHBritain had decided on a blockade of Germany as part its sea power, 
but to effect a legal blockade required control over the German Baltic coast which was 
only briefly attempted with submarines. What was instituted ZDV*XLFKDUG¶VµHFRQRPLF
HQFLUFOHPHQW¶ D GHILQLtion which took account of *HUPDQ\¶V QHLJKERXUV LQ DOO
directions as potential sources for supplies.17  Blockade became a convenient term used 
by Britain, her Allies and neutral critics. An effective blockade would have meant a 
transit through the neutral waters between Sweden and Denmark to reach the German 
Baltic Coast. Therefore, the total prevention of trade between Germany and Sweden, 
Denmark and Norway did not take place.18 The port of Rotterdam in the Netherlands 
was another corridor for Germany to the wider world.  Reliance was placed on neutral  
ships, prepared to carry her imports and hopefully, exports, to pay for the essential 
imports. Given enough vessels to intercept neutrals passing north of Scotland or 
through the Dover Straits, controlling cargoes, should have been straight forward. The 
reality was not so simple. Britain initially sought to observe the rules proposed in the 
Declaration of London, 1909 and take DFFRXQWRIµQHXWUDO¶ rights. This had set down the 
rules for the conduct of blockades and the classifyinJRIJRRGVDVHLWKHUµ$EVROXWH¶ or 
µ&RQGLWLRQDO¶ contraband or placed on a µ)UHH¶ list.  
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The two arms of Government mainly responsible for the daily work of the blockade 
were the FO and the Royal Navy. The blockade could be compared to a telescope with 
the FO looking through the eyepiece and getting a fuller, longer, more strategic view. 
7KH)2LQDGGLWLRQWRSXUVXLQJ%ULWDLQ¶VZDUDLPVKDGWRDYRLGoffence to neutrals on 
which Britain, as well as Germany, depended for supplies and support; not the least of 
such neutrals was the United States of America. (USA)  The Navy seemed to be 
looking backwards through the WHOHVFRSH¶V object lens and getting a shrunken. This 
focussed on the historical perception of interception and seizure of vessels.  However, 
Britain, like other colonial powers, was already enmeshed in an economy dependent on 
Empire trade plus goods and services from neutral countries. The foundations of 
globalisation had developed rapidly in the previous century and a world war affected 
not only the military forces but also the civilian workforces of both belligerents and 
neutrals alike.  
 
On 6 August, 1914 the United States proposed to belligerent governments the 
Declaration of London be adopted as the legal code for the blockade. Germany and 
Austria agreed but Britain refused. The American Government withdrew its suggestion 
and the opportunity to base blockade operations on the best code available was lost. 
This dominated the relationship between Britain and the USA. Significantly, the USA 
was the only nation to ratify the Declaration of London.  On 20 August, 1914 Britain 
issued an Order in Council establishing its own list of absolute and conditional 
contraband which was much more extensive than those in the Declaration.  
Subsequently, %ULWDLQ H[WHQGHG WKH GRFWULQH RI µFRQWLQXRXV YR\DJH¶ WR FRQGLWLRQDO
contraband contrary to Article 35 of the Declaration.  Since Britain had not ratified the 
Declaration she adopted a selective strategy to allow flexibility in her approach to the 
neutrals¶ reactions. 19 
 
Foreign Office Arrangements. 
On 2 November 1914, the Admiralty declared the North Sea as a war zone in response 
WR*HUPDQ\¶VPLQHOD\LQJDFWLYLWLHV. This was a month before De Chair transferred his  
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flag on 4 December 1914 to await the Edgar replacements.20  Whilst the Squadron 
personnel had been getting to grips with their part in the blockade, changes and 
GHYHORSPHQWVZHUHSURJUHVVHGLQ:KLWHKDOO¶VDGPLQLVWUDWLYHDUUDQJHPHQWVThe Allied 
intention was to prevent contraband goods reaching Germany whilst allowing other 
trade to continue normally. Reliance was placed on the periodic issue of Orders in 
Council and negotiations with foreign governmental organisations or national trade 
bodies willing to guarantee cargoes consigned to their country would not be  
transhipped to Germany. For the FO the blockade became a welter of committees, 
complex legal discussions, administration of export/import licenses and the collection 
of trade intelligence which was buttressed by the available sea power.  Controlling 
commerce in Britain and abroad was at the core RI WKH EORFNDGH ZLWK WKH µPDULWLPH
HOHPHQWV¶SURYLGLQJYLWDOconstabulary checkpoints. Events bred more committees, each 
providing a service considered necessary but not necessarily communicating well with 
each other.  
 
By the 15 August 1914, the War Trade Committee was formed with representatives 
from the Board of Trade (BoT), FO and the Admiralty. It was to co-ordinate the work 
of all ministries which were concerned in the block. On the 22 September 1914, Lord 
Crewe was appointed Chairman of the War Trade Advisory Committee, this was a 
consultative organisation intended to act as a clearing house for information of all kinds 
relating to the blockade.21    In the same month an Export Licensing Committee was 
appointed and further committees and sub committees to look after specific aspects. 
One of the most contentious tasks was the maintenance of secret Black Lists.   The 
Foreign Trade Department, as part of the FO, had control of the Statutory Black List 
and directed banks as to the granting of credits and exchange rates.22  The Statutory 
Black List, first issued on 29 February 1916, gave the names of firms known to 
working for the enemy. It was issued to commanding officers of blockading ships to 
enable tKHPGHFLGHPRUHUHDGLO\ZKHQDFDUJRVKRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGµVXVSHFW¶23  The 
War Trade Department had control of the General Black List. This was in classes A 
and B.  Individuals and firms in Class A were denied all facilities for shipments, 
cabling and correspondence and were regarded as enemies as far as trading was 
concerned.  Class B individuals and firms were under Government surveillance and 
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were usually denied facilities for shipments, cables and correspondence.  Parmelee 
records individuals and firms were unaware of their presence on the secret lists to 
ensure they continued to attempt to trade rather than push them into offering 
cooperation and help to Germany.24  The War Trade Statistical Department published 
a detailed µ6HFUHW 0RQWKO\ 5HSRUW¶ HQWLWOHG µ6WDWLVWLFV RI ,PSRUWV into Scandinavia, 
including Iceland, the Faeroe ,VODQGV DQG WKH 1HWKHUODQGV¶  7KH ILJXUHV ZHUH WDNHQ
PDLQO\IURPFRSLHVRIVKLS¶VPDQLIHVWVDQGRWKHUVKLSSLQJGRFXPHQWV25 It can be seen 
operatLQJ D PRGHUQ µEORFNDGH¶ IURP D :KLWHKDll centre was much more than 
intercepting, boarding and sending neutral vessels in for examination.  It required 
meticulous record keeping on large card indexes supported by complex cross 
referencing.  The various committees and departments collected information 
concerning the dealings of merchants thought to have German interests as well as 
records of cargoes referred to the Contraband Committee and also financial 
transactions and bank credits of those firms suspected of German sympathies. Each 
item in itself created suspicions, any one of which could trigger an order for a neutral 
vessel being intercepted by the Squadron. 
 
Although 21 October, 1914 was the first formal meeting of the Contraband 
Committee it did not start a Minute Book until November, 1914, when meetings 
started  daily.26  Department examined all contraband referred to it, from all parts of the 
world, for a decision to release or presentation to the Prize Court for adjudication. 
Britain continued to add to the contraband lists in a spate of Proclamations and Orders 
in Council commencing 21 September followed on 29 October 1914,   23 December 
1914, 11 March and 27 May 1915. For example on 29 October 1914, iron, copper, lead, 
and rubber were declared contraband. On 11 March 1915, wool, hides, skins and 
leather were added.  In August 1915, cotton was declared contraband. Many of these 
items were on the free list in the Declaration of London.27  This protracted stiffening of 
the FO¶VYLHZRIWKHEORFkade resulted from the initial reluctance of Sir Edward Grey 
WRVWUD\IURPWKH'HFODUDWLRQ¶VGHILQLWLRQRIFRQWUDEDQGLWHPV7KHODZ\HU+Reason 
Pyke, made the point it is impossible to compile a list of contraband articles valid for 
all times when he stated: 
 It has accordingly been the invariable practice from the inception of the law of  
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 contraband for maritime nations to exercise their discretion, subject to such 
 restrictions as may attach either by treaty or under the customary law of nations, 
with regard to the objects to be treated as contraband, and to include in that category all 
articles and commodities which, from the changing phases of the war, or from novel 
modes of conducting war, may be capable of rendering material support to the naval or 
military power of the enemy.28      
 
Pyke recorded  in 1866 Spain, declared that a belligerent has the right to declare new 
articles to be contraband of war when, from the circumstances of the war they become 
on the part of the enemy elements for undertaking and carrying on hostilities. Similarly, 
in correspondence with Chile in 1885, the United States acknowledged that with the 
lapse of time, the just rights of belligerents may require additions to the articles 
previously regarded as contraband of war.29   Pyke shows during this period the 
German and Austro-Hungarian Governments also started on the premise of the 
Declaration of London but also created many amendments.  
 
By 18 April 1915, the German Government issued a new Contraband Order in 
retaliation to the British Orders. Their lists of absolute and conditional contraband did 
not differ materially from the British lists of 23 December 1914 and as amended on 11 
March 1915. However, coal and coke were made absolute instead of conditional 
contraband, while motor tyres, which were absolute on the British lists, were 
conditional in Germany, as was wool.  The German Order, unlike the British, had a 
µIUHH¶OLVWZKLFKLQFOXGHGUDZFRWWRQDQGH[FHSWIRUPHWDOOLFRUHVUXEEHURLOVHHGVDQG
nuts was practically the same as that given in Article 28 of the Declaration of London.30 
 Although there were similarities by both belligerents, differences no doubt reflected 
the perceived strategic needs of each side.  
 
The First German Declaration of Submarine War.  
On the 4th February 1915 the German Government sent a memorandum to all neutral 
powers warning of reprisals in response WR WKH (QWHQWH¶V VWRSSDJH RI maritime trade 
between neutrals and the Central Empires. A German objection was the British 
proclamation of a war zone covering the North Sea was effectively an irregular 
blockade of neutral coasts which was forbidden by international law. The declaration 
warned from the 18th February 1915 onwards any hostile merchant ships encountered in 
British or Irish waters, including the Channel, would be destroyed without regard for 
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crews or passengers. Although the construction of a submarine did not allow the taking 
of survivors, Germany felt no conscience over this approach. Neutral ships were also at 
risk in these waters since hostile merchant ships had previously used the ruse of 
hoisting neutral colours and mistakes could not be avoided.31 
 
:RUOGSRZHUVZHUHDVWRQLVKHGDW*HUPDQ\¶VGHFODUDWLRQ7KH8QLWHG6WDWHVDWWHPSWHG
without success, to intervene between the belligerents: it was requested that the Entente 
allowed foodstuffs to pass to the Central Powers provided they were consigned to 
neutral agencies, able to guarantee distribution would only be to non-combatants. In 
return Germany was requested not to use submarines against merchant shipping as she 
had threatened.  GermDQ\¶V UHSO\ ZDV HYDVLYH DQG gave no promise of restraint but 
instead put her threats into effect.  This was the spur for Britain to introduce the terms 
of the Order in Council referred to earlier dated 11 March 1915, sometimes known as 
WKHµ5HSULVDOV2UGHU¶.  Prior to this date Britain and France had confined their actions to 
contraband but in the future they were free to bring into their ports any goods the 
destination, ownership or origin of which was presumed or merely suspected of being 
hostile.  The result was all direct trade between Germany and the powers overseas was 
blocked.32   This retaliatory Order in Council was the trigger for a further spate of 
diplomatic exchanges, of which the Squadron probably knew little.  
     
Reaction in the Navy. 
From August to November 1914 the Northern Patrol had been in the hands of the 
Edgars alone. Commodore Goodenough writing aboard Southampton whilst in 
command of the First Light Cruiser Squadron made the clear case for a more rigorous 
DSSURDFK WRZKDWKH WHUPHG µD OLPLWHGEORFNDGH¶33  He records weather and possible 
submarine attack, in addition to other duties, prevented every merchant ship wearing 
neutral flags being physically visited. He further admits due to limited resources many 
other ships must have passed unseen. The benevolent British attitude to the blockade 
allowed a flourishing trade to the Skaggerrak and hence to Scandinavia and Germany. 
Goodenough also expressed the view destroyers were too valuable as warships to be 
risked for boarding duties against neutrals. This point was confirmed in a separate 
paper by an unknown author, possibly Jellicoe.34   
                                                 
31
 Guichard, The Naval Blockade  40-41 
32
 Guichard, The Naval Blockade  41-42 
33
  TNA  ADM 137/1915  Goodenough to C-in-C Home Fleet  11 October  1914  271-2 
34
  TNA  ADM 137/1936  Employment Of Destroyers In War   1913 125-126 
Blockade: Whitehall and Westminster Perspectives                                   Chapter 2 
 
33 
 
The µpost manoeuvres¶ review in 1913 of the War Plans revealed the paucity of ships 
available for the Northern Patrol to provide the following cover : 
 The Pentland Firth also the Channel between Orkneys and Shetlands and the    
             area between the North of Shetlands and the coast of Norway  (62ºN).  
 
The ships of the 10th and 11th Cruiser Squadrons (totalling at the outside twelve ships) 
were allocated, but the point was at any one time, a quarter of the number would be 
away coaling or steaming to or from the patrol grounds.35  This meant the practical 
difficulties of Commodore Goodenough in the early war patrols had already been 
recognised but no evidence of further planning demonstrated.  *RRGHQRXJK¶V ILQDO
recommendations harked back 100 years and sought to have a more rigorous blockade 
with a northern and southern port, as checkpoints to obtain clearance to proceed.36  
Failure to observe these was treated as un-neutral service and the full force available to 
a belligerent was to be used to ensure conformity.  Vice-Admiral David Beatty, aboard 
H.M.S. Lion, wrote to Jellicoe on 1 October 1914 with similar recommendations to grip 
the blockade since he had observed significant neutral traffic heading towards the 
Kattegat. Petrol and foodstuffs was getting through to Germany and a tougher approach 
would be needed. Even in the North Sea, the shortening days and approaching winter 
weather was not conducive to boarding and effective searching could only be done in 
sheltered water.37 From the outset, Jellicoe had had some misgivings about the value of 
the blockade and the cost of the naval resources being employed. Supported by the 
recommendations from Beatty and Goodenough on the 13 November 1914 he made a 
stark submission to the Admiralty.  
SECRET 
COPIES OF TELGRAMS 
            )URP«««7KH&RPPDQGHU-in-Chief, Home Fleets. 
            7R««««$'0,5$/7<'DWH«th 1RYHPEHUµ&¶ 
55. Since 5th October, 25 merchant ships have been detained and sent into Kirkwall. One of these sailed from South 
America with contraband for Germany before war was declared and has been permanently detained.   One for 
Bergen was ordered to discharge rubber portion of cargo before proceeding with remaining  cargo of foodstuffs.   
Remainder were bound for Baltic and Dutch ports and were allowed to proceed with complete cargoes which 
included 1 ship with copper, 11 with grain and foodstuffs, 5 with petroleum, 1with magnetic ore,  I with sulphur,  1 
with coal and 2 with general cargoes. The 25 ships do not include vessels sent into other northern ports.   
 
The Squadrons now employed on this patrol work are much required for other duties, and it seems doubtful whether 
it is desirable to continue incurring the risks, wear and tear entailed in boarding ships if all ships boarded are 
subsequently released,  unless any real benefit is derived from the temporary detention of these vessels.    The 
captains  of several of the ships stated that the cargoes were known to be going to Germany. 
 
Submitted whether the present practice of boarding should continue or not. 
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REPLY 
            )URP«««$'0,5$/7<'DWH«th 1RYHPEHUµ'¶ 
            7R««««7KH&RPPDQGHU-in-Chief, Home Fleets. 
282. Your 55. Unfortunately great legal difficulties exist dealing with neutral ships from neutral ports carrying 
cargoes to neutral owners.  The ultimate arbiter is the Prize Court and in many cases you mention, such as food, we 
have been advised we had no case and would be liable to heavy damages, besides greatly irritating neutral 
governments.  With the copper and petroleum ships satisfactory guarantees were obtained in every case that the 
cargoes were for neutral consumption and would not be re-exported. Such guarantees could not have been obtained 
except by means of your action of bringing in ships. As Germany is an exporter of coal, the import of this article into 
neutral countries helps to cripple German coal export.  Magnetic ore, see Admiralty signal 61 of 25th October . 
Sulphur referred to was understood to be making wood pulp. 
          Your action in arresting these ships has already produced most valuable results, viz.- 
                    1. Ship owners are avoiding carrying cargo 
                    2. Underwriters will not insure except at extreme premiums. 
                    3. Guarantee has been forced has been forced from neutral Powers, who are now 
                        prohibiting export of many objectionable articles. 
           All this pressure on German trade is direct consequence of the delay, anxiety and extreme inconvenience 
involved to neutrals by the Fleet interference.  
                                                       ------------------------------- 
R.F. 0019 
The VICE ADMIRAL COMMANDING 
            ORKNEYS AND SHETLANDS. 
           Forwarded for your information with reference to your communication No.30 of 10th instant 
Forwarding a list of vessels sent in to Kirkwall. 
 
17th November 1914. 
.Jellicoe to Admiralty and Reply.38 
 
-HOOLFRH¶VWHOHJUDPDQGWKH$GPLUDOW\¶VUHSO\HQFDSVXODWHERWKYLHZVRIWKHµEORFNDGH¶ 
The Commander-in±Chief had given vent to his frustrations and the futility of the 
operation with the few ships available.  In reply, KDG FRPH D µZHOO GRQH¶ IURP Whe 
Admiralty reassuring him WKH 1RUWKHUQ 3DWURO¶V µYLVLW DQG VHDUFK¶ DFWLYLWLHV ZHUH a 
valuable deterrent to the neutral ship-owners. A clear morale booster no doubt sent with 
FO approval. The first gale of the winter brought the matter to a head and when the 
Edgars had to be decommissioned, WKHµEORFNDGH¶E\WKH1RUWKHUQ3DWUROZDVYLUWXDOO\
non-existent until the armed merchant cruisers started to become available from mid 
December1914.39   
 
The Orders in Council of March 1 and May 1915 meant the British Government had, at 
last, reached a degree of finality on the contraband lists. It was  fortuitous the FO 
deliberations of the months since the war started, occurred when the Squadron was at 
its weakest with only Edgars, followed by WKHQHHG WR µZRUNXS¶ WKH URXWines for the 
armed merchant cruisers.  It confirmed Britain had been a long way from being ready 
for the practical needs and implications of a distant blockade. Below flag officer level, 
commanding officers and boarding officers must have found the flow of contraband list  
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changes by the FO frustrating.  Captured ships, sent in to Kirkwall¶ seemed to be 
repeatedly ordered for release. This demoralised boarding boat crews who felt let down 
after risking life and limb with repeated boardings.  For many afloat in the Squadron, 
HYHQWKRXJKWKH\DFFHSWHGWKHEORFNDGH¶VLPSRUWDQFHWRWKH*RYHUQPHQWLQWHUFHSWLQJ
neutral shipsERDUGLQJLQVSHFWLQJDQGWKHQSHUKDSVµWDNLQJLQ¶WRDQH[DPLQDWLon port 
did not seem UHDOµZDUZRUN¶ RUµFRQWDFWZLWKWKHHQHP\¶. This view was often noted by 
commanding and senior RN officers in the Squadron.  Although the Naval Prize 
Manual had been rewritten in 1913-14 it was still a very detailed text.40 There was a 
need for a true pocket guide for boarding officers.  *LHYH¶V, the naval tailors, met the 
demand with a concise SRFNHW JXLGH HQWLWOHG µ&RQWUDEDQG RI :DU¶41 The author 
stressed the importance to the Naval Officer of understanding the Declaration of 
London with the following bidding: 
 
 «although it is to be presumed that the Government will in all ordinary cases assume   
             responsibility for the actions of their servants, it must be understood that the personal    
             responsibility for wrongful application of these laws rest with the Naval Officer; for in  
             misapplying them he renders a dis-service to the State by exposing her to diplomatic      
             remonstrance and heavy pecuniary loss. In other cases a want of  knowledge of these  
             laws may lead to indirect service being rendered to the enemy.42       
 
This should have left little doubt for the active service naval mind, as to the importance 
of the  µYLVLWDQGVHDUFK¶URXWLQH work, even though less exciting than the prospect of 
any direct North Sea contact with the enemy.  
 
Being in Operational Command of the Squadron, Jellicoe continued to amass statistics 
showing the number of ships intercepted when bound both east and west through the 
patrol lines. These were garnered from Squadron reports all of which convinced him 
contraband was getting through to Sweden and potentially Germany. Lack of feedback 
as to whether a captured vessel was subsequently released compounded the frustration. 
He had only to read The Times and note IURP WKH PDQ\ µEORFNDGH¶ DUWLFOHV and 
editorials to know veU\ VWURQJ YLHZV ZHUH KHOG DERXW ZKHWKHU WKH µEORFNDGH¶ ZDV
having an effect. These dispiriting articles did nothing for the Squadron¶VPRUDOH, so 
Jellicoe felt it important to keep up his pressure on the FO by repeatedly raising the 
issue through Admiralty channels.    
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-HOOLFRH¶V6WDII5HVHDUFK.      
The Commander-in-Chief had another card to play in this game of correspondence 
shuttlecock.  -HOOLFRH¶s Secret Pack reveals on the 1st September 1915, he wrote to The 
Secretary of the Admiralty enclosing a research paper proposing further measures for 
the blockade.43  He submitted a paper written by one of his staff aboard H.M.S. Iron 
Duke, namely, Lieutenant E. Hilton Young, M.P., RNVR,  of whom Jellicoe wrote: 
 µ«KDVEHHQRIJUHDWDVVLVWDQFHWRPHLQGHDOLng with the statistical side 
 of the contraband trade. He writes with knowledge and authority on the  
 subject, and is well acquainted with the work of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron.¶ 
 
Hilton Young was a good example of the personalities and hidden experience which 
could be found in the R.N.V.R..  Unlike officers in the R.N.R., whose life experience 
was confined to their normal seafaring occupation, the R.N.V.R. often garnered men 
with experience in other professions and walks of life which fitted then for demanding 
intellectual workloads.  Hilton Young was such a man. After Eton, he studied at 
University College, London and Trinity College, Cambridge where he took the Natural 
Sciences tripos. Called to the Bar in 1904, he SUDFWLVHGLQ WKH.LQJ¶V%HQFK'LYLVLRQ 
and the Oxford Circuit.  When illness forced him to abandon a legal career he turned to 
journalism and politics. He became an assistant editor on the Economist  and later 
financial editor of the Morning Post (1910-1914).44  He was not a peacetime Reserve 
officer but in August 1914, was commissioned as a lieutenant R.N.V.R..  Jellicoe had 
FKRVHQ ZHOO DQG +LOWRQ<RXQJ ZDV VHW WR ZRUN RQ WKH LGHD RI µUDWLRQLQJ¶ LPSRUWV WR
neutral countries, a concept which would become well known in the blockade.  Aged 
36 and given his background, the tasked of an original research paper for the 
Commander-in-Chief would not have been daunting. In 1915, Hilton Young started his 
first term of office as Member of Parliament for Norwich, a position which probably 
gave him the right of direct access to Government Departments.45  
 
+LOWRQ<RXQJ¶VSDSHU IRFXVVHGRQ WKHQHHG WRKDYHD µVLPSOHDQGFHUWDLQ¶PHWKRG WR
decide whether or not a particular consignment of goods for Germany¶V QHXWUDO
neighbours H[FHHGHG LWV µXVXDO FRQVXPSWLRQ¶ZKLch would be counted as its µration¶. 
He proposed exporting neutrals and importing neutrals be induced to inform Britain of 
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shipments of commodities needed by the enemy,  to countries contiguous to Germany 
and the relation such shipments bore to the µnormal consumption¶ by that country.  
Shipments notified should be allowed to pass, XSWRWKHµQRUPDOUDWLRQ¶, and those not 
notified be liable to detention.  Jellicoe gave the paper his strong backing, making the 
point again that the level of our sea power beinJXVHGZDVFDXVLQJ*HUPDQ\EXWµVOLJKW
LQFRQYHQLHQFH¶ +H ZDQWHG DOO RWKHU Fonsiderations set aside and every opportunity 
taken to crush Germany both economically and by force of arms.  Jellicoe then, was 
RQHRIWKHµKDZNV¶ 
  
In his paper Hilton Young argued too many ships were released after capture. Only 
fifteen percent of those intercepted were detained and of these only a small part of the 
cargo was placed in the Prize Court. His source was the Squadron¶VRZQUHFRUGVDQG
DOVRWKH&RQWUDEDQG&RPPLWWHH¶V minutes to which he had access.  He recognised that 
the neutral exporters, especially the United States, would be reluctant to control exports 
and undertake the difficult task of refusing one exporter whilst allowing a competitor to 
trade.  In fact, such discrimination to the advantage of Britain and the disadvantage of 
Germany, could lay the United States open to a charge of acting in an un-neutral 
manner. He also saw difficulties in leaving the control of imports in the hands of the 
contiguous neutrals since these could be falsified and the excess imports still find their 
way to Germany.  Despite the agreements made with organisations like the Netherlands 
Overseas Trust and certain continental shipping companies, it was well known abuse of 
the agreements took place.  Instead, Hilton Young proposed cooperation be sought 
from µexporting¶ neutrals and contiguous µimporting¶ neutrals DVWRDJUHHLQJDµQRUPDO¶ 
amount and subsequently notifying when a shipment was made. Britain  would be 
expected to agree not to increase its own exports to contiguous neutrals of the materials 
concerned and take an unfair trading advantage.  For Britain, it would remove the 
EXUGHQ RI SURRI DV WR µFRQWLQXRXV YR\DJH¶ DQG IRU WKH QHXWUDO H[SRUWHUV D VLPSOH
administrative procedure which would not incur internal disputes between rival 
exporting manufacturers claiming favouritism and resulting in less interference.46        
 
5HDFWLRQWR+LOWRQ<RXQJ¶V3DSHU 
On the 6 September J.E. Masterton Smith, Private Secretary to the First Lord of the 
Admiralty, sent an informal reply.  The formal response from the Admiralty was dated 
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3 October, 1915, a month after the paper was submitted. The writer acknowledged 
receipt of the paper by Lieutenant E. Hilton Young  RNVR and pointedly made no 
reference to the Member of Parliament status of this junior ranking reserve officer.  
Instead, there followed a defensive statement: 
 I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you 
 that they are fully alive to the urgency of the question and certain measures are in 
 contemplation which if found practicable will, it is hoped, result in diminishing the 
 facilities for suspicious importations which you have represented.47       
 
The Hilton Young paper seems to have had some impact at the Admiralty. This also 
revealed that Mr. Balfour had referred it to the Contraband Committee.  Mr Balfour had 
received a seven page Minute written by the Chairman of the Contraband Committee 
and he promptly required this to be passed to the Commander-in-Chief.48     
 
The Minute started with DQ H[SUHVVLRQ RI DJUHHPHQW ZLWK -HOOLFRH¶V GHWHUPLQDWLRQ WR 
beat the enemy and then reassured WKHµFRQWUROH[HUFLVHGE\WKH1DY\KDVEHHQPXFK
PRUHHIIHFWLYHWKDQ$GPLUDO-HOOLFRHVXSSRVHV¶   The Chairman then chose to deal with 
the matter by splitting cotton from other goods. Cotton was considered to be under 
control, especially since it had been declared absolute contraband on March 1st, 1915.  
Cotton was dealt with at some length since it had been a very contentious matter with 
the United States.  Britain, as an exception, had allowed contracts in hand on that date 
to be shipped and completed. The Chairman confessed  little doubt Germany would 
have built up significant stocks prior to the transfer of cotton to absolute contraband.  
 
7XUQLQJWRµRWKHUWUDGH¶WKe Chairman gave a detailed account of the processes used by 
the Contraband Committee whenever ships and all or part of its cargo were sent in for 
examination, before the approaching the Prize Court.  Details of the amount and nature 
of each consignment together with the names and address of the shippers and 
consignees were telegraphed to the Contraband Committee.  The FO along with the 
War Trade Department, assisted with Diplomatic Service reports from abroad and 
intelligence by the Censor from intercepted letters and telegrams, could provide a mass 
of information about suspect traders and commercial deals. All these sources had to be 
considered and it is not surprising the clerical effort needed caused irritating delays. 
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Cargoes were landed and stored or even purchased for British use. The Chairman 
revealed sometimes additional guarantees were required and assured Jellicoe  all 
possible precautions were taken to ensure cargo is not re-exported after a vessel was 
released.  The whole seemed to be hamstrung by watertight departmental functioning. 
(YHQWKH&XVWRPVDW.LUNZDOOZHUHRQO\WROGµWKHYHVVHOPD\SURFHHG¶ZLWKQRIXUWKHU
explanation as to the reasons for its release. The Minute shows the effort involved to 
observe international law and deal with the political sensitivities, both national and 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO7KH&KDLUPDQFKDOOHQJHGVRPHRI-HOOLFRH¶VWUDIILFILJXUHVDQGSURYLGHG
KLV RZQ µIURP /RQGRQ¶ Whilst the need for secrecy can be understood, the whole 
document is so revealing of the blockade workload which had developed in Whitehall, 
it is a pity VHDJRLQJRIILFHUVRI-HOOLFRH¶Vand de ChaLU¶VUDQNKDGQRWEHHQWROG of it 
earlier.  It could have saved much frustration.  
 
Jellicoe replied on 14 September, 1915 inIRUPLQJWKH$GPLUDOW\µLWZDVVDWLVIDFWRU\WR
note the [Contraband] Committee consider the control exercised by the Navy is much 
PRUHHIIHFWLYHWKDQLVVXSSRVHGLQWKH)OHHW¶ He then went on to give further examples 
from his own sources and observations as to why he considered there was a risk of 
adopting a false sense of security by relying on guarantees.  His reply concluded: 
            For these reasons it is considered that the guarantees on which we depend 
must be regarded as largely inoperative, and that the enemy is able to  
obtain such portions of the guaranteed cargoes as he may require. 49       
 
For a while that is how things were left.  Those at sea, risking life and limb, convinced 
of leakages taking place were not encouraged by Whitehall¶V VRft approach.  
Meanwhile, the Contraband Committee was running and expanding a large 
administration process. This sought to observe fully the laws and tried to avoid 
unnecessary compensation and demurrage costs for cases likely to be thrown out by the 
Prize Court.  In fact, in August 1915, an Allied conference on economic warfare was 
held at which the first rationing list was drafted.  However, it was not until February / 
March before the Ministry of Blockade issued two orders in respect of forcible 
rationing that governed the blockade of Germany during 1916. 50     
Transatlantic Politics. 
On 29 November 1915, Grahame Green was instructed by the Lords Commissioners to 
send the Commander-in-Chief, a copy of a confidential American Note dated 5 
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November 1915, addressed to Sir Edward Grey.51  It seemed Whitehall felt, having 
already explained their complex daily control of contraband, it would be worthwhile 
letting Jellicoe realise the amount of political communication came from the United 
States. It is surprising it had not been officially copied to Jellicoe earlier since it had 
already been published, almost in full, in The Times on Monday, 8 November 1915. 
The original note ran to thirteen pages of close text and then six pages of statistics. 
These six pages were  µDQLQFRPSOHWHOLVWRIYHVVHOVFDUU\LQJ$PHULFDQFDUJRHVZKLFK
sailing in practically all instances from American to Scandinavian ports, were diverted 
by British authorities to the port of Kirkwall, or called at that port under instruction 
from owners, fURP  0DUFK  WR  -XQH ¶   This comprised 274 vessels 
showing in each case the extent of the delay caused.  A further 75 vessels made up a 
provisional list for the remainder of June, July and August 1915.52   
 
The Note covered thirty-two paragraphs raising issues over detention of vessels, 
shipments to neutrals, blockade of neutral ports, evidence of contraband, blockade 
measures, blockade law, the British prize courts, damage to trade, illegal exercise of 
force, forced re-consignment of cargoes and suspected trading with enemy.  The issue 
of µYLVLWDQGVHDUFK¶had rankled between Britain and the United States since the War of 
1812 when American vessels were boarded to re-capture British seamen deserters.  In 
the American Civil War, the Union States blockaded the coastlines of the Confederate 
States, hoping Britain would support the north.  Instead, Britain declared neutrality and 
continued to trade and supply arms to both North and South.  Nassau became the 
neutral delivery point from which the Confederate blockade runners collected their 
imports and endeavoured to export cotton in payment which supported the British 
textile industry. To the United States it was an artificial distinction to quote Nassau as 
the port of delivery, when clearly the cargoes were intended for Confederate 
FRQVLJQHHV  7KH 1RUWKHUQ 6WDWHV GHFODUHG WKH FRQFHSW RI µFRQWLQXRXV YR\DJH¶ WKH
transhipment at Nassau being a mere subterfuge by Britain seeking to trade with both 
north and south in the war.                
 
By 1914, international trade had expanded beyond anything imagined in the American 
Civil War and America chose to repeat %ULWDLQ¶V earlier actions by proclaiming 
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neutrality in order to trade with both belligerents. American exports of grain, cotton, 
meat, oil and minerals were sought by both Germany and Britain. The American 
REMHFWLRQVWRWKH%ULWLVKµEORFNDGH¶ZHUHVXPPDULVHGDWWKHHQGRIWKH1RWH 
 
Objections were that British methods to obtain and use evidence of cargoes being 
destined for enemy ports or label such cargoes as being contraband were not justified. 
The blockade was declared ineffective, illegal and indefensible; the whole judicial 
procedure of the Prize Courts was claimed to be a violation of the law of nations.  
America objected to the maintenance of µEODFNOLVWV¶DIIHFWLQJWKHLUEXVLQHVVKRXVHVDQG
condemned the British of relying on expediency in conducting the affairs of the 
blockade. The Government of the United States took on its shoulders the job of being 
the champion of neutral rights not only for all neutral nations generally, but clearly for 
the protection of its own trade in particular.53   
 
-HOOLFRH¶V5HVSRQVHVWRWKH$PHULFDQ1RWH   
On the 6 December 1915, Jellicoe sent the Admiralty his reactions to the American 
Note.  His first rebuttal was against the claim all ships were being sent in for 
examination and that a search could easily be conducted at sea, there being little 
difference between a ship of 1000 tons or one of 20,000 tons.  Any seafarer would have 
supported Jellicoe when replying¶,DPVXUHWKDWWKHIDOODF\RIWKHVWDWHPHQWPXVWEH
DSSDUHQW WR DQ\RQHZKRKDVFDUULHGRXW VXFKD VHDUFKDW VHD¶  The need for detailed 
searches was compounded by the practice of contraband being concealed in SDVVHQJHUV¶ 
baggage. The different cargo packaging such as casks, barrels and wooden cases found 
in a general cargo required close examination.  Where a vessel carried a bulk  cargo the 
contraband could be placed at the bottom of the hold and the bulk cargo stowed on top. 
 On suspected vessels a search could only be done safely in port, when part or all of the 
cargo was discharged before the ship or cargo could be placed before the Prize Court 
for adjudication.  Jellicoe stressed when an interception took place both the neutral and 
the armed merchant cruiser were at risk from U-boats. However, the British practice of 
µVHQGLQJ LQ¶ ZDV IDU PRUH KXPDQH WKDQ WKH *HUPDQ WKUHDW RI VLQNLQJ without any 
consideration of a QHXWUDOFUHZ¶VZHOOEHLQJ 
 
$PHULFD FODLPHG WKH EORFNDGH ZDV QRW µHIIHFWLYH¶ VLQFH WKH %Dltic coastline of 
*HUPDQ\ZDVQRWXQGHUEORFNDGHSURYLQJWKHµVRFDOOHGµEORFNDGHZDVLQFRPSOHWHDQG
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illegal.  Jellicoe pointed out the American blockade in the Spanish-American war was 
confined to Spanish colonies and America was neither able nor attempted to blockade 
the coast of Spain.  Legal opinion later showed it was legitimate for a blockade to be 
FRQILQHG WR RQO\ SDUW RI D EHOOLJHUHQW¶V FRDVWOLQH  &RPSODLQWV DERXW WKH QXPEHU RI
interceptions of American vessels and delays caused to their voyages were challenged 
by Jellicoe who had kept meticulous records of his own. To strengthen his arguments 
he had the benefit of reports from the boarding and armed guard officers who 
constantly sought intelligence from the masters of merchant ships intercepted. Many 
masters gave willingly of their knowledge of the situations in the Scandinavian 
countries and almost boasted of the amount of contraband that was evading the 
blockade. This information was not always to the liking of the Whitehall community. A 
further reason for interception was the number of Germans of military age travelling 
back to Germany often on forged papers. 
-HOOLFRH¶VOHQJWK\OHWWHUZHQWRQWRTXRWHWKHDFWXDOLQWHUFHSWLRQVWDWLVWLFVIURPKLVRZQ
Squadron records. The oilers [tankers] were operated by the Standard Oil Company 
some having been transferred from German ownership to the American flag which 
always rendered them under suspicion. 54  
ENCLOSURE No.2 
In Home Fleets letter No.2747/H.F.0020 of 6 December 1915 
 
List of American ships which arrived at Kirkwall for examination 
1st APRIL ± 30th SEPTEMBER 1915 
                                   Summary  
28 Ships arrived   (only 1 Westbound). 
                                                               ³SURFHHGHG 
                                                                 ³VHQW6RXWKIRUIXUWKHUH[DPLQDWLRQ 
                                                                 ³³LQE\2ZQHUV± 4 of these also had 
                                                                                      armed guards  
 
                                                                 Average time of detention of ships which 
                                                                      3URFHHGHG««««««GD\V 
 
                                                                 Longest time of detention.  25 days ± in case of 
                                                                        ³32/$5,1(´RQ-XQH 
                                                                     Jellicoe to Admiralty 55 
The file concerned reveals the most meticulous records of the movements east and west 
of neutral ships intercepted. The extract above shows the delays caused to ships sent in 
for examination due to the administration work of the Contraband Committee served to 
discourage ship-owners from accepting contraband cargoes. 
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A further analysis UHYHDOHG KRZ -HOOLFRH¶V GHWDLOHG UHFRUGV DOORZHG KLP WR GLVSXWH
American claims: 
Percentage of American vessels to neutral vessels generally, intercepted by 
the Northern Patrol is as follows:  
                                            1915 
   1st Apl.  to 30th  Sep.    3.3  
                                      1st Oct.  to  30th Nov.   4.6 
 
Percentage of American vessels which are sent into port by the Northern  
Patrol on being intercepted is as follows:  
                   EASTWARD BOUND 
   1st Apl.  to 30th  Sep.     96.  
                                      1st Oct.  to  30th Nov.    57.1   
                   WESTWARD BOUND 
   1st Apl.  to 30th  Sep.    10.5.  
                                      1st Oct.  to  30th Nov.      0.   
  
             Eastward bound American vessels carry oil, foodstuffs and other commodities 
 which render search in port necessary.  
 Westward bound vessels are sent into port from time to time to ascertain whether they 
 carry goods from Germany, and whether they are being used as auxiliaries to the  
 German Navy. 56 
 
Time spent in port is not productive for a shipowner.  Bell conceded it was difficult to 
quantify the effect of these coercive delays in an examination port but gave an 
indication of the total loss which would depend on the following: 
  
               (i) For vessels on time charter (of which there were a great number): 
       Total number of days detained  x  daily charter rate.    
  
 (ii) For vessels working in the service of their owners: 
       Total number of days detained x ships daily charges  
                   (a sum which often included the cost of supplying hundreds of passengers 
                    with a first-class hotel fare).The total would certainly be many millions 
       of pounds.57    
 
Apart from dealing with diplomatic exchanges, accurate records were needed to 
counter any subsequent financial compensation claims from neutral owners. 
 
Jellicoe continued his dialogue with the Admiralty, which was his official route to the 
Foreign Office, until his appointment as First Sea Lord in December 1916. How much 
RI ZKDW KH UHFRPPHQGHG ZDV EORFNHG E\ DQ\ µJDWHNHHSHUV¶ DW WKH $dmiralty and 
Foreign Office is not known. Nevertheless, he was µWKHPDQon the spot¶DQGFRXOGQRW
be ignored entirely. He was known for his attention to detail, commitment to planning 
and the observance of orders. These attributes, coupled with his historic naval 
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perception of blockade, imSHOOHG KLP WR WDNH WKH SDWURO¶V SHUIRUPDQFH VHULRXVO\ and 
not only as the Tenth Cruiser Squadron, which was continuously on patrol, but it was 
the part of his wide command.  
 
Extracts from a letter to the Admiralty dated 19 June, 1916 aboard Iron Duke show 
-HOOLFRH¶VIUXVWUDWLRQ 
 
 2. The ships of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron intercept the greater part of 
 the Atlantic Trade with Northern Europe, but owing presumably to the  
difficulty of proving the belligerent intention and purpose of the cargoes  
on board the merchant vessels brought in, we allow the majority of it to  
proceed. The effect of this is that Germany obtains most of her requirements, 
and the object of the Blockade announced by the Prime Minister in the  
House of Commons, namely the prevention of commodities of any kind from 
reaching Germany, is nullified. 
 
3. Thus the considerable outlay incurred in the hire and upkeep of the ships of 
the Tenth Cruiser Squadron, and the maintenance of their crews is largely wasted 
and the pressure of our sea power on Germany can hardly be said to exist: we 
cause the enemy slight inconvenience only.58        
                
Jellicoe was justified in his concern about costs and an examination of the Squadron for 
the week Sunday, 4 July 1915 is revealing.  On that day, the following ships were 
included in the Squadron: 
  Alcantara, Alsatian, Ambrose, Andes, Arlanza, Cedric, Changuinola, Columbella, 
 Digby, Ebro, Hilary, Hildebrande, India, Mantua, Motagua, Orcoma, Oropesa, 
 Orotava, Otway, Patia, Patuca, Teutonic, Victorian, Virginian.59 
The total gross tonnage for these 24 vessels was 232,637 tons. The charter rates were 
laid down by Government in a publication known as the Blue Book and those for 
Armed Merchant Cruisers were as follows:  
             Armed Merchant Cruisers, 
             Speed.                                                           Per gross ton per month.       
                                                                          s.  
 22 knots and over                                          25 ) 
 21 knots and under 22                                   24 )      With relief from all 
 ³³          23 )        risk and expense of   
 ³³    20                               22 )        ship and stores. 
 ³³            21 ) 
             Under 18 knots                                              20 ) 
 
 Period three months certain. 
             If period is in excess of three months, rate to be 1s. per ton less in each 
 case in respect of the excess period. 60  
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Taking into account the above parameters the monthly charter costs alone, totalled  
£222,354.  In addition, there were victualling costs and pay for 7,330 officers and men.  
The bunker capacity is known for only seventeen of the above ships which totalled 
39,673 tons. It cost £41,656 to fill the bunkers with Rhonda coal priced at £1.05p per  
ton in 1915 of these seventeen ships alone.61  
 
&RQFHUQ IRU FRVWV DOVR VKRZXS LQ /W&GU*HQIHOO¶VGLDU\RQ0D\ZKHQKH
wrote: 
  µ«««KHUHZHKDYHEHHQGD\VDWsea & no but one boat away & 
  have scarcely seen a ship. At £1000 a day for the use of Cedric, this is  
  not good value for the %ULWLVK3XEOLF¶62   
                                       Fig 3 Selected operating figures for H.M.S. Andes / RMS Andes 63 
 
Ship-owners, such as the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, enjoyed a welcome 
regular income from the Government charter money.  The table above shows the 
comfort of regular surpluses from the Andes under war conditions in 1915-16 with 
relief from repairs costs. These contrast with the fluctuations of peace time trading in 
the period 1921-22 where seasonal trade and responsibility for repairs make a clear 
difference to a ship-owner, even one with mail contracts.  
 
In his letter of 19 June, 1916 Jellicoe touched on another frustration which was clearly 
not helpful when he closed with this polite but clear complaint: 
,QFRQFOXVLRQ,ZRXOGPHQWLRQWKDWWKH&RQVXO¶V>DW&KULVWLDna] reports enclosed in 
Admiralty letter N.I. 14786 of 11th instant are dated 25 March and 2 April respectively,  
             but were not received by me until 13th June, and then only after special application for 
them had been made. The delay has rendered some of the information contained in 
these valuable documents of little use.64    
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 NMM RMS/1/17 Minutes of Court of Directors Jan. 1913-Nov.1916    * 
               RMS/1/17 Minutes of Court of Directors Jul.1921-May. 1922    * 
Date of entry  
C of D  Minutes    * 
Date Voyage  
Completed  
Surplus / 
 Deficit 
Amount  '¶O\ 
(T¶QW 
Repair 
Costs 
'¶O\ 
(T¶QW 
Voyage  
Length 
Government  Service H.M.S. Andes       
29.10.1915 30.  6.1915 Surplus £16305 161.4 £3755 37.1 101days 
16.10.1915 30.  9.1915      ³ £16750 182.0   -----  ----   92 days 
   9. 2.1916 31.12.1915       ³ £17918 194.7   -----  ----   92 days 
21.  6.1916 31.  3.1916      ³ £17983 197.6   -----  ----   91 days 
11.10.1916 30.  6.1916      ³ £17730 194.8   -----  ----   91 days 
Peace time Trading RMS Andes       
27.  7.1921 12.  3.1921 (Deficit) (£21530) (422.1) £15220 298.4  51 days 
  5.10.1921 23.  5.1921 Surplus £12898 243.4 £  7030 132.6   53 days 
  2.11 1921 31.  7.1921       ³ £  6202 119.3 £  7600 146.1   52 days 
22.12.1921   8.10.1921      ³ £  6832 133.4 £  6960 136.5   51 days 
22.  2.1922 17.12.1921      ³ £14342 281.2 £  7500 147.0   51 days 
24.  5.1922   3.  3.1922   (Deficit) (£ 7565) (154.4) £  8250 168.4   49 days 
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There is always a conflict between the need for security and secrecy pitted against the 
passing of information which is needed or helpful. The Tenth Cruiser Squadron¶V
activities were always kept out of the public limelight to imbue a sense of surprise 
when interceptions were made. The Squadron Standing Orders specifically stressed the 
QHHGIRUµUHWLFHQFH¶E\RIILFHUVDQGFUHZVZKHQDVKRUH65  Poor communications clearly 
extended beyond the relationship between the Admiralty and the FO, when the Vice 
Admiral Commanding Orkneys and Shetlands turned to Jellicoe for help in his letter 27 
May, 1916: 
Submitted.  With reference to H.F.0020/442 of 23 May, 1916, the Customs at 
Kirkwall receive no information IURP/RQGRQZKHQSDUWRIDYHVVHO¶VFDUJRKDV 
been declared prize unless the ship is actually ordered to discharge part of her 
cargo into prize court at some British port. 
 
2.  I would submit that the Admiralty be asked to request the Customs in 
/RQGRQWRLQIRUPWKHLURIILFLDOVZKHQDQ\SDUWRIDVKLS¶VFDUJRLVSUL]HFRXUWHG 
whether the vessel is permitted  to proceed to her destination or not and the information 
would then be passed on to me from Kirkwall or Lerwick.66  
          
Additional Blockade Measures: Coal, Mails and Navicerts 
 
Three further measures which impinged either directly or indirectly on the Squadron 
were coal exports, searching of mails and the issue of Navicerts; they were 
progressively implemented with Foreign Office backing. 
 
Britain had a near monopoly on coal exports to neutral countries and the maintenance 
of bunker coal stocks around the world.  It was to prove an effective negotiating tool 
for blockade policies.  The Squadron maintained a patrol to upset the trade of iron ore 
between Narvik and Rotterdam. Although occasional arrests were made, the trade was 
able to continue by using the territorial waters by day and also moving at night to avoid 
the patrols. The ore ships and also many vessels carrying herrings to Germany often 
called at the Tyne and Sunderland for bunker coal. In May 1915, Trade Division issued 
orders bunker coal was to be refused and the Division widened the control of coal with 
the full support of the Foreign Office.  The effect was: 
 (i) No coal would be supplied to any vessel trading with a German port 
 or to any vessel carrying goods of enemy destination or origin. 
  
 (ii) No coal would be supplied to a vessel chartered to an enemy subject or 
       a blacklisted firm. 
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(iii) All vessels supplied with British bunker coal were to call voluntarily 
at a British port; all vessels supplied with British bunker coal were to receive 
approval for the cargoes carried from a neutral to a neutral port; all vessels 
  supplied with British bunker coal were to secure certificates of origin for all 
cargoes exported from Scandinavian countries; all vessels supplied with 
British bunker coal were to refuse cargo space to goods consigned to order. 67   
 
The control of bunker coal reduced the interception work load of the Squadron by 
coercing neutral ship-owners into making voluntary calls at examination ports. 
 
Historically, the overt or covert interception of mails had been a fruitful source of 
military intelligence. However, by 1874 governments were beginning to cooperate on 
agreed standards as to the operation of mails which started to take on a more sacrosanct 
nature.68 Even so, attempts, some involving the American Supreme Court, to grant mail 
ships a form of special immunity had not been agreed by 1900.  At the second Hague 
conference in 1907, the German delegate realised that mail ship immunity was 
impractical and made the following proposal: 
 The postal correspondence of neutrals or belligerents, whether its character  
 be official or private, shall be inviolable if it is found in a neutral vessel; if the 
vessel is seized it shall be forwarded by the captor with as little delay as possible. 
Exception is made in the case of violation of blockade, if the correspondence 
is destined to, or starts from a blockaded port. 
   
 The rules in the preceding paragraph are applicable to postal correspondence 
               found in an enemy vessel. 
 
7KHSURSRVDOZDVDFFHSWHGDQGLWPDGHDQµDEUXSWLQQRYDWLRQ¶ZKLFKRYHUXOHG the older 
law relating to enemy despatches.69  It confirmed the sacrosanct status which mails now 
held.  
 
Although the War Office War Book allowed for the limited opening of mails it was 
necessary to seek Foreign Office warrants to do so. The whole process was complicated 
and understaffed. Originally the military was only interested in military intelligence but 
inadvertently realised the amount of commercial intelligence which had a direct bearing 
on the blockade. There was no interest in the parcel post by the military authorities. The 
French authorities had started to see the abuse of the parcel post to send high value 
items, such as furs, sometimes as means of paying for other commercial trade. 
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The British post authorities produced the following figures: 
Parcels sent to per week.                                    Parcels coming from per week 
Before war     15th September, 1915                    Before war     15 th September, 1915      
              
   50                    400                        Sweden             5                       1,000              
Negligible           250                        Norway        Negligible                150 
      40                    600                        Denmark          30                      4,500 
       50                      80                        Holland           120                        150      
 
In the light of these figures, ministers authorised customs to open parcels entering the 
United Kingdom from September 1915. The French complained British practice lagged 
behind their own, in that Britain restricted the examination to mails transiting Britain 
and parcels were not seized by our patrols. In late September instructions were given to 
inspect parcels found on neutral steamers. Sir Edward Grey insisted a French cruiser 
was attached to our patrols as a public gesture the French government shared the 
responsibility for the interference with the mails.70     
 
The justification was borne out when it became clear the Germans were using the 
postal service as a vehicle of trade.  Searches revealed such high value items as rubber, 
jewellery, violin strings and medicines were found in 7XEDQWLD¶V mail bags.  Rubber to 
the value of £400 was found in *HOULD¶V mail; and four hundred small packets of coffee 
were found in the Iris. In this case the envelopes were labelled µ6DPSOHVRIQRYDOXH¶
which was a clear abuse of the postal convention.71                                                          
                    
It appears the actual opening of the mail bags was done by the UK Customs in the 
examination ports since no instruction for boarding officers to do so can be found. 
0DQ\RIWKHERDUGLQJRIILFHUVZRXOGKDYHEHHQµPDLOVKLS¶PHQLQSHDFHWLPHDQGWKH
idea of tampering with the mail was quite alien to them. They had been brought up to 
treat mail with a reverence akin to that given to a shipment of bullion. Failure to do so 
ensured serious career consequences. 
 
Navicerts 
:KHQ+LOWRQ<RXQJKDGZULWWHQKLVSDSHURQµUDWLRQLQJ¶KHUHFRJQLVHGWKHQHHGWRVWDUW
the process of blockade control in a sLPSOHZD\DWWKHHDUOLHVWSDUWRIDFDUJR¶V transit. 
The interceptions and possible subsequent vessel searches were an inconvenience to 
shippers and ship-owners costing them money. As the war progressed, more neutral 
shipping companies made voluntary arrangements to call at British ports for clearance 
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and avoid interceptions. On 11th 0DUFK  D V\VWHP NQRZQ DV µ1DYLFHUWV¶ ZDV
brought into effect. These were Letters of Assurance issued by British consular or other 
officials at a YHVVHO¶V GHSDUWXUH SRUW when bound for a neutral country. The letters 
certified that the vessel carried no contraband articles after a search at the departure 
port. When Navicerts were granted this saved much in time and money and avoided 
interceptions and coercive delays.72  The system was applied to vessels leaving the 
United States until that nation joined the Allies and entered the war against Germany.  
It particularly facilitated trade between America and Scandinavia and since much 
dispute had arisen from this trade was no doubt a politically selected starting point for 
the new system.             
 
Political Reaction in Westminster.    
The issue of the blockade received a full airing at Westminster. Two debates, in 
particular, revealed the difficulties of communication between the Navy and the 
Foreign Office; also the limited understanding of the situation by members not closely 
involved with the blockade.  
 
The first was a two day debate in the House of Lords which started 22 February 1916.73 
Lord Sydenham placed the following motion before the House: 
 That this House considers that, in conformity with the principles 
 of International Law and with the legitimate rights of neutrals, 
 more effective use could be made of the Allied Fleets in preventing    
 supplies, directly conducing to the prolongation of the war, from 
 reaching enemy countries. 
 
Initially blaming the Navy, the debate turned into a severe criticism of the Foreign 
2IILFHDQGWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VFRQGXFWRIWKHEORFNDGH6\GHQKDPGHOLYHUHGDFOHDUDQG
detailed history of the blockade¶V events since the war started. He called for a more 
rigorous approach to rationing and revealed to the House the underestimated 
importance of cotton and cocoa.74 
 
These long and detailed debates disclosed the levels of understanding and 
misunderstanding of the speakers; only the most penetrating statements together with 
their originators follow, in order to give the tone of the discussions. 
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Admiral Lord Beresford, making his ILUVW FRQWULEXWLRQ WR D µLords¶ debate gave a 
cutlass brandishing performance. He claimed the Navy should be in charge of the 
blockade, arresting suspicious ships and sending them in for adjudication by a Prize 
Court. Instead he asserted:  
1RZ ZH KDYH RQO\ D ³VRUW RI EORFNDGH´ FDUULHG RXW E\ 3URFODPDWLRQV 2UGHUV LQ
Council,  Agreements, and Committees, and it is not clear who controls that blockade.  
............If the Cabinet would settle a definite, policy, the  Navy could enforce it 
 
Beresford continued: 
       
«Now who is to blame? Is it the sailors? Is it the soldiers? 1R««««««1R 
And there are no party differences. Then what is it? I maintain that it is the conduct and 
control by the Government. You have a Cabinet of twenty-one amateurs, and they have 
usurped the Executive. ........... amateurs who know nothing whatever about it.75 
 
These damaging salvoes from Beresford were thoroughly in keeping with his 
reputation. He had focussed on the realities and revealed the political confusion at high 
levels.   
The Marquis Of Lansdowne, countered the emphatic views of Beresford and others outside of 
the House:  
«.. In his view-and it is a view that is held by many people outside the House-we 
have only to emancipate the Fleet and turn it loose to take whatever steps may seem 
good to it in order to bring this war to a prompt conclusion. In this House these things 
are said in temperate and courteous language. 
He then claimed the rationing system was often used simplistically to prove leakages of 
contraband in the blockade 
 
........I venture to press upon your Lordships that all these figures and statistics require 
extremely careful scrutiny before you base conclusions upon them. 76           
        
Here Lansdowne had hit on the difficulty of deciding a base year for the rationing 
process calculations; a point raised much earlier in /W +LOWRQ <RXQJ¶V SDSHU
Lansdowne continued to explain the rationing system in greater detail then gave a 
welcome announcement. 
We mean to put the whole of this blockade business-in charge of a single Minister, who 
will be of Cabinet rank, and who will be entrusted with the general co-ordination of all 
this business. 77 
 
The debate continued with more detail concerning the Prize Court operations 
The Lord Chancellor (Lord Buckmaster) 
 
«The noble and gallant Admiral thought that if the Fleet had its way it would be able 
to tighten the band that is now around Germany,  and he seemed to have been led to 
think that the Fleet could stop anything of that character sailing on the high seas.78 
                                                 
75
 Hansard,  HL Debate  22 February 1916 vol. 21 cc 84-93 
76
 Hansard, HL Deb 22 February 1916 vol 21 cc 96 
77
 Ibid. cc 103 
78
 Ibid cc 123-124 
Blockade: Whitehall and Westminster Perspectives                                   Chapter 2 
 
51 
 
 
Beresford promptly denied this. 
 
The Lord Chancellor  
«I am glad the noble Lord makes that admission. But directly he denies that, he opens 
the loophole for exactly the transactions of which Lord Devonport has spoken-that 
certain goods we wish to keep from the Germans may be the subject of legitimate and 
fair trade transactions between neutral countries which we cannot stop.  
 
The Lord Chancellor then explained, if the Navy sent in large numbers of ships for 
adjudication, the Prize Court was unlikely to cope. This would mean longer delays and 
the possibility of large claims for damages from ships wrongly arrested. It could even 
destroy the justice of the present system. Finally he sought s more balanced support 
from Beresford.  
  
Nobody knows better than I do the fairness of the noble and gallant Admiral. ...and I 
am sure he will give consideration to what I say even if he does not accept it.79  
 
Coming as it did at the end of the first day of the debate, this proved an effective reply 
WR%HUHVIRUG¶VRSHQLQJEURDGVLGH  The next day the debate continued to focus on the 
legality of the workings of the Contraband Committee, rationing and agreements with 
neutral trade organisations.80  The long day closed with an apologetic retraction of the 
motion by Lord Sydenham ending with the words: 
.................and I therefore beg to withdraw the Motion.81 
 
The real benefit was the appointment of Lord Robert Cecil as Minister for Blockade at 
the end of February,1916.   
 
Thirteen months later the blockade came under scrutiny again during a debate in the 
House of Commons on the War Measures (Blockade).82 Cecil had been appointed to 
bring about a more business like approach to the blockade and when replying he 
reviewed the changes made and admitted what many had long suspected: 
.......I do not think I am indiscreet in saying that when I took office there was a certain 
amount of friction between the two offices. [Admiralty and Foreign Office] I am glad 
to say it has entirely disappeared.83   
 
To bring about the new accord Cecil had been helped by the appointment of de Chair, 
now a Vice Admiral. Cecil¶Vnext task was to rationalise the blockade administration. 
Some departments were merged and an all-round improvement made in 
communications between departments.  He went on to review the progress made on the 
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rationing scheme and the implementation of the Navicert system. For those who were 
still baying for the Admiralty to have sole control of the blockade he pointed out that 
such a transfer would simply move the workload of international diplomacy for which 
it had no proper resources.84 
 
Clearly, Cecil had no intention of supporting a move to the Admiralty. Throughout 
these debates, mention of giving the Navy or the Fleet a free reign on the blockade, 
leaves the reader with the impression speakers visualised huge squadrons of 
Dreadnoughts and battle-cruisers being deployed. An impression which confirmed the 
views of Midshipman Scrimgeour referred to at the start of this chapter. Only one 
speaker, Sir Edward Carson, provided some reality. 
««WKHblockading squadron at the present moment would have to go out and insist 
upon every ship coming into port for examination. That would be almost impossible, 
certainly with the force we have now; 85 
   
He referred, of course, to the nominal twenty-four converted merchant ships in the 
Tenth Cruiser Squadron. 
    
Cecil¶s recruitment, in March 1916, of a naval liaison officer was a careful choice. It 
was Rear Admiral de Chair, then commanding the Tenth Cruiser Squadron. No one had 
a better understanding of the practical blockade issues at sea. De Chair had been in 
command of the Squadron during the crucial first twenty months of the war. Promoted 
to Vice Admiral, his new appointment had been approved by Jellicoe, but de Chair 
admitted he was almost heartbroken to give up his sea-going command.86  
Congratulations flowed from his contemporaries and many regretted his departure, for 
he had in effect, built the Squadron into the effective team it had become. Reporting to 
Whitehall, de Chair found the First Lorrd of the Admiralty, Mr Balfour, readily 
confided there had been little harmony between the Navy and the FO. The latter was 
more interested in placating neutral countries by releasing ships than supporting the 
Tenth Cruiser Squadron.87  Subsequently, Lord Cecil, the Blockade Minister  
confirmed two different cultures existed, one of action in the Navy rather than the 
slower, measured approach of the FO.88  However, the bitterest pill for de Chair was 
yet to come. When he called officially on Sir Edward Grey the Secretary of State for 
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Foreign Affairs he explained WKH6TXDGURQ¶VGLIIiculties. De Chair records the reaction 
from Sir Edward: 
 He was very much interested and apparently surprised, as no one had taken  
the trouble to acquaint him fully with the difficulties the difficulties we had 
to contend with at sea on that vast expanse of water comprising the North 
Atlantic and Arctic Oceans. 89   
Somewhere along WKHOLQHVRIFRPPXQLFDWLRQµJDWHNHHSHUV¶KDGUXQ their own blockade 
and provided unnecessary challenges for the Navy and the Squadron. 
 
Both de Chair and Tupper, were fortunate in having Jellicoe as their Commander-in-
Chief, who correctly believed his GXW\ZDVWRµILJKWWKHFRUQHU¶IRUWKHP-HOOLFRHFDPH
to have a KLJKUHJDUGIRUWKHµ7HQWK¶; it was a view which led him to concern himself 
with some blockade aspects, which Whitehall would have preferred to have in its 
exclusive ownership. The legal and political backgrounds reviewed above, formed a 
constant background challenge for the Navy, during which, the resources for the 
Squadron had to be assembled and then applied to the important challenge of patrolling 
the Northern waters.  
------------ 
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Background. 
The Royal Navy has often commandeered merchant ships in wartime or periods of 
tension. The subsidised mail steamer services which emerged iQWKH¶VDQG¶V
marked another link between the Navy and merchant shipping.  From about 1870 
onwards, interest by Government and the Admiralty grew in using commercial tonnage 
not only as transports but also as armed auxiliary cruisers.  By 1914, a relationship 
existed between the law, naval war planning and the shipping market which allowed 
the Navy to treat the merchant and fishing fleets, as a potential reserve of vessels to be 
commissioned and operated as warships.  
 
The Advent of Mail Steam Packets. 
In 1823 the Admiralty became responsible for the Mail Packet Services and by 1837 
controlled thirty-seven sailing and seven steam packets running out of Falmouth.1   By 
1840, mail contracts had been concluded with Cunard, P&O and the RMSP companies, 
to provide steamer mail services across the Atlantic, to India and the West Indies 
respectively. This way mail services were developed by WKHµSULYDWHVHFWRU¶EXWXQGHU
Admiralty control. Contracts terms required the steamers, when built, to be capable of 
carrying guns of the highest calibre, have wooden hulls and be able to transport military 
personnel at reduced rates.2   ,QWKHFDVHRI5063&WKH'LUHFWRU¶V0LQXWHVUHFRUG 
 
              That the Admiralty required the introduction of a clause in the  
              Contract authorizing  the Lords of the Admiralty to employ the  
               Vessels as Vessels of War 3 
 
The ships were regularly surveyed by the Navy and each ship carried an Admiralty 
Mail Agent. Besides supervising mails, the Agents rendered reports DERXW WKH VKLSV¶
condition, management and maintenance.  Fourteen steamers were required for 
5063&¶V :HVW ,QGLHV FRQWUDFW DORQH DQG ZLWK WKH DGGLWLRQ RI WKH &XQDUG DQG 3	2
vessels, the Admiralty had acquired, via the mail subsidies, access to a potential reserve 
of ocean going steamers for wartime. 
 
The Crimean War and the Contract Steam Packets. 
In the Crimean War, Government circles commented on the disappointing response to 
its adverts offering charters to commercial sailing and steam powered vessels. One 
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possible cause of the reluctance was the extensive inventory of ERDWVZDLQV¶
FDUSHQWHUV¶ HQJLQHHUV¶ Dnd gXQQHUV
 VWRUHV UHTXLUHG DW WKH RZQHU¶V H[SHQVH EHIRUH D
charter would be granted. These lists, together with specimen charters, for both sailing 
and steam vessels were set out in a Government publication Instructions for Masters on 
board Her 0DMHVW\¶V +LUHG 7UDQVSRUW.4  There were also detailed instructions as to 
charts, chronometers and other navigational matters.  No doubt some parsimonious 
owners, used to operating sailing ships on a shoestring, decided the capital cost of 
meeting the stores requirements outweighed the charter terms on offer. In addition to 
charter terms, Instructions for Masters set out the required accommodation and feeding 
scales for troops, as well as other general guidance.  
 
However, the contract mail steamers had little choice but to comply with Admiralty 
requirements. The requisitioned vessels were compensated by agreed charter rates for 
the transport work.  The rates appear to have been open to some negotiation. The 
RMSPC Directors were approached in July 1855 by the Admiralty seeking to retain the 
steamers Medway, Trent, Thames and Severn for a further six months at forty-two  
shilling per ton.5   The Company required forty-five shillings and only seven days later 
had received Admiralty acceptance of the higher rate.6  Thus, although the Government 
and Navy sought to control the merchant steamers, it was on a mutually agreed 
financial basis. 
 
In the event, none of the mail steamers were ever armed beyond their signal cannons. In 
fact in these early years there appeared a clear reluctance by the Admiralty to allow 
cannon into the hands of merchant seamen.  In an earlier period of tension, the RMSPC 
had approached the Admiralty on this matter and did so again in 1854, but the Board of 
Ordnance declined the request for the loan of thirty carronades against privateers, on 
the grounds of inconvenience and precedent.  The Board was, however, prepared to sell 
DWDµUHDVRQDEOHSULFH¶7KHUHLVQRHYLGHQFHWKDWWKH&RPSDQ\WRRNXSWKLVRIIHU7   
 
When the diplomatic crisis caused by the American interception of the Trent emerged 
in December 1861, the news initially electrified Britain with a demand for war.  The 
Government made war plans, assembled troops, and diverted warships. At the same 
time it chartered transports from both Royal Mail and P&O.  The threat of war 
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prompted the RMSPC Directors to raise again the matter of arming the packets against 
privateers. By 1861 the Post Office had regained control of the Mail Packet Service and 
correspondence with the Admiralty had become at arms length.8  This allowed an 
excellent opportunity for prevarication. The General Post Office wrote on 18 December 
1861 stating that the Admiralty needed to know the necessary plans and strength of 
RMSPC ships to be armed.9  It was the Admiralty that had laid down such rules and 
measured the ships twenty years earlier, when the original mail contract was signed.  
Finally, on 6 January 1862, the Admiralty offered a full list of available guns in 
Chatham, Portsmouth, Devonport and Woolwich. There was however, one problem in  
that no gun carriages could be manufactured, due to pressure of work in Government 
Departments.  If the Company wished, the War Office would readily provide 
information for their construction.  Also, rifles of the pattern of 1842 could be supplied 
but shot and ammunition for the heavy guns only could be issued.10  
 
In the coming years, great progress was made in shipping. Propellers replaced 
paddlewheels, iron hulls emerged and coaling stations sprang up around the world to 
support expanding cargo, mail and passenger services. The replenishment of the 
coaling stations created a trade of its own.  By 1875 all references to the armament or 
fitness for war service of mail packets had disappeared from British shipping contracts. 
All that remained, in contracts with four companies, was a clause allowing the 
$GPLUDOW\ WR FKDUWHU VKLSV LQ FDVHVRI µJUHDW SXEOLF HPHUJHQF\¶11  It would be 1876 
before the issue of armed merchant vessels returned to the agenda. 
 
During the final thirty years of the century the Royal Navy was immersed in technical 
change. The century had seen the transition from wood via iron to the use of steel for 
hull construction.12 Rapidly changing technology meant it was prudent to build only 
small classes of warship as a hedge against early obsolescence.  Improving gunnery, the 
arrival of torpedoes and, most importantly, the use of electricity aboard ship all played 
a part. 7KH µMHXQH HFROH¶ ZDV TXHVWLRQLQJ WKH SODFH RI EDWWOHVKLSV DQG WKH YDOXH RI
convoy in favour of the fast cruisers protecting defended sea lanes.  The British Navy 
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League, started 1894, generating WKHHPHUJHQFHRIµQDYDOLVP¶LQWKHSXEOLFPLQG which 
continued throughout the years prior to 1914.13   
 
Great Steamers, White and Gold. 14 
In March 1876, a report circulated in the Admiralty that stated: 
 There is a magnificent fleet of British Merchant Ships, possessing 
            the most valuable elements of warlike efficiency, viz. high speed, 
            coal endurance, strength of structure and seaworthiness. 
 
The report continued: 
 The introduction of torpedoes into offensive warfare has given,  
             to the weakest of these ships, the power of inflicting swiftly and  
             secretly, fatal  blows upon Ships of War, clothed with armour,  
             and defended by powerful guns. 15 
 
The report reflected the growing discomfort that µQDYDOLVWV¶ZHUH feeling over the Royal 
Navy being under-strength in available  cruisers WRGHIHQG%ULWDLQ¶VYLWDOWUDGHURXWHV,W 
was the result of discussions started a year before in the Admiralty,  µDV WR WKH
desirability of reverting to the former practice in the Navy of partially fitting Mail 
6WHDPHUVIRUZDUSXUSRVHV¶  The reporting committee had referred to a mail contract of 
29th January 1852 and concluded that the first and obvious choice for armed merchant 
cruisers, was the mail steamers already receiving a Treasury subsidy. 16   They were, 
after all, among the fastest steamers afloat.  
 
The Armed Merchant Cruiser Experiment. 
The idea of mail steamers fitted to fire torpedoes at warships smacks of lateral thinking 
but also optimistic expediency. Nevertheless, the Director of Naval Construction 
(DNC), Mr. Barnaby, saw fit to give initial support when he stated:  
 As the modern Mail Steamer is so strongly built structurally as to be 
capable of receiving armament upon its decks without distress, it might 
be found  possible to regard it as an auxiliary to the un-armoured fleet.     
    
+RZHYHURQIXUWKHUUHIOHFWLRQKHEHFDPHµDIUDLGLWZRXOGQRWEHZLVHWRHPSOR\VXFK
ships as men-of-ZDU¶  2QFH DJDLQ WKHUH ZDV D UHOXFtance to finally decide to place 
armament aboard mail steamers.17 
 
                                                 
13
    Hamilton, W.M., µ7KHµ1HZ1DYDOLVP¶DQGWKH%ULWLVKNavy League, 1895-¶ 
      7KH0DULQHU¶V0LUURU  Vol. 64  (1978)  37-44 
14
    Rudyard Kipling, Just So Stories (1902) 
15
    The torpedo appears to have been perceived as solely a surface ship weapon at this time. 
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Fig.5 H.M.S Hecla. 
Nevertheless, the interest in adapting merchant ships continued. The Naval Estimates in 
1877/78 provided for a trial which was carried out by converting the British Crown into 
the armed cruiser named H.M.S. Hecla being commissioned on 7th                   
March 1878. Hecla was fitted with  five muzzle loading guns firing a 64  pound shell  
and one breech-loading  40 pounder. The vessel could deliver broadside, bow or stern 
fire. Captain Singer and Admiral Boys, who had been on board reported that the 
experiment was successful.  In fact, so successful that twenty four sets of armament  
similar to +HFOD¶V were sent to foreign stations for local fitting  to merchant ships on 
ocean trade routes.18  In 1883, Captain A.K.Wilson concluded that +HFOD¶V armament 
was not ideal and the debate as to suitable attributes of an arPHG PHUFKDQW FUXLVHU¶V
construction and armament moved forward again. A dormant list of merchant vessels 
suitable for conversion, started to be kept by the Admiralty.  
 
The fast, modern Cunard liners Oregon and Umbria built in 1883 and 1884, took the 
development of the armed merchant cruiser forward.19  These ships had incorporated 
the current Admiralty guidelines developed for armed cruisers.20  As a result of this 
encouraging experience, in 1886 an agreement was reached giving the Admiralty an 
option for five years RQWKHXVHRI&XQDUG¶VILYHIDVWHUVKLSVDVDX[LOLDU\FUXLVHUV7KHUH
was a total subsidy of £20,000 per ship being paid annually for Umbria, Etruria and  
Aurania as part of the deal. The agreement required half the crew to be Royal Naval 
Reservists and gun platforms to be fitted. Owners were required to store and maintain 
guns and mountings as well as guaranteeing to fit the ships as auxiliary cruisers in one 
week at short notice.21  
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7KH¶V VDZD IOXUU\RI VLWXDWLRQV LQZKLFK WKH Navy took ships up from trade to 
serve not only as transports but also armed cruisers. Even earlier, in the Abyssinian 
War, six P&O steamers were employed on Red Sea and Indian Ocean transport work. 
The waterless landing place for the Expedition was supported by the shLSV¶FRQGHQVHUV
providing the army with 500,000 gallons of distilled water.  In 1882 unrest in Egypt 
saw P&O providing a refugee ship and eight transports for the Egyptian Expedition.  In 
1884, when the Mahdi forces were beleaguering small Egyptian garrisons, P&O was 
called on, at short notice, to transport troops from Cairo to Suakim in the Red Sea. 
:KHQWZRRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶VHDVWERXQGVKLSVFDOOHGDW3RUW6DLGWKH\ZHUHFRQYHUWHG
for troops during their southbound Canal transit. Within 10 and 16 hours respectively, 
of their arrival at Suez, they departed for Suakim fully provisioned, with 1600 troops 
aboard.   In another crisis with Russia in 1885, the first steps to protect shipping in 
Eastern waters were equipping 3	2¶VMassilia at Sydney and Rosetta at Hong Kong as 
armed cruisers. 7KH YHVVHOV ZHUH UHSRUWHG WR EH µILWWHG ZLWK JXQV DQG PLOLWDU\ VWRUHV 
and were performing gun drill before vessels chartered at Liverpool for the same 
purpose KDGWDNHQWKHLUHTXLSPHQWRQERDUG¶With these recent experiences in mind, 
in 1887, P&O started to build a class of four Jubilee ships which were fitted with gun-
platforms and material for speedy conversion to armed cruisers.22 
 
Cheap Alternative or Value For Money? 
Armed cruisers came to the fore during the Naval Estimates Debate in the House of 
Commons on 7th September 1887.   A 59 page transcript starts with a 30 page barrage 
of criticism by Sir John Colomb, formerly a Royal Marine Artillery officer, before 
becoming a Member of Parliament.23  Colomb projected himself as a supporter of the 
Empire and protection of trade by a strong Navy. He also strove to use facts and 
statistics when he spoke in the House. This debate was no exception. The retention of 
the transcript in P&O records shows the company¶V LQWHUHVW LQ WKH GHEDte, no doubt 
prompted by the events recorded above. 
 
Colomb wanted µWRreduce the Vote by £10,000 being the subvention for the rights of 
pre-HPSWLRQRUKLUHDVDUPHGFUXLVHUVRUWUDQVSRUW¶7KHFUX[RIWKH Admiralty proposal 
was to set aside a fund, payable to selected shipowners, to ensure the availability of 
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specified vessels in time of war, no doubt prompted by events of the decade. The 
proposal was presented as a new policy and Colomb demanded, not unreasonably, to 
NQRZµWKHHQGVDQGREMHFWVDQGOLPLWDWLRQVRIWKLVQHZSROLF\¶+HDOVRZDQWHGWRNQRZ
what existing policy it was to replace. Colomb asserted µLQWKHPHUFDQWLOHPDULQHWKHUH
is an enormous dormant reserve of naval power and the only question is how it is  
WR EH XWLOLVHG¶ 24  Colomb then claiPHG WKH $GPLUDOW\¶V ROG SROLF\ DPRXQWHG WR QR
more than a faint idea of using the mercantile marine. He believed an unpublished list 
of 300 vessels totalling over 1,000,000 tons existed but in the Egyptian crisis vessels  
other than those listed were chartered. Colomb then moved to the facts. The proposed 
£10,000 was to give control over two ships and bought the right of employing them in 
war at a fixed (but as yet unknown) sum.  
Colomb continued: 
«««we are to pay the £10,000 in peace for reserving that right.  Now, in  
1883 the Admiralty hired three transports, in 1884 it hired 26, and in 1885  
for this small expedition to Egypt over this small distance 121 ships were 
 hired and the entire cost of that large number of vessels, nearly 150, for a 
 small expedition to send a short distance was over a million and a half 
 of money. Now it is quite evident that if you have for an Expedition 
 of that kind and that you require over 150 transports you have to give a 
 larger force for double the distance and you will see how the number of  
 those transports must swell. Therefore in this matter of transport as a  
 provision for war I think that the payment of £10,000 for two ships can 
 produce no effect  if you want transport. 25 
 
It is easy to imagine this tirade being delivered as a scathing attack. Credit must be 
JLYHQWR&RORPEIRUKLVXVHRIµH[SDQGLQJ¶VWDWLVWLFVDQGHPRWLYHZRUGVVXFKDVµVPDOO¶
DQGµVKRUW¶DVZHOODVµODUJHU¶DQGµGRXEOH¶WRVXLWKLVDUJXPHQW.  That said, a reader can 
start to feel some substance in his emerging argument. 
 
Colomb was concerned at the proposed maximum cost of up to £50,000 a year for 10 
ships in peace time. In five years of peace this would total £250,000 compared with the 
16 ships costing £600,000 when the threat of war actually existed in 1885. This was an 
average cost of £37,500. In fact, only one ship was fully equipped and it took 42 days 
from being chartered to having her guns aboard. Many of the others never left harbour.  
Colomb went on to accuse the Admiralty of using the idea of armed merchant cruisers 
to avoid ordering purpose built cruisers for the Navy.  He considered the proposed 
expense as a gift to the shipowners. He felt that if it was to ensure availability and 
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prevent ship sales to foreign powers then laws should be passed to prevent this. 
Although he spoke ZLGHO\RI%ULWDLQ¶VPHUFDQWLOHWUDGHURXWHV, his thoughts on how to 
deploy armed cruisers were somewhat convoluted. He envisaged the cruisers would 
carry out patrols whilst continuing with their carriage of mails and cargoes, even 
suggesting that passengers would prefer to travel aboard armed merchant cruisers rather 
than slower unarmed ships.26   
 
It then fell to Mr. Forwood WR VWDUW D  SDJH UHEXWWDO RI &RORPE¶V FULWLFLVPV27  
Forwood started by saying the idea was not new and whilst the present Board of 
Admiralty were united in the proposal, previous Boards had considered the plan. It was  
with the 1885 debacle in mind, that the proposal had been brought up. At the root of the 
proposal was the need to ensure our best steamers could not be sold to foreign owners 
ZKR PLJKW EH LQLPLFDO WR XV &RORPE¶V LGHD RI OHJLVODWLRQ ZDV XQZRUNDEOH since in 
times of emergency, and no hostilities had started, it is difficult to pass any law that is 
only to operate on the outbreak of hostilities.  A shipowner could easily sell to a 
mutually agreed neutral flag. Afterwards, the vessel could be sold on to an unfriendly 
foreign state. Later in the debate, this was confirmed by Sir E.J.Reed who admitted he 
had been approached by foreign powers, in past emergencies, with a view to securing 
VRPHRI%ULWDLQ¶VIDVWHVWVWHDPHUV28  
 
Forwood analysed the costs and demonstrated that the proposal was financially very 
sound. Gun platforms and gun carriages were stored where the ships usually came to 
refit and so they could be made ready at short notice. The Admiralty had stipulated that 
half the crew would be Naval Reserve men. The need was for ships capable of 16 knots 
and speed had a price. It was not thought there would be many ships with this high 
speed and the proposal would provide funds to give control of them. Forwood gave a 
reassurance: 
 
It is far from the idea of the Board of Admiralty that these vessels 
are to supersede Naval Cruisers. 29   
 
Later he carefully encouraged Members to support the proposal when he said: 
 
I do not mean to say that those 10 vessels are a proper substitute for the  
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            10 Cruisers but the House may  be able to form some estimate of the 
            comparative cost of having 10 vessels always under our finger and thumb 
            and in our call whenever we want them and building 10 steamers and keeping 
            them up. Now ten cruisers of speed at all to compare with merchant steamers 
            would cost something like one million and a half of money. To maintain, 
            man and keep these ships in repair would cost about £150,000.30 
 
 
Presented like this, the thought of £50,000 per annum for the control of 10 armed 
merchant cruisers probably started to be attractive to those in the House. Conversely,  it 
FRQILUPHG&RORPE¶VVXVSLFLRQWKH$GPLUDOW\ZDVGRLQJLWRQWKHFKHDS Colomb  also 
argued the Government should follow foreign countries examples and support owners 
in their ship design and construction. He thought the trifling subvention of £10,000 per 
2 ships would hardly be enough encouragement. Forwood was at pains to announce 
that the White Star Line had found the sums sufficient to lay down two ships as a result 
of the prospect of the subvention. These ships would have their engines and boiler well 
secured and not exposed to shell and shot and meet the wishes of the Naval 
Constructor.31  
 
A supportive speech from Sir E.J.Reed for the Admiralty was followed by a few small 
exchanges between Colomb and Forwood. Colomb fell back to claiming his only 
thought was for the British tax payer.  Finally, his motion was withdrawn and the Vote 
agreed.32 Both Colomb and Forwood proposed the deployment of armed merchant 
FUXLVHUV DV WUDGH SURWHFWLRQ DQG µVFRXWLQJ¶  7KH VXFFHVV RI WKH ODWWHU SXUSRVH ZDV
dependent on outpacing an enemy to return to base with a sighting report ± the days of 
wireless were some way off.  Despite these woolly statements, the debate placed the 
important idea of armed merchant cruisers firmly on an agenda affecting the Navy, its 
Reserves and the management of major shipping lines.  In 1888 ten ships of the P&O, 
four from ,QPDQ /LQH DQG WKH :KLWH 6WDU¶V Majestic and Teutonic, among others, 
formed part of a total of twenty seven ships on the Armed Cruiser list, drawn from 
eight different companies.  The addition of fast ships to the auxiliary register was part 
of the sweeping changes in the Naval Defence Act of 1889.  The Act planned to 
increase the number of cruisers but even Victorian capitalism did not run to building 
the desired number. Despite protestations to the contrary, the Admiralty found it 
expedient to develop the armed merchant cruisers to help protect trade.33 
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Sir Thomas Sutherland, chairman of the P&O , in an  interview reported in the Pall 
Mall Gazette, when asked if  in favour of the armed cruiser policy he replied:  
 
Decidedly, I am of opinion that the Government should have first call upon  
the best and latest steamers of our mercantile marine. And the Admiralty is  
slowly coming round to the view that our great merchant vessels may in time 
of war prove themselves valuable auxiliaries to the Navy.  I do not mean, 
           of course, that a merchant ship can ever be transformed into a man of war.   
A merchant cruiser is armed for purposes of defence, not offence; and with 
the great speed that our biggest ships now possess, and their enormous coal-
 carrying capacity, they would  be of the utmost service if war broke out. The  
fastest vessels would, of course, be employed as patrols and scouts,  
 perhaps as transports; while the slower vessels could be engaged in  
 carrying coal and stores for the blockading Squadrons.     
 
So Sir Thomas, as a shipping magnate and Member of Parliament, was conveniently in 
tune with Government and Admiralty thinking.  Sutherland went on to make the point 
µWKDW LI ZDU EURNH RXW IDVW ELJ VWHDPHUV ZRXOG ULVH WUHPHQGRXVO\ LQ YDOXH¶  If the 
Government wanted to be certain of their services then it would be necessary to buy 
them right out as hiring them would hardly be entertained by the owners.  For this 
reason the policy of a subvention was needed in time of peace. The subvention was an 
µDQWLFLSDWRU\ FRPSHQVDWLRQ IRU WKH PRGHUDWH UDWH DW ZKLFK WKHVH ILUVW FODVV YHVVHOV
ZRXOG EH FKDUWHUHG LQ WLPH RI ZDU¶  7KH 3	2 KDG IRXUWHHQ YHVVHOV UHWDLQHG E\ WKH 
Government. The monetary subvention was received on only four of the steamers ± µZH
have presented the other ten ± so as to speak ± WRWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶   7KLVµODUJHVVH¶QR
doubt helped Sutherland reconcile any conflict of interest between being a shipowner 
and simultaneously an M.P. concerned for the Defence of the Realm.   Finally, the 
interview turned to the question of manning the armed merchant cruisers. The 
*RYHUQPHQW KDG ZDQWHG DQ\ µHDUPDUNHG¶ VWHDPHU WR EH PDQQed by a crew of which 
fifty percent, were Naval Reservists.  Sutherland said he would be very pleased to 
employ Reservists but not enough of them were available. He made the point if this 
was to be a pre-requisite foU D VWHDPHU WR EH µOLVWHG¶  the Admiralty must make the 
effort to develop the Naval Reserve. This was not the task of the shipowner.34 
  
Above all, Sutherland was a commercially minded ship manager and understood the 
financing, construction, manning and potential difficulties which would affect 
operating merchant vessels as armed cruisers. His contemporaries in Cunard and 
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RMSPC would have shared his views and whilst the mail contracts helped create a 
façade of  Victorian patriotism,  deep down they were in the shipping business to make 
a profit.  
 
Towards an Understanding of Requirements 
By 1891 the Admiralty had set out the regulations and terms on which the subventions 
would be paid on vessels which may be employed as armed merchant cruisers.35  The 
preamble read: 
 
 The Board of Admiralty will consider from time to time applications 
  from owners who may have built or who propose to build, steamers 
  which will be suitable for use as armed merchant cruisers, to have 
         such steamers placed on the list of vessels for which a subvention is paid. 
  Such applications will be considered on the terminations of any contract 
  which the owners of vessels that are now on the list. 
 
The regulations then set out the detailed specifications required to be met by ships on 
the list.  A prime criteria was speed and this controlled the basic level of subvention. 
 
 
Average continuous speed 
 on ocean  voyages. 
Annual subvention  
                        21 Knots                           £10,000 
                        ³                             £9,000 
                        ³                             £8,000 
                        ³                             £6,000 
                        ³                             £4,500 
                        ³                             £3,350  
 
Fig.6 Armed Merchant Cruiser basic subvention rates 1891. 
  
However, the interests of the taxpayer were given comfort by the fact that in the case of 
vessels having a mail subsidy these subventions were reduced by 25%.  A further  
reduction was imposed of £12 a head per annum, for any deficiency in the average 
number of Royal Naval Reserve men borne less than the number required by the rules.    
The specifications developed three lists of vessels which gave the Admiralty valuable 
potential options in the event of taking these steamers up from trade. 
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  List I - List of merchant vessels qualified for service as Armed  
                        Cruisers and receiving an Annual Subvention.  Comprising: 
 
                          Company  No. of Ships     Total 11. 
                          Cunard  2 
                          White Star Line  2 
                          P&O  4 
                          Canadian Pacific  3 
                  
  List II - List of Merchant vessels qualified for service as Armed Cruisers,  
                          which the Admiralty at their option can claim to Purchase or  
                          Hire when required. 
 
                            Company  No. of Ships     Total 17. 
                            Cunard 
   4                 (16-18 Knots) 
                            White Star Line 
   3                 (14-15 Knots) 
                            P&O 
 10                 (14-16 Knots)  
 
 
          List III - List of other Merchant Vessels which are qualified for Service 
                            as Armed Cruisers. 
 
            Company  No. of Ships     Total  28 
            Royal Mail Steam Packet   11   
            Pacific Steam Navigation     4 
            Union Steamship     2 
            David Currie     2 
            P&O     1 
            Orient Line     3 
            Guion Line     2 
            Barrow Steamship     1 
            Canadian Australian SS      2 
 
,QWHUHVWLQJO\/LVW,LQFOXGHG:KLWH6WDU/LQH¶VTeutonic built in 1889 which was later 
taken up for the 10th Cruiser Squadron.  List III included 11 RMSPC steamers but in 
the event none of these were to join the Squadron.  Indeed most of them did not rate the 
recommended speed of 16 knots.  Significantly, List III bore the printed footnote that  
µRZQHUVRIWKHVHYHVVHOVKDYe not made a definite application to have WKHPVXUYH\HG¶
It may be they were unaware these vessels were on this dormant Admiralty list.   
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Looking at the owners, it is clear the range of speed and geographical options 
concentrated on the fast transatlantic runs and the key routes via the Mediterranean to 
the East or south to the Cape. 
 
In the South African wars the Admiralty chartered merchant ships as transports and 
troopships but not armed cruisers. However, the planning and correspondence 
regarding armed cruisers continued.36   There had evolved an DJUHHPHQWNQRZQDVµ7KH
WKLWH 6WDU $JUHHPHQW RI ¶ ODWHU this was to be UHSODFHG E\ WKH µ&RPELQHG
$JUHHPHQW RI ¶ EXW ZLWKRXW VXEYHQWLRQ  $OZD\V ZLWK DQ H\H RQ D EXGJHW WKH
AdPLUDOW\ VRUW WR IL[ WKH µKLUH¶ costs in advance of any take up from trade. Not 
surprisingly this was resisted by the shipping companies, who obviously had an eye on 
the market rates which would actually exist in wartime.37  An Inter-Departmental 
Committee considered how to apply the SULQFLSOHµWKDWQR*RYHUQPHQWVXEVLG\VKDOOEH
given to any company which will not give the Admiralty the right of purchase or hire in 
WKHHYHQWRIZDURQSUHYLRXVO\DUUDQJHGWHUPV¶ 
 
7KH $GPLUDOW\¶V ZLVK WR IL[ FRVWV DV IDU DV SRVVible beforehand contrasted with the 
Board of Trade which recorded the following protest: 
 Under Schedule 3 of the New Cunard agreement the conditions for 
         purchase or hire appear to relate only to the use of the vessels as cruisers,  
 and it will be remembered that this Dept: has always deprecated the use 
 of vessels for transport work forming part of an agreement for purchase or 
 hire for cruiser purposes, it being held that the Dept: should be free to  
 take up, on the best terms obtainable at the time, any British vessels meeting 
 its special requirements.  
 
Finally, the Transport Department made the point: 
 The fixing of rates by agreement beforehand in the case of a limited and 
 special class of vessels, which must be engaged under special conditions, 
 and are only wanted in Naval War, was no doubt advantageous;  but to apply  
 the same principle to the numerous ships suitable as ordinary transports is an 
 entirely fresh departure, which in the opinion of the Department would be a 
 source of loss rather than gain to the Crown. 
 
Linking the Armed Merchant Cruiser and Naval Reservists. 
The discussions with legal advisers continued until 1908. The records reveal that a 
certain amount of negotiating correspondence sprang up between the Admiralty and 
individual companies.  An example in respect of Cunard  follows: 
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With regard to the question of complement, under the present arrangement  
 The Company undertake that in peace time half the officers, other than  
 engineers, and not less than half of the crew carried shall belong to the R.N.R.  
 or R.F.R.. It appears probable that without the increase of subsidy the Company 
 might be willing to arrange that half of the Engine Room Dept. should also 
 be comprised of R.N.R. and R.F.R. Officers and men. 
 
There was also a growing desire to charter merchant vessels on a monthly basis, no 
doubt another SOR\ WR OLPLW WKH &URZQ¶V RXWJRLQJV  6RPH RI WKH &RPSDQLHV ZHUH
prepared to continue to provide food for the crew aboard ships taken up and where this 
happened the hire payable was increased per gross ton per month e.g. 20/- became 
24/- and 17/6 became 21/6.   
 
Finally by 1908  the Combined Agreement had emerged with the two types of Charter 
Form established, both on monthly hire: 
 
 Charter A  to correspond with the revised Transport Regulations  
          (without demise to the Crown) 
 Charter B  applicable to all Commissioned Mercantile Fleet Auxiliaries 
                   (with demise to the Crown) 38  
 
Clearly that the idea of taking up ships from trade was considered sufficiently 
important to occupy significant planning effort by the Admiralty to establish 
commercial negotiations with a range of owners.    
 
Speeds on the Atlantic routes continued to increase and speed was a major prerequisite 
for armed merchant cruisers. In 1907, Cunard brought out the Lusitania and 
Mauretania both capable of an average speed of 24 knots.39  The British Government 
had made a loan to Cunard of £2,400,000 at 2¾% interest for the ships. They were 
VWLIIHQHGWRFDUU\´JXQVDQGKDGDQDQQXDORSHUDWLQJVXEVLG\Rf £75,000 per ship in 
addition to the Mail subsidy.  6HFXULW\IRUWKHORDQLQFOXGHG&XQDUG¶VZKROHIOHHW 
which was to be held at the disposal of the Government.40 The interest in armed 
merchant cruisers was now reaching almost obsessive levels. However, the expansion 
of German liners and their rumoured, superior armament no doubt focussed the minds 
of the  British planners.  In the event, biggest is not always best and when war came,  
Lusitania and Mauretania  proved better suited to trooping. Their huge fuel costs  
changed their role in the war. 
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Responsibility for arranging transport for Government work laid with the Transport 
Department of the Admiralty. Mainly, this was chartering passenger vessels for 
trooping and organising passages for Naval and Army officers with the main shipping 
companies. In addition, some three or four hundred colliers were chartered in a year, 
mainly on single voyages to supply the Fleet and naval bases. The Department was also 
entrusted to make detailed shipping plans for expeditionary forces and ships required 
for naval use under approved naval war plans.  Although limited in scale, it had 
experience of the commercial nature of shipping and the need to negotiate within the 
industry.41     Whilst WKHWHUPµUHTXLVLWLRQLQJ¶KDVDQDuthoritarian ring to it, the taking 
up of merchant ships from trade, had steadily evolved as a subtle combination of legal 
enforcement and commercial negotiation for tonnage in the market. The tonnage was 
found by ordinary commercial processes such as business contacts, press notices 
calling for tenders and the Baltic Exchange facilities. Although patriotism was more 
commonplace prior to World War I, technically, shipowners could have µIODJJHGRXW¶LI
they had not wanted their ships caught up in the war. However, the continuance of mail 
contracts and the prospect of guaranteed freight money from a Government committed 
to war were strong incentives to remain under the Red Ensign.     
 
Planning for the take up of ships was matched by parallel planning as to their manning. 
Between 1900 and 1911 Parliament and the Admiralty had passed Acts,  progressively 
strengthening the Naval Reserve forces to be available in time of war.42   The raising or 
keeping of a standing army within Britain and Ireland in time of peace, without the 
consent of Parliament, was unlawful. The answer was to bring forward the Army Act 
for renewal by Parliament each year, when amendments were incorporated. The Act 
had long included requisitioning powers for carriages and horses but in 1913 Section 
[5] it was extended to LQFOXGHµYHVVHOV¶DQGµDLUFUDIWRIDOOGHVFULSWLRQV¶43   
 
Requisitioning and the Transition to War. 
By 1914 the necessary planning, legal and commercial negotiations to take ships up 
from trade were firmly in place and when war was declared, only two more triggers 
were needed. The first was the Defence of the Realm Act which was passed on the 8th 
August 1914.44 Its wording was short, succinct and all embracing. It started as follows: 
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   [1] His Majesty in Council has power during the continuance of the 
                  present war to issue regulations as to the powers and duties of the 
                  $GPLUDOW\DQG$UP\&RXQFLODQGRIWKHPHPEHUVRI+LV0DMHVW\¶V 
                  forces, and other persons acting on his behalf, for securing the public 
                  VDIHW\DQGWKHGHIHQFHRIWKHUHDOP«««« 
 
The other trigger came from The London Gazette on Friday 31st July 1914, calling out 
the Naval Reserves and announcing the Requisitioning of Ships.45  The .LQJ¶V
Proclamation gave authority to the Admiralty µWRUHTXLVLWLRQDQ\%ULWLVK6KLSRU%ULWLVK
9HVVHOZLWKLQ WKH%ULWLVK ,VOHVRU WKH:DWHUV$GMDFHQW WKHUHWR¶   Whilst stressing the 
need and national emergency it continued:  
  ««RZLQJWRWKHXUJHQF\RIWKHQHHGLWLVLmpossible to delay 
 the employment of such vessels until the terms of engagement  
 KDYHEHHQPXWXDOO\DJUHHGXSRQ««««««««««« 
 
and concludes with the principles as to the terms of engagement:  
  ««««for such period of time as may be necessary on condition 
 that the Owners of all ships and vessels so requisitioned shall receive 
 payment for their use, and for services rendered during their employment 
 in the Government service, and compensation for loss or damage thereby 
 occasioned, according to terms to be arranged as soon as possible after 
 the said ship has been taken up, either by mutual agreement between the 
 Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty and the Owners or failing 
     such Agreement by the award of a Board of Arbitration to be constituted 
  and  Appointed by Us for this purpose.  
 
On the same day, secret advance notices were sent to various ship owners that certain 
ships from the Armed Merchant Cruiser register might be required for war service.  
 
So as de Chair led the Edgar Class cruisers to northern waters, the process had already 
been started to find replacements from trade which would be desperately needed in 
RQO\DIHZPRQWKV¶WLPH 
 
A telegram such as that sent to Andersons for 2ULHQW/LQH¶VOtranto would be followed 
by a letter of confirmation.46  
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Fig.6 Requisition telegram Otranto 
 
Merchant Ship Conversion. 
Prior to conversion work, a Pre Charter Condition Survey would be made and agreed. 
This work would ensure any routine maintenance required by national and international 
legislation was up to date, as well as reviewing the general condition of the vessel and 
machinery. Thereafter, maintenance was in accordance with good seamanlike practice 
 
Before examining the conversion of merchant ships to their auxiliary warship role, it is 
necessary to understand their different roles and construction.  Purpose built warships 
are essentially a weapons¶ platforms and their purpose is to remain afloat, whilst 
operating their weapons for as long as possible. Thus, warships have a high degree of 
internal subdivision into many internal watertight compartments. Hull plating is 
strengthened in places with armoured plating and the continuous weather-deck 
completes what is essentially a strong box structure.  In contrast, merchant ships need 
plenty of internal open space, with minimum subdivision, to create flexible stowage 
arrangements for cargo or room to build extensive living accommodation for  
passengers. Merchant ships are also strong box structures but with one essential 
difference. The weather-deck of a merchant ship is interrupted by large hatch openings. 
These are needed to load and discharge the cargo, into and from, WKHKROGVDQGµWZHHQ
decks.  At sea these openings are made secure and watertight by portable beams, hatch-
boards and tarpaulins. The latter two are held in place by locking bars together with 
battens and wedges against cleats on the hatch coaming. There is no armoured plating 
on a merchant ship¶V hull when built.   
 
Telegram                          Admiralty, London 
O.H.M.S.                         Anderson, Telex, London. 
Urgent and confidential OTRANTO is requisitioned under Royal proclamation 
IRU VHUYLFH DV DUPHG PHUFKDQW FUXLVHU Ɣ 2ZQHUV UHTXLUHG to supply coal full 
bunkers engine room and deck stores for four months mess traps and utensils for 
IXOO FRPSOHPHQW DQG YLFWXDOOLQJ IRU WKUHH PRQWKV DOO DW $GPLUDOW\ H[SHQVH Ɣ
Admiralty prepare ship but will require all assistance possible from you also in 
obtaining engine room complement which will be signed on from mercantile 
PDULQHƔ&DSWDLQ+XQW51FR3	27LOEXU\DSSRLQWHGWRVXSHULQWHQGILWWLQJ
Ɣ3OHDVHDFNQRZOHGJH/HWWHUIROORZVƔ7UDQVSRUWVƔVHQW 
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This fundamental difference in hull construction was at the core of %DUQDE\¶VFRQFHUQV
as DNC in 1875.  After inspecting many merchant ship plans he was appalled at the 
lack of sub-division in many of them, revealing ships that were un-stiffened and frail.  
To convert such ships would be a long process when time would be precious in any run 
up to war. Another vulnerable point was that merchant ships propulsion machinery had 
much of it located above the vessels waterline. However, good sub-division did exist in 
some vessels and the outcome was to persevere with the armed merchant cruiser 
concept.47 So much so, that by August 1881 there were 207 ships on the Admiralty 
auxiliary cruiser list and another seventy building.48 
 
Merchant ship technology advanced with speeds increasing and for passenger ships the 
move from single screw to twin screw gave more manoeuvrability. As stated earlier, by 
1891 the Admiralty had issued regulations regarding the armed merchant cruiser. In 
making a selection from any steamers offered, the Board intended to give preference to 
vessels which most closely met the following nine conditions: 
 1.  Highest continuous seagoing speed at load draught 
 2.  A minimum of 50 days coal endurance for all purposes at 10 knots  
 3.  Twin screws 
 4.  Ample sub-division into water-tight compartments 
 5.  Good coal protection of such portion of the boilers or machinery 
      as may be above the water 
 6.  Approval of designs before construction where practical 
 7.  The retention, free of charge, of other suitable vessel or vessels 
      with each steamer subsidized 
 8.  Convenience of trade in which the vessel is engaged for prompt 
      use in the event of emergency 
 9.  A reasonable surrender value 49    
The Lists I, II and III mentioned earlier, clearly take these key attributes into account as 
far as possible.  
 
Although Otranto was not designated for the 10th Cruiser Squadron, Poolmans account 
of her the conversion activity reveals the frantic work to be completed. 2WUDQWR¶V 
owners, the Orient Line, carried out the work at Tilbury.  
  
 Decks under gun platforms were strengthened and shored up, packing rings 
 were fitted, and the guns themselves secured in place ± HLJKW¶VIRXUZLWK 
shields, four older ones without. Bollards and fairleads were cut away to give 
a good arc of fire. A rangefinder was fitted on the bridge, magazines and shell 
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rooms built in the fore and aft holds, with flooding arrangements. Steel plate 
half an inch thick was installed round the steering engine house, bagged coal 
was stowed abreast the engine cylinder tops. Cabin bulkheads, glass ventilators 
 and furniture were removed to make space for mess-decks, a large sick bay with 
cots was fitted up in the old smoking room and an operating theatre set up 
amidships, the most stable part of the ship at sea.  
 
The work had started on the 4th August 1914, when the vessel was taken up and 
completed in only nine days.50  The workforce needed was: 
   
  Shipwrights  45 for 4 days,14 for 4 more days  
  Boilermakers 70 
  Shore party & bosun  20 
  Joiners  30 reducing to 12 
  Electricians    3-4 
  Plumbers        2-4 
  Together with an unrecorded number in shore workshops 51 
  
Poolman omits to mention that at least the vessel¶VXSSHUZRUNVDQGIXQQHOV would have 
been painted grey in this time.  The summary shows the amount of pre-planning that 
had now grown up around the take up of vessels to be converted. It also shows the 
benefits of a significant ship repair industry, dry-dock and maintenance facilities which 
existed in most British port complexes. These had developed as a result of a large 
British merchant fleet needing support in the ordinary course of trading. Without this 
infrastructure the rapid conversions would have been impossible. Brown also states in 
the month of August, 1914 eleven such conversions were already in progress and by 
any standards this would have been a testing challenge.52      
 
The merchant ships designated for the 10th Cruiser Squadron were either 
passenger/cargo or cargo/passenger ships, depending on the predominant activity. To 
change the nature of these vessels to auxiliary cruisers meant compromises and some 
fundamental reworking of essential elements of a ship¶V design. The most basic of these 
was WKH YHVVHO¶V VWability $ PHUFKDQW VKLS¶V GUDXJKt will vary hugely between her 
loaded condition DQG ZKHQ µOLJKW¶ ship with no cargo aboard.  The loaded condition 
means that propellers are fully immersed and most efficient. This be appreciated by 
recognising  in a single screw cargo ship LQDµOLJKW¶FRQGLWLRQ, a propeller may not even 
be immersed for a full revolution, resulting in loss of power.  For this reason, twin 
screw steamers were preferred since their propellers were more deeply immersed for 
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most of the time. The armed merchant cruisers needed permanent ballast, using either 
stone or pig iron, so that they floated close to their loaded draft. This ballast 
compensated for the absence of cargo which when carried was always carefully 
DSSRUWLRQHG EHWZHHQ ORZHU KROG DQG µWZHHQ GHFN   7RR PXFK ZHLJKW LQ WKH KROGV 
FUHDWHG WRRJUHDWD µULJKWLQJ OHYHU¶PDNLQJ WKHYHVVHO µVWLII¶ RU µFUDQN¶  LQD VHDZD\
This could cause severHµUDFNLQJ¶VWUHVVHVoQWKHVKLS¶VIUDPLQJDVVKHUROOed quickly.  
Conversely, too little weight in the hold made WKHYHVVHO µWHQGHU¶DQGcreated a slow, 
gentler UROOLQJVLQFHWKHµULJKWing OHYHU¶ was reduced.  In practice the vessels would be 
ORDGHGVOLJKWO\µVWLII¶VRWKDWDV bunkers and water were used, the severity of the rolling 
decreased.53  This was a most important issue for the Squadron¶V VKLSV, in view of 
being tasked to the Norwegian Sea and Icelandic waters.   Precautions had to be taken 
to prevent the ballast from moving in a sea way.  Warships, once built and fitted out 
vary their drafts by only a small amount depending on how much fuel, water and 
ammunition is on board, consequently unlike a merchant ship their stability changes 
little during normal operations. 
 
The extensive watertight sub-division in warships has been mentioned and to simulate 
this in the armed merchant cruisers, large baulks of timber and large numbers of empty  
40 gallon drums were stowed in the holds. These provided additional buoyancy in the 
event that the hull plating was breached by gunfire or torpedo. The principle is known 
DVµSHUPHDELOLW\¶DQGWKHSUHVHQFHRIGUXPVDQGWLPEHUUHGXFHGWKHDYDLODEOHVSDFHIRU 
the ingress of water. The holds were also used to provide additional stowage for coal 
bunkers as well as for the main ammunition magazines.  
 
Additional coal bunkers were often constructed abreast the main engines which were 
triple or quadruple expansion reciprocating steam engines. Typically tall, their 
cylinders were particularly vulnerable to damage by gunfire.  Another weak point was 
the emergency steering position at the after end of the ships.  Secondary steering on a 
warship is well protected. To protect the Squadron¶VVKLSV the after steering positions 
were given the protection of steel plating.  
    
The main armament was intended to allow the ships to fire a four barrel broadside from 
either side of the ship.  The larger ships had eight guns, four on each side. The smaller 
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VKLSVKDGVL[JXQVWZRRQHDFKVLGHSOXVRQHRQWKHI¶F¶sle and one on the poop deck.  
7KHI¶F¶VOHDQGSRRSJXQVZHUHRQWKHVKLS¶VFHQWUHOLQHDQGKDGDZLGHDUFRI ILUH WR
allow four barrels to be brought to bear on either side of the ship.  Originally the plans 
were for 4½ inch guns on all ships but these were replaced with 6 inch guns whenever 
possible, when it was realised that German commerce raiders had more powerful 6 inch 
guns. Ships joining the Squadron later in the war were fitted with 6 inch guns when 
taken up. 
 
Once work had been completed, two further vital tasks had to be done. Stability had to 
be verified and magnetic compasses adjusted.   Addition or removal of weights aboard 
DVKLSDOWHUV WKHYHVVHO¶VFHQWUHRIJUDYLW\DQG WKLV LQ WXUQDIIHFWV WKHµULJKWLQJ OHYHU¶  
The weight changes in the conversion process from guns, ballast and additional  
bunkers combined with the absence of a normal cargo, meant the stability had to be 
rechecked. $Q µLQFOLQLQJ WHVW¶ ZDV carried out under carefully controlled conditions.  
The resulting measurements allowed rHFDOFXODWLRQ RI WKH YHVVHO¶V EDVLF VWDELOLW\ The 
test would have been familiar work for a ship builder or repairer.  
  
Compass adjusters were found throughout ports serving the shipping industry. Ships¶ 
magnetic compasses require periodic adjustment. After structural changes likely to alter 
magnetic influences at the compass position, the ship must be swung by a qualified 
compass adjuster on all points of the compass.  The   difference between a true heading 
and the compass heading is FDOOHG µFRPSDVV HUURU¶   &RPSDVV HUURU KDV WZR
components, namely, µYDULDWLRQ¶DQGµGHYLDWLRQ¶9DULDWLRQLVWKHHIIHFWRIWKHHDUWK¶V
magnetism and differs between positions on the earth, however, its value is well 
documented. In contrast, deviation varies with WKH YHVVHO¶s heading as shipboard 
structures change their relative position to the compass needle.  Thus deviation is 
exclusive to a particular vessel and may be affected by different cargoes, especially 
steel cargoes. In the case of the armed merchant cruisers such changes were caused by 
the fitting of guns and other ferrous items.  Permanent magnets inside the binnacles are 
repositioned to minimise the effect of deviation.  A µdeviation card¶ showing the 
residual deviation on the major headings was then constructed.54   
 
Thus, the contents of a short Admiralty telegram, followed by a letter of confirmation, 
triggered a welter of activity based on detailed planning for many commercial merchant  
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ships from many different trades. Later, additions were needed such as the addition of 
paravane gear, against mines. In some cases depth charge chutes were fitted and also 
deceptive hull paint schemes primarily against submarines. 
 
Figure 7 overleaf shows a general arrangement drawing of Virginian when these 
additional measures had been adopted.55   The result was the armed merchant cruiser 
which was inevitably bound to be a compromise solution in the mind of a professional 
QDYDORIILFHU,QGHHGGH&KDLUKDGVDLGWKH\ZHUHRIµVPDOOILJKWLQJYDOXH¶ 
 
Two technical developments which came to affect all types of ship had developed 
during the pre-war years require special mention. These were electricity aboard ships 
and the arrival of wireless communications. Neither was compulsory for ships but all 
merchant ships in the Squadron were already fitted with both when taken up. 
 
7KHVHWKHQZHUHWKHSK\VLFDOUHVRXUFHVZKLFKZHUHSODFHGXQGHUGH&KDLU¶VDXWKRULW\
to replace the inadequate Edgar class cruisers. The Edgars looked like classic Victorian 
warships which in the first months may KDYH IL[HG -HOOLFRH¶V SHUFHSWLRQ RI WKHLU
purpose. He had often detached them from their interception duties to join other 
cruisers, under his command, on various sweeps - sometimes well into the North Sea. 
With such diversions and the dilution when two were off task to coal ship, it was 
remarkable that they achieved over 300 boardings in the early months of the 
blockade.56  Even if Jellicoe had allowed the Squadrons six ships on task, to 
concentrate solely on visit and search activities this would have been inadequate, given 
the huge sea area to be covered. De Chair had spent such a large part of his career 
actually at sea, he must have been well aware that his resources were inadequate in 
both quality and quantity. 
 
Early in August, de Chair was told that his Squadron was to be strengthened by four 
armed merchant cruisers, namely, Alsatian, Mantua, Oceanic and Teutonic. It was 
decided that these four ships when available would concentrate their patrols from the 
most northern point of the Shetlands to the north west.  This was issued by de Chair on 
19th $XJXVWLQKLVUHSRUWRISURFHHGLQJVUHTXLULQJWKHDUPHGPHUFKDQWFUXLVHUVWRµVWRS
DQGH[DPLQHDOOPHUFKDQWVKLSSLQJ¶57 
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Fig.7 General arrangement armed merchant cruiser Virginian. 
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When all seemed settled on 9th September the news broke that Oceanic was now a total 
wreck after her grounding near Foula Island.  Alsatian was tasked to take Oceanic¶s 
survivors to Liverpool, leaving Mantua and Teutonic on patrol.  Jellicoe confirmed  the 
10th Cruiser 6TXDGURQDQG µVXFK $UPHG0HUFKDQW&UXLVHUV DVPD\EH DWWDFKHG WR LW¶
were under de &KDLU¶VFRPPDQG$OVRLQGH&KDLU¶VDEVHQFHWKHVHQLRURIILFHUZDVWR
take charge and may receive orders direct from the Commander-in-Chief. In the same 
despatch Jellicoe withdrew the 10th Cruiser Squadron to the Cromarty Firth and placed 
Alsatian and Mantua with the Rear-Admiral, H.M.S. Drake, patrolling the Norwegian 
coast.58 De Chair hoisted his Flag in Alsatian on 4th December at Liverpool, after the 
withdrawal of the Edgars from the 10th Cruiser Squadron.   The blockade was now 
virtually non existent until the promised replacement armed merchant cruisers were 
ready.        
 
 In his Report of 25th January 1915, de Chair set out the situation as at the 4th December 
1914. 59 
Activity Liverpool London Avonmouth Hull Tyne Clyde 
Rearming 
:LWK´JXQV 
Alsatian      
Fitting Out Eskimo 
Caribbean 
Ambrose 
Oropesa 
Hilary 
Hildebrand 
Virginian  
Cedric 
Orotava 
Clan 
MacNaughton 
Digby 
Otway 
 
 
Patia 
Patuca 
Bayano 
Motagua 
Changuinola 
Calyx Viknor Columbella 
                                       Fig. 7   Fitting Out Situation as at 25.1.1915 
Almost without exception, the ships were fitting out at their normal home ports taking 
advantage of a familiar local ship repairing industry.  De Chair must have found it very 
helpful to have so many of his Squadron fitting out in Liverpool at the same time. This 
would give the opportunity to meet at least some of the new commanding officers as 
they took up their appointments.    
 
The Edgars had been between 22 and 24 years old and had heavier armament.  One 
author describes their merchant ship replacements as µdiverse¶ a tactful reference to 
their varying type and age.60  A look at the liners and their owners shows there is a 
clear sense of µage JURXSLQJ¶IURPGLIIHUHQWFRPSDQLHV3UREDEO\WKHPRVWREYLRXVLV
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Age Analysis 10th CS Armed Merchant Cruisers 
as at 31/12/1914
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WKH(OGHUVDQG)\IIHV¶JUoup of five very similar ships. An age analysis of the vessels 
reveals most were of relatively recent build. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 Fig.8 10th Cruiser Squadron - Age Analysis. 
Sixty six per cent of the Squadron (16 ships) were under ten years old, fifty per cent of 
the Squadron (12 ships) were under five years old and sixteen per cent of the Squadron 
(4 ships) were only one year old.  Nevertheless, a look at the list of ships (See 
Appendix 4ZRXOGUHYHDOWRDVHDPDQ¶VH\HDIHZSRLQWVIRUFRQFHUQLQWKHYHVVHOV
allocated to the Squadron.   
 
Two ships, Caribbean and Teutonic were twenty five years old, even older than the 
Edgars. Teutonic survived the war and proved to be a tower of strength in the 
Squadron.  In contrast, Caribbean lasted only a few months with the Squadron before 
being withdrawn for other work. She was a single screw ship, originally the Dunottar 
Castle for Union Castle line.61  When bought by RMSPC in 1913, renamed Caribbean 
and considered a bargain, her purchase avoided repairs to two older ships in the 
company. The next doubtful was Viknor (formerly the Viking) owned by the Viking 
Cruising Company which specialised in summer cruises to the Norwegian Fjords. 
Viking, formerly the Atrato from RMSPC, was an elegant ship with slender hull lines, 
raked funnels, low freeboard amidships and a clipper bow. Viknor was never intended 
for the Norwegian Sea and Icelandic waters in the winter.  Two former cargo ships the 
Clan MacNaughton and Digby seemed out of place on the list.  Whilst Digby had been 
built for the North Atlantic services of Furness Withy, Clan MacNaughton was 
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LQWHQGHGIRU&ODQ/LQH¶VVHUYLFHVEHWZHHQ%ULWDLQDQG,QGLDFinally, the Calypso and  
Eskimo from Wilson Line of Hull, built for service in the Baltic and North Sea also 
seemed out of place on the list. Calypso had been renamed H.M.S. Calyx, probably to 
avoid confusion with H.M.S. Calypso, the headquarters ship allocated to the 
Newfoundland Royal Naval Reserve in 1902.62   No doubt de Chair would have had 
concerns about at least some of these ships and events would later prove him to have 
been right to do so.  
 
The Admiralty had shown again, that the fleets of shipping companies were, in the 
Navy¶VPLQG, a µVWUDWHJLFUHVHUYHRIVKLSV¶WREHFRPPDQGHHUHGZKHQHYHU*RYHUQPHQW
saw fit.  The effectiveness of the blockade, to all practical purposes, was in abeyance 
whilst the merchant cruisers were fitted out.   At this point, the Admiralty made it very 
FOHDU WR -HOOLFRH DQG GH &KDLU WKDW ZKHQ UHDG\ WKH VKLSV ZHUH WR EH µHPSOR\HG
H[FOXVLYHO\IRUSDWUROGXW\¶63   It was a clear pointer to Jellicoe and potential support 
for de Chair if any interference should emerge.   This brief pause in events, gave de 
Chair the chance to think about how the increased number of ships might be deployed 
and also who would man them. The Edgars crews were to be transferred to the armed 
merchant cruisers, but many more officers and men would be needed. De Chair 
estimated it to be a complement of 9,800.64  With this new impetus, it was time to think 
about the µreserves of manpower¶ZKLFKFRXOG be made available and where they could 
be found.  
------------ 
   
                                                 
62
 For King and Country ± Stanley I Hillier and the Newfoundland Royal Naval Reserve       
    http://home.thezone.net/~ainal/for_king_and_country.htm   (Accessed 25/07/05) 
63
 TNA  ADM 137/989  Admiralty to C-in-C Home Fleet  18 November 1914   390 
64
 De Chair,  The Sea is Strong   184 
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µ&DOORXWWKH5HVHUYHV¶ is a rallying call as stirring and rousing as the cry from Victorian 
times to µ6HQG D *XQERDW¶  7KH DFW RI FDOOLQJ XS D QDWLRQ¶V reserve is deemed, in 
international diplomacy, a belligerent one.  In 1914, Britain did not delay in mobilising 
the Naval Reserves.  On Monday, 3rd $XJXVW WKH.LQJ¶V3URFODPDWLRQFDOOHGRXW
µ0HQRIWKH5R\DO1DYDO5HVHUYHDQG5R\DO)OHHW5HVHUYHDVZHOODV2IILFHUVDQG0HQ
of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve¶   A separate Proclamation on the same day called 
RXW µ2IILFHUV RI WKH 5R\DO 1DYDO 5HVHUYH¶  $ IXUWKHU 3URFODPDWLRQ announced the 
extension by five years, of the service of all classes of men in the Navy whose term of 
service had just expired or was about to expire.1  Here then, with one exception, were the 
crewing resources for the 6TXDGURQ¶VVKLSV.  There was no mention of Mercantile Marine 
ratings that, as civilians would be expected to form a vital part of the manning 10th 
Cruiser Squadron.2 Technically, these civilian personnel were free to stay or go, since 
conscription had not yet been introduced.  
 
All these sources of manpower had their own history, ethos and culture which needed 
moulding into a cohesive team by Admirals de Chair and Tupper together with the 
Royal Naval Commanding Officers and First Lieutenants of the ships. Additionally 
there were a numbers of ratings from the decommissioned Edgar cruisers.  This chapter 
will look at some of the historical background to these groups and examine their 
position in the years leading up to the war. This will include their backgrounds, 
training, motivation, conditions of service and rivalries.  
 
Impressment style recruiting fell into abeyance after 1815, but the law relating to it had 
not been repealed. A peacetime reduction of the Navy¶V size made the manning issue a 
lower priority.  However, the question of how the fleet would be manned in the event 
of war, occupied the thoughts of many in Government and the Admiralty. In that event, 
the need would be for seamen capable of handling sails and working guns. The arrival 
of steam propulsion circa 1830 to 1840, sometimes obscured the fact that sail handling 
remained a key skill aboard both warship and merchantman until almost the end of the 
century. For example, steam gunboats responsible for policing the Empire were 
barquentine rigged and used sail whenever possible. Sail handlers could be found 
aboard merchant vessels but the Navy would also need men competent at gunnery and 
teaching this to merchant seamen was at the heart of the concerns.   
 
                                                 
1
 The London Gazette, Friday 31st July 1914. Third Supplement 
2
 See Appendix 6 
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The solution would occupy nearly fifty years of discussion, theorising, politics, 
Treasury restraints, commercial resistance and plain stubbornness on the part of some 
naval officers and politicians. The issue ran parallel to the arguments about armed 
merchant cruisers and it was fortunate that no real major conflict emerged whilst all 
this took place. In the Crimean War it had been politic not to use powers of the press 
gang. However, a manning shortage for the Baltic Expedition in that war, generated 
some sense of urgency amongst politicians and the Admiralty which resulted in 1859 
the Royal Naval Reserve (Volunteers) Act being passed. The Act provided for the 
raising of a volunteer force of professional Mercantile Marine seamen to undergo naval 
training.3  There were no plans to recruit officers at this stage. 
   
Manpower planning is difficult at any time for large organisations. Requirements 
change, technology develops, international relations and government policies fluctuate, 
whilst at the back of all these variables remains the available finance. The Navy was 
subject to all these forces whilst ship and weapon technologies were advancing. In 
addition, there was always the changing asseVVPHQW DV WR DQ\ SRWHQWLDO HQHPLHV¶
resources. The challenge was finding a balance between peacetime needs and a rapid 
expansion needed in war. In 1852 the Admiralty set up a Commission on Manning 
which led to the idea of continuous service being introduced.4 This resulted in the 
benefits of stable employment to the Navy and the men.  Merchant seamen enjoyed no 
such employment security until the next century and continued to be paid off after each 
voyage.      
 
The concept of turning to the Mercantile Marine to provide a reserve of both ships and 
men seemed an obvious route. However, shipowners and merchant seamen did not 
always see the solution in the same light as some politicians and senior naval officers.  
Nevertheless, the 1859 Act setting up a naval force was at least a start.  
       
The Royal Naval Reserve (R.N.R.) 
Prior to 1859 there had been earlier attempts to form a reserve for the Navy. Initially 
the Sea Fencibles in the Napoleonic Wars and later the Royal Trinity House Artillery, 
consisting of a corps of 1200 men, raised by Trinity House from merchant seamen and 
                                                 
3
  Bowen, F.C.,  History of the Royal Naval Reserve  (London,1926)  8 
   %RZHQ¶VHistory of the Royal Naval Reserve  is the most authoritative and detailed  
   account of the   515¶VFUHDWLRQDQGHDUO\KLVWRU\ 
4
 Wells, J., The Royal Navy: An Illustrated Social History 1870-1982  
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their officers.5  The costs of the Press Gangs, when revealed, astounded the public and 
showed 3000 useful seamen were employed therein who would have been better 
deployed at sea. Figures for the Press Gang operations between 1811-1813 record that 
of 29,405 men pressed some 27,300 deserted.  In 1834 Sir James Graham brought 
forward his ticket scheme which intended to create a registry of merchant seamen to 
improve the status of seamen and a potential for a naval reserve.  His proposed bill was 
dropped but in 1835 the first Merchant Shipping Act was passed which covered much 
the same ground and set up a modified registry of British Seamen. The system was not 
a success since it was bedevilled with desertion by the seamen. The cause of this 
problem was the scandalous treatment of seamen by the owners, a problem which 
nobody cared to tackle.6  
 
By 1846 Captain Sulivan, R.N., later Admiral Sir B.J.Sulivan, drew the attention of the 
authorities and the public to the need for a naval reserve of trained seamen, the 
Merchant Service being the only source from which such reservists could be trained. 
6XOLYDQ¶VVFKHPHZDVUHPDUNDEO\ close to the one which was finally implemented but 
at the time Sulivan received only laughter for his efforts. In fact, a year later in 1847, 
Captain J.H.Brown, the Registrar-General of Seamen under the Board of Trade, 
proposed a voluntary Naval Reserve WRPHHWWKHFRXQWU\¶VQHHGV,WDOOVRXQGHGOLNHWKH
FODVVLF µQRW LQYHQWHG KHUH¶ V\QGURPH EXW QDYDO RIILFHUV KDG DOZD\V YLHZHG WKH LVVXH
from the )OHHW¶VYLHZSRLQWDQGH[FOXGHGRWKHUFRQVLGHUDWLRQV7KH5HJLVWUDU-*HQHUDO¶V
experience made him aware of the difficulties which would need to be overcome.  
Discussions turned into personal attacks but finally Brown saw the 1852 Navy 
Estimates provide for 5000 reservists to be enrolled. Politics again swept this aside but 
in 1853 there emerged the Naval Coast Volunteers and a wide reaching questionnaire 
about the idea of a Naval Reserve.7  The replies revealed only critical opinions of the 
Merchant Service and the poor quality of men and some officers. Still no one thought 
to relate the quality of personnel with the poor conditions of service but it served to 
arouse interest. Some supporters of the R.N.R. wanted a period of service in the reserve 
to be compulsory for merchant seamen whilst others saw it as a voluntary reserve. 
There were issues of whether service qualified for any pension payments. The Manning 
Committee in 1859 had also recommended positioning training ships at ports around 
the United Kingdom. These were to provide training facilities for both the reservists 
                                                 
5
  Bowen,  History of the R.N.R.  1-2 
6
  Bowen,  History of the R.N.R.  3 
7
  Bowen,  History of the R.N.R.  3-4 
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and the coastguard, which was a separate force. In this way it was envisaged that an 
DQQXDO µLQWDNH¶ Rf seamen would be created for the Merchant Service and also the 
reserve.8 It was expected that many of the reservists would be drawn from the coastal 
trades and the very extensive fishing fleets.  These men would be available 
immediately should the need for a µcall out¶ arise.  In fact, men on long voyages in the 
deep sea trades were not entirely welcome since their availability could be delayed. 
Men on a voyage expected to exceed six months  had to apply for leave from the 
R.N.R.. There was strong support from the men in Scotland and the North East coast.9 
The situation was reviewed at the end of 1861 when just over 8000 men were enrolled 
and a further 600 on a waiting list. Of the 8000 enrolled, 6000 were qualified in 
gunnery and only 850 were on leave for long voyages, meanwhile 5000 were working 
in the coastal trades and readily available. Thus the R.N.R., once created and clear of 
politics, had reached a significant size. At this time the Royal Navy itself, had only 
15,000 able seamen.10    
   
Although the Act of 1859 had allowed the setting up of a reserve of seamen it did not 
include the recruitment of officers. This came later under the Royal Naval Reserve 
Officers Act, of 1861 which allowed the recruitment but detailed requirements were 
intentionally left vague.11   The regulations turned out to be less than generous from the 
Admiralty and less than appealing to men who had command of first class merchant 
ships. The reserve was not to have more than 400 officers in all, at any time.  The 
senior officers were to be lieutenants and not more than 130, ranking after RN 
lieutenants. To qualify for entry, a man had to be in command of a merchant ship, hold 
an extra PDVWHU¶VFHUWLILcate and to have had command of a vessel of not less than 500 
tons gross for at least three years. The regulations set down similar extensive previous 
sea service to be appointed sub-lieutenant.  These gave little encouragement for a man 
who had held posts on crack liners as chief officer to find himself messing in the 
gunroom.12  At least the reserve officers were granted a uniform which distinguished 
them from fulltime naval officers.13  R.N.R. ratings had to wait until 1869 when an 
R.N.R. cruise was planned to take the reservists to sea as a body. A uniform was issued 
                                                 
8
   One of these training ships was H.M.S.   Trincomalee, stationed first at Sunderland and  
    later West Hartlepool, where she is now preserved. (2006)  
9
   Bowen,  History of the R.N.R.  5-10 
10
  Bowen,  History of the R.N.R.  15 
11
  Bowen,  History of the R.N.R.  8  & 11  
12
  7KHµJXQURRP¶LVIRUMXQLRURIILFHUVRIVXE-lieutenant and midshipman level only.  
13
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on loan for the cruise and in return for good conduct a man was allowed to keep it 
without payment.14        
 
The next twenty-five to thirty years would see R.N.R. supporters and detractors rise 
and fall. The Admiralty wanted a reserve at little or no cost but was unsure of its 
precise requirements. Increasingly the Registrar General of Shipping and Seamen 
(RGSS) was expected to administer the R.N.R., act as recruiter and to keep a balance 
between the Navy¶V GHPDQG DQG WKH VKLSRZQHUV¶ OHJLWLPDWH concerns about the 
manning of their ships. One of the first things done by the RGSS in connection with the 
enrolment of officers was to point out to the Admiralty that only 400 extra masters 
certificates had ever been issued and that a lieutenant¶s rank as a maximum would not 
encourage younger men. A further file note records: 
  
 I have heard that the Admiralty do not care about having the elite, 
 if so, this is a mistake for the Officers who stand high in the  
 Mercantile Marine would be the men in whom most dependence 
            could be placed in time of need.15    
 
This resulted in the stringent extra masters certificate requirement being modified.16 
A further revealing file note shows the confusion as to how the R.N.R. was to be 
managed, µ7KH$GPLUDOW\ VHHPDWD ORVVKRZ WRGHDOZLWK WKHDFFRXQWVRI WKH1DYDO
5HVHUYH¶17   
 
In 1867 the RGSS produced a detailed report of the state of the R.N.R. in response to 
criticism of the numbers and quality of the reservists. As at the 31st December 1866 the 
reserve stood at 16,346 ratings and 1190 officers.  The Registrar made the following 
points:  
 To enter, men must have 5 years sea service ± one year at least as A.B.  
 The average height of reservists was greater than Royal Navy average. 
 Men rejected from the Reserve had been accepted by the Navy. 
 
 
The Trent Affair in 1865 showed huge support from the Reservists as evidenced in 
their letters to The Times. The report continued: 
 «ZHEHDULQPLQGWKDWHDFK1DYDO5HVHUYHPDQLVDVNLOOHGZRUNPDQ 
 [by the nature of the entry requirements] and far above the class of men 
 from which our Army is recruited.  
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  Bowen,  History of the R.N.R.  23 
15
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  Bowen,  History of the R.N.R.  15  
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A final point being: 
 The real question at bottom is a question of policy ± are we to 
 have a large standing Navy ± or a less large Navy with Reserves. 
 The former is naturally the general tendency of the service: the 
 latter perhaps of civilians.18 
 
This really was the heart of the matter. Looking back, there were so many opinions and 
viewpoints, the temptation is to ask whether the Admiralty really did want a Reserve 
and the associated responsibilities and overheads.  
 
By 1868 the Board of Trade (BOT) was made responsible for Estimates for the R.N.R. 
Vote but the differences between the BOT and the Admiralty continued. The file 
shows: 
 But it is not to be supposed that whenever the Navy want men we are 
 to go for them to the Reserve. If these were the conditions we could 
 get no reserve at all. The men would not join for they could not be 
 perpetually harassed by going into and out of the Navy and  
 Ship owners would not consent to their joining for they could not  
 have their Ships unmanned whenever the Navy wanted men. 
 To prevent this undue interference with our Commerce the regulations 
 have been framed and wisely framed so as to assure the Trading  
 Community that our Merchant Seamen will not be called on to serve  
 unless a sudden emergency requires an increase in the Fleet.19 
 
These views VLJQHGE\Dµ7 *UH\¶ revealed the extent to which the BOT and RGSS sat 
as a buffer between Navy and Mercantile Marine interests.  
 
The perceived need to provide a reserve of men for the Navy coincided with the 
possible need to requisition top quality mail steamers. Pitted against this, was the desire 
of the shipowners to be cooperative whilst remaining profitable and have sufficient 
manpower for their needs. This latter point was especially true with expanding demand 
for shipping services to serve an expanding Empire.  The opening of the Suez Canal 
meant an expansion in the merchant steamship fleets which in turn reduced the need for 
merchant VHDPHQ µKDQGOLQJ VDLOV¶   7KHVH ZHUH WKH very seamen who were being 
sought by both the Naval Reserve lobby and the trading shipowners.  Many were 
prompted to contribute to the debate but they often confused the agenda by trying to 
solve both problems at once.  Like many naval officers, they found it difficult to 
separate in their minds that the Navy was an organisation dedicated to serve the 
Monarch and nation, unlike the Mercantile Marine.  This was a privately owned part of 
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 TNA  MT 9/34 M2612/1867  Royal Naval Reserve Criticism of working,  results and policy 
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a growing world transport system, which had existed to create profit for its owners and 
employment for its workers. Both sides had a need, but both were reluctant to commit 
funds or administrative resources to either set up training or release men to carry it out. 
Both the Navy and the Mercantile Marine used ships and this similarity seems to have 
clouded the fact that they used very different types of vessel and both organisations had 
different agendas. 
    
In 1873 Admiral The Hon. Sir F.W. Grey published a pamphlet on the subject.20  In this 
Admiral Grey proposed a scheme which sought to solve all problems at a stroke. He 
had had responsibility for manning in the Navy and was pleased with the idea of 
continuous service. He argued that reliance on volunteers from the Merchant Service 
was unwise since only the men from the best companies would be fit for the Navy.  
Instead, he looked forward to a compulsory period of naval service, say three years, and 
then a man could stay in the Navy or transfer to the Merchant Navy. This was unlikely 
to please the shipowners since they were already feeling the shortage of seamen. 
Interestingly, he considered different rates of pay for wartime and peacetime and 
somehow sought to bring this into a pension arrangement.  In 1898, Lord Brassey, well 
known for his interest in Naval Reserve matters, also wrote on the subject of linking 
The Royal Naval Reserve and Mercantile Marine and took the bold step of associating 
the Colonies to his views.21   
The recent Royal Jubilee allowed Brassey to enhance his proposal with the following: 
 The sentiment of loyalty evoked all over the Empire by the Jubilee afforded 
 a splendid opportunity of laying the foundations of federal defence and 
            of making the Naval Reserve a truly Imperial force - a force in which 
 Canadians and Newfoundlanders, Afrikanders and Australians should 
 serve side by side with and on the same conditions as Britishers. 
 The importance of educating our colonial fellow-subjects to realise 
 their common responsibility with us in the defence of the Empire can 
 hardly be over-estimated. 22 
 
These were fine words which discounted the fact that each of the provinces of Canada 
and the states of Australia saw matters on a much more parochial basis. Assisting with 
WKH(PSLUH¶VGHIHQFHZDVQRW WRSRIDOO DJHQGDV%UDVVH\KDGSURGXFHGDQRWKHU µone 
size fits all solution¶ but recognized the rapid growth in steamers and a similar decline 
in sailing vessels  ,Q UHWURVSHFW VRPH RI ERWK %UDVVH\¶V DQG *UH\¶V LGHDV GLG ZRUN
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  BL  Grey, F.W.,   Suggestions for Improving the Character of Our Merchant    
    Seamen  and  for Providing an Efficient Naval Reserve  (London,1873)    
21
  BL  Brassey, T.A.,   The Royal Naval Reserve, the Mercantile Marine and the  Colonies  (London,1898)  
22
  Brassey,  The Royal Naval Reserve,  19 
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their way into the British maritime world but not in the terms in which they had been 
proposed.  
 
A practical view was put forward in 1878 by Mr John Burns, of the Cunard Line, when 
he proposed the following: 
 ..the formation of a reserve of ships from the fleets of the great mail 
 Companies. He did not wish to interfere in any way with the existing 
 Royal Naval Reserve, but in addition to the ships he proposed the formation 
 of a special reserve of men drawn entirely from seamen in the employ of the 
 mail companies,  who should be trained in naval ships when necessary, and 
 VKRXOGIRUPDORQJVHUYLFHSHUVRQQHOLQWKHFRPSDQLHV¶VHUYLFHV 
 The Admiralty were to pay an annual retainer so long as the ships were 
 maintained at the standard they demanded for cruiser service, and,  
 in the event of war breaking out, they were to have the right of purchasing  
 or chartering the ships at a rate to be mutually agreed. On the other hand  
 the companies had to undertake to facilitate the training of the men and to  
 release them from all engagements in the event of war in order to allow  
 them to be employed in the Navy.23   
 
This seemed a commonsense approach but unfortunately it came from a shipowner and 
not the Navy.  Bowen states this was the first time that a scheme such as this was put 
forward, but with various modifications it would be repeated many times during the 
next forty years.   
 
Whilst these verbal and policy contests went on, those more directly responsible for the 
Reservists, effected changes to the drill arrangements and annual sea training. Pay and 
allowances were reviewed and improved. The main complaint was that the equipment 
in the training centres was old and obsolete, a problem which was always put down to 
lack of finance.24  The rank of Midshipman was introduced by an Order in Council in 
October 1872.25  A further move was the introduction of Assistant Paymasters.  
Although temporary assistant paymasters had been admitted to the Reserve since 1894 
it was not until 1904 that an Order in Council placed the Accountant Branch on a 
formal basis. In peacetime the assistant paymasters would train and serve ashore but in 
wartime they would join the Fleet.26 
 
To help things along in 1888 the Admiralty wrote to the BOT as follows:  
 «..to acquaint you, for the information of the Board of Trade, that the 
 reason for conferring appointments as Honorary Commanders in the 
 Reserve on Superintendents of large Steamship Companies was principally 
 to enlist their sympathies in the Royal Naval Reserve and thus to induce 
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  Bowen,  History of the R.N.R.  33 
24
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  Bowen,  History of the R.N.R.  28  
26
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 them to take an interest in manning the Companies Vessels with Royal  
 Naval  Reserve men and firemen and to assist generally in the recruiting 
 of the Force.27 
 
When the SuperintendHQWDIRUPHUVKLS¶VPDVWHUof the Liverpool Mercantile Marine 
Office wrote seeking a similar honorary commission he received the following succinct 
answer from the Admiralty: 
  
 The special reasoning which led to the Order-in-Council in question 
  in favour of Superintendents of Steamship Companies however, 
 does not apply in the case of Superintendents of Mercantile Marine  
 who act as registrars of Naval Reserve whose duty it is to recruit men. 
 
This would certainly have helped recruit deck officers in the large mail companies, 
since a suggestion of support by the marine superintendents was as good as an order. 
By the turn of the century the R.N.R. was in a healthy state as to numbers. The 
promotion stakes allowed advancement beyond lieutenant and with growing numbers 
RIVHQLRUPDLOVKLSV¶FDSWDLQVKROGLQJFRPPLVVLRQVLWZDVDOPRVWDQH[SHFWHGDPELWLRQ
for younger deck officers to want to join.  It has been shown in the previous chapter 
that to have a mail contract, a shipowner was required to have a certain number of  
R.N.R. officers and ratings in his employ. This provided an excuse for further pressure 
on the deck officers and seamen. Quite apart from this company pressure, many young 
deck officers would see naval service as a valuable extension of their professional 
NQRZOHGJH DQG D FKDQFH WR VHH µKRZ WKH Navy GLG WKLQJV¶  ,Q DGGLWLRQ, periodic 
training with the Navy provided a welcome break from the routine of commerce and 
provided opportunities of social and sporting activity not found in the Mercantile 
Marine.  Two other factors deserve mention. Firstly, an unwilling deck officer may 
have had the option of joining another company but had very little chance of shore 
employment if he felt really aggrieved about company pressure to join the R.N.R..  
Secondly, many young deck officers in the mail companies had undergone pre-sea 
training aboard training ships before starting their apprenticeship at sea. Here they had 
experienced discipline and routine based on the Navy and the R.N.R. basic and annual 
training would, in many ways, have been a familiar experience.      
 
Engineers had been eligible to enter the R.N.R. since 1863.28   However, the question 
of ZKHWKHU VKLSV¶ HQJLQHHUV FRXOG EH pressured to join the Reserve by an engineer 
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superintendent was a very different matter. Both the Royal Navy and the Mercantile 
Marine took a long time to both accept the need for the engineer and agree his status 
aboard ship. The engineer represented a challenge to the hard earned sNLOOVRIµVDLOLQJ
VKLS VHDPDQVKLS¶, long cherished by the seaman officer in the Navy and the deck 
officer in the Mercantile Marine. The QDYDOHQJLQHHU¶Vlong struggle for recognition is 
IXOO\ UHFRUGHG E\ *HRIIUH\ 3HQQ¶V  µ8S )XQQHO 'RZQ 6FUHZ¶29 Merchant ships¶ 
engineers, whilst establishing their profession, appeared to fare better than the Navy¶V
HQJLQHHUV7KHHQJLQHHU¶V VNLOOZDV LQ VKRUW VXSSO\ DQGZKHUHDV WKH Navy seemed to 
resist the change, important parts of the Mercantile Marine, such as the mail 
companies, saw the future economic opportunities of steam power.  They were 
prepared to accept the premium of higher pay and readily grant officer status and 
conditions to their engineers.   
      
Other causes for cohesion amongst engineers were that most came from the North East 
Coast of England or Scotland. In both these centres of ship building and marine 
engineering, industrial and academic institutions emerged which formed focal points 
IRUGHYHORSLQJWKHHQJLQHHU¶VVNLOOV30 Engineers served apprenticeships between say  
16 and 20 years of age and during that time developed their own individual 
personalities, influenced by free time after work. In contrast, the deck officer was at sea 
for his apprenticeship and required to conform to company culture, suppressing to some 
extent any individuality. There were also social class differences. Deck officers tended 
to come from the more affluent southern England and often had families rich enough to 
send them for expensive pre-sea training aboard school-ships such as the Conway and  
Worcester. These gave exclusive entrés to the larger mail-ship companies and often the 
Navy itself.  
 
Engineers competed to acquire an engineering apprenticeship coming from the poorer 
populations such as Clyde-side and the rivers Tyne and Wear. By the time these two 
groups came together aboard ship, at about 19 or 20 years old, they were very different 
SHRSOH7KHGHFNRIILFHU¶V self assurance bred from the familiarity of life aboard ship 
contrasted with the new engineer feeling his way in a strange environment, sometimes 
with behaviour and demeanour which revealed insecurity. Once aboard, the 
accommodation and working stations for these two groups were quite separate and they 
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often dined, for practical reasons, in different locations. It was perfectly possible for 
each to perform efficient work with only minimal contact between them. Little wonder 
WKH DWWLWXGH WKDW µRLO DQG ZDWHU GRQ¶W PL[¶, took hold on both sides.   As already 
indicated, things were little better in the Navy. The long wait for real recognition 
prompted some naval engineers to leave and transfer to the Merchant Service. The 
difference between Navy and Merchant Navy in 1849 thereabouts is quoted by 
Murray.31   
 ...the engineers would require better pay than those in the Navy.  
 On board the Oriental [that is, the P.&O.] boats a first class engineer 
 receives £16 to £26 per  PRQWK,WLVWUXHWKDWLQWKH4XHHQ¶V6HUYLFH 
 chief first-class engineers get £17 a month and pensions, but we find our 
 first class engineer as good a table as you or I would set down to ± in fact, they 
 live like princes.  In the Navy they have to find their own table, except the 
 common rations of the ship. As regards pensions, I have heard some  
 RIWKHHQJLQHHUVVD\µ:KDWLVWKHXVHRIDSHQVLRQ" Very few of us will 
 ever live to enjoy pensions; if we go on foreign station perhaps there is not 
 RQHRIXVWKDWZLOOUHWXUQWRUHFHLYHLW¶,Q,QGLDZHKDYHVFDUFHO\NHSWD 
 complete crew of engineers for more than a year together; we have entire  
 changes year after year, principally from death, and from liver complaints 
            arising from the intense heat of the engine room. 
 
Engineers were in demand in both organisations, yet the Navy continued to prevaricate 
over their status. But the naval engineers were as dedicated and determined as their 
Merchant Service counterparts. In 1851, the Royal Naval (QJLQHHU¶V&OXEZDVIRUPHG
in Portsea, for both social and professional purposes where technical papers were read 
and collected.32  
 
The movement of water in the form of steam through piping, boilers, condensers and 
engine cylinders, led the seaman officer to deride HQJLQHHULQJDVµlittle more than  
DGYDQFHG SOXPELQJ¶  7KLV LJQRUHG WKH YLWDO HQJLQHHULQJ VNLOOV QHHGHG WR HIIHFW DQ\
running repairs which might be needed at sea.  The situation was not helped by Sir 
Andrew Noble, Chairman of Elswick Shipbuilders, when he wrote to Fisher supporting 
reductions in the number of engineers being trained and claiming much of the 
HQJLQHHU¶V ZRUN ZDV RI D URXWLQH QDture.  Noble claimed that great theoretical and 
practical attainment was not needed on board ships as the work was of a mundane 
practical nature requiring, only basic knowledge. He argued that the clamour for 
increased status for engineers arose from a mistaken idea as to the duties and class of 
men required as engineers on board warships, noting that engineers in the merchant 
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marine appeared to be content.33   As a shipbuilder, Noble clearly had a sales agenda 
for steam power. 
  
It should be no surprise that the Navy¶VLQWHUQDOGLOHPPDVRYHUengineer officer status 
meant that the issue of engineers in the Royal Naval Reserve received a low priority. 
Initially, engineers were not required to carry out training in the Navy, it being held that 
engineering was the same in any ship. This only served WRXQGHUOLQHWKHµRLODQGZDWHU¶
division between engineer and seamen officer. To the Mercantile Marine engineer it 
only proved they were far better off outside the Navy. In any case the idea of all that 
µVDOXWLQJDQGPDUFKLQJDERXW¶ZDVQRWSDUWRIWKHHQJLQHHU¶Vpsyche, not to mention the 
idea of paying Mess Bills as part of board and lodging. The R.N.R. situation by 1889 
was as follows: 
  
R.N.R. Authorised Serving 
Lieutenants 150 120 
Sub-Lieutenants 270 120 
Engineers 150     3 
Asst. Engineers 150     0 
Midshipmen 200 155    
                                                       Fig.9  R.N.R. Officers  1889 
 
Clearly, these figures confirm the R.N.R. was perceived by potential volunteers as an 
occupation for µPDLO company¶PHQDQGFHUWDLQO\QRWRQHRILQWHUHVWWRHQJLQHHUV34    
 
However, as a concession in 1897, the Admiralty allowed engineers to undertake some 
training in Naval Dockyards to study the construction and repair of machinery and 
attend trials of warships. There was a good response but what the engineers really 
wanted was experience on warships at sea.35   
 
There still remained a potential need for engine room ratings. By 1894, with the 
continued increase in steam propulsion, it was recognised there would be a need to 
increase the number of authorised firemen to 6000.  Imaginatively, the Navy looked to 
the land as one source of recruitment. It agreed to recruit a special class of firemen 
from the large gas and electric light generating companies.  These men were 
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accustomed to working ashore in the winter months and going to sea in the summer. 
These were often slack periods when R.N.R. training could be slotted in.36  This move  
showed the Navy ZDV UHDOLVLQJ WKDW VLPSO\ µVQDSSLQJ WKH ILQJHUV¶ could not instantly 
produce a civilian based reserve force without causing disruption to vital industries. 
(YHQWKHµPDLOFRPSDQLHV¶ZLWKWKHLUYHVWHGLQWHUHVWLQWKHR.N.R. found the release of 
reservists for training an administrative overhead.  
 
In fact, on 21st August 1903, Louis Battenberg then Director of Naval Intelligence, 
wrote to shipowners:37 
 ««««UHTXHVWLQJWKHKHOSRIVKLSRZQHUVWRFROODERUDWHZLWKWKH 
           Admiralty to plan the protection of trade. 
 
 
In the correspondence, Battenberg poses some pressing questions and supports his 
letter with three lists: 
 
 List A  - Vessels to be taken up from trade. (listed by type) 
 List B  - Armed Merchant Cruisers  (individual ships and owners were named) 
 List C  - A summary of the strength of the Royal Naval Reserve 
   
Two of the questions are reproduced and the answers of Sir Ian Sutherland dated 26 th 
August 1903, after an internal report by a Captain Parfitt of the P&O, are in italics.  
 
 
 Question 3. What would be the effect upon their carrying arrangements,  
 of the withdrawal of the Steamers which will be taken up by the Admiralty 
 for auxiliary services as shown on the attached List A? 
 
  Answer. The effect on the carrying trade of the country by the withdrawal 
  of  these Mail & Passenger steamers would be practically insignificant. 
 
After the experience of World War I, today this seems an optimistic response.  
From the ZRUGVµZLOOEHWDNHQXS¶ the Admiralty clearly knew its intentions.  
 Question 6. What would be the effect upon such ships as may be on the 
 point of sailing from the Home ports, of calling out the numbers of  
 Royal Naval Reserve Seamen and Firemen which are shown on List C?     
      
 Answer. As a larger number of ships would be laid up, according  
 to my belief, during the whole term of a Naval war, I do not think that  
 the absorption of the Officers and men of the Royal Naval Reserve 
 would prevent  the adequate manning of the ships that would be able to 
 keep the sea. In the case of a Company like the P&O Company, the large  
 number of Naval Reserve Officers whom they employ would, if absorbed into 
 the Navy, create a considerable inconvenience, and the chances are that their 
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 places would not be easily filled without considerable delay. But this 
 inconvenience would no doubt be overcome in time if a Naval war proved to be 
 of a prolonged duration. 
 
This reply, whilst flagging the &RPSDQ\¶Vadministrative difficulties in supporting the 
R.N.R.UHYHDOVRPHLQWHUHVWLQJLQVLJKWVLQWR6XWKHUODQG¶VSHUFHSWLRQRIWKHFRQGXFWRI
any future war. Why would a large number of ships be laid up?  The internal memo 
between Captain Parfitt and P&O Chairman, Sutherland in the same file is worth 
noting. On the maintenance of trade, Parfitt seems to be a few years ahead of the 
Admiralty in recognising  reality when he stated: 
 «««WKHUHVWLOOUHPDLQVWKHGDQJHURIWKHHQHP\¶VFUXLVHUVSUH\LQJXSRQ 
 RXUFRPPHUFHIRULWZRXOGEHLPSRVVLEOHWREORFNDGHWKHHQHP\¶VSRUWVVR 
 closely as to prevent his cruisers or privateers from putting to sea.  
  
In this same corrHVSRQGHQFH %DWWHQEHUJ¶V µ/LVW &¶ UHYHDOV WKH IROORZLQJ VWDWHPHQWV
and assumptions: 
         
            1. Approximately 10,000 Royal Naval Reserve (all in 1st or 2nd period of 
 Service) in the United Kingdom. The greater number of these are  
 Fishermen or engaged in the Coasting Trade. 
 
 2. All Royal Naval Reserve Firemen available at home, and estimated at about 
 2,600 at present; 300 or 400 more would be required if available. 
 
 3. All Royal Naval Reserve men outside the United Kingdom, of whatever 
 class or period of service, would be technically called out by the proclamation,  
 and may be called on by the Senior Naval Officers abroad to serve in the 
 Royal Navy; but instructions have been given not to disturb the Mercantile 
 Marine unnecessarily, and it is not considered likely that more than a small 
 percentage of them would be required. 
 
It is clear from Battenberg¶VFRUUHVSRQGHQFHZLWK the shipowners that the Navy were at 
last shaking off the dithering discussions and debates about the R.N.R. and Armed  
Merchant Cruisers.  Instead a sharper focus on how the R.N.R. men and merchant ships 
taken up from trade would be deployed was emerging, coupled with the recognition 
that trade must still go on as much as possible.   
 
 As to mobilising the Reserves and the P&O&DSWDLQ3DUILWW¶Vinternal memo stated: 
 
 «««Our Company has at the present time 221 Officers (Executive and  
 Engineer) holding commissions in the Royal Naval Reserve, also a large  
 proportion of the European Seamen are belonging to that force. In the event 
 of the Admiralty enrolling our Native Firemen for service on Men of War 
 in the East, we should have a large number of Officers and Men for the  
 service of the Country. 
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7KLVH[WUDFWVKRZVDW\SLFDOµPDLOFRPSDQ\¶FRPPLWPHQWWRHQFRXUDJLQJ its officers to 
volunteer for the R.N.R..  Equally interesting is the offer of Native Firemen. Merchant 
ships often had multinational crews, just as the Navy LQ 1HOVRQ¶V GD\ had some 
coloured men on board. However, the R.N.R. (Men) Regulations of 1914 made it clear 
that coloured crew members were not to be accepted by R.N.R. Registrars at 
Mercantile Marine Offices. The criteria laid down in Paragraph 20 was:38 
 
 1. No applicant is to be accepted for enrolment in the Royal Naval Reserve 
 unless he is a British subject, is able to speak and understand the English   
 Language, can sign his name, is free from physical defect, has been 
 vaccinated, and is in all respects suitable.    
      
 2. Coloured men, natives of India, and Mulattos are not to be entered in the 
 Reserve. 
 
 
Attitudes in 1914 towards coloured seamen aboard a Navy vessel are recorded by 
Commander A.D.R. Pound whilst serving in H.M.S. St.Vincent and destined to become 
First Sea Lord  1939-43. 39 
 Thursday 27th August, 1914. 
 ««« DGGLWLRQDO 3HWWy Officers (Active Service), 3 R.F.R. $%¶V DQG 
 R.N.R. Seamen joined the ship yesterday. One of the latter is a black man. It is 
 a great mistake to enter them because it is hardly fair to make a distinction and 
 PHVVWKHPDSDUWIURPWKHVKLS¶VFRPSDQ\but on the other hand it would not be  
            surprising if the men objected to having him in their mess. 
 
The issue of coloured firemen had been considered by a House of Commons 
Committee in 1902.  It was a delicate issue which raised arguments for and against the  
employment of Lascars and Kroomen as stokers. It was decided that any plan for their 
inclusion in the reserve should be left to the governors and the commanders-in-chief of 
the various naval stations.  The committee considered that:  
 
 ««Whese coloured subjects of the King offered a reserve of stokers that 
 should not be neglected, and that even Chinese firemen might be found in 
 Hong Kong and Singapore who could be made useful. 40 
 
Clearly, in 1914 the R.N.R. Regulations had not incorporated this viewpoint. If these 
Asian and Chinese men, regarded as compliant and well disciplined, been able to 
physically tolerate the cold temperatures of the Artic and Norwegian Seas, it might 
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have prevented the some disciplinary problems from Liverpool firemen which affected 
the 10th Cruiser Squadron.  
 
An important R.N.R. development took place in 1910 when the Trawler Section was 
established. The Navy, although researching the subject, generally had a limited 
interest in mine warfare and had not seriously considered the task of sweeping mines to 
clear a channel. The problem had interested Admiral Lord Charles Beresford and whilst 
on a visit to Grimsby in 1907 he was intrigued by the possible use of fishermen and 
their craft for minesweeping.  The towing of nets or trawl gear outboard was natural to 
these men, but for the deep sea man the idea of cordage and gear over the side was 
alien. Beresford championed the cause and not only was the Trawler Section created 
but the Admiralty was persuaded, after experiments with chartered craft, to order six 
trawlers for training purposes.  The Trawler section, which had a modified but practical 
uniform authorised, would go on to be a most important part of the R.N.R.¶VZDUWLPH
contribution. Armed trawlers became the smalOVKLSµZRUNKRUVHV¶IRUWKHIOHHW41  Nine 
armed trawlers were attached to the 10 th Cruiser Squadron as shown in Appendix 5. 
:KHQ%DWWHQEHUJZURWHWRWKHVKLSRZQHUVLQKLVµ/LVW$¶specified eight different 
types of vessel to be taken up from trade but made no mention of using trawlers or 
GULIWHUV <HW KLV µ/LVW &¶ VKRZHG WKDW RI WKH  R.N.R. ± µWKH JUHDWHU QXPEHU RI
these DUHILVKHUPHQRUHQJDJHGLQWKH&RDVWLQJ7UDGH¶42  If these men had been used 
LQODUJHQXPEHUVWRPDQYHVVHOVRQ%DWWHQEHUJ¶V µ/LVW$¶WKHQWKHILVKLQJDQGFRDVWDO
trade would certainly have been disturbed and these men placed in larger vessels of 
which they had no experience.  The formal creation of the Trawler Section must have 
prevented a number of square pegs finding round holes. 
 
As the years 1900 to 1914 passed, the conditions of entry to the R.N.R.  became less 
onerous, more sensible and more considerate to the officers, men and their employers. 
A more realistic and practical effort had been made to dovetail civilian employment 
with a potential Navy requirement.  The last return prior to the war showed that on 1 st 
August 1914 the R.N.R. rating strength was as follows:  43 
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 R.N.R.   Wireless Telegraph Operators           6 
                             Engine-Room Artificers        513 
                             Leading Seamen        197 
                             Seamen     9,793 
                             Leading Stokers          88 
                             Stokers     4,733  
                                                Total   15,330  
  
 Trawler               Skippers        111 
 Section                 Second Hands        152  
                              Enginemen        275 
                              Trimmers        119 
                              Deck Hands        368 
                                                Total         1,025   
                                                                  Grand Total          16,355 
                                                               Fig.10  R.N.R  Rating Strength 1.8.1914 
 
The R.N.R. had come through many trials since its inception in 1852 but had reached a 
balanced state when called up in 1914. The prospect of promotion to rank of 
commander certainly made it more appealing to the deck officer. However, with the 
take up of liners as armed merchants cruisers in mind, the Navy List in December 1913 
revealed a weakness: out of 1980 R.N.R. officers shown, only 300 were Senior 
Engineers, Engineers or Warrant Engineers.44  Furthermore, within this one reserve 
force, although all earning a living from sea employment, there were many different 
types of experience gleaned from very different trades and vessels. µHome Trade¶PHQ 
were different people from those signing µForeign Going¶ Articles!  It must be 
remembered that peDFHWLPH µ515V¶DQG WHPSRUDU\515V¶ UHPDLQHGFLYLOLDQVXQWLO
mobilisation or they accepted a temporary commission respectively.  
  
 
The Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve  (R.N.V.R.) 
The impetus behind the creation of the R.N.R. came IURPD µWRSGRZQ¶ approach by 
politicians. The Admiralty and naval officers had sought to meet their perceived need 
from the Mercantile Marine by actively trying to attract volunteers, sometimes using  
µHPSOR\HU¶SUHVVXUH  ,QFRQWUDVW WKH5R\DO1aval Volunteer Reserve (R.N.V.R.) had 
its origins in a clear µbottom XS¶DSSURDFK. It was the individual civilian volunteers who 
begged the Admiralty to form them into an organised reserve force.  Finally, the Naval 
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Forces Act of 1903 permitted the raising of a force of naval and marine8. volunteers.45  
The years 1880 to 1900 had seen an increase in the idea of voluntary service when the 
7HUULWRULDO$UP\VSDZQHGPDQ\XQLWVZLWKD µFLW\¶RU µFRXQW\¶DIILOLDWLRQ  ,WZDVQRW
long before those with an interest in the sea, from all walks of life, sought to form some 
type of naval voluntary unit.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
 
 
                                               Fig.11  R.N.V.R. Recruitment Poster 
 
 The Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers (R.N.A.V.) existed from 1873 until 1892 but 
was not really wanted by the Navy. The R.N.R. had had a struggle for birth and the 
R.N.V.R. would repeat that struggle. The difference was that the volunteers needed for 
the R.N.R. were fragmented in companies and merchant ships, whereas the lobbyists 
for the R.N.V.R. were a united presence, mustering support from the public and 
luminaries such as Brassey and Beresford.. They just would not go away from the 
$GPLUDOW\¶V GRRUVWHS 7KH ERRN µ7KH 5195¶ E\ 0HVVUV .HUU DQG *UDQYLOOH
describes the extent of the R.N.V.R.¶VVWUXJJOH.46   
 
Despite the fact that many naval officers could not conceive of the idea that shore based 
volunteers would be of value aboard ship, the R.N.V.R. did survive and flourish. 
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Frequently pre-war this had been at great personal cost for VRPH 'LYLVLRQV¶ 
Commanding Officers, who were often men of substance. By 1914, they were 
organised into regional divisions with either a drillship or drill hall available to them.  
The London Division R.N.V.R. had their drill ship, H.M.S. Buzzard, moored close to 
Blackfriars Bridge. The obvious zeal and enthusiasm of the volunteers soon caught the 
attention of the nearby Fleet Street press which nicknamed WKHP WKH µ%ODFNIULDUV
BuccaneerV¶47   The New Regulations for the R.N.V.R., published in 1909, saw the 
men no longer defined DVµefficient¶ DQGµOHDGLQJPHQ¶,QVWHDGWKH\EHFDPHµ2UGLQDU\
6HDPHQ¶µ$EOH6HDPHQ¶DQGµ/HDGLQJ6HDPHQ¶7KLVZDVDVLJQLILFDQWPRYHDJDLQVW
the prejudices held out towards the R.N.V.R..  By now the force had over 4,000 officers 
and men spread over six divisions at London, Clyde, Bristol, Mersey, Sussex and 
Tyne.48 When the war broke out, this was what was to become known as the 
µ3HUPDQHQWR.N.V.R.¶ and it numbered 5,680. 49  
 
One myth, often repeated by historians that the R.N.V.R. was made up of rich 
yachtsmen needs to be dispelled.  It was a very inclusive organisation drawing men 
from all walks of life, the intake often dictated by the local employment activities. 
Whilst London had a large number of professional men, in Liverpool, Glasgow and 
Bristol the great majority were working men from shipyards, workshops, high stools, 
and from behind counters. The London Stock Exchange and Law Courts components 
were made up of clerks as well as principals.50  
 
When the R.N.V.R. and the Royal Fleet Reservists (see below) reported for duty there 
were no ships for them to man. Instead, Churchill found it expedient to form this body 
of men into The Royal Naval Division which fought, with great distinction, as part of 
the Army ashore.51   Very few of this original part of the R.N.V.R. were to serve at sea. 
µ&U\VWDO3DODFH3DUN¶LQ6RXWK/RQGRQZDVXVHGas a mobilisation depot and when the 
Royal Naval Division moved to Blandford Camp in January 1915, it started to train 
wartime RNVR recruits for the Navy. Daily training revolved round basic seamanship 
in classrooms, gunnery, boat-work on the park lake in boats brought up from Chatham 
and communications, including wireless telegraphy as shown in the poster. In fact, 
some 8,000 new entries were trained as Signalmen and Wireless Telegraphists. During 
four and a half years some 5000 officers and 120,000 ratings received their preliminary 
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training at Crystal Palace.52   These recruits became WKH µ7HPSRUDU\ R.N.V.R.¶, 
required for the duration of the war only and many of them came to serve in the 10 th 
Cruiser Squadron as seamen.  The R.N.V.R. would reach a total of over 40,000 in 
October 1918.53 
 
Only 260 R.N.V.R. officers served on board ships larger than destroyers and sloops.54 
A small number of R.N.V.R. officers served with the 10th Cruiser Squadron. These 
were often Assistant Paymasters, R.N.V.R.. Some were former Army officers, whose 
injuries prevented their return to the Front, and they received R.N.V.R. commissions to 
carry out coding and decoding duties.  Pre-war, the R.N.V.R. had always been open to 
recruits from many trades and walks of life. In the war, the Admiralty used the 
R.N.V.R. as an umbrella under which it could gather all those able to contribute a 
civilian or specialist skill for the Navy¶VSXUSose, for the duration of hostilities.    
   
The Newfoundland Royal Naval Reserve. 
The creation of the R.N.R. (1859) and R.N.V.R. (1903) had both been preceded by 
protracted political argument as to the need for their existence. The creation of the 
Newfoundland Royal Naval Reserve (1902) suffered similar political birth pains.55  The 
idea of having a Newfoundland Royal Naval Reserve (NF R.N.R.) had sprung from the 
years prior to 1902, when the British Government was urging the colonies, such as 
Australia and Newfoundland, to take on D VKDUH RI WKH(PSLUH¶VGHIHQFH56   Almost 
µVKDPHG¶LQWRDFWLRQ1HZIRXQGODQG¶V3ULPH Minister, Robert Bond, preferred  a naval 
defence force if money had tRFRPHIURP1HZIRXQGODQG¶VH[FKHTXHU ,QUHWXUQ%RQG
ZDQWHGWRVHH6W-RKQ¶VGHYHORSHGDVDFUXLVHUEDVHDQGDGHIHQGHGSRUWIURPZKLFKWKH
North Atlantic cables and grain traffic could be secured in time of war.  It was also a 
practical viewpoint in that, he believed recruitment for a naval force would be easier 
from the fishing community. This proved correct, for numbers came forward. Sensibly, 
the annual training cruise to the West Indies, was timed to be clear of the peak fishing 
season. For the young men of Newfoundland it almost became a point of family honour 
to volunteer for the Reserve. Additionally, it provided an opportunity to visit places 
such as the West Indies and New York, when aboard the ships of the North American 
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Squadron.  They soon earned the approval of the station commander, Commodore G. 
A. Giffard, R.N.. when he referred to them DVEHLQJµ«DIRUPLGDEOHDGGLWLRQ WRRXU
personnel.¶ 57  
 
In October 1902, H.M.S.  Calypso arrived at St.Johns to be berthed there as a reserve   
drillship. She was an obsolete barque cruiser which had been refitted with modern 
armament and had a permanent team of twenty eight R.N. instructors.  The Governor 
and local politicians saw great public relations benefit by developing the training 
facility in the island¶V PDLQ KDUERXU :KHWKHU E\ SODQ RU DFFLGHQW WKH FRPPDQGLQJ
officer selected was Commander F.M.Walker R.N., whose previous appointment was 
commanding officer of the reserves drillship H.M.S. Gleaner on the lower Thames. No 
doubt he had learnt that reservists need to be run from a µGLIIHUHQWUXOHERRN¶LIWKHEHVW
was to be drawn from them.58   The NF R.N.R. flourished and in the early years recruits 
were almost always hardy fishermen. They were to be trained as seamen gunners and 
amongst their many training activities was an annual day long event of competitive 
rowing. This was held in August on Quidi 9LGL /DNH LQ 6W-RKQ¶V 7KH
Newfoundlanders consistently beat the teams from the R.N. Squadron, in which the NF 
R.N.R. KDGEHHQJLYHQWKHQLFNQDPHµ4XLGL9LGL/DQFHUV¶    Thus, their boat handling 
skills as professional fishermen became almost legendary, enhanced by their success in 
these annual contests. Ransom records:           
  The Newfoundlanders were valued above all for an increasingly rare  
  capability in traditional seamanship within a technologically complex 
  steam-powered armoured fleet. Sentiments which remain valid even 
  today.59   
When war came in 1914, over 100 NF R.N.R. reservists found themselves aboard 
HMCS Niobe (Capt. Robert Corbett R.N.).  Part of the 4th Cruiser Squadron under Rear 
Admiral Cradock, Niobe was tasked to blockade patrol off the Atlantic ports of the  
United States.  The Newfoundlanders were in demand, since many of them had trained  
on heavy ordnance and there was a significant requirement for the boarding of 
intercepted merchant ships. Captain Corbett in a note to the governor of Newfoundland 
stated:   
 7KHVHPHQ««DUHDOPRVWXQNQRZQWRPHDVGHIDXOWHUV7KH\DUHPRVW 
 able and willing, which speaks highly for their previous training.60 The two 
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 Sea Boats are manned entirely by them and they have had constant 
 work boarding ships in all weathers, and I am prepared to back them  
 against any boats crew of the Imperial ships on the station.61 
                        
 
 
 
                      
 
 
 
 
                                     Fig.12  Newfoundland Reservists on wharf adjacent H.M.S.  Calypso, circa 1914 
By the summer of 1915, Niobe was taken off task and the Newfoundlanders were 
transferred to Britain to join other NF R.N.R.¶V  borne on the books of H.M.S.  
Pembroke, the Naval Barracks at Chatham, Kent.  The  Newfoundlanders were drafted                  
into three main activities in the Royal Navy. Some, being trained gunners, were placed 
aboard Defensively Armed Merchant Ships which sailed independently on the 
Mediterranean and Indian trade routes.     Others found themselves working with British 
fishermen who had formed the R.N.R. Trawler Section but the majority served aboard 
the armed merchant cruisers, particularly those of the 10 th Cruiser Squadron.62                  
Like all reservists, they were more interested in getting an important job done rather 
WKDQ EHLQJ LPPHUVHG LQ WKH µKLHUDUFKLFDO FHUHPRQLDO¶ VR SUHYDOHQW LQ WKH SHDFHWLPH
Royal Navy. In the 10th Cruiser Squadron, some 80 Newfoundlanders would lose their 
lives during the war.63       
                                                                                                                
The Surgeon Probationers, R.N.V.R. 
In 1913 on the 19th December, an Order in Council established the officer rank of 
Surgeon Probationer, R.N.V.R. under the authority of the Naval Forces Act, 1903.64   
The Navy recognised the shortage of medical officers and introducing Surgeon 
Probationers was an expediency to help relieve the situation. The idea was to encourage 
accredited medical students  at  recognised universities or medical schools to volunteer 
to serve for a minimum of six months or a maximum of five years.  There  was a good 
response from students, especially from Ireland, where conscription was never 
implemented  during  World War I.   
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                                            )LJ7LWOHSDJHIURP5-:LOODQ¶VERRN.          
 
They were not to be used as substitutes for fully qualified  surgeons but were to be 
employed principally to give first aid on board ship, and in naval hospitals and hospital 
ships acting as clinical clerks and dressers. They were to be found in destroyers, sloops 
and small escort vessels. In thHVHFDVHVWKH\KDGPHGLFDOFKDUJHRIWKHVKLS¶VFRPSDQ\
but were always able to obtain advice from a fully qualified R.N. Surgeon.  They wore 
the uniform of a Sub Lieutenant R.N.V.R. with the scarlet cloth of a surgeon beneath 
their single gold stripe and messed in the wardroom.65  Their pay and conditions of 
service were identical to those of a Sub Lieutenant.   
 
Their professional training was not forgotten and the regulations allowed them to be 
granted reasonable leave to take their final examinations. This was fixed at three weeks 
but where a probationer needed longer and requested demobilization this was never to 
be refused. The hope was that once qualified they would return to serve in the medical 
branch and to this end  the fifth year students were released to qualify and their places 
taken by less advanced students.  Surgeon Rear Admiral R.J.Willan R.N.V.R. wrote a 
book of Clinical Notes for their guidance. In it, he gave the following profound 
guidance: 
 In civil life the successful Practitioner is the one who does not 
            consider it an indignity to have a second opinion about a case.66  
 
The intake of Surgeon Probationers was strong for each of the war years and the fact 
that their introduction was conceived in 1913 showed a welcome degree of forward 
planning.  In all, some 1029 students served as Surgeon Probationers.67 All armed 
merchant cruisers in the 10th Cruiser Squadron carried a full surgeon or medical 
                                                 
65
   Allison, R.S., The Surgeon Probationers  (Belfast,1979) 9  
66
   Allison,  The Surgeon Probationers  64   
67
   Allison,  The Surgeon Probationers  118 
Mobilising 7KH1DY\¶V5HVHUYHV                                                       Chapter 4. 
 
 103 
practitioner. In addition, DQ DQDO\VLV RI SUREDWLRQHU¶V QDPHV LQ $OOLVRQ¶V ERRN VKRZV
that twenty one ships of the Squadron also had a Surgeon Probationer appointed at one 
time or another. In all, twenty eight Surgeon Probationers served with the Squadron.68 
Five of the ships had more than one appointment, indicating the idea of release for 
examinations and replacement by new students seems to have worked in practice. The 
whole concept demonstrated the flexibility of using the Reserves to provide specialised 
manpower to the benefit of the Navy and the individual. 
 
The Royal Fleet Reserve. 
The Parliamentary Estimates for 1899 saw the issue of the Reserves under discussion 
again, with a proposal to increase the R.N.R. establishment by 1000. One M.P. 
proposed an increase in the establishment from 25,800 to 70,000 or even 80,000. This 
was abandoned on cost and significantly, to prevent disruption of trade should a call up 
EHQHHGHG7KHKXJH LQFUHDVH LQ%ULWDLQ¶V0HUFDQWLOH0DULQHKDGDOVR coincided with 
an increase in foreign seafarers being employed, whilst the British nationals had 
declined from 182,000 to a little over 152,000.69  Instead, the Naval Reserve Act of 
1900, set up a new reserve force, the Royal Fleet Reserve (R.F.R.) with an 
establishment of 15,000.70 This was a reaction to the German naval expansion under 
Rear Admiral Tirpitz after his appointment in 1897.   In essence, the terms of the Act 
allowed naval pensioners to be recalled for duty and additionally, men enlisted in the 
Navy or marines could have their term of engagement extended, if required. Whilst no 
precise numbers can be found, the logbooks for the 10th Cruiser Squadron ships, 
frequently show R.F.R. men and pensioners joining the ships.  These personnel were 
FRQVLGHUHGWREHµIXOO\WUDLQHGPHQ¶    
 
The Royal Marines. 
Each Armed Merchant Cruisers had a Royal Marine detachment on board, in charge of 
a Non-Commissioned Officer.  Typically, there were between 25 and 45 depending on 
the size of the AMC.  As far as possible, Marine reservists were mobilised but soon 
reliance had to be placed on new recruits, no doubt attracted by posters such as that 
shown overleaf. 
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                                                                      Fig.14  R.M. Recruitment Poster                                                                                        
The poster depicts Marines in tropical whites and protected by gun shields. In the real 
world, many of the Squadron¶V JXQ PRXQWLQJV KDG QR VXFK SURWHFWLRQ DQG WURSLFDO
whites must have been a fantasy which invaded many minds in the Arctic and 
Norwegian waters. The logbooks at the National Archives reveal that men from both 
the Royal Marine Artillery as well as the Royal Marine Light Infantry were drafted to 
the Squadron. Apart from brief mention in the books by Admirals de Chair and Tupper, 
WKH RQO\ PHQWLRQ RI WKHVH GHWDFKPHQWV LQ µ5R\DO 0DULQH¶ OLWHUDWXUH LV LQ %OXPEHUJ¶V
record of the Royal Marines  1914-1919.71 
 
The Mercantile Marine. 
Merchant seamen had always been considered a potential manpower reserve for the 
Navy. Being civilians they never wore uniform ashore and except on passenger ships, 
wore only rough working clothes at sea. In that sense, they were an invisible reserve.  
To most naval men, the merchant seaman seemed only motivated by making money. 
But then that was the prime interest of their employers, the ship owners. The whole 
situation was complicated by different rDWHVRISD\EHWZHHQµIRUHLJQJRLQJ¶DQGµKRPH¶
trades, which were further complicated by slightly differing rates between owners 
based at different ports.    As recently as 1911, British Merchant Seamen had been 
HPEURLOHG LQ D ELWWHU VWULNH DJDLQVW WKH RZQHUV  7KH VHDPHQ¶V SOLJKW GUHZ V\PSDWK\
and support from the British dock and road transport workers, as well as seamen from 
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four other countries.72  If the Squadron¶VDUPHGPHUFKDQWFUXLVHUVZHUHto operate, they 
would need cooks, stewards and most important of all, firemen and trimmers from the 
Mercantile Marine. Fortunately, when the British Empire was threatened by war the 
owners and men of the British Mercantile Marine sank their very considerable 
differences and agreed to co-RSHUDWHLQWKH&RXQWU\¶VVHUYLFH73 
 
The relations between owners and men had been in a low state for years. In August, 
1914, British Shipping totalled approximately 20,000,000 tons; the personnel including 
officers and men numbered about 193,500, not counting fishermen and Lascars.  Some 
14,000,000 tons were controlled by members the Shipping Federation Ltd and a further 
5,000,000 tons were controlled by WKH /LYHUSRRO (PSOR\HUV¶ $VVRFLDWLRQ 7KXV WZR
PDLQ HPSOR\HUV¶ DVVRFLDWLRQ FRQWUROOHG YLUWXDOO\ WKH HQWLUH LQGXVWU\  In contrast the 
merchant seamen were fragmented into no less than nine organisations seeking to 
represent their members.  Deck Officers (about 24,000) were organised in four separate 
Associations: 
                        The Imperial  Merchant Service Guild 
  The Mercantile Marine Service Association 
  7KH%ULWLVK6KLSPDVWHUV¶DQG2IILFHUV3URWHFWLRQ6RFLHW\ 
  The Association of Coastwise Masters, Mates and Engineers  
 
On the Lower Deck there were roughly 37,200 Cooks and Stewards of whom a 
FRQVLGHUDEOHQXPEHUZHUHRUJDQLVHGLQWKH1DWLRQDO8QLRQRI6KLS¶V&RRNV6WHZDUGV
Butchers and Bakers, though many Cooks and Stewards aboard tramp vessels were 
PHPEHUV RI WKH 1DWLRQDO 6DLORUV¶ DQG )LUHPHQ¶V 8QLRQ  3HWW\ Officers, Sailors and 
Firemen numbered 106,500, of which 90% of were LQ WKH1DWLRQDO8QLRQRI6DLORUV¶
DQG)LUHPHQ¶V8QLRQof Great Britain and Ireland.  
 
The best organised were the Engineers (about 20,600) being represented by only two 
Associations which probably reflected their experience of industrial relations when 
serving their shore based apprenticeships. These were:  
   7KH0DULQH(QJLQHHUV¶$VVRFLDWLRQ 
   The Amalgamated Society of Engineers 74 
 
All the different factions of seafarer, felt certain their own union would best look after 
their own specialist interests.  It was the SHUIHFW µGLYLGH DQG UXOH¶ VLWXDWLRQ ZKLFK 
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suited the ship-owners very well. The owners were defeated in the strike but between 
1911 and 1914, relationships between owners and men worsened. The Shipping 
Federation acknowledged that it had to reorganise to be in a better position to meet its 
antagonists in the future.75 With bitterness like this festering under the surface, all the 
more credit is due for the declaration of co-operation for the sake of the country.   
 
The Navy had to ensure that it could engage the merchant seamen it needed, 
particularly engine room personnel. When R.N. Captains were appointed to the 
Armadale Castle, Oceanic and Marmora they were instructed: 
   «WKDWHQTXLULHVEHPDGHE\WKHVHRIILFHUVRIWKHORFDO6KLSSLQJ 
 Registrar as to what % additions to the rates of wages ruling at the  
 Port are likely in his opinion to be necessary to ensure the prompt 
 HQJDJHPHQWRIWKHPHUFDQWLOHFUHZ««76 
 
On August 13th, 1914 a Conference held in Westminster proposed: 
 (i)   That the Admiralty should agree to authorise a flat rise of 
        of £1 per month over and above the wages set out in the  official 
                   wages book of the Union, dated June 1913, in all vessels requisitioned  
        or chartered by the Admiralty during the present emergency 
 
 (ii)  That in that case the National Union, by their officers, will undertake 
         to inform their branch officers throughout the United Kingdom that those           
                   are the rates to be observed during the period of requisition or charter  
        by the Admiralty.  
 
             (iii) Will use its utmost endeavour to furnish men required at such rates.77 
 
In 1913, wages for an Able Seaman stood at from £5 to £5.50p per month; of Firemen 
and Trimmers at from £5.25p to £6 per month.78  Doubtless the higher rates for 
Firemen and Trimmers reflected the demand from the near complete transition to steam 
and the very heavy physical and unpleasant work in the stokehold. The Admiralty was 
now coming to terms with the market forces in the real world of industry. These ratings 
signed a special agreement called T124, which whether they realised it or not, 
conveniently brought them under the Naval Discipline Act.  Reading the small print 
was never a strong point for most merchant seamen. All too often merchant seamen 
were trusting when they should have been suspicious, and often suspicious of those 
seeking to help them.  
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In the main, the Union proved to keep their agreement of co-operation. One small 
LQFLGHQW DURVHZLWK WKH0DVWHURI WKH5R\DO0DLO6WHDP3DFNHW&RPSDQ\¶V Teviot, a 
transport,  when he claimed difficulties from the local OIILFLDO RI7KH 6HDPHQV¶ DQG
)LUHPHQV¶8QLRQLQ'XEOLQ7KHORFDO'LYLVLRQDO1DYDO7UDQVSRUW2IILFHUZDVDVNHGE\
WKH 0DVWHU WR µSUHYHQW VXFK DFWLRQ¶ +H LQ WXUQ VRXJKW KHOS IURP WKH 7UDQVSRUW
Department which gave him a disappointing reply dated 10 December 1914: 
  
 With reference to your submission of the 7th instant, regarding the 
 the signing on of crews of Transports, you are informed that it is not  
 possible to take such action as you desire. Every effort should be  
 made to avoid friction as the question of provision of crews is  
 becoming very difficult. 
 
This reply and a pencil note below the typescript - µ7KH XQLRQV RQ WKH ZKROH KDYH
ZRUNHGZHOOZLWKXV¶± summed up the position.79 
 
Before leaving the Mercantile Marine there are other points to consider. The Engineers 
were usually retained aboard the AM&¶s by offering them µtemporary¶ commissions in 
the R.N.R..  Other Merchant Navy officers could be placed on a T124 agreement 
whereby they rHFHLYHG RZQHU¶V SD\ 15%.  Most of the Squadron¶V Commanding 
Officers chose to encourage an $0&¶V SHDFHWLPH 0DVWHU to stay aboard in a 
µQDYLJDWLRQDO FRQVXOWDQW FDSDFLW\¶ DQG ZKHQ WKLV KDSSHQHG WKH 0DVWHU ZDV granted a 
µWHPSRUDU\¶FRPPLVVLRQDV&RPPDQGHUR.N.R..80  This was reverting to WKH µ6DLOLQJ
0DVWHU¶post of 1HOVRQ¶s day, and a practice which was repeated aboard the transport 
Canberra in the Falklands Campaign of 1982.  
 
Finally, there was the question of Radio Officers. Wireless operators in the Merchant 
Service would not receive the titOH µRIILFHU¶ XQWLO 7, however, they did enjoy 
RIILFHU¶VDFFRPPRGDWLRQDQGSULYLOHJHVIURPWKHWLPHRIWKHLULQWURGXFWLRQDWVHD81 The 
Navy considered Wireless Telegraphists as a specialist communications rating so here 
was another anomaly for the Navy to consider for the AMC¶VWDNHQXSIURPWUDGHAll 
the ships taken from trade were already fitted with wireless and the solution was to 
grant the operators the status of Warrant Officers.82 
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Royal Navy. 
When the Edgar class cruisers were de-commissioned some of the crews were 
WUDQVIHUUHGWRWKH$0&¶V,WPLJKWKDYHEHHQLPDJLQHGWKDWR.N. ratings would have  
taken it on themselves to act as mentors for the Reservists.  One reservist, although not 
in the Squadron, makes some valid points in that he noticed in the Army, - regulars, 
territorials and volunteers, µZHUH all one.¶7KH\DOOZRUHWKHVDPHNKDNLDQGµSLSV¶RQ
their shoulders whereas the Navy had many subtle features of uniform which 
differentiated the R.N., R.N.R. and R.N.V.R. officers.83  
 
    
                                        )LJ5151551952IILFHUV¶8QLIRUPVFRPSDUHG  
 
Previous experiences tended to accentuate the differences, for example the R.N. µROG
KDQGV¶KDGRIWHQKDGVDLOWUDLQLQJZKLFKVHWWKHPDSDUW7KHR.N.R.¶VZRXOGKDYHWKHLU
Merchant Navy interests to talk about and the R.N.V.R.¶V ZLWK D VWDEOH VKRUH EDVHd 
background were preoccupied with cricket or football match results.  They were often 
given separate messes and in the logbooks the R.N. ratings were always referred to as 
µ$FWLYH6HUYLFH¶No doubt there were many moments when the R.N.R., R.N.V.R. and 
MHUFDQWLOH5DWLQJVIHOWWKH\ZHUHRQHTXDOO\DFWLYHVHUYLFH:KLOVWµJURXSOR\DOW\¶LV
always laudable, there would have been good grounds to discourage divisive cliques 
developing on a ship which might have to go into action whenever a neutral vessel was 
boarded.  
 
The &KDQJXLQROD¶V crew complement below, shows the typical variety of seafaring 
H[SHULHQFHZKLFKZRXOGKDYHWREHPRXOGHGWRJHWKHURQHDFKRIWKH6TXDGURQ¶VVKLSV 
The Royal Naval officers on board a Squadron ship would typically be the 
CommandiQJ2IILFHURIFDSWDLQ¶VRUFRPPDQGHU¶VUDQNWKH([HFXWLYH2IILFHUXVXDOO\
a lieutenant commander plus a commissioned gunner and a paymaster.   
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Collar Twists 
Buttons 
RN Crown and 
Anchor  
Straight Stripes White Patch with 
Gold Twist 
Crown and 
Anchor 
RNR Crown and 
Anchor letters 
RNR super imposed 
Narrow Interlaced 
Stripes 
Blue Patch with 
Gold Twist 
Crown and 
Anchor letters 
RNR super imposed 
RNVR Crown and 
Anchor letters 
RNV super imposed 
Wavy Stripes Red Patch with 
Gold Twist 
Crown and 
Anchor letters 
RNV super imposed 
 
Mobilising 7KH1DY\¶V5HVHUYHV                                                       Chapter 4. 
 
 109 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                          Fig.16  H.M.S.  Changuinola    -- Composition of Crew 84 
 
It can be seen, in conjunction with Chapter 3, that the long process of bringing together 
a fleet of ships and men from civil sources was ready, but only µMXVW LQ WLPH¶  7KH
Hague Conference in 1907 had set out the requirements which allowed converted 
merchant ships to act as warships.85 These are shown below:  
 Art.1.  No merchant-ship converted into a warship can have the rights and 
            duties appertaining to the status, unless she is placed under the direct authority,      
                          immediate control and responsibility of the Power whose flag she flies. 
 
 Art.2. Merchant-ships converted into warships must have the external signs 
            which distinguish  the warships of their nationality. 
  
 Art.3. The commander must be in the service of the state and duly commissioned by the   
                         competent authorities. His name must appear on the list of officers of the military fleet. 
 
 Art.4. The crew must be subject to the rules of military discipline. 
 
 Art.5. Every merchant-ship converted into a warship is bound to observe 
           in its operations, the laws and customs of war. 
 
 Art.6. A belligerent who converts a merchant-ship into a warship must, as soon  as  
                         possible, announce the conversion in the list of the ships of its military fleet.    
  
By the time the names of the Squadron¶V VKLSV ZHUH progressively published in the 
Navy List, the longest continuous World War One naval operation was already in the 
hands of Admirals de Chair and Tupper and the commanding officers of the Squadron.                     
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  Brocklebank, J., Ed.  Tenth Cruiser Squadron Northern Patrol from the diaries and   
     letters  of Captain H.C.R.Brocklebank July 1914-August 1917 (Affpuddle, Dorset,1974)  8 
85
   Hall, L.A., The Law Of Naval Warfare  (London, 1914)  22 
      NMM 342.537 International Convention relative to the conversion of merchant ships into 
      warships.signed at The Hague 18 October 1907 (London H.M.S.O 1910) 
Officers Royal Navy    4  
 Royal Naval Reserve  14  
 Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve    1   19 
Petty Officers & Men Royal Navy  22  
 Royal Fleet Reserve (both classes)  42  
 Royal Naval Reserve  35  
 Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve  15 114 
Marines Royal Marines    6  
 Royal Fleet Reserve (both classes)  16  
 Pensioners    3   25 
Civilians Cooks, Stewards & Firemen  63   63 
                                                Total   221 
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Commanding  Officers. 
Although the highest number of ships in the Squadron at any one time was 24, 
throughout the period 1914-1917 some 39 merchant ships would serve the Squadron, 
allowing for replacements.  In that time, some 30 officers of captains rank with a 
typical seniority of 6¾ years and 25 officers of commanders rank with a typical 
seniority of 6½ years, served in command of these vessels. Eighteen of the ships had 
the same commanding officer throughout, but the rest had anywhere between two and 
five changes of commanding officer. The precise reason for the many changes of some 
commanding officers, at a time when stability would have helped cohesion, is not clear.   
The previous appointments of these officers reveals that five of them had served on 
board the Edgar class cruisers, two had been on the staff of the Royal Naval College at 
Greenwich, three in Admiralty departments, two on loan to foreign governments, and 
the remainder in a variety of sea going or training establishment appointments. Two 
took post in these Arctic waters directly from service in the Mediterranean and one 
from the West African station. 
 
This varied group of commanding officers were the ones who had the task of managing 
such a disparate group of seafarers and turning them into a team. Hopefully, they would 
recognise that the R.N.R. officers and engineers would have a degree of empathy with 
the Mercantile Marine ratings, thus creating another internal group interest. This must 
have been inevitable since at the end of the war they would all be employed for their 
former ship-owners again.  
 
The Need for an Identity. 
With so many varied origins and experiences amongst the crews, what was needed was 
a simple unifying idea that would uniquely identify them and their difficult work to the 
rest of the Navy. With former members of the µQuidi Vidi Lancers¶ and µBlackfriars 
Buccaneers¶ LQ WKH Squadron, the clue was in their midst. The closest land to the 
Squadron was often the most northern lighthouse in Britain, Muckle Flugga, and was a  
frequent reference landmark.86 They needed a cohesive nickname and inspired by the 
lighthouse chose to be known as the µMuckle )OXJJD+XVVDUV¶87    
----------------- 
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 See Appendix 7 
87
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The armed merchant cruisers usually UHWDLQHGWKHYHVVHO¶VSHDFHWLPHPDVWHUWRVHUYHDV
a navigational consultant to the naval commanding officer.1 The civilian master¶Vship 
knowledge assisted the naval commanding officer and relieved him of some pressures 
whilst operating an unfamiliar type of vessel.  It was a special and challenging 
relationship which required forbearance and cooperation between the two officers 
concerned. The masters were either already R.N.R. officers or were granted temporary 
commissions as R.N.R. commanders, if they agreed to serve. A shipmaster is expected 
to conduct his vessel safely to the satisfaction of the shipowner, shippers and insurers.  
Risk taking was not required in his personality or performance. Safety and compliance 
with company, national and international regulations were the ways to the top for the 
mail steamer master.  There is nothing to suggest that ship owners hinted that masters 
should µNHHSDQH\HRQWKHNavy¶whilst using µtheir¶ ships. However, at least some of 
these long serving µFRPSDQ\VHUYDQWV¶SUREDEO\VDZLWDVDVHOIDSSRLQWHGWDVN but one 
which needed to be kept in check. 
  
In contrast, whilst a commanding officer in the Navy was not expected to risk his ship 
in any foolhardy way, it was accepted that a ship¶V loss or damage is sometimes a 
necessary sacrifice. A commanding officer, whilst required to comply with naval 
discipline and show good sense, was expected to have an extra personal spark and flair. 
The naval officer would have been used to competition throughout his service career to  
reach the top and the ultimate competition was to beat the enemy. The two types of 
personality could either gel successfully or clash disastrously. This relationship was a 
key factor in the first loss of the Tenth Cruiser squadron. 
    
In addition to the eight Edgar Class cruisers, de Chair had responsibility (at least on 
paper) from 19 August 1914 for the armed merchant cruisers Alsatian, Mantua, 
Oceanic and Teutonic.  At first, these vessels patrolled lines to the north east from 
Muckle Flugga in the Shetlands, depending on the number available, since one ship 
would be coaling at Liverpool at any one time.2  Initially, de Chair seems to have 
focussed his attention on the Edgar cruisers. De Chair inspected the Mantua on 25 
August 1914 at Lerwick and was impressed with the unused accommodation which he 
thought could carry away the wounded after a fleet action.3  Whilst he agreed the armed 
merchant cruisers had considerable speed he felt that they had small µfighting¶ value.  
                                                                                                                                          
                                                 
1
 Hurd, A., The Merchant Navy  Vol. 2 (London,1921)  122 
2
 TNA  ADM 137/185   Revised Arrangements for Cruiser Force B  19 August 1914   24-5 
3
 TNA  ADM 137/185   de Chair to Admiralty    27 August 1914   11-21 
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Their duty was to report and shadow enemy war vessels, as well as stop and examine 
all merchant shipping.  On 8 September 1914, little more than a month after the war 
had started; Oceanic was reported aground to the east of Foula Island and then 
abandoned as a total loss.  This was 25% of the IDVWHVWYHVVHOVLQGH&KDLU¶VFRPPDQG
and even with his diluted view of their capabilities, cannot have been welcome news.   
 
The Loss of Oceanic             
What then, had happened?  No official records remain of the courts-martial proceedings  
against Captain W.F.Slayter R.N., Commander H.Smith R.N.R. and Lt.D.Blair R.N.R., 
the commanding officer, the 2FHDQLF¶s former master and the navigating officer 
respectively.  However, a close insight into the event and the personalities involved has 
been gleaned from press reports of the courts-martial, 2FHDQLF¶Vnavigational log and 
individual biographies.4    Whilst establishing the root cause of the grounding it lay in 
setting the wrong course at 0332hrs on 8 September, the landfall was not helped by fog 
and mist patches. The enquiries also revealed a stark lack of understanding between 
Slayter and Smith as to their professional relationship.5 Smith had been on the bridge 
when the ship grounded EXWFODLPHGKLVDSSRLQWPHQWDVµDGYLVHU¶GLGQRWUHTXLUHKLPWR
EHµLQ commDQG¶6PLWKFRQVLGHUHGKLPVHOIDSSRLQWHGµ$GGLWLRQDO for Special ServicH¶       
However, Slayter construed Smith as µ$GGLWLRQDO QRW IRU 6SHFLDO 6HUYLFH¶ DQG
accordingly had authorised Smith to take charge during daylight hours and he had done  
so on occasions prior to the grounding. The issue pivoted on Sections 188 and 189 of 
King¶s Regulations & Admiralty Instructions         
188. " Additional for Special Service."- Captains and other officers of the Military 
Branch, borne on the books of any of His Majesty's ships as " Additional, for special or 
particular service," are never to assume the charge and command of the ships in which 
they are so borne, nor any other charge or command, except that which may appertain 
to the special or particular service for which they are borne, unless they receive from 
the Admiralty, or from the officer in command of a foreign station, express authority to 
the contrary. 
 189. " Additional " not for Special Service.- Captains and other officers of the 
 Military Branch who are borne on the books of any of His Majesty's ships as 
 "Additional," but not for any special or particular service, are to take rank and 
 command in the ships in which they are so borne, and be considered generally, to all 
 intents and purposes, as if they belonged to the complements of such ships. 6 
                                                                                                                                  
                                                 
4
 NMM Barnett, L., An Embarrassing Loss ± H.M Armed Merchant Cruiser Oceanic 
  8th September 1914  (London,2004)                               
5
 NMM  Barnett, An Embarrassing Loss  14-18 
6
 H.M.S.O., .LQJ¶V5HJXODWLRQV	$GPLUDOW\,QVWUXFWLRQV - 1913 ± Vol.I  51  
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It was the loss of a fine ship. Fortunately, in one sense, it had come early in the 
operations. It must have alerted everyone, to these sensitive working relationships in 
the Squadron, especially when the Squadron came to rely exclusively on armed 
merchant cruisers after the removal of the Edgar cruisers. The Naval Historical Branch 
limited its report of the event as follows: 
   «RQ6HSWHPEHUWKHOceanic was detached to the Faeroes, and on return 
 to the Shetlands went ashore on Foula Island on September 8 and became a 
 total wreck.7  
 
6OD\WHUPDGHWKHSRLQWWKDW6PLWK¶VDSSRLQWPHQWKDGEHHQE\WHOHJUDPDQGQRWby the 
usual written format. One outcome of the tragedy was that future masters were granted 
seniority dates and their appointments were as executive officers of the ships 
concerned. In this way the normal command precedence was established.    
 
Although the fate of the Oceanic was not repeated in the Squadron, the differences in 
ethos appear in the diary of Commander H.C.R. Brocklebank R.N., commanding the 
Changuinola.8  %URFNOHEDQN¶V diary and letters give an excellent idea of life in the 
Squadron. They also reveal Brocklebank concerned to introduFH WKH µFKXPP\¶
atmosphere of DQRIILFHUV¶ZDUGURRPPHVV aboard Changuinola.   Such a communal 
atmosphere was seldom found aboard a merchant ship where shipmates are seen as 
µ%RDUGRI7UDGHDFTXDLQWDQFHV¶UDWKHUWKDQµEURWKHUnaval RIILFHUV¶ The former master, 
Lt.Cdr.A.H.Reade R.N.R., as Executive Officer would have been president of 
&KDQJXLQROD¶V wardroom mess. Reade comes in for repeated criticism in 
%URFNOHEDQN¶VGLDU\ZKHUHKHLVWKLQO\GLVJXLVHGDV5« . There was clearly a clash of 
personalities when Brocklebank wrote, µ2OG 5« is a weak spot in the ship, not of 
PXFK XVH DV QDYLJDWRU DQG RI QR DXWKRULW\ LQ WKH PHVV¶9 As the former master in 
peacetime, Reade would have maintained his authority by aloofness and solitude, rather 
than being a team leader LQPRUHGLUHFWFRQWDFWZLWKWKHWHDPPHPEHUV%URFNOHEDQN¶V
real feelings about the R.N.R. come to light with his entry: 
 I have been at sea in this ship for over two years now and feel myself 
 sinking to the level of the R.N.R.., good fellows, worthy and honest though 
 they may be, constant association with them does not tend to liven any  
 brain or thoughts one may have.10     
 
                                                 
7
 Naval Historical Branch Monograph No.19 The Tenth Cruiser Squadron during  
  the Command of  Admiral De Chair 1914-1916  (London,1921) para.12 
8
  Brocklebank, Tenth Cruiser Squadron  q.v. 
9
  Brocklebank, Tenth Cruiser Squadron    40 
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Nevertheless, Brocklebank accepts he had to be tolerant and reveals a degree of 
compassion when he writes: 
 R«gets more foolish daily; I hope I can stick him out for the rest of the war  
 for his own sake, because if I sack him then Elders & Fyffes will follow suit and 
 the poor old boy will starve.11 
 
Clearly, the relationships and different cultures between commanding officers and 
former shipmasters in the Squadron was a difficult and vital challenge to be reconciled.  
 
µ%HLQJLQDOOUHVSHFWVUHDG\IRUVHD¶, was the time honoured preamble to Sailing Orders 
for naval commanding officers and masters in many mail ship companies. These 
simple, precise words transferred UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU WKH YHVVHO¶V VHDZRUWKLQHVV GDLO\
management and the execution of its defined task firmly in the hands of the 
commanding officer.  His receipt for the orders, confirmed that he considered the ship 
read\IRUVHD+RZHYHUIHZLIDQ\VKLSVHYHUSXWWRVHDWRWDOO\UHDG\µLQDOOUHVSHFWV¶
and commanding officers, sometimes, tacitly accepted minor shortcomings in crew or 
ship. Many individuals in the Squadron already had wide seagoing experience, and 
undeUVWRRG WKH µRUGLQDU\ SUDFWLFH RI VHDPHQ¶ +RZHYHU WKHVH QHZ RUGHUV WULJJHUHG
many individual and collective challenges in adjusting to routineVUHTXLUHGE\µ.LQJ¶V
5HJXODWLRQV	$GPLUDOW\,QVWUXFWLRQV¶DQGµ6TXDGURQ StanGLQJ2UGHUV¶$OOWKLVKDGWR
be accomplished in unfamiliar waters, renowned for atrocious weather, whilst facing 
enemy threats.  
 
A Harsh Baptism for Caribbean          
Today, VKLSVXQGHUJRDSHULRGRIµZRUNXS¶WRDVVLVWLQWHDPEXLOGLQJEHIRUHVDLOLQJRQ
task. The Squadron was denied this luxury and as ships were converted, they sailed to 
their patrol areas immediately after storing, loading bunkers, adjusting compasses and 
JXQ WULDOV7UDLQLQJ IRU WKHLUQHZ UROH WRRNSODFH µRQ WKH MRE¶ DV WKH VKLSV¶ ORJERRNV
show. The logbook entry for Caribbean anchored at Liverpool on 23 December 1914, 
after satisfactory gun trials and compasses adjusted is typical of the start of a 
commission.12  At 0930 p.m WKH ORJ VKRZV µ7XJ Wapping arrived with Christmas 
SUHVHQWV¶Caribbean departed Liverpool on 24 December at 12.20 p.m. and next day 
on Christmas Day at 12.10 p.m. the ship was at sea, rolling 35º each way with 5 men on 
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 TNA  ADM 53  37068  Navigational Logbook Caribbean 
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sick report and the vessel frequently pounding.13  On Sunday 27 December at 1.50 p.m. 
the log shows the reality of the situation: 
   µAttempted to turn ship about. Failed . Ship rolled 41½º¶ 
By 8.55 p.m. the same day Caribbean had sighted Muckle Flugga Light.14 On passage 
from Liverpool the logbook recorded trouble with her steering four times, losing a 
patent logline and having her propeller fouled by the wire from her sounding machine. 
It was a challenging introduction to life on patrol in the Tenth Cruiser Squadron, 
packed into only four days after weighing anchor in the Mersey.  
 
Undaunted, Cdr.F.H.Walter R.N. started training aboard Caribbean on 30 December, 
when targets were dropped and all gun layers were given practice. These were short 
winter days packed with relentless gun drill, instruction on ammunition care and 
handling, pistol and rifle drill, fire control, sight setting and signalling for officers, 
midshipmen, ratings and boy seamen.  Many R.N.R. and R.N.V.R. personnel would 
have had training but the need now was to bring performance to concert pitch. The 
R.F.R. personnel were considered to be already proficient. This schedXOHRIµRQWKHMRE
WUDLQLQJ¶ZDVGHPDQGHGRIHDFKRIWKH6TXDGURQ¶VVKLSVDVWKH\EHFDPHDYDLODEOHYHU\
necessary to transform the attitudes of all aboard to the realities of war service.  One 
exception was the occasional mention of sword drill.  An entry on the afternoon of 15 
March aboard Caribbean, shows - µ2IILFHUV DQG 0LGVKLSPHQ DW VZRUG 	 FXWODVV
GULOO¶15  Such an instructional activity is a spectacle to watch on a perfectly still parade 
ground, but on the moving deck aboard a ship in a force 4-5 northwest wind it must 
have been close to circus clowning. The value of time spent on WKLVµFHUHPRQLDO¶ZDV 
questionable given the circumstances in which the ship was working.   
 
Adapting to the daily naval routines was a challenge felt most acutely by the Mercantile 
Marine ratings on board, mainly from the catering and engine room departments. The 
peacetime R.N.R. establishment had no requirement for stewards and cooks so these 
ratings were brought under the umbrella of special agreements known as T124.  
Although the peacetime R.N.R. had provided vacancies and training for officers and 
ratings from the engine room department, relatively few volunteered to join. However, 
since the R.N.R. provided a structure, it was possible to absorb them aboard the armed 
mercKDQWFUXLVHUVDVµWHPSRUDU\R.N.R.¶V¶LIWKH\FDUHGWRYROXQWHHU7KLVH[SHGLHQF\ 
                                                 
13
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would prove to have some problems later. Those not volunteering, were free to seek 
other employment in the Mercantile Marine.   The most obvious difference to merchant 
ship life was the issue of Daily Orders laying GRZQWKHGD\¶VDFWLYLWLHV. Allied to this, 
was the morning muster known as Divisions and the late afternoon muster known as 
Evening Quarters. At these assemblies, important notices and also punishment warrants 
were read out. None of this happened on a merchant ship.  Most surprising to the 
mercantile ratings would have been the reading of prayers at these musters.  No 
merchant ship documentation recorded D FUHZ PHPEHU¶V UHOLJLRQ, it was a private 
matter.  The only formal Christian service held aboard, would be on passenger ships 
when Sunday Divine Service was taken by the master in a public room.  Officers not on 
watch, mainly pursers and cadets, were required to attend if they valued their future in 
WKHµFRPSDQ\¶  Ratings were neither expected nor wanted at these services which were 
a µ3DVVHQJHUV2QO\¶ occasion. Mercantile ratings would have been very surprised that 
Daily Prayers and Divine Service on Sundays were to enter their lives. De Chair saw 
this as an important part of inclusiveness to help disperse any differences of attitude 
amongst the ratings.  'H&KDLU¶VVXFFHVVRU9LFH$GPLUDO57XSSHUZKR took over in 
March 1916, included the attendance of the Mercantile Ratings in the Squadron¶V  
Orders. 16  
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 Fig.17  Extract from ADM 137/822   p.100 
One further routine event which would bring home reality to all aboard, but more 
especially the Mercantile Ratings, was the regular reading of WKH µ$UWLFOHV RI :DU¶   
  
 729. Articles of War.-The printed sheets containing so much of the Naval   
 Discipline Act as relates to the punishment of offences, viz., the Articles of 
 War, are to be displayed in an accessible part of the ship, for the information of 
 the ship's company, to whom this portion of the Act is to be read quarterly, 
 together with the last  return of courts-martial received from the Admiralty.17 
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Anyone hearing these solemn words for the first time, cannot avoid reflecting very 
seriously on the position in which they find themselves.  The Articles are read on 
commissioning and repeated quarterly lest their meaning should be fading in any 
memories. 
A wardroom steward, Ben Dack Rutland, aboard Mantua has recorded their impact on 
him in his diary:   
            Nov.22nd Sunday 1914  Had general parade [Divisions] the Captain read to us the 
 Act of War we have to do YHU\OLWWOHZURQJDFFRUGLQJWRWKHPWREHVKRW««  18 
Rutland had joined Mantua in January 1914 and completed three voyages between 
London and Bombay as a Bedroom Steward, before agreeing to continue serving after 
the ship had been requisitioned.19  Although his diary only covers the three months 
Rutland served in the Squadron, its value lies in it being a rare mercantile ratiQJ¶V
account of events from his perspective. He covered the weather and operations he 
observed, as well as his own concerns and fears.  
 
In his Reminiscences, Tupper gives an insight into the detailed working of the 
Squadron. The daily routines and watch-keeping times are repeated in Appendix 8.20 
Another FKDQJH WR URXWLQH IRU DOO RQ ERDUG ZRXOG KDYH EHHQ WKH SUDFWLFH RI µGDUNHQ
VKLS¶ from dusk until dawn. Portholes and doorways would have to shed no light on 
deck. Deck lights, which gave limited but adequate illumination to work on deck at 
night, would be switched off. Familiarisation with deck layout and fittings would 
become essential if injuries were to be avoided. Further reminders they were now at 
war in difficult circumstances.   
 
Navigation. 
The bridge watch-keeping officers found themselves navigating in totally unfamiliar 
waters, although many were familiar with the actual vessels. Only officers from the 
North Atlantic services of Allan Line, White Star, Anchor and Furness Withy had 
regularly experienced constant µKHDY\ ZHDWKHU¶  Although by 1914 gyro compasses 
were being fitted to H.M. warships, they were yet to appear aboard merchant ships. 
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     by Ben Dack Rutland,  Bedchamber  Steward  Entry 94 
19
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In 1914 navigation was not the featherbed of electronic aids in use at the end of the 
century. Such electronic aids were beyond the imagination of the Squadron¶V officers. 
Navigation in 1914 was more labour intensive than today. Safe navigation relied  on the 
traditional µOHDG ORJOLQH DQG ORRNRXW¶, combined with a well adjusted magnetic 
compass and Admiralty paper charts. If terrestrial or celestial observations were 
unavailable, then reliance had to be placed on efficient dead reckoning to derive 
estimated positions. These needed human assessment of currents, the wind effects and a 
proper leeway allowance. In a confused following sea with the ship zig-zagging, 
loglines streamed astern often fouled and had to be cleared. Clearing a fouled logline 
would take two or three men up 20 minutes to recover and re-stream whilst balancing 
themselves on a moving deck. Significantly, when Oceanic grounded, her logbook 
showed the patent logline had not been streamed for many days previously. Possibly, 
her µKRXUO\ GLVWDQFHV UXQ¶ were calculated from engine room revolutions or merely 
estimates.  It would be some years before thHµSDWHQW¶ log which towed a brass rotator 
astern to notch up the distance run was replaced by better technology.  
 
In 1915 depths were measured using either a hand-lead, deep-sea-lead or the patent 
sounding machine. Hand-leads required a party of two men, with the ship  moving only 
very slowly ahead. The deep-sea lead required the ship to be stopped and a party of 10 
men. Slow moving or stopped ships were easy prey for German submarines as de Chair 
had experienced when the Hawke was torpedoed on 15th October 1914.21   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                Fig.18  Patent Sounding Machine   
 
                                                                                                                                         
Well found ships were fitted with patent sounding machines which could be used when 
the ship was under way at normal speed. Hand driven and electric models were 
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available.  In each case the actual reading was taken by an officer or midshipman. 
Steaming in 20 fathoms (120 feet) of water at a speed of 10 knots soundings can be 
easily obtained continuously once a minute, and in 10 fathoms (60 feet) once every half 
minute.22 The sounding party would need two or more ratings as well as a supervising 
officer.  
 
When making a rendezvous, the flagship Alsatian and other vessels had to rely on 
meticulous dead reckoning navigation. Consequently, we see repeated references in the 
logbooks to the magnetic compasses being frequently swung to verify deviation. 
Compasses were affected as the ships were now configured very differently from 
peacetime. Armament and ammunition, ballast, additional bunkers and a derrick 
regularly topped for boat launching and recovery. Additionally, patrol work required 
frequent alteration of course in unfamiliar latitudes, where cloud often prevented taking 
sun azimuth bearings to check compass deviation. When the base at Swarbacks Minn 
was established, a heeling error instrument was available, on loan from Gibraltar, to 
help with compass correction.23  
 
Another concern was collision avoidance, especially ZKHQ WKH 6TXDGURQ¶V VKLSV 
showed only dimmed or even no navigation lights, as was usual for warships in 
wartime. Neutral vessels trying to avoid the patrolling cruisers, were not averse to 
steaming as darkened ships with no navigation lights, a practice not permitted by the 
Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea. A proper lookout was not only 
needed for collision avoidance but also for sighting mines or submarine periscopes.  
 
New Technology- Electricity and Wireless Telegraphy. 
Two aspects of recent technology which affected the Squadron were electricity, and 
wireless telegraphy. From 1870, the Navy had increasingly used electric power aboard 
ship for functions such as gunnery control and searchlights to illuminate targets.24  A 
Captain H.B.Jackson, R.N., torpedo and electrical specialist, was given command of 
                                                                                                                                 
H.M.S. Defiance, the torpedo school at Plymouth in 1895.  Here, Jackson pursued his 
experiments with wireless waves and constructed a wireless set by the end of the year.   
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  H.M.S.O.,  Manual of Seamanship Vol.1 (London,1908)  141     
23
  TNA ADM 137/822 Tenth Cruiser Squadron Orders. 69   
24
  Hezlet, A., The Electron and Sea Power  (London,1975)  25    
Early Disasters: New Training And Technology.                                        Chapter 5. 
 
 120 
In 1896 he met Signor Guglielmo Marconi. From this point the two men worked 
closely LQDVWDWHRIµFRPSHWLWLYHFRRSHUDWLRQ¶.25  
 
When wireless sets became viable, a network of commercial shore stations was 
developed by Marconi.  Similarly, the Navy developed shore stations, firstly in Home 
Fleet waters and then further afield.  Marconi rented out wireless sets to shipowners, 
WRJHWKHUZLWKRQHRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶VHPSOR\HHVDVWKHRSHUDWRU7KHUHDIWHU, there was a 
µWUDIILFFKDUJH¶calculated on the message activity. The loss of the Titanic in 1912 and 
the part wireless had played in it, gave a boost to the acceptance of wireless aboard 
merchant ships.  The extent of progress by 1913 can be seen below: 
 
 
Year 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 
 Installations 143 250 303 580 686 
                                    Fig.19  Shipboard Marconi Stations 1913 26    
 
In 1906 The International Radio Telegraphic Conference in Berlin had set up the 
procedures for the conduct of wireless communications. Matters such as allocating  
operating frequencies, traffic lists and call signs needed to be documented if the 
technology was to succeed in an orderly way.27 The introduction of the half hourly 
three minute silence periods, to allow any distress calls to be heard without 
interference, stemmed from the 1912 London Radio Conference.  
 
The Navy¶V1906 exercises brought home the need for wireless discipline.28 The need to 
use succinct, clear, and accurate messages had always been a requirement for the naval  
communications. The new technology seemed to encourage redundant and useless 
clutter which degraded the effectiveness of a wireless network.  
 
,Q  WKH $GPLUDOW\ LVVXHG WKH µ,QVWUXFWLRQV IRU WKH &RQGXFW RI :7 6LJQDOOLQJ¶
which allowed for international requirements as well as the particular needs of the 
Royal Navy.29  The instructions required the use of visual signalling by flags and light  
                                                                                                                
when possible since this was actually quicker than W/T.   This inclination to lax W/T 
discipline was not confined to the Royal Navy.  Hezlet records the chaotic scene in the 
U.S.Navy in 1908.30 Wireless telegraphy would prove to be the vital technology for the  
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Tenth Cruiser Squadron, and the FKDOOHQJHWRFRQWUROWKHµKXPDQHOHPHQW¶LQWKHQHZ
W/T technology remained unchanged in 1914.   
 
TKHµGrand Fleet W/T Memoranda¶1RGDWHGst November 1915 entitled   µ*HQHUDO
Instructions For The Use 2I:LUHOHVV7HOHJUDSK\¶UHSHDWHG all the points made above 
together with reinforcements by Jellicoe such as: 31 
  
 ««the Admiralty informs me that Officers will be held personally responsible for 
          any misuse of wireless telegraphy in the Squadrons and ships under their 
                      command. 
  
 ««Serious notice will be taken hereafter of disregard of instructions in this matter, 
 
             ««impress on flag and commanding officers the necessity for adequate     
                      supervision of  telegraphist staff in ships at all times.  
 
 ««8QGHUQRFLUFXPVWDQFHVDUHSULYDWHPHVVDJHVWREHWUDQVPLWWHG« 
 
It followed that radio discipline in the Navy, directly affected the Tenth Cruiser 
Squadron. In fact, Many of the Grand Fleet cautions were repeated by de Chair and 
Tupper in their Squadron Orders.  Referring back to the Grand Fleet W/T Memoranda, 
the Squadron Orders state: 
 ..it is essential that the procedure thereto laid down should be rigidly adhered to. 32 
 
Thus wireless telegraphy in the Royal Navy had brought the need for good radio 
procedures.  This was not a problem in merchant ships. The cost of Marconi outward 
messages fell to the VKLSRZQHUDQGQRPDVWHUVLJQVDZD\WKHRZQHU¶VPRQH\ZLWKRXW
good cause and proper receipts. Some masters of cargo ships  resented paying a crew 
member just to be available to send a message in the event it was needed.33    In the 
Royal Navy WKHZKROHFRQFHSWZDVSHUFHLYHGDVµIUHH¶DQGRIILFHUVZKRKDGEHHQXVHG
WRµPDNLQJDYLVXDOVLJQDO¶IURPVKLSWRVKLSKDGQRWDGMXVWHGWRWKHQHZWHFKQRORJ\¶V
implications.  Being ready for sea in 1914, meant observing wireless discipline.  
The RMSPC KDGVWDUWHGILWWLQJ0DUFRQLVHWVWRWKHLUQHZµ$¶FODVVVKLSVLQ,Q
WKHVDPH\HDU3	2¶VMantua was fitted ZLWKZLUHOHVVDQGLQ%LEE\/LQH¶s  
                                                                                                                                              
30
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Gloucestershire was among many others.34  When the Squadron received the vessels 
from trade they were already fitted with Marconi sets which had a range of 150 miles.  
These were considered inferior to the Navy¶VVHWV, nevertheless, the ships had arrived in 
DµUHDG\WRJR¶VWDWXV when taken up.35   
 
In May 1914, Alsatian had been fitted with an early experimental radio direction finder. 
Initially, its value appeared limited, mainly because no one aboard knew how to operate 
it.36  The fast development of wireless communications in the years leading up to the 
war had revealed the directional attributes of radio waves.37   In time, the $OVDWLDQ¶V 
radio direction finder was improved and operators developed the necessary skills to 
give a more effective performance. There were many occasions when a rendezvous, in 
poor visibility, was made between the flagship, Alsatian, and other ships as a result of 
her direction finder. Later, both Otway and Teutonic were fitted with direction finders. 
Thus the Squadron was reasonably well placed with means of inter-ship and ship to 
shore communications in this, the first war where both belligerents used electronic 
warfare.  The ships also received nightly broadcasts from the Marconi station at Poldhu 
in Cornwall ZLWKFHQVRUHGQHZVRQWKHZDU¶VSURJUHVVZKLFKZDVSDVVHGWRWKHVKLSV¶
companies. Individual commanding officers frequently used W/T to counter isolation in 
the absence of squadron meetings. Although IRUELGGHQ WKLV µFKDWWHU¶ VHHPV WR KDYH
been tolerated, IRU%URFNOHEDQNRQO\WZLFHPHQWLRQVµZLUHOHVVVLOHQFH¶EHLQJLPSRVHG
in a span of two and a half years.38   
 
Providing skilled W/T operators was a major challenge for the Navy which turned to 
the Marconi Company for support.  Marconi wireless operators were trained to both  
operate and maintain W/T equipment.  These men were transferred in their hundreds 
from the merchant ships to warships ranging from battleships to armed trawlers.39  
However, expediency usually brings its own problems and the Mercantile Marine was 
left bereft of wireless operators. Most merchant ships normally had only a single 
operator in time of peace; the matter was worsened by the requirement to place two  
                                                                                                                                     
operators aboard, to maintain a twenty four hour watch system in wartime.  The 
demand for operators was further increased when vessels between 1600 and 3000 tons 
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which had previously been exempt, were required to be fitted with wireless.40  Marconi 
started a recruitment campaign to enrol young men for training at the company 
instruction centres to meet this need.  In addition, Marconi was contracted to provide  
W/T training in naval establishments and one of the largest was at Crystal Palace in 
South London.  The R.N.V.R. had recently introduced a Signals Branch and many of 
these reservists considered themselves lucky to be drafted to the Fleet rather than the 
Royal Naval Division.  The new demands of a prolonged war together with casualties 
meant that a new generation of wartime R.N.V.R. signalmen and telegraphists had to be 
trained. The initial needs of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron for W/T personnel had been 
dealt with by de Chair. The Marconi operators declined to serve in the Navy as Chief 
Petty Officers, their point being that assistant pursers and junior engineers were being 
granted commissions.  De Chair set about getting telegraphic approval from the 
Admiralty for the men to be engaged as Temporary Warrant Telegraphists R.N.R.., a  
posting which became increasingly seen in the Navy Lists of the time.  'H &KDLU¶V
supportive comment was that: 
 
 ««the men appeared to be socially and intellectually quite as worthy of commissions 
 as the majority of other mercantile officers who had received them,« 41 
 
No doubt WKH0DUFRQL&RPSDQ\¶VVHOHFWLRQSURFHVVDQGWKHPHQWKHPVHOYHs, had they 
known of this assessment, would have felt reassured. Twenty five operators were 
VHFXUHGZLWKWKHKHOSRI0DUFRQL¶s Liverpool office prior to sailing.   
 
The Tenth Cruiser Squadron¶V need for W/T personnel was reflected throughout the 
Fleet and the temporary R.N.V.R. trainees from Crystal Palace were absorbed into 
VKLSV¶FRPSDQLHVDVTXLFNO\DVSRVVLEOH The approved W/T complement for ships of 
the Squadron was four.42  In the early stages of the war one of these would have been a 
Boy Telegraphist EXWE\'HFHPEHUDQ\%R\7HOHJUDSKLVWVZHUHµDGGLWLRQDO¶WR 
complement. Commanding Officers were required to ensure Boy Telegraphists started 
watch-keeping as soon as possible. A Boy Telegraphist unable to keep a watch by 
himself when 17 years and 3 months had to be reported to the Flag Officer.  
 
The aim was to have them fit for advancement to Ordinary Telegraphist by the age of 
17½ years and once advanced, they would be eligible to be drafted elsewhere in the 
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Fleet.43  Thus, like all other ships in the Grand Fleet, the Tenth Cruiser Squadron was 
challenged to share in the training of telegraphists to benefit all from the new wireless 
age. De Chair wrote a long report on the use of W/T in the Squadron in 1916.44  
 
Naval Aviation. 
The other significant technological advance had been the rapid growth in naval 
aviation.  When war seemed inevitable there was concern that Germany might attempt 
a landing in the Shetlands. The Army was keen that the military forces should have a 
joint operation with the Navy.45  Vessels were sailed from Scapa Flow on the 3rdAugust 
1914 for the islands.  Initially, in addition to commanding the Edgar class cruisers, de 
Chair had to help set up an R.N.R. force to assist in the defence of the Shetlands. The 
extra commitment towards the defence of the Shetlands must have distracted some of 
his attention from the seagoing task of the Squadron.  In September, 1914 Vice 
Admiral Sir Stanley Colville was appointed to the new command of Admiral of the 
Orkneys and Shetlands and no doubt madHDZHOFRPHUHGXFWLRQWRGH&KDLU¶VSHUVRQDO
workload.46  The joint discussions on the Shetlands defence in 1914, had revealed the 
berthing of two seaplanes in Lerwick harbour was feasible.47  De Chair may have been 
thinking about the potential for seaplanes to provide reconnaissance to spot submarines 
and vessels for boarding.  Jellicoe was known to be keen to embrace aviation into his 
command.48  The matter of aerial resources for the Tenth Cruiser Squadron was not 
raised until 1916.   
 
On 23 September 1915 Admiral Beatty arranged for sea-going balloon tests at Rosyth 
under the supervision of Rear Admiral Hood. Carried out aboard the seaplane carrier 
Engadine the tests proved a balloon could be towed successfully as speeds up to 22kts 
and could easily reach a height of 3,000ft.  In an enthusiastic report to Beatty on the 
tests, Hood wrote: 
            I think I have proved the value of the kite balloon for reconnaissance 
 purposes; in a suitable vessel the strategic and tactical value will be very 
  
            great; at 3,000ft there will be a radius of vision of 60 miles and the 
 communication will not be of the sketchy kind in use from aeroplanes, 
 but will be conversation by telephone from a skilled observer sitting  
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 comfortably in a basket, to a responsible officer in a balloon ship, who 
 with efficient W/T and all signal books and code books at hand, will rapidly 
 VLJQDOE\WKHPRVWHIILFLHQWPHWKRGWKHLQIRUPDWLRQ««49      
  
The results appeared promising but an important omission was no mention of the 
weather conditions at the time. One particular benefit was telephone communication  
with the balloon observer which promised to be better than contemporary aircraft radio. 
The visibility range achieved pointed to potential benefits for the Tenth Cruiser 
Squadron in sighting shipping to intercept.  
 
Prolonged stays in port for repairs gave Flag Officers time to visit the Foreign Office 
and the Admiralty to discuss Squadron matters. On 5 July 1916 Tupper visited the 
Royal Flying Corps at Roehampton. Here he ascended to 1000 feet in a balloon. He 
was clearly attracted to the idea and calculated that a balloon ship could cover a gap in  
the patrol of 120 miles which had to be left open on occasions.50   Clearly, Tupper had 
some success in his plans since his reports for 25th July, stated: 
 The Commander-in-Chief informed me that Campania would be available to carry 
             out experiments with a kite balloon between the Faeroes and Shetlands on 28 & 29 
             July, but this had to be postponed owing to engine defects developing in Campania.  
             It is proposed that Alsatian should attend these experiments when they take place.51 
  
These experiments were planned for mid-summer, when fogs were prevalent and one 
wonders whether the prospect of being aloft in the winter gales would have been 
practical.  Whilst an increase in the range of visibility to spot ships seemed attractive 
the converse was that neutrals were equally able to spot the balloons above the horizon 
and take avoiding action. 
 
Tupper persisted, for when Alsatian was in Liverpool for refitting he reported on 15 
September 1916, during the refit, a steam winch was fitted aft on the upper deck for the 
purpose of working a man lifting Kite or Kite Balloon. The man-lifting Kites had not yet been 
received.52 Kite Balloons did not emerge again until November 1917. By now the 
Squadron was being redeployed and Tupper submitted proposals for a reduced number 
of ships to patrol.  Clearly, now convinced about aviation he proposed: 
  
Whilst in harbour at Scapa the three Armed Merchant Cruisers could be fitted 
             by dockyard hands for carrying numerous aircraft-a sketch is attached  
             regarding Alsatian WRFDUU\VD\DHURSODQHVDQGWZRNLWHEDOORRQV« 
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The proposals were overtaken by the progressive transfers of cruisers to convoy escort 
duty and the possible excursion into naval aviation for the Tenth Cruiser Squadron was 
over.53 
 
Naval aviation also attracted the attention of many young naval officers, including one 
aboard the Changuinola. Commander %URFNOHEDQN¶VOHWWHUGDWHG$SULOUHYHDOs: 
            Tom Smith my best Lieutenant has asked for a recommend for the 
 flying corps but he came at a bad time, as in addition to being up till 1.30 
 last night, I had a glass of sherry at dinner with the consequent liver this 
 mornLQJVRKLVUHTXHVWZDVUHIXVHGEXW,UHDOO\FDQ¶WDIIRUGWRORVHDOOP\ 
 decent people and get mates of colliers in their place.54  
  
The refusal may have had its roots in an earlier letter from Busta Voe, dated 24 
February 1916 when Brocklebank wrote: 
 Last month I recommended Carroll for submarines and now to my disgust 
 they have taken him and I lose my best Lieutenant. Everyone is now clamouring 
 to go so I have caused it to be published in the ship that in future I only recommend 
 people whom I want to get rid of as useless!55    
 
Brocklebank reveals an element of snobbery towards the Mercantile Marine when he 
baulks at the prospect of a µFROOLHUPDWH¶LQWKHZDUGURRP6XFKPHQZHUHXVXDOO\ 
excellent seamen. The multiple requests for transfers to submarines and one for flying, 
may have been youthful desires for further adventures or perhaps a desire to escape 
from Changuinola or even Commander Brocklebank. 
 
Shore Support. 
Whilst the individual commanding officers were responsible for ensuring individual 
ships were ready for sea, it fell to the Flag Officers de Chair and his successor Tupper 
to ensure there was shore support for the ships.  For many of the cruisers, the Clyde and 
Liverpool were their peacetime home ports and well honed coaling and repair facilities 
were there to ensure as quick a turn round as possible.  Since the armed merchant 
cruisers had been selected, in some haste, from merchant ships already in British ports 
it made sense to use existing facilities until a better solution could be found. A Base 
Office was opened in Liverpool under the auspices of the Senior Naval Officer there.56                          
This carried out administrative work for the Squadron generally and particularly for  
ships in that port for repairs or coaling.57    
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The average distance from the patrol areas to the Mersey was a distance of at least 600 
nautical miles each way. Prior to the armed merchant cruisers being requisitioned the 
Edgar class cruisers had coaled at Busta Voe from colliers sent there for this purpose.  
De Chair needed a northern base in order to save the coal used on long passages back to 
the Clyde or Mersey as well as maximising time on patrol for the Squadron.  
Furthermore, there was  a growing threat from mines and enemy submarines to 
Squadron ships on passage to and from home ports. Busta Voe, like Olna Firth, was an 
inlet leading off the strait of Swarbacks Minn on the west coast of the Shetlands.58  At 
first de Chair looked at West Loch Roag in the Hebridean Isle of Lewis but Swarbacks 
Minn was to be preferred. 59  The personal contacts and the familiarity with the islands 
de Chair made at the start of the war would prove invaluable when he proposed setting 
up this base in the Shetlands for the Squadron.  To keep the vessels at sea for the 
maximum time any forward base would need good coaling facilities with fresh water 
easily available for both boiler and domestic use. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                       Fig.20.Two six-inch 1st World War guns with emplacements  guard                                                             
                                 the entrance to Swarbacks Minn naval base for the  10th Cruiser Squadron. 60  
 On 16 April 1915, the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets wrote to the Admiralty 
VXSSRUWLQJ GH &KDLU¶V UHFRPPHQGDWLon to develop  a northern base at Swarbacks 
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Minn.61  The anchorage at Swarbacks Minn was surrounded by a remote hinterland its 
great advantage was being adjacent to Squadron patrol areas. Additionally, the entrance 
was easier and less dangerous than that of Loch Roag,  all key points made in a letter to 
Admiral H.F.Oliver, Chief of the Admiralty War Staff.62  Final Admiralty approval 
came on 21 May 1915, and Swarbacks Minn was to become a new naval base with 
Rear Admiral W.B. Fawckner appointed Senior Naval Officer after de Chair¶V
recommendation. 63 Significantly, Fawckner had had dockyard experience in berthing 
and handling ships. Since his retirement he had been in charge of the coaling station at 
Perim, an island near the southern entrance to the Red Sea possessing a large natural 
harbour.  Fawckner seemed an ideal choice for Swarbacks Minn. The new naval base at 
Swarbacks Minn, in addition to providing coal and water, needed defence and this was 
given immediate attention. The first priority was for anti-torpedo nets to protect the 
entrance, together with the necessary trawlers and drifters.  The Squadron had a coal 
consumption of 1600 tons per day and de Chair wanted four colliers always available in 
the anchorage. In addition, he foresaw that a coal barge was needed to bunker the 
drifters and trawlers, water piped to a pier and water barges for its transfer to the 
cruisers. Lookout posts connected by telephone were set up. A Hospital Ship and 
Frozen Meat Ship were called for and central to these demands was that the de-
commissioned Edgar cruiser Gibraltar was to be brought to Swarbacks Minn.  
Gibraltar was to act as a depot and repair ship and provide W/T facilities for the Senior 
Naval Officer. The Gibraltar became home to 250 R.N.R. Firemen, mainly with gas 
company experience, who assisted with the thankless and never ending job of coaling 
the cruisers as they came in.64     
 
On occasions the ships used Loch Ewe on the west coast of Scotland for coaling, where 
there was an established naval presence.65  Those ships with limited bunker capacity 
would continue to use Loch Ewe for coaling and as an alternative to either Swarbacks  
Minn, the Clyde or the Mersey.  A pattern is indicated, certainly for Changuinola, 
ZKHUHE\DZHHN¶VVWD\LQ*ODVJRZZRXOGEHIROORZHGEy three or four cruises when  
coaling would be at Busta Voe before a return to Glasgow.66  The flag officer aboard 
Alsatian, or in his absence then the second in command of the Squadron, had to keep a  
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meticulous check on the coal stocks of all ships. This was one of the items of Squadron 
administration which fell to the flag officers staff, which were carried above $OVDWLDQ¶V  
normal complement. Squadron Standing Orders required ships to report to the Senior 
Officer when their coal stocks had only forty percent remaining.67  This allowed  
planning to rearrange patrols and send ships in to Busta Voe, where there was a 
stockpile of 5000 tons, or send the ship to the Clyde or Mersey.68  
 
De Chair Removes Unsuitable Ships. 
IN 1908 de Chair had started a three year appointment as Assistant Controller at the 
Admiralty. His work had centred on ship construction, repairs and alterations to ships  
visiting Navy Dockyards and  private shipyards.69  Earlier between 1903 and 1905 he 
had made six transatlantic crossings by steamer.70  These experiences would have given 
him sufficient knowledge of merchant ships to be apprehensive about some of the 
merchant vessels allocated to the Squadron.71  Knowing the sea areas and the work 
planned for these ships, together with the weather to be expected there, four ships 
would have raised TXHVWLRQV LQPRVW VHDPHQ¶V PLQGV7KH\ ZHUH Clan McNaughton, 
Eskimo, Calix and Viknor.   Clan Mcnaughton was a moderate sized cargo vessel which 
had limited living accommodation although space enough for additional bunkers.  
Eskimo and Calix (ex Calypso) were small North Sea passenger/cargo ships with 
limited bunker capacity owned by Wilson Line.  Although Eskimo ZDVWKHµFUDFN¶VKLS
of the company, like her sistership, Calix, they were not suitable for ocean work.  
Lastly, Viknor (ex Viking) built in 1888, was a steamer with a clipper bow which had 
recently been used on holiday cruising during summer months in Norwegian waters. 
Since the Edgars had been withdrawn the patrols had been practically non-existent.  
The merchant cruisers had been brought forward with such urgency that de Chair 
probably felt, at least initially, he must accept the resources available. The ships had, 
after all, been passed by the Naval Constructors so de Chair needed to have experience 
of them before writing formal complaints.72     
 
Some commanding officers also had reservations about the arrangements in their ships.  
Commander Brocklebank writing home from the Changuinola on 30th January 1915 
says: 
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 Some days ago I wired to Liverpool saying that I would want three hundred tons 
 of ballast on arrival and last night comes a telegram from the Admiralty wanting 
 a full report on the subject as they do not consider that the stability of the ship 
  necessitates any ballast: so I suppose it will be some months before I get my ballast: 
 it is not the stability that is wrong but the trim. She is down by the stern and should                       
             be on an even keel and when very light of coal handling her in heavy weather may be 
 DZNZDUG6R\RXQHHGQRWEHDQ[LRXVDERXWWKHVKLS¶VVWDELOLW\VKH¶VQRWJRLQJWRWXrn 
 over.73  
 
Merchant ships performed EHVW ZKHQ VOLJKWO\ µGRZQ Ey the stern¶ VR that their 
propellers and rudders were more deeply immersed in the water. When cargo was 
discharged or coal consXPHGWKHQ WKHYHVVHO¶VGUDXJKWZDs reduced and the propeller 
became less effective. Warships were designed to be on an even keel and their draught  
differed relatively little between light and loaded condition.  Here then was a challenge 
QRWLFHGLQWKHHDUO\VWDJHVRI%URFNOHEDQN¶VWLPHLQFRPPDQGRIChanguinola. 
 
Commander Walters aboard the Caribbean reported on the 9 January 1915: 
 ««EXWYHU\EDGZHDWKHUZDVexperienced and though the ship is a  
 very good seaboat, rolls very heavily, and steers badly, unless going Full Speed.  
 
 11. Several defects require to be made good, the Telemotor gear being the 
 principal item, and the alteration of the sHDERDW¶VGDYLWVZKLFKDUHDWSUHVHQWD 
 PRVWGDQJHURXVILWWLQJ«« 
 
 ««&RDOH[SHnditure appears to be excessive since leaving Liverpool ship 
 has steamed 3028 miles on 1200 tons of coal.74  
 
Merchant ships were intended to operate at economical full speed most of the time. 
Manoeuvring the engines is confined to the departure and arrival events of a voyage. 
Constant alteration of speeds and the need to make broad zig-zags became a burden too 
much for Caribbean.  By 23 February 1915, de Chair was reporting Caribbean as ± 
µXQVXLWDEOH 2OG DQG VORZ DQG RI VPDOO FDSDFLW\ 'LIILFXOW WR ORDG DQG UROOV EDGO\¶75  
Even so Caribbean struggled on with patrols until 9 June 1915 when her officers and 
crew were transferred to commission Victorian.76  Orotava, like Caribbean, had not 
been rated highly by de Chair, nevertheless, the Navy had bought both steamers for 
£75,000 from the RMSPC on 30 June 1915.77  
 
Patia was one of five similar ships taken up from Elders and Fyffes, the others were 
Bayano, Changuinola, Motagua and Patuca.  Captain G.A.Vivian R.N., in command of 
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Patia, raised two important points in his first report after RQO\ D PRQWK¶V VHUYLFH 
aboard. The first, mirrored comments reported above by Commander Brocklebank 
aboard Changuinola.  Vivian reported of the Patia: 
  
             When full up with coal and down by the head, as is for normal trim under these 
 conditions, she is not a particularly good seaboat and is sluggish and wet. 
 When however, the forward coal is out or to an extent out, the ship behaves  
 extremely well in a sea-way and is buoyant and dry when hove to in a heavy sea.  
 
The forward holds were no doubt filled with extra coal and this was not the way the 
ship would normally be stowed in peacetime on the banana trade. Ships down by the  
KHDG DUH DOZD\V VOXJJLVK 9LYLDQ¶V QH[W FRPPHQW VKRZV WKH VWDUN GLIIHUHQFH LQ
watertight subdivision between a merchant ship and a purpose built warship. 
 Her weak point from a structural point of view is that the two large holds have 
 no subdivision  at all and no real decks; they are in fact two large tanks, the 
 flooding of either being sufficient to sink the ship, and owing to the extremely 
 small pumping power available for clearing these spaces the flooding of them 
 is a comparatively easy matter. This point has been represented to the Admiralty, 
 but if it is intended to retain these ships for service in the Navy, they would  
 undoubtedly be very vastly improved by the fitting of a thwartship watertight 
 bulkhead in each hold, and this would not be a matter of much time and or money.78  
 
9LYLDQ¶VQH[WUHSRUWLQFOXGHGDUHSHDWof these views when he included: 
 I would again submit that the efficiency of the ship would be very materially 
 improved by the fitting of a thwartship bulkhead in each of the two holds.79  
    
News received on the 11 March 1915, of Bayano being torpedoed with a heavy loss of 
life RQO\IRXUGD\VDIWHU9LYLDQ¶VUHSRUW, prompted action.  The risks associated with the 
absence of a watertight bulkhead were reported to the Admiralty.80  Patia arrived at 
Belfast on 14 April 1915 and work was put in hand to fit the bulkheads authorised by 
the Admiralty as well as other improvements.81  The whole episode showed that ships 
taken up from trade would sometimes need significant alterations, especially where 
they originated from a specialised trade such as bananas. 
 
Weather, the Unavoidable Challenge. 
One challenge which constantly dominated the Squadron¶VRSHUDWLRQs, over which there 
could be no control, was the weather.  Ships on the North Atlantic runs had started to 
pass weather information ashore by means of W/T as early as 1909.82   Gale warnings 
for the British Isles were broadcast to ships in the Eastern North Atlantic approaching 
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these shores as far back as 1911. On the outbreak of war in 1914, this service ceased, 
the war brought home the fact that weather information was too valuable to hand to the 
enemy.83   However, the Navy seems to have continued a daily weather report to all 
H.M. Ships.84  The Squadron ships on patrol needed little in the way of weather reports 
since most of the time they were in the midst of the most challenging weather in the 
world.   Many  patrol activities were in the present day areas of Fair Isle, Faeroes and 
South East Iceland. Ships proceeding to and from the Clyde and Mersey would pass 
through the Hebrides, Malin and Irish Sea areas.  In the winter months, the Flag 
Officers Reports of Proceedings and Navigational Logs of the ships abound with 
mention of heavy weather often causing damage to the ships. Sometimes the weather 
severely hampered the rate of boarding, when patrol vessels might be µhove to¶ for 
considerable periods against strong westerly gales.85   
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                              
                                                            Fig.21 BBC Forecast Areas in 1924.86 
&RPPDQGHU%URFNOHEDQN¶VGLDU\ aboard Changuinola  for  12 December 1915 states:  
 µ6XQGD\5ROOLQJYHU\KHDYLO\DOOQLJKWQRVOHHS'LYLVLRQVQRURXQGVRUSUD\HUV9HU\
 heavy rolls smashed fore-gun platform and fore magazine. The sea gets up and goes 
 GRZQZLWKUHPDUNDEOHUDSLGLW\¶ 87  
 
The volatile nature of the weather conditions was often a point for comment. The 
challenge of the weather varied markedly between the summer with almost 24 hours of  
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daylight and the winter with typically only five or six hours.  The winter months saw 
gale and storm force winds daily with their attendant high seas and wintry squalls. Icing 
was always a possibility which would put dangerous top weight on the upper deck.  
 
Whilst the sea ice between Iceland and Greenland closed off the Denmark Strait in 
winter, this was a possible route for neutral ships in the summer. A Squadron ship had 
to be sent in the spring to observe the sea state and a summer patrol considered.  The 
dark winter nights gave increased opportunities for neutrals to evade the Squadron.  In  
FRQWUDVW WKH VXPPHU¶V long daylight hours provided the Squadron increased 
opportunities to sight, chase and board neutrals. Although the storms moderated in 
summer, the Squadron was often hampered in summer by sea fogs. In July 1915  
Alcantara, whilst on E Patrol to the north of Iceland reported experiencing twelve days 
nearly continuous fog and mist.88 
 
The weather is well recorded in logbooks and official reports but a look at Ben 
5XWODQG¶VGLDU\IURPWKHMantua shows how debilitating constant foul weather can be, 
even for those not working on deck.  
A selection RI5XWODQG¶Ventries shows: 
 Sunday 27th September 1914 
 Very bad weather with rain and hail storms seas running mountains high.. 
 night time again not much change in the weather, still creaking and straining to  
 make headway. 
  
 Monday 9th November 1914 
 $ZIXOZHDWKHUFDQ¶WVWDQGWKLVDOOWKHZLQWHUHVSHFLDOO\XSLQWKHVHODWLWXGHVZHDUH 
             nearly always in the Arctic Circle. We are battened down everywhere without a ray of  
 daylight all day if you go on deck you stand a great chance of being washed overboard. 
 
 Thursday 12th November 1914 
Very bad weather decks were covered in ice this morning and nearly all day it has been 
snowing I shall be very glad to get away from this. 
  
             Saturday 14th November 1914 
 6WLOOUROOLQJKHDYLO\QHYHUJHWDQ\JRRGVOHHS«««,FDQQHYHUVWDQGWKLVDOOZLQWHU             
 
  
Monday 30th November 1914 
 $UULYHGLQWKH0HUVH\ODVWQLJKW««. anxiously awaiting letters must get away from  
 this.89  
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Hard though it seemed to Rutland, he was not keeping a watch on deck exposed to the 
elements. Rutland often comments on the cold weather and on October 14, records 
µJHWWLQJYHU\FROGVRZHKDGZDUPFORWKLQJVHUYHGRXWJUDWLVWKLVPRrnLQJ¶90  
 
 
 
 
                                                                      Fig.22. Extract from ADM 137/822  p.15 
Nine months later the Navy had accepted the Squadron¶V VSHFLDO QHHGV ZKHQ ZDUP
clothing was authorised all year round.91 In contrast to the cold, the firemen and 
trimmers in the engine-room, stokehold and bunkers laboured four hours on and eight 
hours off in dehydrating heat. Day after day, coal had to be trimmed, bagged for the  
next watch and then fed to the boilers. Ash had to be removed and sent up on deck, all 
to be done whilst the ship rolled and pitched mercilessly.   
 
De Chair was well aware of the weather¶V power after the devastation to the Edgar 
Class cruisers in the previous autumn: and it was the weather which claimed the first  
loss of the reconstituted Squadron. This was the Viknor, lost on passage from patrol to 
Liverpool with eight German nationals aboard, taken from the Norwegian liner  
Bergensfjord.  Wreckage was washed ashore at Portrush and it was assumed she was 
lost on the 13th January 1915 in a gale. De Chair records that she was considered a poor  
sea boat and was not classed A1 at Lloyds.92   Barely, three weeks had passed when 
Clan Macnaughton was concluded to have foundered on the night of 2/3 February 1915 
again under stress of weather with a loss of 277 lives.93  The precise cause of her loss 
was uncertain. Ransom infers the vessel was torpedoed.94  In contrast, Chatterton 
claimed she was mined in a gale.95  :UHFNDJHIRXQGLQÛ¶1Û¶:identified as 
belonging to Clan Macnaughton, led Jellicoe to concludeµ,IHDUVKHIRXQGHUHGGXULQJ 
night 2nd inst.¶96  Brocklebank recorded in his diary that on the morning of 30 January 
1915 Changuinola had come across Clan Macnaughton when he had a few minutes  
talk with Commander Jeffreys by searchlight.  Bob Jeffreys had been a longstanding 
friend of Brocklebank.97   
                                                 
90
 NMM P&O /65/206  Mantua  Rutland entry 55. 
91
 TNA ADM 137/822  Squadron Orders, Warm Clothing 15 
92
 TNA ADM 137/185   de Chair to Admiralty  25 January 1915  87-103 
93
 TNA ADM 137/185   de Chair to Admiralty  9 March 1915  121-43   
94
 %/5DQVRP%µ$1XUVHU\RI)LJKWLQJ6HDPHQ"7KH1HZIRXQGODQG5R\DO1DYDO 
   Reserve, 1901-¶  in Hadley, M.L., Huebert, R., Crickard, F.W., (Eds.)  
   $QDWLRQ¶V1DY\LQTXHVWRI&DQDGLDQQDYDOLGHQWLW\  (Montreal,1996)   251  
95
  Chatterton, The Big Blockade  91 
96
  TNA  ADM 137/1081 C-in-C Home Fleets to Admiralty 10 February 1915   21 
Early Disasters: New Training And Technology.                                        Chapter 5. 
 
 135 
 
The loss of Clan Macnaughton was widely felt and the diary of Commander 
F.H.Grenfell of H.M.S. Cedric reveals the strength of the feeling: 
  
            The Admiralty have been stirred to action by the criticism of Lord Charles Beresford 
 and others upon the un-seaworthy state in which some of our Squadron have been sent 
             to sea and have ordered the Calyx to pay off.  We know well enough that she is 
 unstable. The Clan Macnaughton¶V officers were firmly convinced that nothing could 
 save the ship from capsizing if she met really bad weather and their fears were  
 XQIRUWXQDWHO\ DOO WRR ZHOO IRXQGHG 7KH &RQVWUXFWRU¶V 'HSDUWPHQW DW WKH $GPLUDOW\
 ought to render up some victims for hanging after the war; it is they who have passed 
 the ships and allowed them to go to sea with empty holds and guns on deck and nobody 
 with the least idea how these novel conditions would affect their stability.98 
 
In response to dH &KDLU¶V complaint about the choice of merchant ships, a certain 
DPRXQWRIµpassing WKHEODPH¶quickly developed. The Third Sea Lord was concerned  
to combat any possible criticism that ships had been sent to sea in an un-seaworthy 
condition.99 The Superintendent of Contract Work, W.H.Whiting, reported to the Third 
Sea Lord that the vessels taken up were the best available, given the urgency with 
which they were needed.100  A further note by Whiting to the Third Sea Lord named the 
committee members responsible for the selection of the first nine ships. These included 
the Viknor and Clan Macnaughton and there is an admission that these first nine ships 
were not inspected before being taken up. Whiting includes a self protective reminder 
that the Third Sea Lord approved the list.  Inclining experiments were only conducted 
on vessels thought to have incomplete stability data and ballast was loaded where 
µFRQVLGHUHGQHFHVVDU\¶101  It is not known whether these admissions were copied to de 
Chair but they would have confirmed his own seamanlike suspicions.  If de Chair had 
NQRZOHGJHRI:KLWLQJ¶VSDSHUVLWZRXOGQRWEHQHZVKHZRXOGKDYHZLVKHGWRSDVVRQ
to his commanding officers in the Squadron.  
 A further file note by Whiting records the need for precise operating requirements to 
be known when taking up ships from trade. He records that ships capable of regular 
transatlantic running, may not be capable of constant zig-xagging in heavy weather 
coupled with the need for frequent alterations of speed. Since the heavy  
weather season was far from over he suggested employing larger vessels of say 10,000 
gross tons ± much bigger than the hard worked vessels from Elders and Fyffes.102   
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Even the hardy Newfoundland ratings felt the stress of weather and the strain of 
adjusting to rigid Royal Navy routines aboard the ill fated Clan Macnaughton.   
A letter to home from one of them, Stephen Dicker, aged 22, is very revealing: 
 ,DPRQHRIDJXQ¶VFUHZDQGKDYHWRVWDQGP\ZDWFKRQWKHIR¶F¶VOHQRPDWWHU  
 how the water is going over her, with a pair of short lace-up boots on. There  
 ZHUHDVPDQ\DVGD\V«. that I never has DGU\IRRW«.103    
 
There are few accounts of Squadron life by ratings and this appears to be the only one 
from a Newfoundland Reservist. Apart from the unavoidable discomfort from the bad 
weather, it reveals inadequate heavy weather clothing. 
   
These then, were the daily challenges to be met by the crews before tackling any of 
those posed by the enemy.  ,QUHWURVSHFWWKH6TXDGURQ¶VVKLSVDQGPHQZHUHµQRWLQDOO
respects - UHDG\ IRU VHD¶ DQG WKH H[HFXWLRQ RI the tasks allotted to them. Some ships 
were inadequate, men needed further training, the weather proved to be far worse than 
most had expected, the proper use of the new technology of wireless needed to be 
understood and practiced whilst at the same time different cultures had to be brought 
together to maintain morale.  There was a need to adapt and compromise, as well as 
recognise the need for a base much closer to operations.  The next chapter will examine 
the effort needed for the Squadron¶s prime task of intercepting neutral ships, passing 
both east and west, to the north of the British Isles. 
----------------- 
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When the Squadron was restructured deploying twenty four armed merchant cruisers, a 
more rigorous approach to interception was required to replace the seemingly random 
interceptions by the Edgar class cruisers.  The matter was considered in a 
memorandum by Captain Richard Webb, Director of Trade Division at the Admiralty.  
7UDGH 'LYLVLRQ¶V SULPDU\ GXW\ was to detain British ships in port at times of special 
danger, or divert them to safer routes to diminish the risk from submarines. The 
Admiralty was responsible for the safety of the seas and the efficient prosecution of the 
maritime blockade. Where these duties required control over merchant ships, this task 
was given to the Trade Division.1   
 
:HEE¶V PHPRUDQGXP DVVXPHG both the Pentland Firth and the passage between 
Orkneys and Shetlands would be patrolled by resources other than the Tenth Cruiser 
Squadron. He proposed two solutions, one of which was less exposed to submarines 
with patrol lines totalling 850 miles whereas the other was only 450 miles in length. 
The second option was chosen on the basis that the patrol lines would always be shifted 
at short notice to keep an element of surprise for the enemy/neutral ships and against 
submarine threats. A patrol speed of twelve knots and an average visibility of 5 miles 
were assumed.2     
 
On the 1st January 1915 Jellicoe promulgated the new organisation of the squadron into 
four divisions which was to be as follows: 3 
Area                             Eastern base Line of Area          Ships allocated 
A. BetweeQ0HULGLDQRI¶:Alsatian  (Flag) 
     Faroes                                                                            Mantua 
     and                                                                                 Otway     
     Iceland                                                                           Virginian 
                                                                                            Columbella  
 
 
Area                             Eastern base Line of Area          Ships allocated 
%1RUWK0HULGLDQRIÛ¶:                    Teutonic (Senior Officer)   
     of                                                                                    Cedric 
     Shetland                                                                         Caribbean  
     Islands                                                                            Patia 
                                                                                            Orotava 
                                                                                            Viknor                       
 
 
                                                 
1
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C. South                         Line joining Sydero                      Motagua (Senior Officer) 
     of                               and Sule Skerry                            Oropesa 
     Faroe                                                                               Bayano    
     Islands                                                                             Changuinola     
                                                                                             Digby     
                                                        Hilary  
 
D. West of                      N ½ W from St.Kilda                   Hildebrand (Senior Officer) 
     Hebrides                                                                          Calyx  
                                                                                             Eskimo 
                                                                                             Ambrose 
                                                                                             Clan McNaughton 
                                                                                             Patuca 
 
It was intended that the armed merchant cruiser Laurentic would join the Squadron and 
be allocated to Area A. In fact, Laurentic never joined the Squadron, being always 
detached on other work carrying troops and particularly gold, for which she was 
specially fitted.  
 
Ships were to coal at Liverpool in rotation and when in routine, this plan intended that at 
least four vessels would be on each patrol line.  Set up in mid winter, when the daylight 
hours were typically only about five hours, it was recognised that some steamers would 
get through the patrol. Later the patrols would be moved and changed, especially in 
summer when the ice cleared from the Denmark Strait and opened that as a potential 
route for blockade runners. The Squadron was intended to work in association with the 
nearby Yacht and Trawler Patrols and it was proposed to keep one cruiser squadron in 
the vicinity of /DWLWXGH Û1 /RQJLWXGH Û: UHDG\ WR support the Tenth Cruiser 
Squadron.4  
 
As the war progressed a number of armed trawlers were allocated to assist the squadron, 
usually with inshore activities, since the Squadron was intended to work seaward of the  
100 fathom line (200 metres).5  Blockade runners often aimed to reach latitude 65º N. 
and then work south inside Norwegian territorial waters to the reach the Baltic via the  
Skaggerak, thence to German Baltic ports. Conversely, this formed an exit route for 
German surface raiders and neutral vessels attempting to carry German exports. Thus at 
last, the Squadron could focus on its task of intercepting merchant vessels, eastbound 
with possible imports for German consumption and westbound with revenue earning 
exports from Germany.   
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Patrol Formations. 
The three methods of patrolling were line ahead, line abreast or in a quarter line 
formation.6  The distance apart of the ships was about 20 miles and each vessel had a 
clear view of 15 miles to the horizon, thus a blockade runner would be sighted by one 
or both adjacent cruisers.7  Sometimes the interval 
between ships was extended to 30 miles. On clear 
days, masthead lookouts were to be placed as high 
as possible.8 The lookout man did two hours aloft 
and six hours off but in very severe weather this 
was reduced to one hour aloft and seven hours off.9   
6RPHVKLSVKDGDQDGGLWLRQDOFURZ¶VQHVWILWWHG well 
above that of their original design, a feature 
repeated in World War Two.                      
   Fig.23 H.M.S. Almanzora on patrol.                   
In the line ahead or cross patrols, the cruisers steamed  in line ahead across the track of 
shipping. The ships generally steamed thirty or forty miles in one direction than altered 
course by 180º to steam the same distance on the reverse course. A disadvantage of this 
type of patrol was that if a ship had to stop and search a suspect steamer, there was a 
gap in the formation. This had to be covered by adjacent ships adjusting their station to 
give cover until the intercepting cruiser could rejoin.10 
 
Ships steaming line abreast or quarter line formation steered a course to meet any 
blockade runners for twelve hours in daylight, then turned together at 20.00 hours onto 
a reverse course and then ran through the night with blockade runners until 0800 hours.  
Thus blockade runners were on a parallel course to the patrol through the dark hours 
and were likely to find themselves in the midst of the patrol at dawn.11 One advantage  
of the line abreast patrol was that the formation was less disrupted if a cruiser had to 
stop to search a steamer. The gap was covered quickly by other cruisers altering course 
to close it and a gap could be made quickly, to allow a cruiser to rejoin the formation.12   
The plan was that if a blockade runner evaded one type of patrol, the probability was  
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that another would sight the vessel later. It should be noted that the Squadron ships 
steamed as darkened ships and showed no navigation lights in accord with warship 
practice LQ WLPHV RI FRQIOLFW 7KH 6TXDGURQ¶V VKLSV ]LJ-zagged almost continuously, 
which added a further challenge to their station keeping difficulties in rough weather.        
 
Action on Sighting a Steamer. 
When a ship was sighted, a cruiser was brought to full speed and course altered to 
intercept the suspect vessel. When close enough a large red pennant was hoisted to 
indicate that the vessel had to stop. Guns were made ready and the crew closed up to 
action stations.13 All vessels were treated as possible enemies until the boarding officer 
was able to confirm otherwise. All nations had been notified of this signal and to ensure 
attention two blank charges were fired. Failure to obey meant a shot was put across the 
suspect¶s bow. However, before firing the cruiser had to ensure her own white ensign 
was flying.14 When the ship stopped, a cruiser would position herself to windward or 
ahead of the target ship if there was no wind. The boarding boat would be lowered with 
the officer, an armed guard and a party to search the ship. This was the point at which 
the Newfoundland Reservists and Scottish R.N.R. fishermen manned the boat and 
brought their particular experience to bear.  
 
All ships had the benefit of an Evinrude outboard motor as auxiliary power for sea-
boats in addition to oars and sail. Alsatian made good use of this but they were not to 
the liking of all commanding officers who were exhorted in Squadron Standing Orders  
µWR SHUVHYHUH¶ ZLWK WKHLU XVH15 Most boarding boats preferred to use oars and 
sometimes even sail. Squadron commanding officers would have been used to a sea 
boat being a Naval Service Montagu 27ft. whaler, when aboard naval ships in their 
earlier careers. 
Boarding Boats. 
The logbooks at The National Archives reveal that all the Squadron ships had retained 
their full complement of standard Mercantile Marine lifeboats. These robust clinker 
EXLOWFUDIWZHUHSULPDULO\µOLIH¶ERDWV LQWended for survival.  They were not renowned 
for their handling or sailing qualities.  Alsatian had been provided with two steel 
boarding boats which were stowed on her foredeck, one each side of No.2 hatch.16    
                                                 
13
 This was in case the intercepted vessel might prove to be a decoy ship. See Glossary 
14
  TNA ADM 186/11 Instructions for Boarding Officers and Prize Officers in Wartime  
    (London,1914)  16 
15
  TNA ADM  137/822 Tenth Cruiser Squadron Orders 83 
16
 H.M.S..  Alsatian  Merseyside Maritime Museum  Cat. No. 512  
    They can be clearly seen on the model of Als
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Wind and sea                                           
 
 
 
 
Step 1.  Sea boat launched.                                                                
  
            Armed Merchant Cruiser (MC)                                      Intercepted  Neutral  (N)                                      
           
  
 
          Seaboat                                                                     Prepares to move ahead and give lee to sea boat                                                                                 
 
------------------- 
 
Step 2.   Boarding.                       
                                                                                                                            ,                                                                         
                           Receives Boarders                                                                                                                                      
                                                         
 
                                             
                                                                        
                                        Sea boat                                                                   Stands off, circles  
                                                                                                                                                         and zig-zags.   
                                                                                                                                                         Guns trained   
                       ------------------- 
 
Step 3.   Sea Boat Return.                                                                                                                                      
 
         Clears away after  inspection completed. 
                                             
                  
                  
              
                                                                                                                                                                                        
                                                                                                                                                                Prepares for recovery.                                                                    
 
 
 
                                         Sea boat         Head to sea, prepares for recovery.               
                                                 
------------------- 
Step 4. Boat Recovery 
                                                     Closes for recovery 
                                     
                                                              
                                               Sea boat   
                                              Ready to be hoisted aboard                                                                  
                                                        
                                                           ---------------- 
Fig.24 Visit and Search Operation 
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The favoured seaboat ZDV WKH 0RQWDJX ZKDOHU ZLWK 5RELQVRQ¶V 'LVHQJDJLQJ *HDU
This allowed the bRDW¶V FR[VZDLQ WR UHOHDVH WKH ERDW TXLFNO\ IURP WKH IDOOV onto the 
peak of a wave. The tiller being lashed RYHU WRZDUGV WKH&UXLVHU¶V VLGH DQG with the 
painter or boat rope secured to the bow, the slight ahead motion of the cruiser would 
give the boat a quLFN VKHHU DZD\ IURP WKH VKLS¶V VLGH EHIRUH WKH UHOHDVH RI WKH ERDW
rope. Captain Vivien of Patia in his first Report of Proceedings disclosed that after 
intercepting the Swedish steamer Laplandµ7KLVVKLSZDVQRWERDUGHGDVWKHUHZDVWRR
much sea and we hDYH QR ERDW ILWWHG ZLWK GURSSLQJ JHDU¶ ,Q WKH ODVW SDUDJUDSK WKH
point is stressed when Vivien added:    
  
 When fitting out I asked for Montagu whalers with dropping gear, I got two 
 ordinary whalers without dropping gear. These boats are stowed on crutches 
 in the after well deck, and can only be hoisted out by the derricks and winches. 
 In a sea-way this is not a satisfactory method at all, and these boats should be 
 at davits (which can easily be fitted)  with dropping gear.17         
 
The Virginian was also supplied with a steel boat which was disliked by her 
commanding officer who, surprisingly, agreed a swap for one of &KDQJXLQROD¶V rotten 
wood boats, much to the delight of Commander Brocklebank.18  Changuinola stowed 
her boat in a cradle on the port side of No.1 hatch. The method of hoisting out was by 
two derricks, one plumbing the landing point on deck and the other plumbed over the 
VKLS¶VVLGH7KHFDUJRrunners from each derrick were brought together by means of a 
union hook. This allowed the boat to be lifted clear of the deck by the first derrick, then 
KRYHRYHUWKHVKLS¶VVLGHUHDG\WREHORZHUHGWRWKHZDWHUE\WKHVHFRQGGHUULFNThe 
boat was suspended by a sling with four legs attached to a single lifting ring into which 
the union hook was placed. This simple arrangement which required a quick unhooking 
wDVDUHSODFHPHQWIRUWKH5RELQVRQ¶VGLVHQJDJLQJJHDUDQGDOso avoided the problems 
associated with standard lifeboat falls.   
  
On one occasion, due to a misheard command, the &KDQJXLQROD¶V boat failed to get 
clear and was towed under and turned over. Fortunately all the crew were recovered 
DQGWKHRQO\ ORVVZDVD IHZVWRUHVDQGDQRIILFHU¶VQHZVZRUG 2QDQRWKHURFFDVLRQ
Changuinola was attempting to launch a boat from her davits. The foremost IDOOµZHQW
DZD\ ZLWK D UXQ¶ EXW WKH SURPSWQHVV RI DQ $EOH 6HDPDQ ZKR OHW JR WKH DIWHU IDOO
avoided a serious accident. Unfortunately, the Master-at-Arms tangled with the falls 
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and broke a leg.19  Concern was also reported by Commander Walters aboard the 
Caribbean when raising the defect list:  
 Several defects require to be made good, the Telemotor gear being the principal item, 
 DQGWKHDOWHUDWLRQRIWKH6HDERDWV¶GDYLWVZKLFKDUHDWSUHVHQWDPRVWGDQJHURXVILWWLQJ 
 WKHGLVWDQFHVEHWZHHQWKHERDW¶VVOLQJVEHLQJIHHWVKRUWHUWKDQWKHGLVWDQFH between  
 the davits.20  
  
Alsatian also used derricks rigged for union purchase to operate her boats. This ship 
had four derricks at her No.2 hold just forward of the bridge.  These were topped ready 
to lower a boat from either the port or starboard side of the ship.21  Usual merchant ship 
practice was to lower derricks at sea and secure them on their crutches. There were 
three main reasons, first they madH DGGLWLRQDO µWRS KDPSHU¶ ZKLFK FRXOG UHGXFH
stability, second in a seaway there is always the possibility they could break loose and 
third they would be in the lowered position when the ship was swung for compass 
deviation. It is not known whether, when swinging for deviation in the squadron, two 
deviation cards were constructed, one with the derricks topped and the other with the 
derricks lowered and housed. These were risks which had been accepted, since the 
prospect of attempting to top derricks when underway was even more risky and too 
time consuming, prior to a boarding operation. 
 
Photographs clearly show Alsatian and Changuinola adopted the union purchase 
method and it was possibly widely used.22 $GPLUDO :DUGOH TXRWHG LQ µ7KH %LJ
%ORFNDGH¶VWDWHG³,PXFKSUHIHUUHGP\ZD\LQAlcantara of having a double-ended  
ERDW RQ 1R KDWFK VR WKDW , FRXOG KRLVW RXW RQ HLWKHU VLGH´23  In contrast, aboard 
Almanzora an identical vessel, Commander Tarrant R.N.R. her peacetime Master, 
GHVFULEHGWKHDUUDQJHPHQWVRQWKDWVKLS³,QAlmanzora we had single wires through  
the davits to the boat.´24  Thus, with some local ingenuity, the absence of traditional 
sea-boats with 5RELQVRQ¶V GLVHQJDJLQJ gear was overcome, proving the adage 
µGLIIHUHQWVKLSV-GLIIHUHQWORQJVSOLFHV¶   
                                                                                                                                    
7KH XUJHQF\ RI WKH RUGHU µ$ZD\ 6HD %RDW¶V &UHZ¶ FDptured completely, the 
IXQGDPHQWDO UDLVRQG¶rWUH IRU WKH6TXDGURQ¶VZRUN 7KHRUGHUDQG reaction were the 
pivotal points of the repetitive process of sighting, chasing, stopping, boarding and 
examining a neutral ship, to be followed by either its capture or release.  A process 
                                                 
19
 Brocklebank, Tenth Cruiser Squadron 13 
20
 TNA ADM 137/989 Walter to Rear-Admiral  10th CS 9 January 1915     596-8 
21
 Chatterton, The Big Blockade  Photograph facing page 49 
22
 De Chair, The Sea is Strong 195, states a swinging derrick but photographs contradicted this.   
23
 Chatterton, The Big Blockade 225-226 
24
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governed by the need to always respect the sea state and weather, as well as the 
requirements of international law.  
 
7KHERRNFRYHUDUWLVWIRU&KDWWHUWRQ¶VZRUNThe Big 
Blockade has caught all the apprehensions and 
tensions at the moment of boarding.25  The sea boat 
is about to pitch to the next wave, whilst the 
coxswain squares his shoulders to keep firm control 
of the tiller in readiness for the pitch. Two seamen 
with boathooks, struggle to fend the boat off, in the 
hope of preventing it from smashing against the 
VKLS¶V VLGH 2QH VDLORU ZDWFKHV DQ[LRXVO\ DW WKH
progress of the visiting officer on the ladder. The  
    Fig.25. The Big Blockade book cover       two remaining sailors perhaps contemplate the  
perilous row back to their parent ship and the task of the boat being hoisted aboard. 
$QG WKLV LV VXPPHUZHDWKHUDV VKRZQE\ WKHFUHZ¶VZKLWHFDSFRYHUs!   At least the 
crew have the help of a boat rope passed from the neutral ship.  
 
The residual water from the previous roll of the ship, drains from the rim of a porthole 
and the overlaps on the hull plating, as she starts yet another roll towards the sea boat.  
The jumping ladder has swuQJ FOHDURI WKH VKLS¶V VLGH WR FKDOOHQJH WKH IRRWKROG DQG
balance of the visiting officer. No doubt he was happy just to have held on, but views 
the distance yet to go, before he reaches the safety of the deck.  A background anxiety 
in his mind might be the reception he will receive once aboard the vessel.  Will the 
Master be cooperative or hostile?  There is a surprising omission - no one appears to be 
wearing a life jacket ± apparently a not uncommon practice at the time. Photographs in 
ERWK &KDWWHUWRQ¶V ERRN DQG 7XSSHU¶V Reminiscences raise doubts about which was 
standard procedure. Many officers bought themselves a patented life saving waistcoat 
sold by Gieves.26   
 
$ERDUGWKHSDUHQWDUPHGPHUFKDQWFUXLVHUWKHVKLS¶VFRPSDQ\UHPDLQHGFORVHGXSDW
actions stations until the boarding officer signalled that the target ship was either 
friendly or neutral.27 
 
                                                 
25
 Chatterton, E.K., The Big Blockade  (London,1932) 
26
 Gieves ± Life saving waistcoats  
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27
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The difficulties of launching were small compared to the task of coming alongside a 
suspect vessel, whose crew might choose to give the bare minimum of assistance. The 
task of coming alongside the parent cruiser for recovery was even worse. It required 
careful positioning of the boat and split second timing to engage the lifting hooks, 
ready for the winches to take up the slack before being hoisted aboard.28  All this 
difficult boat-work was demanding enough by day but it was not unusual to be carried 
out at night.  On those occasions the parent cruiser kept track of the boat by the 
searchlight which was a wartime fitting.  5HDVVXULQJWRWKHERDW¶VFUHZEXWSURYLGLQJD
fine aiming point for any submarine in the vicinity. Time improved the proficiency of 
the boarding operations and the crews showed increasing pride in the work. 
       
Comment must be made about a claim by Joan Brocklebank in her compilation of 
OHWWHUV DQG GLDU\ HQWULHV IURP KHU IDWKHU¶V WLPH LQ FRPPDQG RI Changiunola. In 
describing the armeGJXDUGVWKHVWDWHPHQWLVPDGHµWKHRIILFHULQFKDUJHZRXOGZHDU
his sword as a symbol of his authority.¶29 The idea has been sustained by author Julian 
Thompson.30 There is no evidence that this was a regulation and is likely to be the 
result of an over zealous requirement by Commander Brocklebank.  He made a point of 
running Changuinola on pre-war navy lines: 
 I do divisions, prayers and physical drill every morning in man-of-war style 
             and it does the men much good, much better than the sloppy do-nothing style 
 that existed previously; the firemen now drill with rifle or gun every forenoon 
 and are improving wonderfully. I have hopes of making them quite decent people 
 E\WKHHQGRIWKHZDU«««« 
 
words which showed a clear Royal Navy v. Merchant Marine µdivision of culture¶ and 
the class attitudes of the time.31  Commander Brocklebank used every opportunity to 
lobby for his promotion to captain which he felt was long overdue, and perhaps thought  
a rigid style of management might draw attention to his ambitions.32    The Navy Lists 
RIWKHWLPHRQO\UHTXLUHGVZRUGVWREHZRUQµZKHQDSSURSULDWH¶DQGWKHRQO\HGJHG 
weapon required by the Gunnery Drill Book in a boarding boat was a cutlass in the 
possession of the coxswain.33   
 
7KH%RDUGLQJ2IILFHU¶V*XLGHVWDWHVµ7KH2&ZLOOGHFLGHZKHWKHUWRDUPWKHERDWRU
crew.¶34  This may have been the discretion used by Commander Brocklebank as to 
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29
 Brocklebank, Tenth Cruiser Squadron 11 
30
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32
 Brocklebank, Tenth Cruiser Squadron  Letters from Captain Benson, Second in Command of the 
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swords, which were a compulsory item for an R.N.R. RIILFHU¶VXQLIRUP,WKDValready 
been noted that Commander Walters of the Caribbean was quick to put his R.N.R. 
officers to sword drill soon after commissioning. The obsession with swords may have 
been a generational issue with the commanders who were no longer in the zone for 
promotion. The Ruritanian spectacle of a naval officer struggling up a boat ladder, 
complete with a ceremonial accoutrement, would at best give some amusement to help 
lessen  the annoyance of a suspect PHUFKDQW VKLS¶V FUHZ or simply strengthen their 
anger at being stopped.  Admiral Tupper in his Reminiscences FOHDUO\ VWDWHV µ7KH
officers carried their revolvers; the men had their rifles with bayonets and 
ammunition¶35  7KHVHµWokens of authority¶ were likely to be much more practical and 
effective than any masterpiece from Messrs. Gieve¶V or Wilkinson. 
 
Armed Search Parties. 
According to Tupper, for a typical steamer, the armed search-party consisted of one 
lieutenant or sub-lieutenant with a midshipman and six or eight men, in addition to the 
boarding officer. Once safely on deck, the boarding officer would introduce himself to 
WKHVKLS¶VPDVWHU and separate this man from his officers and crew.  The ratings would 
make quick rounds of the upper deck to see if any hidden armament existed and if 
unarmed, a signal passed to the cruiser. Throughout the interception and boarding, the 
cruiser would stay outside torpedo range and continue to zig-zag.  Once the µDOOclear¶ 
signal had been received, the cruiser would withdraw a further distance and continue 
circling the suspect, which itself was permitted to move slowly ahead, whilst the search 
and inspection took place.  All passengers and crew were mustered and interviewed to 
seek out any German nationals travelling as either passenger or crew and any found  
were taken prisoner. This was an important part of the inspection since many German 
UHVHUYLVWVZHUHWU\LQJWRPDNHWKHLUZD\KRPHWRKHOSWKHHQHP\¶VZDUHIIRUW36  
When the Squadron had been restructured, R.N.R. boarding officers were selected 
because their merchant ship backgrounds made them familiar with the layout of a  
merchant ship, the different cargoes likely to be encountered DQGDVKLS¶VSDSHUV.37 The 
purpose of the boarding was to identify a neutral ship and her destination and ascertain 
the nature of her cargo to see which category of contraband, absolute, conditional or 
                                                                                                                                              
34
 TNA ADM 186/11 Instructions for Boarding Officers 13 
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 Tupper, Reminiscences  240 
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free, it fell into. The Boarding Officer¶s Guide set out the approach to be adopted.38 An 
overriding requirement, repeated in Squadron Orders, was to show courtesy: 
 7KH%RDUGLQJ2IILFHUVKRXOGWUHDWWKHVKLS¶VRIILFHUVFUHZDQd passengers with 
 FRXUWHV\DQGFRQVLGHUDWLRQ««««KHVKRXOGLQYDULDEO\-- in the name of His  
 Majesty -- formally intimate to the master and passengers of neutral vessels 
  boarded, his regret at the necessity for stopping the vessel, and at the same 
 time assure them that every consideration will be shown to their wishes and  
 comfort compatible with a thorough examination of the vessel.39 
 
The master was UHTXLUHG WR SURGXFH WKH XVXDO VKLS¶V SDSHUV tR FRQILUP WKH VKLS¶V
nationality and date of registration, the nature of the cargo together with its time and 
place of shipment, WKHFDUJR¶VSRUWRIGLVFKDUJHDQGWRZKRPWKHJRRGVZHUHFRQVLJQHG
as well as the weight, freight, volume and sometimes the value of the cargo.40  When 
the Boarding Officer was satisfied with the papers and the examination of the vessel 
DQG FDUJR WKHQ HQWULHV ZHUH PDGH LQ WKH VKLS¶V ORJERRN and the vessel allowed to 
continue its voyage.  
 
The boarding might take about two hours as there was a degree of paper work to be 
attended to, especially if the master protested the manner in which the inspection was 
conducted. International law did not recognise any protest about being stopped but did 
DOORZIRUSURWHVWDERXWWKH%RDUGLQJ3DUW\¶VFRQGXFW,IWKHUHZDVRQO\DVPDOOTXDQWLW\
of contraband, WKHQ WKH ODZ DOORZHG WKH GHVWUXFWLRQ RI WKDW FDUJR ZLWK WKH PDVWHU¶V
permission, after which he may be allowed to proceed. In such cases the certified  
copies of cargo manifests and logbook entries had to be exchanged for subsequent 
submission to a Prize Court to justify naval action. The Boarding Officers Guide lists  
pro forma affidavits for some eighteen different circumstances, so the officer brought 
with him quite a stock of stationery.41 
 
Search Problems. 
+RZHYHUH[DPLQLQJDVKLS¶Vcargo at sea is not easy and could be dangerous. It was 
not good seamanship to open hatches at sea, especially given the capricious and volatile                      
weather experienced by the Squadron. Even lifting only the corner hatch-boards  risked 
cargo damage and the ingress of seawater, whilst any descent into the holds with a ship 
rolling or pitching risked serious personal injury if cargo shifted, facts acknowledged 
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by de Chair.42 Common hiding places were hollow masts, double bulkheads and false 
decks. One of the most novel methods was rubber disguised as onions. Large 
consignments of illicit contraband were most likely to be stowed in the lower hold 
hidden by bulk or bagged cargo on top if it. An example was the American barque 
Dirigo which was a prize sent in by Orotava on 2 March 1916. Ostensibly carrying 
barley for Kalwar in Sweden, Midshipman F.L.McKeag R.N.R. records that on arrival 
at Lerwick, a proper search revealed aeroplanes and armoured cars for Germany.43    
&RQVHTXHQWO\LIDQ\VXVSLFLRQDURVHIURPWKHVKLS¶VSDSHUVDQGDFXUVRU\H[DPLQDWLRQ
of the cargo, then the vessel would be seized and sent into an examination port. First 
choice was Kirkwall in the Orkneys with Stornoway in the Hebrides as an alternative, 
whilst Lerwick in the Shetlands was only used in exceptional cases. 
 
Once safely in port, a proper examination could take place, discharging the cargo, if 
needs be, to examine the bottom of the holds.  This task was the responsibility of the 
Customs Service. De Chair thought the British Customs Officers were initially 
somewhat complacent in their approach to examining neutral ships.44  For a shipmaster 
there are few more unnerving sights than a Customs Rummage Team, appearing from 
behind a dockside building, demanding a pilot ladder to climb aboard the moment the 
first mooring lines are ashore. A Rummage Team could demand access to any part of a 
vessel. Possibly de Chair had never had such an experience for had he done so, his 
opinion of the Customs might have been less derisive.  It was not unknown for ships 
sent into Kirkwall or the Downs to be delayed there not merely for days but for weeks 
and occasionally for months. Details of the cargo manifests were transmitted to 
Whitehall Departments controlled by the Foreign Office for further consideration.. A 
further example of the growing importance of electronics in warfare. 45  
Search Delays Encourage Evasion. 
The prospect of such delays, however brief, created a powerful temptation for owners 
and shipmasters to attempt to run the blockade to avoid loss of revenue. From the very 
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    The telegraphic rate and capacity of transmission is an important consideration, particularly in the case        
     of work abroad .The average number of words at Kirkwall was 116,000 a month in 1916: the   
     maximum in one day 20,000. It took two hours to punch 5,000 words, and they could then be   
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outset the Squadron Orders required the following Danish and Norwegian passenger 
steamers to be regularly brought into Kirkwall when bound eastwards:- 
    Bergensfjord 
    Christianiafjord 
    United States 
    Frederick VIII 
    Hellig Olav 
    Oscar II 
 
The orders also referred to a list of ships to be brought in, whether suspicious or not. 46 
When interviewed for the American newspaper the Brooklyn Daily Eagle, de Chair was 
asked to name the worst offender against the British blockade. Diplomatically, he 
UHSOLHG ³, FRXOG HDVLO\ WHOO \RX WKDW EXW , VKDQ¶W 7KH VKLSV RI RQH QHXWUDO KDYH
attempted to carry more contraband through our blockade than any other, but I can 
VFDUFHO\QDPHWKHRIIHQGHU´ 47  The most regular troublesome vessels proved to be the 
Bergensfjord, Kristianiafjord and the Drammensfjord of the Norske-Amerika Line.  
Norway being an independent nation of only a few years standing, sought to observe 
the international law but at the same time had to be aware of the sympathies Sweden 
held for the Central Powers.   
 
Whilst the Norske-Amerika Line showed a desire to conform with requirements of the 
British Government there was a feeling that the company had some sympathy towards 
Germany.  Certainly, some of their Masters and Mates, saw running the blockade as a  
legitimate sport and openly boasted of being able to avoid the cruisers.48 A British 
subject in Bergen reported Kristianiafjord XVHGµWKHQHZ0DUFRQL,QGLFDWRU¶WRSLFNKHU 
way through the patrols without being sighted.49  The British reaction was dismissive 
on the basis that such equipment was proving of little use in Iron Duke and Alsatian. 
This was largely attributed to the lack of British trained personnel and ignored the 
possibility that Kristianiafjord may have had fully trained operators.50   De Chair wrote 
to Jellicoe suggesting that Kristianiafjord¶V success was most likely due to the                   
thick weather at the time. Like Dumas, de Chair based his opinion on the indifferent 
performance of $OVDWLDQ¶V direction finder. He reassured Jellicoe that W/T traffic in the 
                                                 
46
  TNA ADM  137/822 Tenth Cruiser Squadron Orders   3 (5) 
47
  BL  De Chair, D.R., How the British Blockade Works 11    
48
  Chatterton,  The Big Blockade 141    
49
  TNA ADM 137/1081 Extract from Memorandum of Hudson  25 April 1915(?) 267    
50
  TNA ADM 137/1081 Note by Dumas  3 May 1915  262   
Boarding Neutral Shipping.                                                                           Chapter 6. 
 
 150 
Squadron had been reduced and confirmed that efforts would be made to reduce it still 
further.51  
 
Masters of vessels allowed to continue their voyage were issued with a list of WKHµ)ODJ
RIWKH'D\¶WREHIOown for the remainder of the day of boarding and one for each of the 
three subsequent days.  This flag related WR WKHGLUHFWLRQRI WKHVKLS¶VGHVWLQDWLRQDQG
indicated to any other cruisers of the squadron that the ship had already been boarded.52  
Before leaving a vessel the Boarding Officer would ask the master if he had any 
complaints about treatment during the boarding. If any were made, they were noted in 
writing on the appropriate forms, and delivered to the officer in command of the 
cruiser.53 
Suspect Vessels. 
Suspect vessels were deemed captured and placed under the control of an armed guard. 
7KLVGHFLVLRQZDVWDNHQE\WKHFUXLVHU¶VFRPPDQGLQJRIILFHUDIWHUWKHILQGLQJVRI WKH
boarding officer.  Squadron Orders required interceptions were reported at once by 
W/T to the Senior of Officer of the Patrol and also the Rear Admiral Commanding the 
Squadron.54  Although coded and necessary, these reports helped reveal the presence of 
cruisers to neutrals fitted with direction finders. Occasionally, if stress of weather 
prevented boarding, a cruiser escorted a suspect neutral to Kirkwall.  More usually it 
was a Prize Officer and an armed guard tasked to take a prize into an examination port. 
,QWKHVHFLUFXPVWDQFHVWKHZKLWHHQVLJQZDVWREHZRUQVXSHULRUWRWKHYHVVHO¶V own  
national ensign. $OWKRXJK UHTXLUHG E\ WKH %RDUGLQJ 2IILFHU¶V *XLGH WKLV SLHFH RI
chauvinism could have attracted the attention of a U-ERDW¶VSU\LQJSHULVFRSHZLWK 
unwelcome consequences.55 However, 7XSSHU¶V UHYLVLRQ RI WKH Squadron Orders in 
May 1917, took a less flamboyant approach with a clear order that only the national  
flag of the neutral was to be worn.56  Usually, but not always, the Boarding Officer took 
on the role of Prize Officer if the decision was made to capture the neutral and send her 
into an examination port. The prime duty of the Prize Officer was to take charge of the 
vessel and navigate it to the port selected by his Commanding Officer where he was  to                      
hand over the vessel and her cargo to the Prize Marshall or the Principal Officer of 
Customs. He was to invite the Master and crew to assist in navigating the ship but 
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could not compel them to do so.57 Squadron Orders replaced the sentiment of 
µLQYLWDWLRQ¶WRDFOHDUµLQVWUXFWLRQ¶ The Prize Officer was to instruct the master of the 
route chosen and also supervise the navigation. However, Prize Officers were cautioned 
not to undertake responsibility for the navigation unless absolutely necessary.58  In both 
publications, a vital first act for the Prize Officer was to take and retain complete 
control of any W/T installation on board. Any arms and ammunition were confiscated 
and steps taken to guard against recapture by the neutral crew. If a neutral crew or any 
part of it refused to work the ship, the Senior Officer on patrol was to provide a 
sufficient crew to work the vessel. The neutral crew or such part as refused to work, 
were warned of the consequences and if refusal continued, they were to be removed to 
the armed cruiser and detained.59 
 
The Prize Officer and armed guard had to be self sufficient in respect of food for they 
had no right to be victualled on board a captive vessel. Usually this amounted to tinned 
corned beef and bread, sufficient for the passage and two days detention in Kirkwall. 
Warm drinks were cadged from the QHXWUDO¶V galley. However, many vessels did 
provide food and some form of shelter. Usually the master made the Prize Officer 
welcome in the saloon but caution was exercised when receiving hospitality, since  
poisoning was always a possibility. The Prize Officer also had sufficient cash for 
contingencies with instructions to always get receipts for any expenditure. Railway 
passes were issued to get the crew from the port of disembarkation back to Liverpool or 
other port to rejoin their parent ship.60   Each cruiser was allocated an extra two officers  
and twelve ratings in its complement to cover these duties.61   As a cruiser sent away 
more armed guards on captured ships, her own crew became progressively depleted.  
6RPHWLPHVWKLVPHDQWµERUURZLQJ¶ or µOHQGLQJ¶armed guards to other ships in the 
Squadron.  Ships returning from repairs or coaling would bring out crews for ships stil l 
on patrol and this meant more boat-work to get the crews back to their own ships. 
Later, in the summer months smaller armed boarding steamers (usually requisitioned  
railway ferries) would bring out crews and return them to their ships. The management 
of this crew replenishment was a task for the AGPLUDO¶VVWDIIDERDUGAlsatian.                                                                                                                                        
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Further Risks to the Armed Guards. 
It can be seen that the British Armed Guards, once aboard a neutral ship in addition to 
the normal perils at sea were at risk on two further counts. Firstly, the neutral crew  
might attempt to overpower them and throw them overboard. Secondly, they might 
encounter a stoppage by a German U-boat, after which, they might be made prisoner or 
executed, especially if exposed to the German Boarding Party by the neutral crew. As 
already shown the British stance was not to place a neutral into further danger. Often a 
sympathetic neutral crew sought to protect the British Armed Guards and in doing so 
placed themselves at great risk. Pending Admiralty clarification, de Chair laid down the 
following guidance in Squadron Orders: 
 (a) The officer must endeavour to arrange for the neutral ship to escape. 
 (b) The officer must not use the neutral ship as a weapon for attacking the submarine. 
 (c) The officer must not attempt any belligerent act under the neutral flag.  
      Should the neutral crew desert their ship, however, and the submarine open fire 
      the armed guard will then be at liberty to defend themselves on board the neutral  
      ship. 
 It is considered that the fact of an armed guard being on board should be concealed 
 from the enemy for as long as possible. 62 
 
This guidance was modelled on that given by the C-in-C Home Fleets in March 1915.63 
It was modified later to read as shown above by a further letter in June 1915.64 The 
matter was raised again with the Admiralty by the C-in-C on 28 August 1915. This was  
prompted by a German press report that the American Sailing Ship Pass of Balmaha 
had arrived at Cuxhaven on 2 August 1915. The sailing vessel had been intercepted by  
the Victorian on 21 July 1915 and was intercepted again on 31 July 1915 by a German 
Submarine, whilst on passage to Kirkwall with a British Armed Guard aboard. At this 
point the Pass of Balmaha was placed in charge of a single German Petty Officer.  
Jellicoe pointed out it was nearly three months since he had been assured of 
clarification for this type of situation.65 The British armed guard and Sub-Lieutenant  
C.E.Harris R.N.R. were taken prisoners of war and a letter from Harris, mentioned in 
an internal minute, revealed that a German submarine had maintained contact with the  
Pass of Balmaha until Heligoland.  In the circumstances, the British armed guard 
would not have been able to resist.66 This observation in an internal minute hardly 
constituted authoritative advice and it is not clear whether Jellicoe was even aware of 
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the minute.  The matter appears to have festered on and exactly one year later on 28 
August 1916, the C-in-C repeated verbatim his previous communication to the 
Admiralty.67  Jellicoe drew attention to an Admiralty letter M.04362 of 18 June 1915 
ZKLFKODLGGRZQWKDWµDQ Armed Guard should on no account attempt any belligerent 
DFWXQGHUDQHXWUDOIODJ¶ 
 
It was an important issue since Britain had set out to observe the provisions of the 
Declaration of London 1908.  In negotiations, Britain maintained the long standing 
riJKWRIDZDUVKLSWRµVWRSDQGYLVLW¶QHXWUDOPHUFKDQWVKLSV2QHRIWKHLQWHQWLRQVof the 
Declaration of London was to minimize the effect of war on neutral merchant ships 
plying a legitimate trade.  For neutral ships, acceding WRDµYLVLW¶DQGSRVVLEOHFDpture 
for adjudication was preferable to being stopped by U-boat to receive a perfunctory 
search and then an arbitrary sinking by gunfire or scuttling.  Germany had defined a 
µGDQJHU]RQH¶LQZKLFK any merchant ship could expect this treatment. The Declaration 
laid down any vessel which forcibly resisted the legitimate exercise of the right of 
stoppage, search or capture lost the protection of her neutral flag. In such cases the 
vessel stood condemned under Article 63, and her cargo was treated as cargo of an 
enemy vessel.68  The normal procedure for a warship was to send a captured neutral 
vessel into port as a prize. However, abnormal or exceptional circumstances did allow 
other actions. Basically, these were if the safety of a warship or the success of her  
current operations were in jeopardy. In exceptional circumstances the captor could 
carry out the sentence which the case merited. For example, if the vessel was liable to  
be condemned it could be destroyed. If only part of the cargo was liable to be 
condemned this could be destroyed and the vessel released.  In the case of sinking a  
vessel the crew were required to be put in a place of safety, in effect the lifeboats on an 
open sea. The  U-boats, as part of their claim of abnormal circumstances, pointed to  
their construction not allowing accommodation for neutral captives or belligerent 
prisoners.69   
 
Admiral Tupper amended the Squadron Orders in their revision on 8 May 1917 to read: 
 The Admiralty direct that resistance is not to be offered by an Armed Guard on board  
             a neutral vessel in the event a submarine or other armed enemy vessel being 
 encountered. The Armed Guard should, if possible, attempt to escape observation in 
 the manner laid down in G.F.O., 297. Cases have actually occurred where the Armed 
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Guard KDV EHHQ DEOH WR HVFDSH LQ WKH VKLS¶V ERDWV GLVJXLVHG DV ILUHPHQ RU RWKHU
 members of the crew. 
 If capture is imminent, all confidential instructions should be carefully destroyed, and 
 arms, ammunition, &c., thrown overboard to prevent their falling into the hands of the 
 enemy.70  
 
Finally, it appears the Admiralty had provided positive guidance on the action to be 
taken. Tupper recorded that sixteen merchant ships with Squadron armed guards aboard 
were attacked and sunk by enemy submarines.71 
 
These were not mere hypothetical arguments. The relationship between Prize Officer 
and a shLS¶V0DVWHUZDVDGHOLFDWHRQH. Whilst the outcome could be impeded by the 
Master, the Prize Officer had to weigh up the situation carefully before resorting to 
force. The case of the American Pass of Balmaha had brought this matter to the 
forefront, further examples followed.  The Norwegian sailing ship Glendoon with an 
armed guard aboard commanded by Sub-Lieutenant W.MacLure, R.N.R., from H.M.S..  
Oropesa, lay becalmed in a dense fog when she encountered a German submarine at 
3.a.m. 24 May 1915.  The master of the Glendoon, Captain Larssen, was ordered to 
ORZHUDERDWDQGVHQGKLVVKLS¶VSDSHUVDFURVVWRWKH8-boat.  Larssen personally took 
the papers to the submarine. When asked if there were any British subjects on board or 
if he had seen any British warships he said he had not. This was accepted and after the 
papers were examined the submarine left, steering to the West.  Larssen had chosen to 
make the denial personally and in shielding the armed guard had taken a grave risk of  
losing his ship and crew, the more so since his wife and daughter were also aboard. 
MacLure concluded that any resistance using rifles against the U-boats armament 
would have jeopardised the lives of all the neutral persons on board.  Larssen stated 
that he would have been willing to call at Kirkwall of his own accord if asked, but  
objected to the presence of an Armed Guard on board as they only endangered the ship 
and his crew.  Later, whilst becalmed in the Fair Island channel, HMT Sarah Alice  
UHIXVHG0DF/XUH¶VUHTXHVWIRUD tow. This angered Larssen so much he threatened  to 
reveal the Armed Guard if intercepted by another U-boat. 72      
 
On another occasion the Norwegian Steamer Trondhjemsfjord was proceeding to 
Kirkwall under an Armed Guard from Hildebrand when intercepted on 28 July 1915 by 
a German submarine. After a chase the Trondhjemsfjord stopped and the Master,  
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Captain Bang was ordered aERDUGWKHVXEPDULQHZLWKKLVVKLS¶VSDSHUVBefore leaving 
his ship Captain Bang arranged for the Armed Guard to be disguised and their rifles to 
be hidden in the forepeak. Soon after the master boarded the submarine she signalled 
the crew of the Trondhjemsfjord  to abandon ship immediately. At 1.25 p.m. when the 
lifeboats were clear of the ship, the submarine fired a torpedo at 130 yards. The vessel 
sank at 2.51 p.m. and afterwards the submarine towed the boats four miles south to the 
Norwegian barque Glance which was ordered by the Germans to take the survivors 
aboard. Thanks to the praiseworthy efforts of Captain Bang and his wife in providing 
disguise, the Armed Guard under Lieutenant Crawford R.N.R., escaped and returned to 
Thurso from Sweden. The young German U-boat commander treated the captives well 
and explained his motive for sinking the Trondhjemsfjord was because she was an 
English steamer bought by the Norwegian Company.73  
 
One particular challenge for the Boarding Officers was that of the sailing ship. The 
handling of sailing ships was a dying skill for Merchant Navy officers by 1914. 
Nevertheless, the Reports of Proceedings and statistics show they were frequently a 
target for boarding and sometimes had to be sent in for examination.  Boarding Officers 
were probably at Senior Second Officer or Junior Chief Officer level in their civilian 
role and able to call on some sail experience.  Often the officer in charge of an Armed 
Guard would be a junior lieutenant or sub-lieutenant or even a midshipman. This age 
group was likely to have little or no sail experience and a sailing ship master could pull 
the wool over such young eyes in the matter of sail operation.  One such occasion was  
when H.M.S. Ebro stopped the Norwegian sailing vessel Queen of Scots on 16 May 
1917 and she was boarded by Lieut. S.M.Smiles R.N.R. LQ/DWLWXGHÛ¶1  Long 14º 
¶:(About 290 miles south east of Reykjavik and 180 miles west of Sydero Island.)  
 
The Master when instructed he would have to call at Stornoway, expressed concern at 
the risk of submarines, although assured an escort would meet his ship. An Armed 
Guard consisting of Sub-Lieutenant C. Redfearn R.N.R. and six ratings was placed 
aboard with orders for Stornoway.  Redfearn was specially instructed to take the vessel 
to Stornoway and not to get too far to the east as the ship was a suspicious vessel.  
Once clear of Ebro the Master of the Queen of Scots claimed headwinds would make 
Lerwick a more accessible port and finally prevailed on the Armed Guard Officer to 
agree to a change of destination.  Light winds were then experienced and the vessel  
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remained for two days to the north of the Faroes until the wind freshened from the 
south.  On 20 May 1917 an armed boarding steamer enquired of the 4XHHQRI6FRWV¶ as 
to her destination and on being told Lerwick allowed her to proceed. During the same 
day when about 170 miles NNE of Lerwick the wind shifted to the SW and increased to 
a moderate gale. Although sail was shortened the ship continued to make a course to 
the east, for two days. The Master claimed he could not lie any closer to the wind as the 
main topgallant mast was broken after which the wind dropped and the Master reported 
a shortage of water. It was then decided to make for the nearest port to replenish. The  
wind remained in the South West and therefore unfavourable for Lerwick. The ship 
was taken to Alesund, Norway arriving on 28 May 1917, some twelve days after 
boarding.  Commander Wrightson, in command of Ebro, had little option but report the 
account above to Vice Admiral Tupper and acknowledge that Sub-Lieutenant Redfearn, 
owing to lack of sailing ship experience, had been bluffed into agreeing all the Master¶V
proposals.74  In reply, Tupper coQFXUUHG ZLWK :ULJKWVRQ¶V RSLQLRQ DQG LQFOXGHG D
rebuke regretting that an officer experienced in sailing ships had not been allocated the 
WDVN7XSSHUDOVRFRYHUHGKLPVHOIE\DGGLQJµLIVXFKDQRIILFHUZDVDYDLODEOH¶75  That 
was precisely the problem, the Navy abolished the Masted Training Squadron in 
1899.76  Even earlier, the RMSPC had built its last square rigged steamer the Orinoco 
in 1886, leaving sail behind as a secondary means of propulsion.77  This had left little 
or no chance the youngest officers in the Squadron had received sail experience. No 
one could have foreseen a distant blockade in northern waters, where the last 
stronghold of sail was sustained by Scandinavian owners working both deep sea and 
smaller vessels. Cdr Wrightson  replied explaining his officers experienced in sail were 
in the key posts of 1stLieutenant, Boarding Officer, Navigation and Gunnery. However, 
Redfearn had carried out Armed Guard duties satisfactorily in the past and was 
therefore sent.78   
 
Midshipman Francis Poole R.N.R. was placed in charge of the Armed Guard from 
Alcantara aboard the Norwegian 3 masted barque Dagmar on 6 February 1916 with 
orders to make for Lerwick.  The Dagmar had a cargo of resin and was bound for  
Trondheim when Poole boarded her in a SW gale 92 miles NE of Lerwick.  He had a 
very trying time of it, twice running out of provisions, oil and coal. On both occasions                     
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Dagmar fell in with H.M.S. Andes and restocked. Four days after boarding, Dagmar 
arrived off Lerwick when three abortive attempts were made to tow her in by a trawler . 
She then failed to hold her anchorage and was forced to beat out again. When the ship 
ran out of oil for the navigation lights the crew and master refused to work the ship. 
Poole threatened to use force and the crew relented. After further favourable and 
unfavourable wind shifts Dagmar was finally towed into Lerwick on 16 February 1916  
some ten days after boarding.79  On 25 August 1916, Midshipman F.L.McKeag was 
transferred from Orotava on loan to Hildebrand ZKLFKKDGµUXQRXW¶RI3UL]H2IILFHUV
McKeag was tasked as Prize Officer with one man as Armed Guard, to take the 
Norwegian fishing ketch Prima-donna to Lerwick. After several days of alternate head 
and fair winds the ketch was becalmed and finally towed into Lerwick by the armed 
trawler H.M.S.  Sweeper. On passage, McKeag had arguments and refusals to work 
from the crew. Like Midshipman Poole above, McKeag also resorted to the threat of 
force to prevail.80     
 
Many of the sailing vessels were small craft carrying fish and fish oil from Iceland to 
Scandinavia and specifically Denmark. The fish was food and the oil had industrial 
uses were it to get to Germany. In the short period 7-24 May 1917 of fourteen vessels 
sent in by the Squadron, seven of which were sailing ships.  Of the sailing vessels, one 
was driven to Aalesund, one was sunk and the armed guard taken prisoner, another had 
been set on fire and no news of the armed guard. Two more sailing vessels sent in  
between 16th and 20th May had not been heard of, nor the fate of the armed guards 
known.  
 
Two other sailing vessels had been sunk but both the armed guards landed at Lerwick.  
As a result Captain Webb, Director of Trade Division, questioned the policy of  
diverting small sailing vessels in the danger zone and proposed amending squadron 
orders to read:    
 In view of the danger to small sailing vessels from enemy submarines       
 such vessels need not be sent in unless carrying contraband goods of 
 an important nature to Scandinavia or Holland.81 
 
It is not clear whether this was done. Clearly, the longer time taken to bring a sailing 
ship in as a prize, coupled with the increasing submarine activity were factors having                   
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an effect on the availability of boarding and prize crews. Webb¶VVXJJHVWLRQ seems to 
have sought WRSULRULWL]HWKH6TXDGURQ¶VERDUGLQJZRUNORDG  
 
Interception of the Kristianafjord   
A dramatic interception of the Kristianafjord  by H.M.S.  Teutonic (Cdr A.Smyth RN)  
on 15 November 1915 LQFOXGHG DOO WKH NH\ FRPSRQHQWV RI WKH 6TXDGURQ¶V GDLO\
workload. Collecting intelligence, making an assessment, allowing for weather and 
then setting a trap - all of which depended on radio communications.    
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.26 1RUZHJLDQ$PHULFD/LQH¶VKristianafjord 
 
On 14 November 1915, H.M.S.  Patuca passed a report to de Chair that the United 
States tanker Wico had sighted a large steamer heading NE at speed, approximately 70 
miles WNW from the Butt of Lewis. De Chair concluded this was the Kristianafiord 
and promptly instructed Teutonic to patrol to the north of Muckle Flugga.  
Coincidently, Teutonic had also intercepted 3DWXFD¶V signal and was aware of the 
situation before receiving de ChDLU¶V RUGHUV It was known the Captain of the  
Kristianafiord took pride in evading the patrols and Cdr Smyth plotted various 
potential rendezvous points between Sydero Light on the Faeroes and Muckle Flugga 
in the Shetlands. Smyth assessed that Kristianafiord  would aim to sight Muckle Flugga 
for a position and he centred his patrol in that vicinity.     
 
The weather on the 15th was bright and fine with occasional snow flurries and rain 
squalls with a maximum visibility of 10 miles. These were the short days of winter and 
although the moon did not set until 1am., Smyth doubted he would sight Kristianafiord 
if she was not showing lights.  Between 4 and 6pm the wind strengthened from the NE 
and would have slowed Kristianafiord down. At 10.15pm Smyth stepped onto the 
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bridge to hear the Officer of the Watch stop the starboard engine and alter course to 
starboard to avoid a large steamer close to port and without lights. The steamer was                           
slow to answer and switch on her lights and had to be encouraged by a warning blank 
shot from a 6pdr gun. By now the sea was too high for boarding and Teutonic stood 
with Kristianafiord in the direction of Kirkwall. The events of the next few hours are 
encapsulated in the extracts from the signal log reproduced below:       
 
 SIGNALS EXCHANGED 
 
 10.05pm. TEUTONIC -- STRANGER (Lamp)                              15/11/15. 
  ³:KDW6KLS´ 
  Reply ³.5,6TIANAFIORD´ 
 
 10.10pm. TEUTONIC -- STRANGER (Lamp) 
  ³6WRSHQJLQHVDQGVZLWFKRQ\RXUOLJKWV\RXDUHQRWWRPRYH´ 
  Reply:-³,DPVWRSSHG´ 
 
 10.24pm. TEUTONIC -- KRISTIANAFIORD (Lamp) 
  ³2EH\P\RUGHUVDOOFRXUVHVZLOOEHPDGHPDJQHWLF\RXDUHQRWWRXVH 
              \RXU:7RU,VKDOOWDNHLPPHGLDWHVWHSV´. 
 
 10.55pm. TEUTONIC -- KRISTIANAFIORD (Lamp) 
  ³:K\DUH\RXXVLQJ\RXUZLUHOHVV´ 
  Reply:-³,ZDVRQO\VHQGLQJWKUHHOHWWHUVWRP\2ZQHUV´ 
  
            11.10pm. TEUTONIC -- KRISTIANAFIORD (Lamp) 
  ³<RXDUHQRWWRXVH\RXU:7,DPWDNLQJQRULVNV´ 
   Reply:-³7KDQN\RXIRU\RXUFRXUWHV\´ 
  
 11.20pm. TEUTONIC -- KRISTIANAFIORD (Lamp) 
  ³3URFHHGDWNQRWV´ 
   Reply:-³3OHDVH\RXULQVWUXFWLRQVIRUWKHQLJKW,DPJRLQJWRUHWLUH´ 
  
  
 11.25pm. TEUTONIC -- KRISTIANAFIORD (Lamp) 
  ³6WHHU66(VSHHGNQRWV´      
                                                                                                     16/11/15 
  
 10.57pm. TEUTONIC -- S.O. 10TH C.S. (W/T)                                  (15/11/15)82 
  ³/DWLWXGH¶1/RQJLWXGH¶:.5,67,$1$),25'QRZKRYH 
  WRKHUHWRRURXJKWRERDUGVKDOO,WDNHKLPWR/HUZLFNRU.LUNZDOO´ 
   
                             S.O. 10TH C.S.-- TEUTONIC (W/T) 
 1.50am. ³:HOO GRQH´ SXW $UPHG *XDUG DERDrd under lee of Shetlands Lieutenant 
   in charge and send WR.LUNZDOO´  
 
 1.52am.If Captain protests say that you have orders of British  
  Government, send her Kirkwall Lieutenant Armed Guard it should 
  be able to navigate ship if necessary to  2330.   
 
 DP:DV³.5,67,$1$),25'´EXUQLQJQDYLJDWLRQOLJKWVZKHQFDXJKW 
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 TEUTONIC -- S.O. 10TH C.S. (W/T) 
 DP³.5,67,$1$),25'´ZDVVWHDPLQJKLJKVSHHGZLWKRXWOLJKWV 
 
 01.21am. KRISTIANAFIORD -- TEUTONIC (Lamp) 
  As we are now entering the war zone proclaimed by Germany I must have your 
  full guarantee that you will take responsibility for everything happening to the 
  ship in the said zone. Commander. 
  (This signal was repeated at 2-30am.) 
 
 3.30am. KRISTIANAFIORD -- TEUTONIC (Lamp). 
     I am waiting for a reply to my two requests I will not be ordered to do  
     anything before ingoing. 
 
 
 5.03am. KRISTIANAFIORD -- TEUTONIC (Lamp). 
    From Officer of the Guard. 
    The Captain will navigate this ship to Kirkwall. 
  
 
 6.05am. TEUTONIC ± C-in-C and S.O. 10TH C.S.      (W/T) 
    ¶1¶:$UPHG*XDUGQRZWDNLQJ³.5,67,$1$),25'´ 
    to Kirkwall Captain has agreed to navigate her. Am proceeding to 
                            Swarbacks Minn. 83 
 
The sequence of signals reveal the stress and adrenaline on the bridges of both vessels. 
The signal times of despatch from the Senior Officer to Teutonic and the times of 
receipt show the delays needed for coding, transmission and then decoding. The 
illustrations of Kristianafiord and that of the Teutonic in the bibliography, reveal the 
potential for a disastrous collision due to the foolhardiness of steaming without 
navigation lights.  Finally, the signal from Kristianafiord at 11.20pm seeking night 
orders before µretiring¶, reveals a mixture of defiance and nonchalance which was 
understood and respected by both captains.  Most interceptions were of a more routine 
nature and periods of boredom, when no sightings were made, held their own 
challenges to morale.  This boarding was but one of many and in all, the Squadron 
made 12,979 interceptions during its operations.84   
 
Although the articles of the Declaration of London were many and sometimes complex 
in their operation, it had to be borne in mind that trade in contraband goods was by no 
means generally forbidden during war. It was the trade with the enemy in these articles 
which was illegal, and then only under strict rules framed to protect the interests of 
neutral states and individuals.85  The capture of a suspect vessel and the safe conduct of 
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the prize to port could incur inconvenience and cost to the captor out of all proportion 
to the benefits to be gained.86  The correct application of the rules at the point of                                                                         
interception fell to the Squadron and in particular the Boarding Officers and Armed 
Guard Officers.  Whilst a Government normally assumes responsibility for the actions 
of its servants, any wrongful application of the rules by Naval Officers risked exposing  
the State to serious diplomatic repercussions and possibly heavy financial penalties.  In 
other circumstances, lack of understanding of the laws could give indirect assistance to 
the enemy.87   
 
InterceptinJ ERDUGLQJ DQG LQVSHFWLQJ ZHUH WKH UDLVRQV G¶rWUH IRU WKH 6TXDGURQ¶V
existence. The RUGHUµ$ZD\6HD%RDW¶V&UHZ¶ then, brought together the dangers of the 
sea and weather with the onerous responsibility of diplomatic legal interpretation   
aboard neutral ships. By any standard these would have been significant challenges in 
themselves.  However, they had to be met daily against the background threats of 
destruction by WKHHQHP\¶VZHDSRQVERWKRQDQGEHQHDWKWKHVHD  
------------ 
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The appearance RIWKH:KLWH6WDU/LQH¶VTeutonic at the Spithead Review in 1889 was 
a milestone in the development of armed merchant cruisers. The name had been chosen 
DV DQ DFNQRZOHGJHPHQW RI 4XHHQ 9LFWRULD¶V IDPLO\ FRQQHFWLRQV ZLWK *HUPDQ\ The 
Teutonic and her sister-ship Majestic were built in 1889 and 1890 respectively and 
were the first liners designed to be 
converted to armed merchant cruisers 
in twenty four hours. The primary 
armament was intended to be eight 
4.7 inch quick firing guns 
supplemented by two smaller 6 
pounders. 
 27. Teutonic leaving Liverpool 1889 for the Spithead Review.1  
 
The National Maritime Museum¶VSDLQWLQJ by W.L.Wyllie shows Teutonic wearing the 
blue ensign and fitted with two 4.7 guns on the port side, one on the foredeck and 
another on the afterdeck. These had been fitted for the Review, which was in honour of 
Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, and WRVKRZKRZ%ULWDLQ¶VJURZLQJIOHHWRIOLQHUVFRXOG
be transformed for war purposes.  The message was not lost on the Kaiser. In the naval 
race between Britain and Germany in the years leading up to 1914, Germany included 
plans to use large merchant ships as armed cruisers just as the Royal Navy planned.  
The Hamburg-Amerika liner Normannia had been involved in fleet manoeuvres as 
early as 1895. By the twentieth century reinforced decks were built into selected ships 
and secret orders given to their masters. Early war experience showed both sides that 
their largest and fastest vessels such as Mauretania, Lusitania, Wilhelm der Grosse and 
Kronprinz Wilhelm were both costly in fuel and large vulnerable targets. Unlike 
Britain, the Kaiserliche Marine had few suitable fast passenger ships of between 
10,000-15,000 gross registered tons, from which to choose. 0XFK RI *HUPDQ\¶V
merchant ship tonnage had been interned abroad for the duration of the war. The 
Germans decided to convert selected modern cargo ships as commerce raiders. Modern 
cargo ships were available, anonymous in appearance, fast enough to overhaul many 
British merchantmen and even resist attack by small un-armoured warships. As a result, 
the converted merchantmen 0Ęewe, Greif and Wolf  became at one time or another 
challenges for the Tenth Cruiser Squadron.2   
    
                                                 
1
 1005HI%+&µTeutonic OHDYLQJ/LYHUSRRODERXW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2
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The Cruisers¶ Armament. 
In the British planning for armed merchant cruisers the basic objective was to fit ships 
ZLWKHLJKW´JXQV.  This allowed a broadside of four from either side of the vessel.  
These guns were obsolete weapons which had been removed from broken up cruisers.  
6WRFNSLOHVRI´JXQVZHUHDUUDQJHGDt strategic ports throughout the Empire to allow 
a quick conversion of liners taken up from trade whilst overseas. The first steamers 
taken up for the Tenth Cruiser Squadron were all fitted with these guns, typically 
supplemented with two six pounder guns for anti aircraft purposes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               Fig.28  4.7´1DYDO*XQ     Fig.29  Six Pounder Mounting  
 
7KH ´ JXQ ZDV WKH SULPDU\ armament for both attack and defence against enemy 
warships and surfaced submarines.  It was also used to send a salutary shell across the 
bows of neutral vessels which chose to ignore the two warning blank charges fired 
from a six pounder. It was realised these guns were useless to deal with the German 
warships the squadron was likely to meet and WKH\ ZHUH UHSODFHG E\ ´ JXQV3  The 
upgrading was done progressively as ships returned to base for coaling and refit.  
Alsatian was the first to be taken in hand for conversion in December 1914. Gun trials 
were carried out beyond the Mersey Bar on December 15 th but were not satisfactory. 
The extra recoil from the higher calibre guns had started five rivets in the mountings of 
three of her forward guns and the two after guns started twenty three and twenty seven 
rivets respectively.4 This resulted in a further delay of one week and proved the vital 
need for the strengthening to be of the highest quality on ships never built for the 
carriage of guns this size. The lessons were learnt and subsequent vessels joining the 
squadron, namely, Andes, Alcantara, Almanzora, Arlanza, Ebro and Avenger all of 
WKHPGLUHFWIURPWKHEXLOGHUVZHUHILWWHGZLWK´FDOLEUHJXQVDWWKHRXWVHWThese guns 
had a range of 11,000 yards at maximum elevation and fired a maximum of six rounds 
                                                 
3
 Tupper, Reminiscences  223-224 Tupper, at one time Captain of the gunnery school H.M.S. Excellent, 
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4
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per minute. 5  The illustration shows such a gun fitted with a gun shield but in many 
cases these were not fitted.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                    Fig.30  6´1DYDO*XQ 
It did become necessary to build shelters near each gun to protect the crew from the 
extreme weather experienced.6 The other components required to arm the cruisers were 
ammunition magazines, searchlights for target illumination and an optical rangefinder 
which was at the heart of the gunnery control problem.  
 
As electricity became a standard feature aboard warships in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century one of its uses was to power searchlights. It was a normal 
component ILWWHG WR WKH6TXDGURQ¶V VKLSVDVSDUWRI WKHJXQQHU\ system. As stated in 
Chapter 6  they had a role assisting boarding boats at night. This did have some risks in 
providing an aiming point for enemy vessels but on balance their use opened up the 
opportunity of fighting at night with quick firing guns.7   
 
Below decks in a forward and after hold each cruiser had magazines fitted inside steel 
tanks. The magazines were provided with the necessary ventilation and flooding 
arrangements as well as precautions against flash. Some ships had the additional 
precaution of a cofferdam all round the magazines.  Ammunition supply to the guns 
was a problem,  Alsatian relied on whip hoists. 3OHQW\RIµUHDG\XVH¶projectiles were 
kept close by the guns, which were kept loaded at all times.8   Pre war research had 
shown the ammunition supply trunking should be kept a minimum distance of 12 feet  
away from a magazine and not connected to it.9  The squadron orders reiterated the 
stringent rules about the care and handling of projectiles and cordite set out in the 
Grand Fleet Orders. In particular, a constant monitoring of the magazine temperatures 
                                                 
5
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was required.10 Supervision of the gunnery matters would have fallen to the 
Commissioned or Warranted Gunner appointed to each ship. Extreme low temperatures 
needed extreme action to ensure the guns were working. Signalman Thomas Grayson¶V 
diary aboard Ebro North West of Iceland on 30th March 1917, recorded: 
 Steamed foremost guns and got them in working order. Fired a round of Black 
[powder] out of each to clear the boxes. Got Boat Derrick in working order.  
 Clearing ice away.11  
 
Admiral Tupper summarises the gunnery control systems as being by voice pipes with 
telephones fitted to the bridge. Most of the gunnery was entirely independent and left to 
the skill of the gunlayer.12  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                   Fig.31  H.M.S. Alsatian¶V  bridge front and foredeck.                                
  
In addition, Alsatian was fitted with large range clock faces on the port and starboard 
side of the bridge front.13 These also appear on the model of Alsatian made by the 
VKLS¶V FDUSHQWHU14  Buxton records that a special Artillery Clock and Deflection 
Indicator was developed so that the results of spotting could be translated directly into 
changes of gun range and deflection.15  These dials may have been fitted to Alsatian on 
an experimental basis.  
 
A vital element in the gunnery system was the optical rangefinder to provide a target 
range. The optical rangefinder had been under development in both Britain and 
Germany in the pre-war years. They were not a statutory requirement aboard a 
merchant ship and were very expensive instruments. Consequently, very few were 
ILWWHG WR %ULWLVK PHUFKDQW VKLSV VLQFH WKH QHHG WR PHDVXUH µGLVWDQFH RII¶ IURP RWKHU
ships was minimal in peacetime. However, ships of the Squadron were supplied with 
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rangefinders, like other large warships, and their use in gunnery control is explained in 
this chapter and the glossary.     
 
These instruments had been developed prior to the war and by 1914, three companies, 
Barr & Stroud, Vickers and Siemens were supplying the Navy.16  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     Fig. 32  A commercial rangefinder of 1947 vintage.  
 
The rangefinders needed careful attention since they were susceptible to damage from 
excessive sunlight and any damp getting into the mechanism. A log of any adjustments 
had to be kept.  Thomas Grayson, a reservist signalman, recalled for duty aboard Ebro, 
IUHTXHQWO\PHQWLRQV LQKLV GLDU\EHLQJRQ µUDQJHILQGHUGXW\¶EXW IDLOV WR VD\ ZKHWKHU
this was for maintenance work or actual range taking.17     
 
The Fire Control System. 
The solution of the gunnery control problem was a complex matter to be solved without 
KHOSIURPWRGD\¶VHOHFWURQLFDQGJ\URVFRSLFLQSXW7KHPDWKHPDWLFDOSUREOHPWRGHFLGH
the correct elevation and training angles could not be easily solved in the height of 
DFWLRQOHWDORQHDOORZDQFHIRUZLQGDQGDOVRWKHVKLS¶VUROOSLWFKDQG\DZIn addition 
to an accurate range from the target, experienced HVWLPDWHVRIWKHHQHP\¶VFRurse and 
speed were needed.  These were combined with µRZQVKLS¶VFRXUVHDQGVSHHG¶ and  
alterations of course, to ensure a shell landed DWWKHWDUJHW¶VSURMHFWHGSRVLWLRQDIWHUD 
flight of 12 or more seconds. How then, was it done? The gunnery control system 
aboard the ill fated Alcantara has been recorded by one of her survivors, Midshipman 
Francis Poole R.N.R.18 
 
                                                 
16
 NMM  Admiralty Handbook for fire control instruments (London, 1914) 9 
    The rangefinder supplied to Virginian can be clearly seen in Chapter 3 on page 74. 
    ,WLVWKHµT¶OLNHVWUXFWXUHSRVLWLRQHGDEDIWWKHFRPSDVVDQGWKH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3RROH¶VSRLQWDERXWWKHV\VWHPEHLQJVORZZDVYDOLG nevertheless, this was the method 
of fire control for most of the Navy at the time. The mathematics of relative bearings 
and speeds, whilst under constant change, were solved by using the Dumaresq and rate 
clock to keep the range. This meant spotting for range became almost as straight 
forward as when the range was constant.19     A recent publication from the Imperial 
War Museum makes the point that only eight ships in the Royal Navy were fitted with 
director firing when the war started.20   
 
Regular Gun Drill Essential. 
:KLOVW WKH 6TXDGURQ¶V DUPDPent may have been considered suitable and adequate, 
efficient gunnery required well trained crews. The opinions of Commander Grenfell 
aboard Cedric painted a sorry picture. If his experience was typical of the Squadron 
then it showed the problems that lay ahead. In the early days after commissioning, 
*UHQIHOO¶VGLDU\HQWULHVVKRZWKe despair he felt: 
26th November 1914, At Devonport.      
 Told off &HGULF¶V JXQVFUHZV$OOWKHVHPHQDUHHLWKHUUHWLUHG&32¶VRU32¶VRU 
 R.N.R. & R.N.V.R. men in equal proportions of the latter.  Some v. old crocks among 
 WKH32¶V*XQ/D\HUVZHUHWHVted for eyesight & several rejected on that score.   
    
 11TH December 1914,  On patrol ground. 
 Except the Captain & myself, of all our R.N.R. Officers only two have ever served in a 
 naval ship. The midshipmen know a little Gunnery, picked up at the Devonport 
 Gunnery School, but all the principal officers of Quarters have never before seen a gun 
 & some of the men were distinctly gun shy when we fired yesterday. 
 
 13th December 1914, At Sea 
 « we have 28 PO¶V 	 &32¶V DOO UHWLUHG QDYDO PHQ  VHDPDQ all R.N.R. & 
 R.N.V.R., 3 W.Telegraphists, 3 Signalmen (one R.N.V.R.), 2 Armourers, ?.......& 
 VKLSV"  (5$¶V R.N.R.), 10 Artificers (all shore men) & 39 marines, all 
 SHQVLRQHUV«««&KLHI*XQQHU0U.HOO\ --- retired 5 years. Boatswain  Mr. Walsh  
 was boatswain of the ship.  Remains the Chief Steward Mr.------ ---------- now given 
 the rank as a warrant officer, & is a most important part of the complement. 
 
    14th December 1914, At Sea. 
 ««about half our R.N.V.R. had never been to sea before. One man was overheard to 
 VWDWHWKDWKHZDVVHQWWR$QWZHUSZLWKDULIOHKHGLGQ¶WNQRZKRZWRVKRRWZLWK	QRZ
 he was given an oar which he -------- ZHOOGLGQ¶WNQRZKRZWRXVH:KDWFDQRQHGR
 with such men! Most of the R.N.V.R. men have never been to sea before, know   
             nothing RIVKLS¶VOLIH	VHDZD\VRURIVHDPDQVKLSRUHYHQRIVHDWHUPV---- I asked a 
 man whether he could put a mousing on hooks & he did not know what it was. But 
  they are a v. willing lot & many of them are of superior type.  The R.N.R. men are the 
 usual lumbering, thick headed merchant seaman, some pretty useless & it will take 
 much time to teach them to move smartly. 
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7KH VKRUWFRPLQJV ZKLFK *UHQIHOO SHUFHLYHG RI WKH µROG FURFNV¶ ZRXOG HPHUJH DV KLV
salvation. No doubt their maturity and former experience enabled them to realise the 
parlous situation in which all on board were in. They were experienced men who could  
UHFRJQLVHWKHOLPLWDWLRQVLQWKHUDWLQJV¶QDYDOtraining and also the inexperience of the 
younger officers.21 Grenfell seemed to have forgotten he had been on the Retired List 
for nine years himself and was lucky to have support offered spontaneously: 
27th December 1914, At Sea.  
 ««« ,KDGDWDONZLWK&320LOGRQWKH&KLHI%RDWVZDLQ¶V0DWH\HVWHUGD\+HVDLG 
 DOOWKH32¶VZHUHPRVWDQ[LRXVWRKHOSPH	WKDWWKHVKLSZRXOGJRLQWR/LYHUSRRO 
 at the end of this cruise much cleaner than any other Merchant Cruiser, but he said the  
 strain on the older men was pretty great --- 	,GRQ¶WGRXEWLW0DQ\RIWKH32¶Vmust  
 EHZHOORYHU	KDYHEHHQFDOOHGXSDIWHUVHYHUDO\HDU¶VRITXLHWUXVWLFDWLQJQRWWR
 say rusting ± on shore.  7KHµER\V¶DUHZLOOLQJHQRXJKEXWPDQ\RIWKHPDUHLJQRUDQW.22  
 
Two days later, after issuing some typewritten guidance notes on gunnery and other 
RIILFHUV¶GXWLHVKHZDVUHZDUGHGE\DUHTXHVWIURPWKHP 
 They have come to me for some drill in order that they may be able to handle their 
 divisions without exposing themselves to criticism. 23 
 
*UHQIHOO¶VVRPHZKDWGHULVive views of the R.N.R. and R.N.V.R., suggest he may have 
been among those R.N. officers who did not consider R.N.V.R. volunteers would be of 
value aboard warships. The R.N.V.R. was started in 1903 only two years before 
Grenfell retired in 1905. This was a time for development and change in the R.N.V.R. 
and it can be speculated how much Grenfell actually knew about their background. 
Many R.N. officers never came across a reservist at any time at all. Amongst &HGULF¶V 
clutch of R.N.V.R. ZRXOGKDYHEHHQµSHUPDQHQW¶R.N.V.R.¶Vfrom peacetime as well as 
µKRVWLOLWLHV RQO\¶ R.N.V.R. who had even less naval experience. In the earliest years 
there had been a plea for more modern guns in the R.N.V.R. drillships only really 
understood by Lord Beresford.24  Prior to the war, Churchill had stated the R.N.V.R. 
ZRXOGEHµZHOGHGLQGLVWLQJXLVKDEO\¶ZLWKWKH5.N.  Post mobilisation Churchill only  
intended the R.F.R. to join the fleet. He had a large number of R.N.V.R. personnel 
available which he used to form the Royal Naval Division for service supporting the 
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Army in Antwerp and many were never sent to sea.25 The probability is that most of 
&HGULF¶V R.N.V.R.s were µKRVWLOLWLHVRQO\YROXQWHHUV¶IRUDWWKLVVWDJHFRQVFULSWLRQKDG
not been introduced.  
 
Grenfell did recognise there was a difference in ethos and motivation in the R.N.V.R.¶V
not seen in the R.N.R.¶V  8QNLQGO\ GHVFULEHG DV µlumbering, thick headed merchant 
VHDPDQ¶ DPRUHSUHFLVHGHVFULSWLRQZRXOGKDYHEHHQµSKOHJPDWLF¶$VHPSOR\HHVRIWKH
shipowner, they were required to perform routine tasks to ensure safe and uneventful 
sea voyages. They were not required to show the initiative seen in the R.N.V.R.¶VILJKW
to exist, nor did they possess the same extrovert tendencies developed in previous shore 
employment.  Why then did a merchant seaman join the R.N.R.?  Most of them worked 
for the mail companies where the better conditions of pay and short voyages existed. 
Since the mail companies needed a minimum numbers of Reservists to retain their mail 
contracts, membership of the R.N.R. was an economic advantage to owner and 
seafarer.  Undoubtedly, most µSHDFHWLPH¶R.N.R. officers had a professional interest in 
µKRZWKH1DY\GLGWKLQJV¶DQGSDWULRWLFPRWLYDWLRQZRXOGKDYHEHHQPRUHSUHYDOHQWLQ 
WKRVH GD\V +RZHYHU PDQ\ µFRPSDQ\¶V PHQ¶ ZHUH JLYHQ µWHPSRUDU\¶ R.N.R. 
commissions, a move to ensure their retention aboard the armed merchant cruisers. No 
doubt that happened on board Cedric. After complaints the training syllabus for the 
R.N.R. had been extensively revised in 1906.26   
 
The gunnery element set out to achieve the following standard:      
    «gun drill with all the pieces from the 3-pounder to the 6-incher inclusive-This  
 drill being intended not to make the men good shots but to accustom them to the  
 firing of guns in their vicinity DQGWRPDNHWKHPXVHIXOPHPEHUVRIWKHJXQ¶VFUHZ- 27 
 
Grenfell may have been led to think that the R.N.R. and R.N.V.R. training and 
experience was  more extensive and if so, his concern can be understood. It would be a 
significant challenge for him, the RN Gunner and the recalled pensioners, both R.F.R. 
and R.M.L.I., to start raising the standard RIWKHVKLS¶s gunnery.  By 15 February 1915, 
Grenfell was further rewarded by for his patient encouragement leading to his diary 
entry: 
                                                                                                                   
 6WHZDUGVKDYHIRUPHGWZRJXQ¶VFUHZVIRUORDGHUGULOODQG,KDYH 
 gLYHQWKHPSHUPLVVLRQWRSUDFWLFHZLWK3DWULFNWKH*XQQHU¶V0DWH28    
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If the manning situation aboard Cedric was typical, it certainly justified the Squadron 
commanding officers¶ practice of starting gunnery instruction and drill as soon the 
cruisers were commissioned and had put to sea for patrol duty.  
 
Effective gun drill was and still is, a slow and measured progression from individual 
tasks being mastered, leading to the creation of an efficient JXQ¶VFUHZ(DFKman has a 
numbered position on the mounting and a precise task to be performed in a precise 
sequence.  Until everyone knew their work, the ammunition supply parties were drilled  
at different times.  Better results were obtained by short and frequent drills rather than 
long sessions.  One hour was long enough for any one drill and in the early stages more 
than one drill could be carried out in a day.29  Consequently, the Squadron logbooks  
regularly record gunnery instruction taking place morning and afternoon once the ships 
commissioned.  Whilst on patrol the periods of twilight at dusk and dawn made the 
ships vulnerable to attack by submarine.  Consequently, in addition to extra vigilance 
by lookouts, the guns were manned in readiness.   Each merchant ship sighted was 
considered DSRWHQWLDOHQHP\ZDUVKLSDQGVXFKVLJKWLQJVPHDQWJXQ¶VFUHZVZHUHRQ
the alert.  Thus, the combination of training GULOOV DQG UHJXODUO\ µFOHDULQJ IRU DFWLRQ¶
would have quickly improved their gunnery skills.  Gunnery was the elite specialisation 
which pervaded all naval thinking. It started to spread throughout the Squadron when 
Grenfell aboard Cedric noted in his diary as early as 14 March 1915: 
 We are getting so into Gunnery ways and phraseology that the numbers of the 
 hymns at Sunday service are given out by the Captain (quite unconsciously) in 
 VSRWWLQJZRUGVXVHGLQSDVVLQJUDQJHVWRWKHJXQVµ+\PQQXPEHUWZR RKVHYHQ¶ 
 ZHKDGWRGD\DQGµ+\PQQXPEHUIRXUGRXEOHRK¶ODVW6XQGD\30     
 
Tupper, as a former gunnery officer ensured tKH6TXDGURQ¶VVKLSVZHUHprovided with 
all the necessary gunnery training equipment.31 These included floating targets, loaders, 
aiming rifles DQGµGRWWHU¶QRZGHVFULEHG. 32  Ships were encouraged to carry out target 
practice with the heavy guns whenever the opportunity allowed.  The µfloating targets                                                                                          
were large structures which were hoisted outboard and launched whenever weather 
ZRXOG DOORZ WKHLU HDV\ UHFRYHU\ 2QFH UHFRYHUHG WKH VKLS¶V FDUSHQWHUV ZRXOG PDNH
good any damage ready for the next practice shoot. On one occasion Ebro, whilst in the 
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 Admiralty,  Notes on Gunnery for Defensively Equipped Merchant Ships  B.R. 219/39 (London,1939)  8 
    Although published in 1939, the notes refer to the weapon systems fitted to the Squadron in 1914. 
30
 IWM P43  Diary Cdr F.H.Grenfell RN  H.M.S. Cedric  Part 1 176 
31
 Tupper, Reminiscences 253 
32
 Scott, P.,  Fifty Years In The Royal Navy (London,1919) 81-89 
   These training devices had mainly been developed by Admiral Sir Percy Scott from 1897 onwards.  
   Admiralty acceptance of the designs was not immediate but they were in use before World War One started.   
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vicinity of Iceland, took the opportunity of target practice on an iceberg.33  Ideally 
gunnery practice should use a towed target to simulate a moving enemy. In this way, 
the entire gunnery system from the gunnery control officer via the transmitting station 
through to the gun-layer was exercised. A purpose built towed battle practice target was 
90feet long by 30feet tall and the usual range was 4,200 yards. Instead, the Squadron 
had only floating makeshift versions about 12½ feet by 10 feet supported by four casks 
such those aboard Cedric.34  
 
Improved Training Equipment Developed. 
7KHµORDGHU¶ZDV a device which simulated the breech of a gun, into which practice 6-
inch shells were thrust by the loading numbers in the crew. This training was used to 
speed up their performance in clearing the barrel and loading the next projectile in 
order to develop a µrate of fire¶. It was a muscle bending machine and later models 
were used for punishment at Whale Island gunnery school well into the twentieth 
century.35       
 
7KURXJKRXWWKHVKLSV¶ORJV mention is made of target practice XVLQJHLWKHUµVXEFDOLEUH¶
tubes, µ1-inch WXEHV¶ RU µDLPLQJ ULIOHV¶  The sub-calibre tube was fitted inside the 
breech of full sized guns. Its purpose was to fire a ´VKHOOIRUSUDFWLFHSXrposes rather 
than a costly full sized projectile.  Admiral Scott became convinced that this device was 
inaccurate, notwithstanding it was the Admiralty approved apparatus. Once he had 
SURYHG WKH LQDFFXUDF\ KH GHYHORSHG WKH µDLPLQJ ULIOH¶  This was a standard Lee-
0HWIRUG VHUYLFH ULIOH DOVR DGDSWHG WR ILW LQVLGH WKH EUHHFK RI D ´ RU ´ JXQ $Q
armature and electromagnet was attached to the rifle trigger and wires connected this to 
the gun-OD\HU¶VWULJJHUWRDFKLHYHVLPXOWDQHRXVILring. Used with the improved targets 
designed by Scott it proved successful and less costly. Had the Navy adopted its use in 
1898 Scott claimed a potential annual saving of £40,000. At that time the one inch 
cartridges cost £110 per 1000 compared with £4 per 1000 for the Lee-Metford aiming 
rifle.36  Reading the logs, diaries and Squadron Orders it seems in                  
addition to ERWK ´DQG ´ aiming rifles, WKH´VXE-calibre tube was in frequent 
use in the Squadron.37  
                                                 
33
 IWM  96/47/1  Grayson.T.,  Diary Entry   21 March 1917   H.M.S. Ebro 
34
 IWM P43  Diary Cdr F.H.Grenfell RN  H.M.S. Cedric  Part 2  88-89 
35
 Padfield, P.,  Guns at Sea (London,1973)  214 
36
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    Scott claimed had the Navy adopted its use in 1898 a potential annual saving of £40,000. At that time    
    the one inch cartridges cost £110 per 1000 compared with £4 per 1000 for the Lee-Metford aiming  rifle. 
37
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)LQDOO\WKHµGRWWHUJHDU¶ZKLFKZDVDWUDLQLQJDLGWRVLPXODWHWKHVKLS¶V  roll and teach 
the gun-layer to keep his aim on the target. Scott had noticed one man had a particular 
GH[WHULW\XVLQJWKHHOHYDWLQJZKHHOWRNHHSKLVVLJKWVRQDWDUJHWGHVSLWHWKHVKLS¶VUROO 
He believed that other men without this natural skill could be trained to give a similar 
level of performance. This germ of an idea led Scott to develop what became known as 
WKHµGRWWHU¶,WZDVDFRQWULYDQFHZLWKDYHUWLFDOIUDPHZRUNRn which a target could be 
moved up and down using a handle and bicycle chain. Alongside the target and moving 
with it was a card with two horizontal lines drawn so that the area between them was in 
line with the bull. This was placed in front of the gun. A device extended from the gun 
barrel which carried a pencil point. This made a mark on the card, whenever the man 
under training pulled the trigger and at the same time the pencil moved a space to the 
right. The resulting series of dots showed KRZRIWHQWKHPDQ¶VDLP was on target and 
the extent by ZKLFKLWPLVVHGWKHWDUJHW7KLVPHDQWWKHVNLOORIµFRQWLQXRXVDLP¶ZDV
possible rather than waiting for the ship to roll the sights onto the target. The success of 
WKHµGRWWHU¶VDZLWDGRSWHGE\ERWKWKH5R\DO1DY\DQG$PHULFDQ1DY\38               
 
Ammunition Allowances for Training. 
Target practice was limited by the Ammunition Allowances laid down in the Squadron 
Orders.  Allowances were granted for each type of gun and different types of firing. It 
should be noted that ships were not allowed to carry more than half the annual 
allowance on board at any time. Closely allied to Target Practice was a love of 
competition which Scott had encouraged. In pre war years this reached such a level in 
the Navy, that the gunnery results of individual ships were published in the national 
press in order to encourage performance.39    Whenever possible both de Chair and 
Tupper would visit individual ships and oversee a series of evolutions or exercises 
which always included gun drill.40 7KHUHFDQEHOLWWOHGRXEWWKDWLQGLYLGXDOJXQV¶FUHZV
aboard a Squadron ship, would have been timed against each other to sharpen up their 
SHUIRUPDQFHIRUWKH$GPLUDO¶VLQVSections.  Both Admirals always commented in their 
inspection reports on the level of a VKLS¶VJXQQHU\SHUIRUPDQFH 
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                                                    Fig.33 Allowance of  Practice Ammunition 41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        Fig.34 Gunnery Ratings for Defensively Armed Merchant Ships.42 
Tupper had been captain of the gunnery school, H.M.S. Excellent, between 1907 and 
1910 and this experience no doubt strengthened his concern for the Squadron to be well 
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trained in gunnery. The gunnery standards must have shown steady improvement for by 
May 1917 the Squadron Orders included a requirement to release gunnery ratings for 
service aboard merchant ships.43  In 1915 the Admiralty had started to progressively 
arm merchant ships with defensive guns.44  Reading the extract reproduced above, it 
shows a demanding target of seven ratings from each ship on a monthly basis. This was 
a significant training target and must have reflected the standards the Squadron could 
now be expected to achieve. A quarterly return of names was to verify if quotas were 
met.    
 
:KLOVW WKH 6TXDGURQ¶V VKLSV ZHUH DUPHG WKH\ KDG QR DUPRXU SODWLQJ ILWWHG  7KLV
weakness concerned Tupper who stated LQKLVµ5HPLQLVFHQFHV¶: 
 Yet if one properly built and commissioned German cruiser had contrived to get 
   among us for twenty four hours she might have wiped out the whole squadron.45             
 
Germany Starts Surface Attacks. 
It was a well founded concern.  Germany started surface attacks on British shipping 
from the beginning of the war, deploying the conventional light cruisers Dresden, 
Emden, KarlsrXKH .ĘQLJVEHUJ, and Leipzig.46  7KH .DLVHU¶V SUH-war viewing of the 
Teutonic, as a potential armed merchant cruiser, had prompted Germany to turn to the 
conversion of fast transatlantic liners, such as Kaiser Wilhelm Der Grosse, into armed 
raiders.  These vessels were either interned or sunk by mid 1915.  At this time Admiral 
von Pohl had started unrestricted submarine warfare even though Germany had only 23 
serviceable U-boats. An alternative platform was needed until the building rate for U- 
boats could be assured. The solution came from a proposal in October 1915 by 
Leutnant zS. Theodor Wolff  in which he suggested the use of more modest steamers 
such as anonymous freighters. They were to load extra coal to increase their range and 
the loaded draught would increase the deception on which they were to rely. Their 
speed need not be overly high since the speed of the typical British tramp ship was only 
8-10 knots.  Admiral von Pohl was persuaded to give the converted merchant ship 
another chance and so the 0Ęewe, Greif and Wolf were fitted out.47   Both the armed                            
raiders 0Ęewe and Greif would impinge on the work of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron.   
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0Ęewe was built as the banana carrier Pungo a few months before World War One. 
Her speed of 13 knots was somewhat higher than usual because the banana trade.  
Renamed 0Ęewe, KHU W\SLFDO µWKUHH LVODQG¶ VLOKRXHWWH assisted deception perfectly. 
0Ęewe operated from 1st November 1915  until 22 March 1917  sank 38 ships (165,340 
gross tons plus one of unknown tonnage). Uniquely she carried out two major cruises 
and three lesser cruises.  0Ęewe left Kiel in December 1915 to lay mines off the 
Orkneys before the start of raiding merchantmen.48  Throughout 1916 0Ęewe 
continued to seek merchant ship targets. On 15 December 1916 Almanzora, Orcoma 
and Arlanza sailed from Liverpool and were joined by Gloucestershire in the Irish Sea. 
These ships were detached from the Squadron to join other forces to hunt down the 
0Ęewe an operation which proved unsuccessful. Although their absence was short 
lived, it was an unwelcome reduction to WKH6TXDGURQ¶VSDWURO strength in mid winter.49   
 
Surface Action Between H.M.S. Alcantara and Greif. 
Early in 1916 came the news of Alcantara engaging in a close range action against the 
Greif.  The practice of assuming every intercepted vessel was a potential enemy was 
validated in the loss of the Alcantara on 29 February 1916.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               Fig. 35.The raider Greif, showing armament disposition 
 Greif at 4,962 gross tons was about the same size as 0Ęewe but at 13 knots her speed 
was slightly less. Launched a few days before the war started, she had a distinctive 
break between the bridge and boat-deck. Unusually for a tramp steamer she had two 
funnels one of which was removed when taken up by the German Navy.  Her armament 
was two 15 cm guns between the bridge and foremast, one on each side. Two more 
15cm guns were mounted aft of the boat-deck and forward of the main mast.  One                                                                                                                              
10.5 cm gun was right aft on the main-deck, hidden in a deck house. A single torpedo 
tube was placed on each side of the foredeck between the foremast and the forecastle.50  
 
                                                 
48
 Walter, 7KH.DLVHU¶V3LUDWHV 141-142 
49
 Chatterton, The Big Blockade  272   
50
 Walter, 7KH.DLVHU¶V3LUDWHV 91 
Gunnery Systems Of The Tenth Cruiser Squadron.                                   Chapter 7. 
 
 176 
When inspected at Kiel, the occasion was marked by indiscreet publicity telling of 
Greif¶V planned departure for the Indian Ocean. This did not escape the attention of 
espionage rings and no doubt found its way back to London. The weather, typical for  
this time of year, provided Greif with the cover of poor visibility, grey mist and snow 
flurries for her entry into the North Sea.  *UHLI¶Vdeparture occurred about the time the 
0Ęewe had been expected to return from her first cruise. The reconnoitring submarine  
U70 lost contact with the raider but later reported sighting a British submarine. This 
may have revealed the emergence of the Greif to the Admiralty, the information that a 
µsteamer¶ was seen proceeding off Eckersund on the south-west coast of Norway at ten 
knots.51  
  
 Alcantara, owned by the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, had been launched in 
October 1913 and on 19 June 1914 left for her maiden voyage to Buenos Aires. In 1915 
she had been converted to an Armed Merchant Cruiser and was commissioned at  
Liverpool 16 April 1915. She was a very different vessel to the Greif.    Built for the 
South American passenger trade she measured 16,034 gross tons, had triple screws  
and a speed of 17 knots.52  +HUDUPDPHQWZDVHLJKW´4)JXQVDQGWZRSRXQGHUV
plus depth charges.53  By 29 February 1916 Alcantara  had been at sea for fifty days 
and was coming to the end of her patrol. A rendezvous with Andes had been arranged 
by Captain WardleWKH6HQLRU2IILFHURIµ*¶3DWUROin position 61Û¶1Û¶E, which  
is seventy eight miles north east from Muckle Flugga Light. The purpose was to hand 
over secret orders and release Alcantara for a routine refit at base.  At 04.00 a W/T 
signal from the Commander-in-Chief was received alerting the Squadron that a German  
raider was out and was expected to attempt to pass through the patrol. At 0800 a further 
VLJQDORUGHUHGµ*¶3DWUROWRFORVHXSVLQFHWKH\KDGEHHQZRUNLQJPLOHVDSDUW7KH
UHPDLQGHURIWKH6TXDGURQZHUHRUGHUHGWRMRLQXSZLWKµ*¶Satrol in support.54       
                                                                                                                                        
Captain Wardle had Alcantara cleared for action. Guns were made ready and manned, 
four lifeboats on each side were swunJRXWDQGORZHUHGWRµ(¶GHFN Ammunition and 
fire parties were alerted. A most practical task was for the crew to change into clean 
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underwear, this being intended to limit infection in the event of a man being wounded. 
At 08.55 smoke was reported on $OFDQWDUD¶V port beam to the westward which Wardle 
assumed to be Andes. At almost the same time a W/T signal from Andes giving her 
position and reporting the enemy sighted.  $OFDQWDUD¶V speed was increased to full 
ahead and course altered to bring the smoke about three points (33 degrees) on the port 
bow.  By 09.10 Andes had been sighted on the starboard bow of Alcantara and Wardle 
assumed Andes was pursuing the reported enemy.  Meanwhile Wardle decided to 
investigate the vessel on $OFDQWDUD¶V port bow and proceeded with the usual challenges 
for what he expected would be a routine interception. The vessel claimed to be the 
Norwegian steamer Rena which was painted on her bows. She wore a Norwegian 
ensign on her stern and had Norwegian flags painted on the sides of her hull. At 0950 
Andes VLJQDOOHG E\ OLJKW µ7KDW LV VXVSLFLRXV YHVVHO¶  By then Rena had stopped and 
Wardle, having decided to send a boarding party, was manoeuvring Alcantara for this 
purpose intending to approach Rena from the stern.  On seeing $QGHV¶ signal, Rena 
which was actually the raider Greif, moved full ahead, struck her Norwegian ensign, 
broke out the German ensign and lowered gun-ports to commence firing at Alcantara.  
  
The initial hits on AlcanWDUD¶V bridge area came from Greif¶V hitherto hidden poop gun. 
They demolished $OFDQWDUD¶V internal communications, the engine room telegraphs and 
the boarding boat which was swung out. After this lucky opening salvo Greif turned to 
starboard and opened fire with her other guns. Alcantara replied with her port guns and 
scored direct hit on Greif¶V poop gun and set fire to her ready use ammunition. The 
approaching Andes opened fire at 7,500 yards and together with Alcantara had Greif 
ablaze by 10.15.55 During the action Alcantara had been handicapped for ten minutes 
when her steering gear failed and the auxiliary system needed connecting. However 
Alcantara had taken many hits near the waterline on the port side and after taking a 
heavy list to port and had to be abandoned at 10.45.  Captain WaUGOH¶VVNHWFKSODQRI
the action is reproduced overleaf.56 
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Fig.36 Tracing of &DSWDLQ:DUGOH¶VVNHWFKSODQRIWKHAlcantara  v. Greif action.57 
 
When approaching a strange vessel the cruisers gave the order to stop when about 
5,000 yards distant. It was always prudent to keep well away from the intercepted 
vessel to keep out of gun range and in the case of Greif, her torpedo range. It is difficult                    
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to understand why Wardle approached Greif to within 2000 yards. He did not realise 
that this was the armed raider and possibly was becoming over confident in this routine 
and repetitive operation. Once he had decided to board Greif, it may be that he sought 
WRHDVH WKHEXUGHQRI WKHERDUGLQJERDW¶VFUHZ7ZR WKRXVDQG\DUGVPD\QRW VHHPD
great distance but the one nautical mile it represents is a long way to row in a seaway.       
 
Midshipman Poole aboard the Alcantara left his personal account of the action in the 
Imperial War Museum and the magazine Sea Breezes.  The magazine article gives a 
vivid account of the whole action, observed from his Transmitting Station whilst 
damage to the speaking tubes had stopped communication. :KHQWKHRUGHUµ$EDQGRQ
VKLS¶ZDV SDVVHG3RROH¶VYLVLWWRKLVcabin to get his lifejacket let him see the carnage 
first hand.  As a survivor in the water he saw further horrific injuries and also in the 
lifeboat where he finally secured a place. A section in the same article throws light on  
the shambles aboard Greif.  Poole said the action was at such close range it was 
GLIILFXOW IRU HLWKHU VKLS WR PLVV WKH RWKHU 3RROH¶V DFFRXQW DOVR KDV D UDWKHU FKLOOing 
aspect to it.58  
 
Survivors were picked up by Andes and the light cruiser Comus together with the 
torpedo boat destroyer Munster which had also been searching for the Greif. Once the 
survivors were rescued Comus and Munster used Greif as target practice. She finally 
sank shortly after 12.00. The quick arrival of Comus and Munster served to justify 
&DSWDLQ:HEE¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQWKDWDFUXLVHUIRUFHVKRXOGEHNHSW LQ WKHYLFLQLW\WR
back up the Tenth Cruiser Squadron at any time.59       
 
It is worth noting the archives reveal differences of opinion amongst those witnessing 
the events. Wardle remained convinced Greif did not hoist the German ensign when 
firing started. The German survivors unsurprisingly claimed otherwise. Wardle claimed 
when *UHLI¶V gun-ports were lowered, the Norwegian flag on her sides were obscured.  
Comus claimed they were visible at all times and she was better placed to comment 
having spent considerable time close by before Greif finally sank. Wardle was adamant 
that Alcantara was not hit by a torpedo, claiming it passed astern of the ship.  Many 
aboard Alcantara claimed a second torpedo hit her on the port side and witnesses                                                                                                                 
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aboard Andes agree a second torpedo was seen fired from Greif.  Jellicoe had some 
sympathy to the view that a torpedo had struck Alcantara, believing that gunnery alone 
could not have sunk such a large vessel.60  A passenger vessel such as Alcantara would 
have extensive sub division in her hull.  Engine room reports reveal that a closed 
watertight door was forced open after a large explosion on the portside causing rapid 
flooding in the machinery spaces. A torpedo hit was very plausible.  Captain Wardle 
JDYHWKHRUGHUWRµ2SHQILUH¶DWDQGRUGHUHGµCease firing¶DW 10.35. The Gunnery 
Report shows the expenditure of ammunition in an action taking less than an hour.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       Fig.37 Ammunition expended by Alcantara 
 
Pointed common shells with a small number of armour piercing shells were used. There 
were three misfires at the No.1 port gun and one at the port 6 pounder.  The rate of fire 
was nothing like the theoretical maximum for the guns but does show the marked 
improvement LQWKHJXQ¶VFUHZVRIWKHDUPHGPHUFKDQWFUXLVHrs.  In less than an hour 
187, six inch shells had been aimed at Greif.  The gunnery communications from the 
Transmitting Station were by voice-pipe, as described in Appendix 11.  However, once 
firing started is was found impossible to get communications through by this method. 
Consequently firing was controlled by the Officer in charge of each gun. Ranges were 
passed from the Transmitting Room to dials to the four foremost guns but it seems they 
were not used. (See page 164)  Ranges passed varied between 1000 yards and 3,500 
yards. Poole states that the range never exceeded 3000 yards.61 Due to the ammunition 
whips being prematurely disconnected and the early failure of the $OFDQWDUD¶V dynamos 
the hoist motors were useless. However, there was no shortage of shells since each gun 
had 20 rounds on deck and more ammunition was carried over from the disengaged 
side. 7KHHQHP\¶VJXQQHU\ZDVGHVFULEHGDVUDSLGEXWragged, and short rather than 
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Gun Rounds  Fired 
´1R3RUW 30 
´1R3RUW 70 
´1R3Rrt 80 
´1R6WDUERDUG Nil 
´1R6WDUERDUG 4 
´1R6WDUERDUG 3 
Six Pounder  100 
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over. Greif XVHGKLJKH[SORVLYHVKHOOVZKLFKZKHQVWULNLQJWKHVKLS¶VVLde and if they 
detonated often made holes 3 feet in diameter. 62     
 
After their rescue, the interrogation of prisoners from the Greif whilst aboard Comus on 
passage to Rosyth revealed useful intelligence about the German Navy. Especially 
interesting were the similarities and differences between Greif and British armed 
merchant cruisers. The armament was as stated above but in addition there was a 
machine gun intended for the boat deck. Two rangefinders were on the lower bridge 
and a small searchlight placed behind the funnel. Two torpedo tubes were on the 
foredeck.  Tupper stated the use of torpedoes against Alcantara, raised the question  
whether to fit tubes to British armed merchant cruisers but he was against such a step.63  
7KHVKLS¶VFRPSOHPHQWZDVofficers, 5 warrant officers and about 305 crew. Greif 
had over 5000 tons of coal on board stowed in the holds as well as all bunkers. She had 
a water distilling plant on board and was intended to be at sea for many months. There 
were no volunteers in the crew and they had just boarded the ship about two days prior 
to leaving port. After their departure their captain addressed the crew and explained the 
purpose of their mission, to sink British merchant ships. He also stated if needs be, he  
would allow the ship to be interned and she may not return to Germany. There were no 
marines in the German navy and more ships of the 0Ęewe type were planned. 64 
 
Immediately after the action Jellicoe placed an embargo on all discussion within the 
Fleet about the events and no mention was to be made in signal logs.65  When the 
&HQVRU¶V2IILFHILQDOO\DJUHHGDSUHVVUHOHDVHWKHUHZDVQRPHQWLRQRIWRUSHGRHVEHLQJ
fired from Greif.   On 26 March 1916 the &KLHI&HQVRU¶V2IILFHDJUHHGWRSecretary of 
the Admiralty making the following announcement: 
 An engagement took place on 29th February in the North Sea between an 
 armed GeUPDQµUDLGHU¶Greif, disguised as a Norwegian merchant vessel, 
 DQG+0¶V$UPHG0HUFKDQW&UXLVHUAlcantara,(Captain T.E.Wardle R.N.). 
   
 The engagement UHVXOWHGLQWKHORVVRIERWKYHVVHOVWKH*HUPDQµUDLGHU¶ 
   being sunk by gunfire and the Alcantara apparently  by a torpedo. Five 
 German officers and 115 men were picked up and taken prisoners out of 
 a total complement that is believed to have been over 300.  The British  
 losses amounted to five officers and 69 men. 
 
 It should be noted that during the whole of the engagement, the enemy fired  
 over the Norwegian colours painted on the side of the ship. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 This news is now published as it is made clear by receipt of the German wireless 
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 message that the enemy have learned that the Greif , a similar ship to the 0Ęewe, 
 had been destroyed before she had succeeded  in passing our line of patrols.66 
  
Whilst true in itself, it was a refined version of the action, carefully crafted for public 
consumption.   
 
A court martial on Captain Wardle and all surviving Officers and crew of H.M.S. 
Alcantara, was convened on the 28th and 29th March 1916.   It was held aboard H.M.S. 
Indefatigable at Rosyth over which Admiral R.S.Lowry presided.  The court findings 
gave a brief summary of the action and concluded:  
 The Court was of tKHRSLQLRQWKDWWKH2IILFHUVDQGPHQRI+LV0DMHVW\¶V6KLS 
 Alcantara showed promptitude and resource in the circumstances and fought 
 their Ship in  a creditable manner, until forced to abandon her by their Ship 
 lying on her beam ends. 
 
 The Enemy Vessel was put out of action and abandoned by her crew through being 
 HQJDJHG DW FORVH UDQJH E\ +LV 0DMHVW\¶V 6KLS Alcantara ZLWK +LV 0DMHVW\¶V 6KLS
 Andes LQ VXSSRUW  6KH ZDV DIWHUZDUGV VXQN E\ WKH FRPELQHG ILUH RI +LV 0DMHVW\¶V
 Ships  Comus and Andes. 
 
The Court also recorded that the Andes had supported her consort in a proper manner. It 
concluded that no blame was attributable to Captain Wardle, the Officers and Crew for 
the loss of Alcantara and acquitted them.67    
 
In addition to Wardle, copies were sent to the Commander-in Chief, Grand Fleet and 
the Vice Admiral Commanding, Tenth Cruiser Squadron.  De Chair added some 
criticism of both Alcantara (Captain Wardle) and Andes (Captain Young) in his letter 
of 13 May 1916 to Jellicoe.  De Chair considered the confusion over signals at the start 
of the action, the fact that the port guns had trained badly due to the effects of sea water 
and Andes fire often fell short of the target had done little to help. He did admit that 
Andes was at a longer range.  De Chair concluded his letter to Jellicoe:  
 The finding of the Court is satisfactory as regards the action of both Alcantara 
 and Andes, but I am of opinion from the evidence given that Andes did not do 
 all that was possible as to warning Alcantara that she was standing into danger, 
 nor did the Alcantara take sufficient precautions in view of the warning as to 
 the proximity of the raider; nevertheless both Captains, when they did grasp  
 the situation, made the best of it and did very well.68                                                                                  
 
Wardle had been confused in not realising the vessel he approached, with the intention 
of boarding, was the enemy raider being hunted. Whilst he kHSWWKHJXQV¶FUHZVFORVHG
up he had stood down other parts of the crew at the crucial moment.   
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In writing to the Admiralty from Iron Duke on 16 May 1916, Jellicoe added further 
views. He thought Wardle should have taken greater precautions than he did in 
approaching Greif in view of the instructions he had received.  He also thought the 
Andes ILULQJZDVµFHUWDLQO\QRWJRRG¶ZKLFKhe attributed to the longer range. He did 
not consider the Andes was handled very judiciously. Andes had kept a cautious 
distance and although this reticence was criticised by Jellicoe, himself a cautious man, 
he did conclude that the caution was perhaps justified.  
 
If he had seen -HOOLFRH¶V OHWWHU Captain Wardle would have found some comfort and 
consolation: 
 At the same time it is right to state that the situation with which Captain Wardle was 
 faced, and which any ship finds in dealing with a hostile vessel armed with torpedo 
 tubes and disguised as neutral, is one of great difficulty.69 
 
Following the action, protracted correspondence resulted in many recommendations for 
awards and promotions. The exception was Andes, whose performance was not 
considered worthy of such acknowledgement.70 On 22 August 1916 the Prize Court 
awarded a prize bounty of £1,605 to the crews of Alcantara and Andes.71  The RMSP, 
as owners of Alcantara, claimed £805,000 as compensation for her loss and by 11 
October 1916 two amounts totalling £500,000 had been paid by the Admiralty.72   
 
,Q 0DUFK  7XSSHU DV GH &KDLU¶V VXFFHVVRU KDG EDUHO\ WUDQVIHUUHG Kis flag to 
Alsatian in Liverpool, when Captain Wardle reported aboard after the loss of 
Alcantara.73  Both Admirals associated with the Squadron must have found it galling  
WRNQRZWKHRQHµELJJXQ¶DFWLRQ LQYROYLQJ WKH6TXDGURQ had taken place whilst they 
KDGEHHQLQSRUW,WZDVDQH[SHQVLYHOHVVRQFRVWO\LQPHQDQGDILQHVKLS:DUGOH¶V 
DFFRXQW QR GRXEW VWLIIHQHG 7XSSHU¶V UHVROYH WR NHHS WKH 6TXDGURQ¶V JXQQHU\ DW WKH
highest standard possible and he devised further training exercises for the lookouts and  
gun-OD\HUV   *XQ¶V FUHZV UHSUHVHQWHG WKH ILJKWLQJ FRKHVLRQ RI WKH YDULRXV VHDIDUHUV
from whatever their origin or department. The drills encouraged them to work as teams,                   
not the least for their self preservation. The manned guns were a major persuasive tool 
in the daily task of interception. As well as being protection against surface attack the 
guns were also, for the most of the war, the only means of active response to some 
XQGHUZDWHUDWWDFNV$OZD\VSURYLGHGWKHJXQV¶FUHZV¶UHDFWLRQVZHUHTXLFNHQRXJKWR
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open fire on a U-boat before it submerged!  Alcantara and Greif had confirmed the 
acquisition and maintenance of gunnery skills were vital for the Squadron. Tupper 
records that:  
The gunlayers had orders to open fire at once whenever they saw a periscope or 
anything that resembled a submarine, without first reporting it, and they soon proved 
that it was quite safe to trust to their discretion.74 
 
7KLV PXVW EH WKH XOWLPDWH H[DPSOH RI ZKDW *RUGRQ FDOOV WKH µGHYROXWLRQ RI
FRPPDQG¶75 
--------------- 
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Defence against Mines and Torpedoes.  
The psychological impact of unseen, underwater weapons was very real and more so 
since the Navy had paid little attention to either the offensive or defensive aspects of 
mine warfare and had failed to develop anti-submarine weapons and procedures. Mines 
and torpedoes, although usually out of sight, were never out of the minds of the 
6TXDGURQ¶VRIILFHUVDQGUDWLQJVFrom the start of the war to the end of WKH6TXDGURQ¶V
activities, the clandestine delivery of these weapons by either submarine or surface 
vessel always posed a threat.  Mines are  cheap to make and can produce disruption to 
an enemy, the value of which far exceeds the cost of these weapons.  In addition to 
destroying enemy ships, the threat of mines always ensures delay in shipping 
movements, whilst personnel and vessel resources are deployed to clear fields. Only 
one detonation is enough to guarantee a massive reaction and the mere declaration of a 
field, which may be false, can set sweeping operations in motion.  
 
Pre-war Minesweeping Preparations. 
Pre-war, mine warfare was not RQHRIWKH5R\DO1DY\¶Vmajor priorities. For ambitious 
naval officers, gunnery or service in destroyers were the perceived routes to the top. 
Laying practice mines and then recovering them in small vessels had little appeal 
compared to glamorous fleet manoeuvres involving battleships or battle-cruisers. One 
British officer was reputed to consider WKRVHHQJDJHGZLWKPLQHVZHHSLQJDVµQREHWWHU
WKDQODYDWRU\DWWHQGDQWV¶1  Consequently, the Navy was not well equipped to deal with 
mines when the war started. The visionary work started by Admiral Lord Charles 
Beresford in 1907 meant a Trawler Section of the R.N.R. was established by 1914. 
Agreements had been developed with some trawler owners for the hand over of their 
vessels should war break out.2 By October 1914, some 246 mine-sweeping trawlers 
were available, supported by logistic arrangements ashore around the British coast.3   
Many more vessels and men would subsequently be needed to combat the disruptive 
power of the mine. Initially, only passive responses to the mine threat were available 
such as  keeping a sharp lookout, using diversions or re-routing and accepting that 
sweeping could cause delay or even temporary port closure.4 
                                                 
1
 Halpern, A Naval History of World War 1  34 
2
 Bowen, History of the Royal Naval Reserve 94-96 
3
 Hurd, The Merchant Navy Vol.1   335-336 
4
 Sweeping was not a fast operation and normally conducted at a speed of less than ten knots, even in  
   fair weather. Winds in excess of Force 5/6 will prevent effective sweeping. Jellicoe considered such a  
   slow speed ahead of a battle squadron was too risky and routine sweeping was initiated off bases    
   which the Grand Fleet used.  Streaming and recovery of the sweeps takes time and the manoeuvring of  
   paired trawlers can result in the sweep parting. Trawlers were often sunk in mine sweeping operations. 
   A nearby base or base ship is needed to provide repairs and stores.   
Mines, Torpedoes and Submarines.                                                              Chapter 8. 
 
 186 
Mines and The Hague Convention.  
There was a belief that mines would not be laid in the approaches to commercial ports 
but instead, only against naval ports.  This had originated in the eighth Convention of 
the Hague Convention 1907 wherein it was proposed in Article 2: 
 It is forbidden to lay automatic contact mines off the coast and ports of the 
 enemy with the sole object of intercepting commercial navigation.  
 
The Article was adopted, but Germany and France made reservations. One of the 
sticking points was how would it be possible to know whether a particular minefield 
had been laid for the µVROH¶SXUSRVHof intercepting commercial shipping.5  Article 3 of 
the Convention also placed the need to declare minefields to the wider world: 
 When anchored contact mines are employed, all possible precautions ought to be taken 
 for the security of peaceful shipping.  The belligerents undertake to provide, as far as 
 possible, for these mines becoming harmless after a limited time has elapsed, and 
 where the mines cease to be under observation,  to notify the danger zones as soon as 
 military exigencies permit, by a  notice to mariners, which must also be communicated 
 to the governments through the  diplomatic channel.  
 
Article 3, had plenty of scope for a varied interpretation both legally and operationally, 
especially the notification of danger zones.  Even though Germany and France reserved 
their consent to Article 2, Britain accepted the Convention as being better than nothing. 
The Government took the view it should be prohibited for belligerents to use 
unanchored (floating or creeping) mines at all and also anchored mines except in their 
own RU WKH HQHP\¶V WHUULWRULDO ZDWHUV and within ten miles of their fortified ports.6 
Germany had been expected to mine its coastline and that was partly why Britain had 
chosen a distant blockade. Germany had mines and torpedoes which were superior in 
performance to British weapons.  
 
*HUPDQ\¶V2SHQLQJ0RYHV. 
On 7 August 1914 Germany informed the neutral Powers of her intention to close the 
trade routes to English ports by mines and commenced to lay mines indiscriminately on 
those trade routes both inside and outside her territorial waters. The Articles did not 
stipulate the distance from the coasts and ports of an enemy at which mines could be 
laid and Germany was quick to hammer this point home. The auxiliary minelayer 
.ĘQLJLQ /XLVH laid a minefield about 40 miles off Lowestoft on the night of 4/5th 
August 1914.  Next day she was sunk by the cruiser Amphion and a force of destroyers 
returning from the Dutch coast. Whilst returning to base, the Amphion, a new cruiser, 
was herself mined and sunk on the .ĘQLJLQ/XLVH minefield. The minelayer had been 
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painted to resemble a Great Eastern Railway steamer.7 This ruse of disguising a 
minelayer or armed raider as a neutral vessel came to be widely practiced. 
     
On the night of 21 August, mines were laid off both the Humber and Tyne. The fields 
were discovered almost immediately and sweeping commenced. Several trawlers were 
sunk and it was decided that the fields, if left alone, would provide defensive cover 
from further German surface action. The mines had not been laid strategically well 
from the German point of view and by simply re-routing, no further sweeping resources 
were expended.8     
 
Soon WKHUHZHUHIUHTXHQWµVLJKWLQJV¶RIPLQHVZKLFKDOOWRRRIWHQWXUQHGRXWWREHVRPH
flotsam or DILVKHUPDQ¶VEXR\Although frequently mistaken in this way the only safe 
action was  caution and make a sighting report. Many real mines were sunk by rifle or 
gunfire, DV ZHOO DV ILVKHUPHQ¶V EXR\V. The Admiralty organised the weekly 
promulgation of areas which were dangerous due to mines and reported sightings of 
mines. This was a huge central collating task followed by its dissemination to ships at 
risk.9 
      
Two other early mining operations had a more direct relevance to the Squadron. In 
mid-October, the North German Lloyd Liner Berlin (17,300 tons), which had been 
armed and fitted for mine laying broke out from the North Sea. Berlin had a large 
complement of mines aboard and her target had been the Clyde. Her commander 
abandoned the Clyde and instead laid two hundred mines on the night of 22-23 
October, in the shipping lanes off Tory Island to the north west of Lough Swilly. On  
26 October, the minefield claimed a merchant ship, the Manchester Commerce. 
Unknown to the Berlin, the Grand Fleet was nearby and on 27 October, the 
dreadnought Audacious was mined twenty miles off Tory Island. The Grand Fleet had 
been unaware of the %HUOLQ¶V activities. Despite a valiant attempt to save the Audacious 
by the White Star Line¶V Olympic, the battleship was lost. It had been a worthwhile 
operation for the Berlin and had confirmed that Germany intended to reach out with 
their mines.10   
 
After her conversion, the armed raider 0Ęewe left Kiel in December 1915 to lay mines 
off the Orkneys prior to raiding merchantmen. She hugged the Norwegian coast before 
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turning westwards and helped by foul weather evaded any British patrols. On New 
Year¶V'D\, she laid her mines east of Cape Wrath.  Before the end of the day 
0ĘZe had laid 250 mines in eleven separate lines to threaten the western approaches to 
the Pentland Firth.11  The Germans had set the opening scene and made it clear that 
totally safe havens would be difficult to find.  The Squadron would always be at risk 
from these weapons.   
Contemporary Mine Technology.  
In this war, both sides had only contact mines available. The big fear was that floating 
mines would be used since their position varied with tide and current. Under the Hague 
Convention such mines were required to become harmless within one hour of being 
laid.12  7KH&RQYHQWLRQDOVRIRUEDGHWKHVRZLQJRIµDQFKRUHGDXWRPDWLFFRQWDFWPLQHV¶
which did not become harmless on breaking loose from their moorings. Some German 
mines were prone to have weak mooring wires and the corrosive action of sea water 
could prevent the mandatory spring device opening the firing contact to render the mine 
safe.13  This meant a floating mine could be encountered far from the original laid 
location.    
 
TKH *UDQG )OHHW¶V 0LQH 0HPRUDQGD reported that Germany was using two types of 
PLQHWKHµ&DUERQLW¶DQGµ/HRQ¶7KHµ&DUERQLW¶PLQHZDVDPRRUHGFRQWDFWPLQHZLWK
a charge chamber carried below a large buoyancy chamber. The mooring drum carried  
55 fathoms of rope and accurate depth setting was achieved by a sinker in conjunction 
with a hydrostatically operated grip on the mooring rope. Usually five horns were fitted 
to operate the electrical firing circuit.14      Three different sizes were recovered: 
 
Type Charge Probable Use 
I 180 lbs Guncotton By light cruisers and small minelayers. 
II 290 lbs Guncotton By minelayers. 
III 150 lbs T.N.T. (estimated) By destroyers: also adapted for laying 
by submarines 
                                                               Fig.38  German Mine Types. 
 
Type III was a later type and may have been designed for use by submarines. The 
PRRULQJVRI7\SH,,ZHUHVXEVWDQWLDODQGXVHGDVSHFLDOZLUHDERXWò´WKHUHZDVQR 
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provision for rendering them safe when broken adrift and if sighted they were to be 
destroyed by gunfire.15  
 
7KHµ/HRQ¶PLQHZDVDQRVFLOODWLQJPLQHRI6ZHGLVKGHVLJQ:KHQODLGLWVDQNWRMXVW
below the set depth and had no mooring rope. A hydrostatic valve closed and 
completed a circuit from a battery to a small electric motor which drove a propeller at  
the lower part of the mine forcing it up towards the surface. When just above the set 
depth the hydrostatic valve switched off the motor, allowing the mine to sink again. 
Thus it  oscillated between two pre-determined depths. Firing was by means of an 
inertia pistol and the mine became harmless when the battery ran out or by means of a 
time switch.16    
 
*HUPDQ\SRVVHVVHGVRPHWKRXVDQGVRIµ/HRQ¶PLQHV7KH\FRXOGEHODLG from torpedo 
tubes or be thrown overboard from vessels being chased. This was a possibility which 
greatly concerned Admiral Jellicoe.17  Overtaking vessels were warned to keep clear of 
the wake of any vessel they might pursue. Enemy destroyers and submarines were 
expected to make use of this tactic. Battery life was estimated at eight hours and after 
that, WKH VOLJKW QHJDWLYH EXR\DQF\ WRRN WKH PLQH WR WKH VHD EHG 6RPH µ/HRQ¶ PLQHV
were fitted with dummy periscopes to provide additional confusion by tempting 
shipmasters to attempt to ram what they may have believed to be a U-boat.18 
 
In July 1915 mines were detected near well known lightships in the North Sea, 
examples were South Goodwin, Kentish Knock and Shipwash. The mines had been laid 
shallow and were sometimes visible at low water which pointed to their being laid by 
submarine. It was thought submarines were able to carry at least six mines. A warning 
was given that similar mine-laying could be expected in other areas depending on 
distance.19  It had been hoped that the Dover mine barrage would deter submarines 
passing down channel to reach the Western Approaches and force submarines into a 
long passage round the North of Scotland.  As the U-boats improved in performance 
and range, their crews gained in confidence and the north about passage became 
routine. This brought the threat of submarines with either a torpedo or mine-laying 
capability to the Shetlands, Orkneys, Pentland Firth, Hebrides, North Channel, Irish 
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Sea and Mersey.  All were areas frequented by Tenth Cruiser Squadron at one time or 
another. 
 
Minefields of only four mines placed close inshore, at key focal points or in the 
approach channel to a port can be as disruptive as a large field laid by a purpose built 
minelayer. The humble neutral fishing vessel behaving unusually close inshore was 
always suspected. From 1st October 1914, the East Coast ports were closed to neutral 
fishing vessels. Any such vessels found west of a certain line in the North Sea were 
under suspicion of mine laying. Any trawlers not in the exclusive employment of the 
German Government found illicitly laying mines would be sunk and their crews liable 
to be treated as war criminals.20  The action of the Berlin so far to the west, alerted 
Jellicoe to the vulnerability of the North Channel and St*HRUJH¶V&KDQQHODSSURDFKHV
from the Atlantic, leading to Liverpool and other West Coast ports. Sweepers were 
diverted from the East Coast to strengthen the efforts in these areas. Vessels 
masquerading as neutral merchant ships were thought to be the replenishing the 
minefields in the Irish Sea.  The ships of the Squadron regularly used the Clyde and 
Liverpool and so the Lough Swilly sweeper force was tasked to check sweep between 
Barra Head and Inistrahull.21    
 
Minesweeping and Re-routing for the Squadron. 
The prospect of enemy mining in the Irish Sea, North Channel, the Hebridean Sea or 
The Minches was a serious threat to WKH 6TXDGURQ¶V DUPHG PHUFKDQW FUXLVHUV ZKLFK
used the Clyde and Liverpool for repairs and coaling. The most effective and quick 
answer to a mine threat is to establish a diversion route whenever the local hydrography 
permits.  The area around Barra Head was suitable for mines and was also an important 
landfall for the ships coming from the west, on passage to the Clyde or Liverpool.  Two 
routes between Barra Head and the Mull of Cantyre (Kintyre) were laid down in the 
Squadron Standing Orders to control the ships on passage:  
 The following route is to be used by all ships proceeding to the Clyde or Liverpool 
 from the north:- 
 
 9. West of St. Kilda, passing 10 miles 270º from Barra Head and Oversay, thence close 
 round the Mull of Cantyre [Kintyre], avoiding the area mentioned in Notice to 
 Mariners No.137. It is to be observed, however, that the line BC has been moved to the 
 southward, and is 1 mile clear of the Mull of Cantyre. This information is confidential 
 and the Notice to Mariners will not be amended.  
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 The passage between Barra Head and Oversay should be made in daylight, but the 
 Mull of Cantyre should be rounded at night without lights. 
      
 All other traffic must pass between Rathlin Island and the Irish Coast. 
 
 The passage close to the Mull of Cantyre is to be used by ships proceeding to Liverpool 
 and the Clyde. It should also be used by those returning from Liverpool if Senior Naval 
 Officer so directs. 
  
 Directions as to the route to be followed by ships proceeding north from the Clyde or 
 Liverpool will be given by the Admiralty through the respective Senior Naval Officers.
               
 The following alternative route may be used by ships proceeding to and from the  Clyde 
 and Liverpool when considered desirable:- 
 
 Round Barra Head, outside the 50-fathom line, thence, passing northwards of Coll 
 Island, through the Sounds of Mull and Islay, and then as usual.  
 
 As the chart of the Sound of Islay is unreliable this passage is never to be used by ships 
 of more than 26 feet draught, and at low water it is only to be used by ships of less than 
 24 feet draught.   
  
 Ships are to avoid the main trade routes as far as possible. Both when outward and 
 inward bound St. Kilda should not be approached within 50 miles, unless orders to the 
 contrary are received. 22 
 
Two routes, one offshore and one inshore were provided to help protect the cruisers. 
The offshore route between Barra Head and the Mull of Cantyre  had depths close to or 
more than the maximum 55 fathoms used on moored mines. Another advantage was 
more sea room for zig-zagging to avoid torpedoes.  The inshore route was clearly laid 
down in the belief that prospective mine layers, either surface or submarine, would be 
discouraged by the navigational difficulties. This route added 57 miles to Liverpool 
which equated to 4½ hours extra steaming at 13½ knots, assuming safe navigation 
allowed that speed throughout. The inshore route was a navigational challenge in the 
best of weather and sensibly the STXDGURQ¶V VKLSVKDGdraught limits placed on them 
for the passage.23    
 
The sea area near the Mull of Cantyre was similar to the Dover Straits in that a patrol of 
net drifters and armed trawlers was established to hinder U-boats from passing through 
the North Channel. On 22 February 1915 the channel was closed to merchant ships.24   
 
 
 
                                                 
22
 TNA ADM 137/822 Squadron Orders  paras.8-9  Conduct of Patrols (3) 
23
 The extra steaming could create DµNQRFNRQ¶HIIHFWof missing a tide for docking, which in turn, could    
    create a further 6 hour delay. Consequently, this delay could disrupt the booking of shore gangs to  
    attend a ship on arrival, demonstrating the further µDWWULWLRQ¶which mine warfare can create.     
24
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  Fig.39  North Channel Approach from the North West. 
(Not to scale) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Key.   Latitude - North      Longitude ± West 
      _____ Offshore Route    _____ Inshore Route    _____Rathlin Island Route 
 
      BH ¶± Û%DUUD+HDG     OV ¶± Û2YHUVD\               TC Towards the Clyde  
      CI   Coll Island      RI   Rathlin Island  TK Towards St. Kilda 
      LS   Lough Swilly      SI    Sound of Islay  TL  Towards Liverpool 
      MC Mull of Cantyre      SM  Sound of Mull 
  
The Rathlin Island route provided a discrete stretch of clear water regularly swept and 
regularly patrolled against U-boats. Lt.Cdr F.H.Grenfell R.N., second in command of 
H.M.S. Cedric, recorded in his diary for 1915 that Cedric used the Rathlin Island route 
both inward and outward to Liverpool. Cedric was the largest ship in the Squadron at 
21,000 gross tons and whenever she used the Rathlin Island route was escorted by a 
torpedo boat destroyer.25   
 
Squadron Mining Casualties.     
H.M.S. Viknor, the oldest ship in the Squadron, was the first to be lost. Viknor was on 
passage to Liverpool after having intercepted the Bergensfjord, placed a prize crew 
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aboard and sent her into Kirkwall.  Baron von Wedel and seven other Germans had 
been taken off Bergensfjord and Viknor had been instructed to take them to Liverpool.  
She last reported her position through Malin Head on 13 January 1915, after which 
nothing further was heard.  Wreckage from her was washed ashore at Portrush and it 
was assumed she had foundered in a gale. However, in view of the mine-laying activity 
in these waters it was likely a mine, particularly a floating mine, caused her loss.26        
 
H.M.S. Arlanza taken up for the Tenth Cruiser Squadron in April 1915 and built in 
1911 was one of the youngest ships.27  By 1915 every effort was made to avoid sending 
WKH 6TXDGURQ¶V VKLSV RQ µVSHFLDO VHUYLFH¶ but this need did arise on occasions. The 
Admiralty ordered Arlanza to leave for Archangel on 12 October 1915. Her route was 
to pass East of the Orkneys and Shetlands keeping at least 150 miles from the 
Norwegian Coast and the Lofoten Islands except when rounding North Cape when the 
distance could be reduced, if necessary on account of ice.28  Arlanza was tasked to take 
high ranking British and French officers to Archangel and bring back high ranking 
Russian Army and Navy officers. These officers were to take part in a conference with 
the British and French Ministers of Munitions. They were carrying personal letters 
from the Tzar.  Arlanza had also loaded platinum to the value of nearly half a million 
pounds sterling.  In June 1915, Germany had laid 285 mines in the northern approaches 
to the White Sea, scattered in the channels between the headlands on the route to 
Archangel.29  On 21 October 1915, Arlanza left Archangel in convoy with escorting 
trawlers minesweeping ahead and anchored overnight in view of the mine threat. Next 
day the convoy continued and later started to disperse whilst Arlanza proceeded 
independently. Half an hour later, Arlanza struck a mine forward and settled 10 or 12 
feet by the head.30  The ship was abandoned but later re-boarded. Then followed a three 
day struggle in terrible weather to be towed stern first by the Wilson liner Novo. After 
the towing arrangements repeatedly parted, to avoid nearby rocks, Captain Norris 
decided to steam ahead in the hope that the exposed forward bulkhead would hold. 
                                                 
26
 TNA  ADM 137/185  de Chair to Admiralty 25 January 1915 87-103 
    Some 22 officers and 272 men were lost amongst them 25 from the Newfoundland Division.  
    Viknor¶Vloss was taken badly in Newfoundland.  
27
 Haws,D.,  Merchant Fleets - Royal Mail Line & Nelson Line 72-73  
    Arlanza had her first contact with the enemy on 16 August 1914, prior to being taken up from trade.   
    She was captured off the coast of Brazil by the German raider Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse but was  
    released when it was realised she had 337 women and 97 children on board. 
    NMM NOR/1 H.M.S. Arlanza  May-October 1915 Her early days with the Squadron were marked by   
    a detailed investLJDWLRQDVWRZK\VKHZDVLQFRUUHFWO\UHSRUWHGµ5HDG\IRU6HD¶RQ-XQH whilst  
    still engaged in boiler scaling. 
28
 NMM NOR/1 Letter, Admiralty to C-in-C, Home Fleets   9 October 1915    No.278 
29
 Halpern, A Naval History of World War 1 134-135 
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Fortunately it did and Arlanza reached the safety of Youkanskie Inner Harbour in the 
White Sea on 26 October.31    On 2 November 1915 H.M.S. Orotava was detached 
from the Squadron to take $UODQ]D¶Vplace. Orotava arrived on 13 November and took 
aboard the Russian delegation, some of $UODQ]D¶V crew and the platinum. One of the 
trawlers, Lord Denman assisting Arlanza was lost after striking one of $UODQ]D¶V 
protruding propellers. Fortunately, there was no loss of life.32 Arrangements were made 
IRUDµFDUHDQG PDLQWHQDQFH¶SDUW\of eleven officers and eighty one ratings to stand by 
Arlanza whilst ice bound for the coming winter.33 It was nearly a year before Arlanza 
appeared in the weekly Squadron reports again.34  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  Fig.41 H.M.S. Arlanza  Winter Location 1915. 
 
Arlanza, with only six months Squadron service she became unavailable for nearly a 
year and needed costly repairs. Orotava ¶V diversion for $UODQ]D¶V rescue was a further 
temporary reduction in the strength of the patrol.  The whole incident had shown the 
effectiveness of a single mine as an underwater weapon. 
                                                 
31
 IWM  02/2/1  Journal  of  Leading Signalman  Driscoll, J., H.M.S.  Arlanza  14-15 
32
 Leslie, H.W.,  ³7KH5R\DO0DLO´:DU%RRN  (London,1920)   53-57 
33
 NMM NOR/1 H.M.S.  Arlanza  May-October 1915   18 
34
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Submarine Minelayers. 
Jellicoe recorded that by the end of February 1917, Germany had an estimated 130 
submarines available for home waters. Germany was building at the rate of eight 
submarines a month and 50 per cent had mine laying capabilities.35  During April 1917, 
515 mines were swept off the British coast but at the cost of a mine sweeper each day.36 
The minesweeping resources had been expanded to counter the ever growing threat 
confirmed by wireless intelligence, casualties and sightings of submarines. Longer 
range U-boats passed from Heligoland, north of the Shetlands, or through the Fair Isle 
Channel, then altering course to the south west and heading for the North Channel or 
the Eastern Atlantic.37  Sightings were often made to the west of the Outer Hebrides 
and the U-boat commanders had no qualms about passing through the Minches.  Either 
route took them to the Western Approaches and ports on either side of the Irish Sea. 
German policy was to target  focal points such as Barra Head or deliver small fields of 
four mines off harbour approaches.38  Jellicoe was concerned for the safety of the 
Grand Fleet base at Scapa Flow.  Likewise, de Chair realised that the new northern base 
at Swarbacks Minn would attract submarine activity. Inevitably the base was 
discovered and received the attention of the enemy. The need for boom defence and 
anti-submarine nets was recognised.39 Additionally, de Chair warned in his Report of 
Proceedings dated 9 July 1915 that a pair of minesweepers would be needed to keep the 
channel open.40  Six minesweeping trawlers were eventually based at Swarbacks Minn.   
 
The precautions were not wasted.  On 12 March 1917 the Senior Officer, Swarbacks 
Minn reported that the trawlers had sunk three mines off Eshaness.  Changuinola was 
on passage to Swarbacks Minn and was diverted to another patrol. In the evening of 13 
March 1917, the channel was declared clear.  Consequently, Virginian was able to 
leave Swarbacks Minn and Changuinola and Motagua were ordered to arrive there on 
the 15 March 1917.  Changuinola arrived safely at Swarbacks Minn at 03.00 on 16 
March 1917.  At 04.15 Motagua signalled being struck by a torpedo forward.  In fact, 
she had struck a mine at 03.15 in a position some 6½ miles to the south west of 
Eshaness.  Motagua was extensively damaged but managed to reach Swarbacks Minn. 
Subsequently, sweeping near the position in which Motagua was mined revealed three 
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37
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 Grant, U-Boat Intelligence 1914-1918  123 
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more mines. Swarbacks Minn was closed by Admiralty Order until extensive sweeping 
effort was completed.41   Three weeks later, in the forenoon of 6 April 1917, after 
temporary repairs to her damage, Motagua sailed from Swarbacks Minn for 
Liverpool.42  Confirmation was received on 9 April 1917 that Motagua and her escort 
had arrived at Liverpool for repairs.43  0RWDJXD¶V repairs and refit would mean an 
absence from the Squadron of three months. In dull misty weather, she left Liverpool 
on 22 June 1917 to rendezvous with Alsatian for despatches before joining B Patrol.44  
Motagua was a costly casualty from a small minefield and again, the enemy had  
pinned down British resources in extensive mine sweeping effort. The incident showed 
that sweeping effort only relied on µbest estimates¶ DVWRDPLQHILHOG¶VH[WHQWDQGRQH
stray mine, undetected, could still reward the enemy     
 
Mine Counter Measures ± The Development of the Paravane. 
Initially, apart from a good lookout, the only µRQ ERDUG¶ SURWHFWLRQ ZDV WKH ODUJH
number of empty 40 gallon drums and large baulks of timber in the cruisers holds. This 
provided extra reserve buoyancy and prevented the ingress of water in the event of 
underwater damage 
 
In September 1916, Tupper attended some paravane experiments at Spithead. For ships 
fitted with them, paravanes brought the prospect of self protection against mines. 
Tupper submitted a request for the Squadron to be fitted but this had to be on a 
progressive basis as the ships were dry-docked.45   
 
Originally, the paravane had been developed as an anti-submarine weapon but played a 
greater part in the minesweeping role. The paravanes were in pairs, one each side of the 
ship. They remained at a pre-selected depth as long as the ship was making way 
ZKDWHYHUWKHVKLS¶VVSHHGRUFRXUVH46  The two towlines were secured to a clump on 
WKHVKLS¶VIRUHIRRWKHQFHWKHQHHGIRUGU\-docking.47 
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 TNA ADM 137/299 Tupper to Admiralty 29 March 1917  119-41 
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 TNA ADM 137/299 Tupper to Admiralty 9 April 1917 156-70 
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 TNA ADM 137/299 Tupper to Admiralty 24 April 1917 183-200 
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45
 TNA ADM 137/298 Tupper to Admiralty  22 September 1916  372-87  
    TKHSDUDYDQH¶VGHYHORSPHQWEHFDPHOLQNHGWR/W&'%XUQH\51ZKRKDGHOHFWHGIRUKDOISD\LQ 
    1911 to follow his research interests in experimental aviation. When war was declared he was an       
    instructor at the Chatham Gunnery School and his weekends were spent at Bristol on seaplane and  
    other experiments. 
    Cope Cornford, L., The Paravane Adventure  (London,1919) 15-17 
46
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Fig.42 The Otter Paravane in action 
 
The towlines were specially made steel wire rope which was intended to cut the mine 
mooring as it chafed along. At the junction between the towline and the paravane was a 
special cutter intended to finally part the mine mooring and bring the mine to the 
surface where it could be destroyed. The drawing in Chapter 3 on page 74, shows the 
clump piece, towline, paravane, easing out and recovery lines and paravane davit in the 
stowed position on the starboard side of Virginian. Jellicoe records initially there was 
opposition to paravanes because of cost and development problems whereby the 
towlines would un-lay.48  They were introduced to the Squadron but initially were 
unpopular with the deep sea personnel, due to their ingrained training not to have 
cordage outboard when under way. In theory the ships were protected from mines 
XQOHVVRQHZDVGLUHFWO\LQOLQHZLWKWKHVKLS¶VVWHPZKHQFontact was unavoidable. On 
one occasion Alsatian, outward bound via the Minch passed through a recently laid but 
unknown minefield.  Her paravanes saved her by bringing two mines to the surface, 
one on each side, thereby revealing the minefield.49   However, on other occasions 
paravanes could create problems which probably meant total recovery and re-
streaming. Changuinola had one such day on 6 August 1917: 
 During the day the Paravanes (P.V.) gave trouble in the morning; the port one hit 
 some obstacle, came to the surface and had to be rectified.  Later the starboard  
 P.V. hit a shark and brought him up to the surface in a flurry and badly cut about. 
 The P.V. stayed down doing its duty. 50 
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Thus the Squadron came to have some µon board¶ protection from mines. The 
paravanes were deemed a worthwhile protection and by the end of the war, 3000 
British merchant ships had them fitted.51  
 
Submarines. 
Initially, neither Britain nor Germany appreciated the extent to which underwater 
warfare would come to be used.52 The usual method for sinking a merchant ship 
without armament was for the surfaced submarine to stop the vessel and allow the crew 
to take to the boats. Once the crew was clear of their vessel, the submarine would use 
gunfire or scuttling charges to sink the vessel. This was a requirement of international 
law and also German policy. There were, however, occasions when the warning was 
not given, the most notable being the sinking of the Lusitania on 7 May 1915.53  Costly 
torpedoes, were normally reserved for attacks on warships or valuable targets. A 
situation well known to de Chair after the loss of H.M.S. Hawke in the SquDGURQ¶V
early days. The Squadron ships all had guns capable of opening fire beyond the range 
of guns carried by most U-boats.  The Squadron, being technically warships was 
always at risk from torpedoes even before Germany started its unrestricted submarine 
warfare in 1917, when underwater attack was applied to warship and merchantman 
alike.  Before the end of the war the Squadron lost one vessel probably mined, two 
ships badly damaged by mines, another sunk by gunfire and a torpedo from a surface 
raider and six more were torpedoed by submarines.   
 
Germany¶VKLJK OHYHO HQJLQHHULQJ skill provided more efficient mines, torpedoes and 
submarines in the early stages of the war, thereby securing an early advantage in using 
underwater weapons. GerPDQ\¶V VXEPDULQH UDWH RI EXLOG DW HLJKW SHU PRQWK was 
superior WR%ULWDLQ¶VWZRSHUPRQWK2WKHUQotable features were the excellent engines 
and the strength of their hull construction.54    The boats were tested to a depth of at 
least 180 feet and many exceeded 250 feet without damage. Except for the cruiser class 
all could dive from diving trim in between 30 seconds to one minute. They were 
capable of prolonged endurance submerged. They could travel under water at the 
slowest speed for some 48 hours, at about 4 knots for 20 hours, at 5 knots for about 12 
hours, and at 8 knots for about 2 hours.   
                                                 
51
 Hurd, The Merchant Navy Vol. 3  125 
52
 Messimer, Find and Destroy  3 
53
 Hurd, The Merchant Navy Vol.1 410 
54
 Jellicoe, The Crisis of the Naval War 41 
Mines, Torpedoes and Submarines.                                                              Chapter 8. 
 
 199 
-HOOLFRH¶VGHVFULSWLRQRI WKH8-boat in 1917 reveals the versatile range of capabilities 
which had been progressively developed.55  
 
 
                                                              Fig.43 German U-boat types 1917 
 
Torpedo tubes on WWI submarines were aligned on the fore and aft centreline. This 
meant the craft had to be pointHGDWULJKWDQJOHVWRDWDUJHWVKLS¶VFRXUVHas part of the 
aiming procedure before firing the torpedo.56 The U-boats used their higher surfaced 
speed to approach as close as possible without being sighted, often in the awash 
condition, ready to dive if spotted by a sharp eyed lookout.57  Once the U-boat dived 
she was constrained by a reduced underwater speed in reaching WKH µULJKW DQJOHG¶
position some 400 to 600 yards from the target ship and within the range of the 
torpedo.58 The U-boat usually had only one, or at the most two, opportunities to be in 
the ideal firing position, even against a slow cargo ship steaming at 10 or 12 knots. 
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 Jellicoe, The Crisis of the Naval War 31-33 
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 This is not a constraint in 2010 ZKHUHE\µKRPLQJWRUSHGRHV¶DOORZJUHater flexibility in the firing position. 
57
 Domville-Fife, C.W., Submarines,Mines And Torpedoes In The War  (London,1914) 41-42 
    7KHDZDVKFRQGLWLRQLQFUHDVHGWKHVXEPDULQH¶VYLVLELOLW\UDQJHDQGVDYHGEDWWHU\SRZHU 
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  NMM Admiralty, Wartime Instructions for Merchant Ships (London, 1917) 26 
Type Length 
(Feet) 
Displ-
ment 
(Tons) 
Speeds 
Surface    
Sub- 
merged 
(Knots) 
Guns Tubes Torpedo/Mines   Endurance 
Cruisers 
Double hull 
 
Later 
  
215 
 
 
275/320 
1850 
 
 
12  
  6  
 
16-18 
  7-8 
[´ 
2x 22pdr 
 
1 or 2  
´ 
2 
 
 
6 
12 
 
 
10 
4 months 
 
 
12-20000 m. 
At 6 knots 
U-boats 
Double hull 
 
Later 
 
If fitted as  
Minelayer 
 
Much larger 
Minelayers 
 
210-220 
 
 
230-240 
 
 
750 
 
 
800-820 
15-16 
  8 
1 or 2 
´ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[´ 
 
4-6 
 
 
6 
 
2 
 
 
4 
10 
 
 
16 
   
2                   36    
 
 
10+               42      
5 weeks 
 
 
> 5 weeks 
 
U.B.-boats 
Single hull 
 
Later 
Double hull 
100 
 
 
180 
 7-9 
5 
 
13 
  8 
1x 22 pdr 
 
 
[´ 
2 
 
 
5 
4 
 
 
10 
 
2 weeks 
 
 
8000 mls. 
 
U.C.-boats 
Single hull 
 
Later 
Double hull 
111 
 
 
170-180 
175 
 
 
 
6.5 
5 
 
11-12 
 7 
 
 
 
1x 22 pdr 
 
- 
 
 
3 
-                     12 
 
 
5                     18  
800 mls. 
@5.5 knots 
 
8-10000 mls. 
@ 7-8 knots 
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Anti-Submarine Measures. 
A target ship steaming a straight and steady course presented the easiest target for a U-
boat. The U-boat commander faced a set of factors similar the gunnery problem in the 
SUHYLRXVFKDSWHU+HQHHGHGWRHVWLPDWHRIWKHWDUJHW¶VFRXUVHDQGVSHHGLQUHOation to 
his own, adjusting his course and speed to reach an ideal firing position. The estimation 
was frustrated by target ships zigzagging whilst on passage or patrol and also 
manoeuvring for boarding boat operations. From the start, zigzagging was always used 
in daylight and also on moonlit nights. The Squadron logbooks repeatedly show the 
typical entry beLQJµ]LJ]DJJLQJ2 points either side course line every 15 PLQXWHV¶  In 
waters where submarines had been seen or were known to be operating, more active 
IRUPV RI ]LJ]DJ ZHUH XVHG VXFK DV µ]LJ]DJJLQJ 30ÛHLWKHU VLGH FRXUVH OLQH HYHU\ 
PLQXWHV¶   Assuming a patrol speed of 13 knots using these zigzag patterns, the 
distances made good achieved 90% and 87% of the actual distances run respectively. 
The consequence was that between 10% and 13% of bunker coal could be used in 
submarine avoidance alone. There still remained a danger that a submarine would 
monitor these simple zigzags and anticipate the alteration of course to a new leg. By 
1917, merchant ships were instructed to devise their own zigzag patterns to prevent U-
boats anticipating course movements. It was recommended that legs should not be less 
than 1 mile and not exceed 3 miles. When altering course only a small amount of helm 
was used. This reduced the loss of speed on the turn and kept the submarine in doubt 
longer, as to the next course.59  Other simple procedures were showing no navigation 
lights at night, traversing known danger areas such as the Mull of Cantyre at night and 
timing port departures so as to approach danger areas at dusk.60   
          
The reduced visibility at dusk and dawn were particularly dangerous parts of the day. 
At these times U-boats could exploit the limited light and their higher surface speeds to 
gain a closer firing position before attacking 7KH NHHSLQJ RI D µJRRG ORRNRXW¶ KDG
taken on the need to watch for floating mines, torpedo wakes and periscopes. It was 
more than a matter of a pair of eyes watching for other ships with the collision 
regulations in mind and possible blockade runners.  Naval practice was for each 
lookout man to be responsible for only a limited sector of the horizon therefore a 
number of lookouts were on duty at any one time to get all round coverage.  
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The training of lookouts was a need which Tupper pursued with some imagination 
since it was a vital part of the anti-submarine response. To sustain  maximum 
concentration, rotation of sectors and relatively short periods on lookout had to be 
organised.  The masthead look-RXWPDQLQWKHFURZ¶VQHVWGLGWZRKRXUVRQZDWFKDORIW
then six hours off. In severe weather this changed to one hour aloft and seven hours 
off.61  Tired look-outs are inefficient look-outs and the daily routine of closing up to 
action stations each dawn and dusk at sea must have left some residual tiredness in all 
the crew involved. Gunlayers received special competitive training to spot periscopes. 
Tupper describes some simple but effective training schemes devised. The first scheme 
comprised: 
 A large piece of canvas painted to represent an expanse of sea with waves, 
 and this was stretched on a frame and supported about three feet six inches off 
  the deck. The class would gather round and one rating would be sent underneath 
 WKHFDQYDVZLWKDVDLOPDNHU¶VQHHGOHZKLFKZRXOGEHVWXFNWKURXJKWKHFDQYDV 
 until one of the men saw it and gave the order to fire and the bearing from the ship. 
     
 $OWKRXJK VORZ DW ILUVW WKH PHQ¶V UHDFWLRQV VSHHGHG XS DQG 7XSSHU FRQVLGHUHG LW
worthwhile training. Gunlayers had orders to open fire at once whenever they saw a 
periscope or anything resembling a submarine, without first reporting it. They soon 
proved it was safe to trust their discretion.62  Once the Swarbacks Minn base was 
established, demonstrations of torpedo tracks became available as a further training. 
Standing Orders described the form of the demonstrations:   
 In order to exercise Officers and other Torpedo look-outs in observing the track  
 and approach of a torpedo, arrangements have been for a Destroyer, stationed at 
 Swarbacks Minn, to fire torpedoes periodically at a drifter or steamboat stationed 
 in a suitable position close to the ship. Torpedoes would be adjusted so as to pass 
 under the drifter or steamboat, and Officers and men could observe the tracks from 
 the deck of these craft or from the deck of their own ships. 
 
 2. Torpedoes must not be fired at any vessels of the Squadron.63    
 
7KHVHGHPRQVWUDWLRQVXVHGGXPP\WRUSHGRHVZKLFKIORDWHGµKHDGXS¶RQFRPSOHWLRQRI
the run, were then recovered and prepared for further demonstrations. It was a costly 
piece of training but one that had to be experienced in order to know what the tracks 
looked like in reality. 
 
The admonition in the second sentence of the Standing Order above seems superfluous. 
It may have been self protective writing in the event of any misguided action aboard the 
attendant destroyer. It may have been spawned by some µVSLULWHGPLVFKLHI¶by Cedric 
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whilst on patrol.  This happened when the Cedric came up astern of Patia on 5 May 
1915 and was not challenged. Captain Benson R.N. aboard the Cedric, decided a shell 
fired at Patia would ginger up the performance of PatiD¶V lookouts and officer of the 
watch. Captain Vivian R.N. in command of Patia had not shared %HQVRQ¶V VHQVH RI
humour, since the shell fell into the water only 100 yards astern, prompting Vivian to 
make a formal protest to de Chair.64  The reaction to this aboard Cedric was recorded 
E\*UHQIHOO LQKLV GLDU\ ZKHQKHZURWH µ«EXW LW JDYHXV DQ H[FXVH IRU D OLWWOH IXQ¶
However, when it became known that Vivian intended to report the matter, Grenfell 
HQGV KLV GLDU\ HQWU\ ZLWK µ2XU &DSWDLQ LV IHYHULVKO\ FRPSLOing a counterblast for de 
&KDLU¶65   Nothing further can be traced of this incident and it may that de Chair chose 
to let the matter die, since Benson was 6HFRQGLQ&RPPDQGRIWKH6TXDGURQ9LYLDQ¶V
complaint was justified for had the shell ricocheted it could have seriously damaged 
Patia.  For those aboard Cedric it seems to have relieved the boredom of patrol and 
provided some µUHDOLVWLF¶WUDLQLQJ  
 
By 1917 all merchant ships were issued with instructions as to action if the trail of a 
torpedo was seen. 7KHRSHUDWLYHZRUGZDVµLI¶IRULn all but the calmest seas, torpedoes 
were seldom seen and even when they were, it was usually too late.  Merchant ships, 
especially single screw vessel, were not built to carry out the rapid helm and engine 
movements prescribed RQVLJKWLQJDWRUSHGR¶VZDNH.66  The ships of the Tenth Cruiser 
Squadron were all merchant ships, some of them with only a single screw.      
 
Depth Charges. 
There is little evidence of depth charges being used in the Squadron. However, the 
drawing on page 74 VKRZVDµGHSWKFKDUJHVKRRW¶ [chute] on the vessel¶s stern. Whether 
this was an early depth charge thrower or rack is not known. Thornycroft started 
developing a single tube thrower in 1916 which could throw a 300 lb. Type D depth 
charge forty yards. However, this did not go into general service until 1917 and the 
depth charge rack did not appear until 1918.67  Even when supplies of depth charges 
started to trickle through to the fleet, vessels requiring them were initially rationed to 
four such weapons.68 It is not known where the Squadron stood in the priority for depth 
charges, however, enquiries into the loss of Champagne and Hilary mentioned later in 
the chapter revealed these vessels carried depth charges.  Once again Tupper seems to 
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have been up to date on weapon research and developments and devised a further 
training scheme which seems to anticipate the fitting of depth charges: 
 Then each ship had a couple of spars the diameter of a periscope which were weighted  
so that they would float about three feet out of the water.  The ship manoeuvred to be 
about 2,500 yards from where the dummy periscope had been dropped, while the 
officer of the watch and gunlayers were lined up faced inboard.  Then the ship was put 
on her   course, the officer of the watch taking charge and the gunlayers and ratings on 
the look-out. Directly any gunlayer saw a periscope he opened fire without orders, the 
report of the gun and the splash of the shot showing where and when he had seen it. 
The officer of the watch then shaped his course to ram the submarine, while the 
gunlayer continued to shoot, and after passing it the officer of the watch dropped his 
depth charges from the stern so as to get the submarine if the shot missed it.69  
 
Whilst this sounded like an optimistic action, it must have given the squadron crews a 
sense that the\KDGVRPHPHDQV WR µKLWEDFN¶7KHHYROXWLRQ LQ LWVHOIKDGYalue even 
without depth charges for often a quick response with gunfire alone would turn a 
submarine away. These actions were the seeds of what would become the classic World 
War II corvette attack on a submarine.  
 
Tupper gave no indication of the date of this training development but a clue comes 
from a diary entry by Brocklebank aboard the Changuinola for 6 May 1917 when he 
wrote: 
 10.30 Dropped a dummy periscope to practice officer of the watch, lookouts & 
 JXQ¶VFUHZVDWVLJKWLQJLW	DOVRWRSUDFWLFHGURSSLQJDGHSWKFKDUJHQHDULWXVLQJ 
 a dummy mine.70  
 
Squadron Torpedo Casualties.  
Tupper records that on fifty three occasions WKH 6TXDGURQ¶V VKLSV HQFRXQWHUHG
submarines but escaped their torpedoes, doubtless a result of a good look out and quick 
reactions of their gunners.71  However, six Squadron ships were sunk by  submarines.  
Bayano and India were torpedoed in 1915.  In 1917, when the U-boat campaign was 
stepped up, Hilary, Avenger, Otway and Champagne (Oropesa) were torpedoed 
between May and September. 
     
Reports into the losses of Hilary, Avenger and Champagne show the prosecuting 
officers bearing down on the captains to reveal the extent to which Squadron and Grand 
Fleet Orders had been observed at the time of attack. Particular reference was made to 
zig-zigs in operation, watertight doors being closed and most importantly the number 
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and position of lookouts as well as their use of binoculars.72 Prosecutors were also 
looking to ensure a commanding officer fought back with all available weapons, the 
abandon decision was only made when no other options were open and that all crew 
possible were saved.  Hilary was torpedoed at  RQ 0D\  LQ Û¶1
Û¶:ZKLOVWHQURXWHWR6ZDUEDFNV0LQQIRUFRDO6KHKDGUHGXFHGVSHHGWRNQRWV
to stream paravanes and had just returned to 12.5 knots when the attack commenced. 
Three torpedoes were used. She had 5 full time lookouts posted and supplied with 
binoculars. A low sun prevented the sighting of the attacker. The captain was criticised 
for his concern over coal expenditure rather than running at the 16 knots minimum 
speed required by the Grand Fleet Orders and for inadequate training of lookouts. 
However, evidence revealed the ships maximum  speed was only 14.5 knots.  Admiral 
Beatty, by then Commander-in Chief of the Grand Fleet considered the risk from mines 
was small and is on record as stating the Paravanes should have been streamed earlier 
and the planned earlier time of arrival of 01.00 maintained.73  This was in line with 
local orders for Swarbacks Minn which recommended no arrivals between 06.00 and 
10.00 whilst the daily morning sweep for mines took place.74 
   
The next loss was Avenger, one of the most modern ships in the Squadron and the only 
one oil fired. Attacked at 02.30 on 14 June 1915, ZKHQ QHDUO\ GD\OLJKW LQ Û¶1
Û¶:ZKLOVWHQURXWHIURPSDWUROWR6FDSD)ORZPDNLQJNQRWV :KHQWKHILUVW
torpedo struck there were 25 lookouts, with binoculars, on duty and had been on watch 
one hour. The ship was zig-zagging at the time. Avenger¶V after holds, although not 
directly hit, had rivets opened by the impact and began to flood. The ship was not fitted 
with additional buoyancy in her holds. The pumping arrangements for these holds were 
inadequate.75                    
 
Champagne was the last ship in the squadron to be lost. Attacked at 06.10 on 9 October 
LQÛ¶1Û¶:WRWKHZHVWRIWKH,VOHRI0DQZKLOVWHQURXWHIURP/LYHUSRROWR
rejoin patrol duties and making 13 knots. When the first torpedo struck there were 17 
lookouts, some six or seven with binoculars, who had been relieved every hour. The 
ship was using a zig-zag pattern recommended in the Wartime Instructions for 
Merchant Ships in a danger zone. Visibility was clear at the time. Casualties were over 
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fifty members of crew, more than ten killed in the engine room, with difficulties 
handling collapsible lifeboats a contributory factor to the loss of life.76  
 
In all three cases the commanding officers were exonerated, having fought back at the 
submarines to the best of their ability, abandoned their ships only when nothing could 
be done to prevent loss and endeavoured to save any many crew as possible. Another 
common feature of all three losses was that lookouts did not see periscopes or torpedo 
tracks and if they did at the last minute, this was too late. Attempts at avoiding action 
proved fruitless.  All three losses suffered secondary damage remote from the point of 
impact which worsened their plight. Examples were steering gear being jammed, 
damaged gun training mechanisms, limiting the ability to fire when the attacking 
VXEPDULQHVXUIDFHG5LYHWVZHUHµVWDUWHG¶FDXVLQJIORRGLQJLQXQH[SHFWHGDUHDVDQGQR
portable pumps were available if engine rooms pumps were useless.  Less obvious was 
the loss of emergency wireless transmitting ability when the battery accumulators, 
made of glass in those days, were shattered and masts whipped from the torpedo impact 
parted radio aerials and sending them onto deck. In addition to evasive zig-zagging and 
gunnery, two other developments deserve mention in connection with anti-submarine 
measures which were used by the Squadron.  
 
Early Electronic Warfare. 
The war was the first in which both sides made extensive use of wireless and 
telegraphic communications. Germany used its efficient communication network to 
pass warnings to all its warships and merchant ships before war was declared and as a 
result most of its merchant fleet took refuge in neutral ports. However, Britain dealt 
body blows to the network, initially by cutting the German cables in the  Channel on  
5 August 1914.  Subsequently, attacks were made on German wireless stations in other 
parts of the world.77  In Britain, a series of listening posts on the East coast were set up 
with guidance from a Mr. Russell Clarke, a barrister and prominent radio amateur who 
had been supported by Sir Alfred Ewing.78  In February 1915 the Marconi Company 
told Admiral Hall, the Director of Naval Intelligence, of the success they had achieved 
with wireless direction finding with the Army on the Western Front. The outcome was 
a number of direction finding stations being set up around the British coast. These were 
manned by a new section of the R.N.V.R. called the Shore Wireless Service.79   
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The stations were set up in months from Shetlands to Kent and by using cross bearings, 
the position of any ship which used its wireless in the North Sea could be plotted.80 
Together with WKHFRGHEUHDNLQJVNLOOVIURP(ZLQJ¶VWHDP, Admiral Hall could supply 
worthwhile intelligence to the Home Fleet on U-boat movements. The situation was 
further enhanced as the U-boats themselves were fitted with wireless sets with longer 
ranges which tempted them to transmit. Warnings of U-boat activity could be made 
available to the Squadron, to repositioning patrol lines if submarines were expected. By 
moving a threatened patrol line 30 or 40 miles east or west it was hoped to avoid attack. 
Additionally, this served to create a random repositioning which would surprise 
intending blockade runners. Equally important the warnings allowed adjustments to the 
number of armed trawlers working in the vicinities of the Pentland Firth, Kirkwall, 
Lerwick and Swarbacks Minn, all of which were important areas to the Squadron. 
7KHVH YHVVHOV DOVR IRUPHG D µOLVWHQLQJ FKDLQ¶ ZLWK WKHLU HOHFWURQLF K\GURSKRQHV IRU
submerged submarines transiting the Pentland Firth and in the vicinity of Fair Island. 
[Fairisle]81  To work efficiently, these devices required the drifters to be stopped in 
calm weather. 
 
Camouflage and Dazzle Paint Schemes. 
The idea that a paint scheme could render a ship invisible had been raised at times in 
the past. The Admiralty commissioned research at the University of Edinburgh which 
concluded such a hope was not possible. Different background light, sea movement and 
varying latitudes meant no one scheme could meet all circumstances and render a ship 
µLQYLVLEOH¶  Less visible, to some extent, was possible but not invisible.82  The 
proposals usually received polite but arms¶ length replies. Some of these inventive 
minds had printed pamphlets extolling the advantages of their approach to the subject 
and they sought support from politicians and the press in their claims for financial 
reward.83  By 1917, with mounting merchant ship losses, the Admiralty was prepared to 
consider anything and the idea of camouflage went ahead. It came to be known as 
µGD]]OH SDLQWLQJ¶ DQG is associated with Lieutenant Commander Norman Wilkinson, 
R.N.V.R.. It was not so much intended to camouflage but to confuse the submarine 
FRPPDQGHU LQ DVVHVVLQJ D WDUJHW¶V FRXUVH DQG VSHHG ZKHQ SODQQLQJ DQ DWWDFN 7KH
Tenth Cruiser was at the forefront of its use and one authority believes it wore the first 
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designs.84  Once taken up from trade the civilian livery had to be removed. Initially, the 
quickest way was to retain the black hull and paint the upperworks and funnel grey as 
in the model shown in Figure 40 below. As early as 1915 instructions were given to 
SDLQW IDOVH ZKLWH ERZ ZDYHV WR DFFHQWXDWH WKH DSSHDUDQFH RI VSHHG *UHQIHOO¶V GLDU\
aboard Cedric QRWHVµIndia has a terrific bow wave painted on her stem that looks like 
QRWKLQJVRPXFKDVVQRZFODGKLOOVDQGSHDNV¶85  A few days later on 10 June 1915, 
Grenfell recorded: 
 Commodore and I went away in the cutter to note the character and extent of 
 WKHVKLS¶VERZZDYHZKHQJRLQJDWIXOOVSHHGLQFLGHQWDOO\ZHWRRNDZD\ a  
 FDPHUD«««VKLSUDQSDVWXVDWIXOOVSHHGZKLOH,PDGHOLJKWQLQJVNHWFKHV 
 of the bow wave.86                    
 
,Q  WKH SURJUDPPH RI µGD]]OH SDLQWLQJ¶ VWDUWHG HDFK GHVLJQ was created by 
Norman Wilkinson and his artists working at the Royal Academy of Arts, Burlington 
House 6RPH SKRWRJUDSKV RI WKH 6TXDGURQ¶V VKLSV FDQ EH WUDFHG VKRZLQJ WKHLU SDLQW
schemes. Alsatian is shown in dazzle paint and significantly, fitted with two depth 
charge racks on her stern in David Williams book.87   
             Fig.44  R.M.S.Alsatian  in peacetime livery                                    Fig.45 H.M.S. Alsatian  in wartime colours                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                              
                                                       
 
The Royal Mail War Book includes H.M.S. Almanzora LQKHUµGD]]OHVFKHPH¶88   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
 
 
 
 
  
Fig.46 H.M.S. Almanzora   (Photo in sepia)                              Fig.47   H.M.S. Almanzora   (Oil Painting) 
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Black and white photographs cannot show just how brightly coloured the dazzle 
schemes were in real life. Fortunately, an oil painting of Almanzora exists for 
comparison revealing just how vivid some of these dazzle schemes could be.89 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                             Fig.48  R.M.S. Ebro    (Post Card) 
 
A report from H.M.Y. Sayonara LQ2FWREHUVKRZVWKHHIIHFWLYHQHVVRIWKHµGD]]OH
SDLQWLQJ¶90 
 9.55 am. Sighted H.M.S. Ebro in the Sound of Mull on the port bow, end on. 
 She appeared to alter course to port immediately after and seemed to continue 
 to do so, whereas in reality she was altering her course to starboard. 
 I should think confusion would be caused in aiming a gun or torpedo. 
 
 I was so sure that she was trying to cross my bows that I was on the  
 point of stopping my engines and going astern to avoid a collision, when I 
 discovered she was altering course to starboard. After passing the vessel it 
 was almost impossible to tell how she was steering.  
 
The Ebro postcard above, created in peacetime livery, serves to show the vessel was 
not a small one. Other reports gave similar encouragement, but the Admiralty was not 
as convinced as the United States Navy about WKHYDOXHRIµGD]]OHSDLQWing¶as an anti-
submarine measure.  Nevertheless, in October 1917 the Admiralty decided the whole 
British Merchant Navy should be dazzle painted.  The average initial cost per vessel 
was £125 and assuming a renewal twice a year typical costs were between £250 and 
£300 per ship. However, the adoption in the Royal Navy was much less general.  By 
the end of October 1918, 251 warships and 2,719 merchant ships had been dazzle 
painted.91  The µ&RPPLWWHH RQ 'D]]OH 3DLQWLQJ¶ reported on 31 July 1918 and 
concluded: 
 The experience gained in the painting of merchant ships was too short for definite 
 conclusions to be reached. The opinion of the majority of masters and officers of the 
 Mercantile Marine favoured dazzle painting which they looked upon as a substantial 
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 DLGDJDLQVWVXEPDULQHDWWDFNV«««««««in view of the undoubted increase in the 
 confidence and morale of officers and crews of the Mercantile Marine resulting from 
 this painting, which is a highly important consideration, together with the small extra 
 cost per ship, it may be found advisable to continue the system, though probably not 
 under the present wholesale condition.92   
 
Since the Squadron was made up of converted merchant ships manned extensively with 
Mercantile Marine personnel it seems reasonable to assume the dazzle painting in the 
Squadron must have strengthened their morale.  
 
In contrast, it is worth noting the German views of dazzle painting. Released British 
Merchant Navy prisoners from U-boats reported that dazzle painting did not seem to 
worry the submarine commander. More than one submarine commander inquired the 
purpose of the painting. Captured German submarine prisoners did not attach any 
importance to the paint schemes. However, Germany did experiment with the paint 
schemes and used the examples for training the U-boat crews. Support of these views 
came from British submarine commanding officers who stated the assessment of a 
WDUJHW¶VFRXUVHDQGVSHHGalso used other criteria such as mast and funnel positions.93   
 
The 6TXDGURQ¶Varmed merchant cruisers were never built to receive the punishment 
from a submarine attack, whereby several torpedoes were fired, and still survive. No 
amount of wooden shores supporting the steel bulkheads together with holds filled with 
buoyant µcargo¶ proved totally effective against the underwater power and impact of 
mines or torpedoes. 
---------------- 
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This chapter examines several issues which affected the daily life of the Squadron. 
Although treated individually, together they cover important aspects in the wider 
morale in the Squadron and an understanding of them will reveal the less obvious 
challenges in the Squadron.  
Industry Background. 
The bitter strike in 1911 and views of ship-owners towards merchant seafarers were 
mentioned in Chapter 4. The memory of this event remained fresh throughout the 
shipping world. All WKH 6TXDGURQ¶V R.N.R. personnel, stewards and the majority of 
engine-room ratings were drawn from the shipping industry and expected to return to it 
for post war employment.  
Comparison of the Minutes of the Directors of both the P&O and RMSPC, reveal the 
impact of the war, the Squadron activities and two very different attitudes.  The P&O 
Minutes between 1914-1917 were preoccupied with business discussions about 
possible company mergers and the minutiae of share transfer records. There are regular 
statements as to the number and tonnage of their ships engaged by the Admiralty.  On 8 
August 1915 H.M.S. India was torpedoed. However, it was not recorded in the Minutes 
until 15 October 1915 confined to informing the Directors this was the Government¶s 
risk and negotiations were in hand for her value. By the 10 November 1915, the Board 
was reassured that a payment of £65,000 KDGEHHQUHFHLYHGµRQDFFRXQW¶RIWKHORVVDQG
hire of India. Nearly a year later on 21 June 1916 the Board was told claims for the loss 
of India had been settled.1 The Minutes made no mention of the loss of 113 men and 10 
officers, of whom 4 were P&O officers, recorded in CompaQ\¶VZDUKLVWRU\.2  RMSPC 
also included regular statements of their vessels deployed with the Government and in 
addition the amount of regular hire payments received.  In contrast, RMSPC Minutes 
always recorded whenever a staff member paid the ultimate sacrifice DQGWKH'LUHFWRU¶V
resolution that their names PXVWDSSHDULQWKH&RPSDQ\¶V5ROORI+RQRXU3  
The Shipping Federation had been created by the oZQHU¶V to ensure a supply of 
VHDIDUHUV XQGHU WKHLU RZQ FRQWURO µ7LFNHW¶ PHQ DQG ZLWKRXW µWDLQW¶ IURP 8QLRQ
contact. 7KHIUDJPHQWHGµWUDGH¶JURXSVDPRQJVWWKHVHDIDUHU¶V organisations suited the 
owners very well.  They were still smarting from their defeat in the 1911 strike and 
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determined to prepare to confront the µDQWDJRQLVWV¶ LQ IXWXUH7KH)HGHUDWLRQ built up 
resources including a depot ship to move strike breakers to any troubled port.4 The 
Unions LVVXHGPDQLIHVWRHVKHDGHGµ*HWUHDG\IRUWKH)LJKW¶ Simmering attitudes such 
as these were least needed when war broke out and provided an extra challenge to 
create cohesion amongst in the Squadron crews.  The Executive of the National SailoUV¶
DQG )LUHPHQ¶V 8QLRQ decided however, WKDW WKH 1DWLRQ¶V QHFHVVLty should NOT 
EHFRPHWKH8QLRQ¶VRSSRUWXQLW\5   
 
Pay, Parity and Promotion. 
It was fortuitous that the long discussions about armed merchant cruisers and naval 
reserves had ended before the war and reached some conclusions, furthermore, stock- 
piling of naval guns DURXQGWKH(PSLUHKDGWDNHQSODFH+RZHYHUZKLOVW WKHµFDOOLQJ
out of the Naval ResHUYLVWV¶ZDVDVWUDLJKWIRUZDUGDQG rehearsed plan, the supply and  
integration of Mercantile Marine personnel proved less easy. When the war began, in 
order to engage Mercantile Ratings, the Navy was faced with the reality of supply and 
GHPDQGDQGWKHHIIHFWVRIPDUNHWRUµSRUWUDWHV¶([SHGLHQF\ZDV often the solution to 
difficulties over pay, promotion and job titles.  However, expediency often rebounds as 
a later problem.  
 
PORT 1911 1913 1914 1916 1918 
Liverpool £4.75 £5.25 £5.50 £8.50 £14.50 
London £4.75 £5.25 £5.50 £8.50 £14.50 
Southampton £4.75 £5.25 £5.00 £8.50 £14.50 
Glasgow £4.75 £5.50 £5.50 £8.50 £14.50 
Avonmouth £4.75 £5.25 £5.25 £8.50 £14.50 
Hull £4.50 £5.00 £5.50 £9.00 £14.50 
Bristol £4.50 £5.00 £5.50 £8.50 £14.50 
              Fig.49  Indicative Basic Monthly Port Rates of Pay. (£.p)  Able Seaman (Passenger Ships)6 
 
Agreement was made to pay £1 a month above the port rates in tKH8QLRQ¶VERRNfor 
1913 to retain or recruit Mercantile Marine ratings as a reward for added danger and 
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their patriotism in volunteering. In 1913 the monthly pay for a Royal Navy Able 
Seaman was £2.92 and a Stoker 2nd Class £2.53.7  Permanent R.N.R. personnel called 
up from the Merchant Service only received these same Naval rates and effectively 
suffered a pay cut.   The R.N. ratings always considered the Mercantile Ratings as 
overpaid for µseemingly¶ similar work. This ignored the fact that R.N. ratings enjoyed 
continuous service agreements which could lead to pensionable serviFH µLQ KRXVH¶
medical care and many other benefits such as sport and collective welfare benefits. The 
Mercantile Ratings had none of these.8  On arrival at a home port, the Mercantile 
5DWLQJ LV µRII DUWLFOHV¶ DQG FRQVHTXHQWO\ µRII SD\¶ XQWLO KH  µVLJQV RQ¶ IRU WKH QH[W
voyage or finds another ship. The Navy could not come to terms with the fact that 
WKHLUVZDVDµVHUYLFH¶DQGWKH0HUFDQWLOH0DULQHZDVDFRPSHWLWive industry from top to 
bottom for freight rate, passenger traffic and jobs.    
Mercantile Ratings who had signed on the first special T124 articles and mobilised 
R.N.R. ratings, soon found that ratings which had stayed aboard ordinary trading 
vessels and deemed to be less patriotic, soon ovHUWRRNWKHµDPRQWKDERYHSRUWUDWHV¶
by subsequent negotiated war bonuses.  The widening gap is shown below.   
 
 
 
 
                       
 
 
 
                                                         
                            
                                Fig.50  Comparative  Basic Monthly Rates of Pay.  RN v. MM (£.p)9 
Comparing the pay rates it is not surprising the Admiralty found itself involved in 
expedient anomalies, sometimes of its own creation. 
                                                 
7
  Navy List 1913. 773   
8
  TNA  MT 23/574  A point reiterated by the Board of Trade letter dated 15 March 1916.  
9
  Compiled from Navy Lists and Hopkins, ³1DWLRQDO6HUYLFH´ 
YEAR ROYAL NAVY MERCANTILE MARINE 
 
 
 
1914 
1916 
1918 
 
Able Seaman 
With 6 years service 
Basic Pay per Month 
£2.92p  
£2.92p   
£3.17p 
Able Seaman 
Liverpool Passenger Ships 
Basic Pay per Month 
£5.50p 
£8.50p 
£14.50p  
 
 
 
1914 
1916 
1918 
 
Stoker 2nd Class 
With 6 years service 
Basic Pay per Month 
£2.53p 
£2.53p 
£2.53p 
 
Coal Trimmer 
Liverpool Passenger Ships 
Basic Pay per Month 
£6.00p 
£9.00p 
£15.00p 
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The dilemma was shown in Rear Admiral Stileman¶s letter seeking authority to pay 
higher rates to complete the $QGHV¶ crew after the Liverpool port rates were raised. 10 
Authority is requested to place all mercantile ratings at present serving in H.M.Ships 
visiting Liverpool on the port rates as at present or as may in future prevail. To 
complete the crew of H.M.S. Andes the present rates will have to be paid, and I 
anticipate that should different scales of pay prevail in the same ship, wholesale 
desertions will ensue in all ships affected.   
Many arrangements had not been clear and earlier in January 1915, de Chair wrote to 
the Director of Trade Division, who in turn passed the query to the Director of 
Transports.11  
The conditions under which some of the Armed Merchant Cruisers, more particularly 
Alsatian, have been taken up are not quite clear, and the arrangements laid down in  
µInstructions regarding Armed Merchant Cruisers¶ do not appear to have been followed 
as far as engagement, crews, messing and complements etc., are concerned. If you can 
supply any information on these points, it would be of assistance to Captains who are at 
present not sure of their powers or limitations in relation to Companies under which 
their vessels fall. 
The expectation was that the war would only last a few months and so the first T124 
articles were limited to six months service in a specified vessel.  There was an option of 
being released from T124 articles after three months service by giving one weeks 
notice. The option could be exercised by a commanding officer at any time and allowed 
a cost saving in the event of the expected short war. The highest charter rates for the 
ships were for only three months, thereafter a reduced rate applied.  Germany had also 
expected a short war since the Schlieffen Plan relied on knocking out France in six 
weeks. It was not to be.  Soon Mercantile Ratings started to apply for release after their 
three months service and demanded their release after six months. This came as a shock 
to the R.N. mindset and after reference to the Law Officers it was confirmed that 
Mercantile Ratings were within their rights. The only solution was to re-draft the T124 
agreement to require service for the period of war and service in any vessel and it 
became known as T124Z. Those agreeing to sign T124Z received a further 50p per 
month bonus above men on T124 articles.  Thus expediency created a further anomaly. 
Those refusing to re-sign on T124Z,  and many did, were simply allowed to continue 
on the old T124 arrangement and remain on the same ship.12  
                                                 
10
 TNA  MT 23/376  Submission Rear Admiral Stileman to Admiralty 25 May 1915 
11
 TNA  MT 23/346  Director of Trade to Director of Transport 30 January 1915.  By this date, the Edgars had been  
   de-commissioned and De Chair was having to focus on Armed Merchant Cruisers UDWKHUWKDQUXQWKHPµDWDUPV 
   OHQJWK¶DVKHKDGGRQHZKHQWKH\ZHUHILUVWDWWDFKHGWRWKH7HQWK&UXLVHU6TXDGURQ  
12
 TNA   MT 23/794 W.Graham Greene to S.N.O. Liverpool  5 April 1917  
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One of the root problems was the question of parity between R.N./M.M. job titles and 
job content. Examples were Boatswains and Carpenters, often entered as Chief Petty 
Officers on complements, yet the Naval perception of a chief petty officer (CPO) was 
much higher than in the Mercantile Marine, where often it only represented long 
company service.  One of the stark differences of perception was that of Chief Steward 
in the eyes of the Navy, seen as no more than DµGeneral Mess MDQ¶ and classed as a 
µ)LUVW&ODVV'RPHVWLF¶. A &KLHI6WHZDUGLQWKH0HUFDQWLOH0DULQHGRHVQRWµZDLWWDEOH¶
but is responsible for the higher aspects of catering management. This was especially 
so on the passenger ships taken up as armed merchant cruisers. Previous Navy 
discussion papers talked of no more than CPO rank as being suitable.13  The matter was 
helped to a conclusion when Cunard Steam Ship company sent a firmly worded letter 
suggesting that Warrant Rank would be appropriate, as already agreed in some 
vessels.14    
 
In August 1915, ships were required to submit a report as to the relative status, etc, of 
officers and men not in the R.N.R..  The table below shows in detail the disparity of 
pay between naval ratings and mercantile ratings which had developed aboard Arlanza. 
In making the report Captain Norris commented that the Boatswain and Chief 
Carpenter, although classed as Mercantile Petty Officers, he thought they did reach RN 
standards. The two posts in a true naval vessel would be given Warrant Rank and 
Norris promptly created a further anomaly by paying them as Chief Petty Officers 
ZKLOVW JHQHURXVO\ DJUHHLQJ WKH\ FRXOG ZHDU :DUUDQW 2IILFHU¶V XQLIRUP Ior Sunday 
Divisions! 15  This situation was experienced in other ships and the matter seems to 
have been left to the captains to sort matters out themselves. For example, aboard 
Cedric WKH&KLHI6WHZDUGZDVµJLYHQWKHUDQNDV¶DZDUUDQWRIILFHU± which was not the 
same as holding a warrant! 16   
 
                                                 
13
 TNA   MT 23/434 Director of Transports 22 August 1915 
14
 TNA   MT 23/456 Cunard Steam Ship 23.Nov. 1915 
15
 NMM  NOR/1 Admiral D.T. Norris Collection H.M.S. Arlanza  17 August 1915 This provides an excellent 
   account of the difficulties and anomalies which were also experienced on other ships in the squadron.   
16
 IWM   P43   Diary Cdr F.H.Grenfell RN  H.M.S. Cedric  Part 1  52-55 
 
Social and Professional Tensions, Discipline and Recreation.                   Chapter 9. 
 
 
 
 215 
                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Fig.51  H.M.S. Arlanza  Comparative  Mercantile and Naval  Monthly Pay Scales  (£p.)  
The parity issue also affected M.M. Radio Officers v. R.N. Telegraphists. Marconi 
operators had been granted warrant rank as a required inducement to get them to serve.   
Un-certificated Engineers were perceived by the Navy as no more than Engine Room 
Artificers. An attempt by the Navy to down grade Un-certificated Engineers to CPO 
status met huge resistance. Shipping companies wrote perfunctory acknowledgements 
but one replied that engineers were hard enough to recruit without this proposal.17 The 
prospect of a Temporary Commission in the Royal Naval Reserve was not seen as a 
sufficient inducement by many engineers. Originally, it was not anticipated in the 
Armed Merchant Cruiser regulations, that engineers should be commissioned. The 
many disputed cases were eased once military branch status was granted to R.N 
Engineers after 1 January 1915.  A noteworthy incident arose on 10 April 1915 when 
the engineers of  Andes, Arlanza, Alcantara and Orcoma sent a long telegram direct to 
                                                 
17
 TNA MT 23/545 British India S.N. Coy  24.2.1916 
Mercantile Rates of Pay    Naval Rates of Pay  
      
Deck Dept.      
Boatswain  £12.65p *   £  9.00p 
Chief Carpenter  £13.16p *   £15.00p  
Painter  £11.50p *   £  4.75p 
Plumber  £11.50p *   £  4.50p 
&DUSHQWHU¶s Crew  8 £11.50p *   £  3.50p 
Lamp-trimmer  & A.B.  £  6.75p   £  2.75p 
Stewards & Cooks  Dept.       
Chief Steward  1 £18.40p   £  5.25p 
Chief Cook  1 £14.95p   £  5.75p 
Ward Room Steward  1 £10.35p   £  3.375p 
Storekeeper  1 £  9.20p   £  3.375p 
Assistant Storekeeper  1 £  6.00p *   £  2.25p 
2nd Cook  1 £10.35p   £  3.75p 
3rd Cook  1 £  8.05p   £  3.75p 
6KLS¶V&RRNV  2 £  9.20p   £  4.50p 
$VVLVWDQW6KLS¶V&RRN  1 £  6.00p *   £  3.75p 
Baker   1 £10.35p   £  4.50p 
Assistant Baker  1 £  7.50p *   £  3.15p 
Butcher  1 £  8.625p   £  3.75p 
Pantryman  1 £  7.50p *   £  3.00p 
&DSWDLQ¶V6WHZDUG  1 £  8.05p   £  4.50p 
Stewards 20 £  5.50p *   £  2.625p 
Engine Room Dept.      
Leading Fireman  £  8.50p   £  5.75p 
Storekeeper  £  8.50p   £  5.75p 
Dynamo Attendants  2 £  8.50p   £  4.75p 
Greasers 23 £  8.00p   £  4.00p 
Fireman 32 £  7.50p  Stoker 1st Class £  3.125p 
Coal Trimmers 26 £  7.00p  Stoker 2nd Class £  2.50p 
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Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty. Their real grievance was the belief 
that they would not be allowed the same marks of rank granted to other temporary 
R.N.R. commission holders, in particular the deck officers.  Closely allied to the matter 
of uniform was their status as to which messes in which they would be victualled.  All 
this required AdPLUDO6WLOHPDQ¶VDWWHQWLRQWRDUUDQJHDQLQYHVWLJDWLRQ18   
A similar problem arose in October 1915, when the engineers aboard Almanzora 
declined R.N.R. &RPPLVVLRQVXQOHVVSDLGXQGHU.LQJ¶V5HJXODWLRQVIRUWKHLUUHVSHFWLYH
ranks. The Admiralty replaced the engineers, refused their demands and notified 
RMSPC that they would not be allowed to serve on any ship employed by the 
Admiralty. The Court of Directors informed the engineers that having been barred by 
the Admiralty their prospects of future RMSPC employment had been considerably 
reduced, VLQFHVRPDQ\RI WKHFRPSDQ\¶VYHVVHOVZHUHHPSOR\HGE\ WKH$GPLUDOW\19 
Often the engineers real grievances centred round their being treated the same as deck 
officers who had also been granted temporary R.N.R. commissions. Unlike Engineers, 
these officers were not required to sign T124Z articles on renewals and the Navy was 
perceived to quesWLRQWKHHQJLQHHUV¶OR\DOW\LQUHTXLULQJWKHPWRVLJQ7KHLUJULHYDQFH
letters often stated it was not a question of money but of equal trust.  The matter 
reached the point whereby The Marine Engineers Association laid a tersely worded 
formal complaint before the Director of Transports.20    
Another anomaly resulted from the rules governing the promotion of permanent R.N.R. 
Officers to the rank of Lieutenant which were detailed and demanding. Those who had 
achieved the promotion by this route were aggrieved to find that temporary 
commissions as Lieutenant R.N.R., were being granted to Mercantile Officers who had 
QRW SHUIRUPHG WKH µDSSUHQWLFHVKLS RI WKH peacetime 5HVHUYLVW¶V 1DYDO WUDLQLQJ¶ ODLG
down in regulations.21   Engineers observed that deck officers commissioned as Sub 
Lieutenants R.N.R. ZHUHSURPRWHGRQDµWLPHVHUYHGEDVLV¶ZKHUHDVHQJLQHHUVZLWKRXW
certificates were refused commissions. It took the Navy some time to realise that under 
Board of Trade regulations a Second Engineer only required a 2nd Class Certificate. 
This seemed to muddy the issue since mail ship companies chose to employ far more 
certificated engineers than the minimum required by law. This was a commercial 
GHFLVLRQZKLFKSUREDEO\REWDLQHGDOHYHORIUHOLHILQWKHYHVVHO¶VLQVXUDQFHpremiums.  
                                                 
18
 TNA   MT 23/468 SNO Liverpool 13 April 1915. 
19
 NMM  RMS 1/17/  Minutes of the Court of Directors 21 October 1915 300    
20
 TNA    MT 23/816  Marine Engineers Association to Director of Transports 27 March 1916.  
21
 Admiralty,   Royal Naval Reserve Regulations (Officers)  (H.M.S.O London, 1911)  Chapter VIII 
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Another example of the convolutions which could arise was that of Engineer 
Commander J.R. Clay R.D. R.N.R. aboard Teutonic.  This officer was on the Retired 
List with seniority 9 March 1913 ranked as Chief Engineer R.N.R..  Using the new 
military nomenclature for engineers he held a commission as Engineer Lieutenant-
Commander. However, his position aboard Teutonic was one in which an engineer, not 
already belonging to the R.N.R., would have been given a commission as Acting 
Engineer Commander, R.N.R..  The net effect was that Clay was receiving less money 
than when he served in a lower rank in the R.N.R. in peacetime.  It was finally settled 
and the long correspondence makes an interesting example of expediency which cannot 
have been unique.22 
 
After pay rates, closest WR WKH PHUFKDQW VHDPDQ¶V KHDUW, came the reputation of a 
VKLSSLQJFRPSDQ\DVDµJRRGIHHGHU¶-XVWDVSRUWSD\UDWHVYDULHGWKH daily feeding  
scales varied to some extent between owners as can be seen in the table below.  The 
betteU µIHHGHUV¶ ZHUH DEOH WR VHOHFW WKH KLJKer quality of personnel. There was a 
minimum Board of Trade feeding scale of provisions which was usually found in the 
tramp ship trades and often resorted to, as a threat, in the event of complaints about 
food. The predominantly passenger companies from which the armed merchant cruisers 
were chartered, provided a daily feeding rate often in excess of that of the Navy.  The 
KDUVKZHDWKHURIWKH:KLWH6WDU¶V1RUWK$WODQWLFUXQ, brought better feeding for ratings 
than that of WKHµEOXHZDWHU¶VDLOLQJs to the West Indies and South American services of  
Royal Mail.  /LNHSD\ IRRGZDVDOVRD µPDUNHW¶GULYHQDVSHFW WR WKHHPSOR\PHQWRI
civilian merchant seamen. So much so, that some companies allowed a higher meat 
allowance to firemen and trimmers to compensate for their physically punishing work.      
 
In order to secure this key Merchant Marine manpower, the Navy had to come to terms 
with a higher feeding scale. The companies had agreed to undertake the victualling but 
only at the scales shown in the table. Consequently, there was an attempt to establish a  
standard feeding rate for Armed Merchant Cruisers similar to, but more generous than 
those allowed for Transports.   
                                                 
22
  TNA MT 23/794  Commodore H.M.S. Teutonic  25 April 1916  et seq.  
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                                             Fig. 52  Comparative Daily Feeding Rates 
 
 )HHGLQJZDVFOHDUO\DVLJQLILFDQWRYHUKHDGDQGLWLVQRWVXUSULVLQJWKH1DY\¶V'LUHFWRU
RI7UDQVSRUWV¶FRUUHVSRQGHQFHKDGXQGHUWRQHVRIµODYLVK¶DQGµOX[XULRXV¶ZKHQ 
 
Owners  Vessel Officers  Chief Petty Officers Ratings  
Royal Navy 
(original offer) 
   20p 11p 9p 
Royal Mail  Alcanatara 
Almanzora 
Andes 
Arlanza 
Ebro 
Orotava 
Caribbean 
32½p 11p 9p 
Pacific Steam Oropesa 32½p 11p 9p 
Cayzer Irvine Clan Macnaughton 32½p 11p 9p 
Elders & Fyffes Patia 
Patuca 
Bayano 
Motagua 
Changuinola 
32½p 11p 9p 
White Star Cedric 
Laurentic 
Teutonic 
32½p 17½p 12½p 
Allan Line  (CPR) Alsatian 
Victorian 
Virginian 
32½p 17½p 12½p 
Orient Line Orvieto 
Otway 
30p 15p 9p 
P&O    
(initially but 
increased on  1.3.1915)   
India       
Mantua 
Moldavia 
  20p 
32½p 
11p 
14p 
9p 
10p 
Union Castle Kildonan Castle 32½p 
 
 15p 9p 
Furness Withy Digby 32½p                     14p 10p 
Wilson Line Calyx 
Eskimo 
32½p                     14p 10p 
Anchor Line Columbella 32½p 
 
17½p 12½p 
Booth Line Ambrove 
Hilary 
Hildebrand 
32½p 17½p 12½p 
Viking Cruising Viknor 32½p 
 
17½p 12½p 
Bibby Gloucestershire ? ? ? 
Union Steam Avenger ? ? ? 
R.N. Transports 
 
 32½p 12½p 5p 
5R\DO1DY\$0&¶V 
Target Standard Rates 
 32½p 14p 10p 
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referring to the companies¶ feeding rates. Similarly, the Director of Victualling felt the 
ZRUGµH[WUDYDJDQW¶DSSURSULDWH23         
 
The messing arrangements existed from Nelson¶V  WLPH$µPHVV¶FRQVLVWHGRIEHWZHHQ
12 and 16 sailors anGHDFKPHVVPHPEHU WRRN WXUQVDWEHLQJ µFRRNRI WKHGD\¶7KLV
PDQZDVLQFKDUJHRI WKDWGD\¶VFDWHULQJ+HZRXOGUHFHLYHWKHGDLO\IRRGDOORFDWLRQ
decide the meals and prepare the food for baking, cooking, frying or boiling by the 
galley staffs. Next, the µFRRNRIWKHGD\¶ collected the food, served it to his messmates 
and cleared up afterwards. This gave some individual control over the diet at mess 
level. 24  However, it left the way open for a forceful senior rate to set the agenda in a 
mess and at the end of each month rebated money could be shared amongst the mess 
members. The option of eat or spend was often the cause of unhappy messes. This 
quirky system would be known to the full time R.N.R. ratings from their annual 
training periods but was quite alien to the mercantile ratings.  It was used in the 
squadron when it was commissioned.  
 
,Q WKH ¶V, WKH 1DY\ VWDUWHG WR LQWURGXFH µJHQHUDO PHVVLQJ¶ ZKHUHE\ JDOOH\ VWDII
SUHSDUHGFRRNHGDQGVHUYHGWKHIRRGEDVHGRQDµVKLSZLGH¶PHQXIRU WKHGD\7KXV
WKHROGµFRRNRIWKHGD\¶PHUHO\FROOHFWed the cooked food from the galley and brought 
it to the mess tables. This was precisely the method long used on merchant ships. 
However, it needed larger galley facilities.  It appears the Navy trialled this method in 
the Tenth Cruiser Squadron and its introduction was started in 1916.25  Most of armed 
merchant cruisers already had larger galleys and were quite familiar with a general 
messing concept for both passengers and crew in peacetime. There were some minor 
cases of resistance, probably from the few R.N. µROG VZHDWV¶ ZKR VDZ WKH
disappearance of perks from the dividend of messing rebates.  The R.N.R. and 
0HUFDQWLOH5DWLQJVZHUHSUREDEO\SOHDVHG WR UHWXUQ WR µQRUPDOLW\¶7KH$GPLUDOVDQG
Captains were pleased with the quick adoption of the system which would not have 
been difficult with former passenger ship facilities.       
   
About the same time as general messing being introduced, the Navy made a concerted 
effort to introduce its compromise standard AMC rates shown at the foot of the table 
above and also standard pay rates. Neither ambition was achieved in the Tenth Cruiser  
                                                 
23
 TNA  ADM 137/298 Brooks to First Sea Lord 214-215  9 May 1916  
24
 The National Archives,  Brinestain and Biscuit  (Kew, 2006)  4-10 
25
 TNA MT 23/520 Alterations to Galley Accommodation with the introduction of general messing  2 May 1916 
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Squadron. As the war progressed the intention was to introduce these standard rates for 
vessels newly chartered. Once again the need for expediency and acceptances of 
µPDUNHWSUHVVXUHV¶FRQWUROOHGWKHNavy.  
 
The effects of feeding rates are shown below in two of Cedric¶s 1914 Christmas 
Menus.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                     Fig.53  Christmas Dinner 1914  menus aboard  H.M.S. Cedric   
  
&RPPDQGHU*UHQIHOO¶Vdiary comment ZDVµall this DIWHUGD\VDWVHD¶1H[WGD\KH
UHFRUGVµ7KHPHQVD\WKH\KDGPRUHWRHDWDWGLQQHUWKDQWKH\FRXOd get through. Capt. 
sXSSOLHGERWWOHVRIEHHUIRUDOOKDQGV¶26 
 
However, such satisfaction with food was not everywhere. Captain Vivian, H.M.S. 
Patia, wrote a detailed letter of complaint straight to Director of Victualling, this was 
sent, perhaps deliberately timed, when Admiral De Chair was on leave.27 The 
complaints were:- 
 (1) An insufficiency of meat . 
 (2) The inferior quality of the food supplied 
 (3) The extreme monotony of the diet     
 
Vivian also sent some food for examination by the public analyst. The situation was 
difficult for Vivian in that he was unsure as to the rate and terms agreed between the 
                                                 
26
 IWM   P43   Diary Cdr F.H.Grenfell  Part 1 71-73  
27
 NMM  VIV /4  Vivian  (H.M.S. Patia) to Secretary of the Admiralty  4 May 1915. This detailed letter is worth  
   study to get an insight into how unpleasant merchant ship food could sometimes be, often as a result of 
   µUDFNHWHHULQJ¶EHWZHHQDVXSSOLHUDQGWKHFDWHULQJRIILFLDOV         
 
 
Chief Petty Officers 
 
Giblet Soup 
Fried Sole 
Roast Turkey    Cranberry Sauce 
Green Peas 
Roast & Boiled Potatoes 
Plumb Pudding 
Christmas Cake    Mince Pies 
Ice Cream 
Grapes 
Oranges  Apples  Nuts 
 
 
 
6KLS¶V&RPSDQ\ 
 
Giblet Soup 
Boiled Chicken & Bacon 
Green Peas 
Boiled Potatoes 
Plumb Pudding    Rum Sauce 
Mince Pies 
Oranges  Apples  Nuts 
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Admiralty and the owning Company.  A hindrance, about which De Chair had already 
complained to the Admiralty.  9LYLDQ¶VLQYHVWLJDWLRQUHYHDOHGWKHVKLS¶V&KLHI6WHZDUG 
KDG EHHQ LQVWUXFWHG E\ WKH FRPSDQ\¶V VKRUH FRXQWHUSDUW WR µHFRQRPLVH¶ RQ WKH PHDW
ration. Vivian countermanded this, demanding that the full Admiralty ration be issued.  
 
7ZR RWKHU PDMRU µIRRG¶ LQFLGHQWV RFFXUUHG 2QH DERDUG, Gloucestershire where an 
investigation in May 1916 by the Director of Victualling revealed that organisational 
procedures and greedy behaviour by the younger men were root causes. The ship had 
UHFHQWO\WUDQVIHUUHGWRµJHQHUDOPHVVLQJ¶DQGWUDQVLWLRQSUREOHPVH[LVWHd.28  However, 
men in the Tenth Cruiser Squadron were known to supplement their food from their 
own pocket.29  The other incident, involved both food and pay and resulted in a mutiny 
aboard Teutonic,WLVGHDOWZLWKLQWKHµ'LVFLSOLQH¶VHFWLRQEHORZ    
Health 
Each cruiser  had aboard a Staff Surgeon, assisted at times by Surgeon Probationers and 
other permanent Sick Berth Attendants of whom some were auxiliaries and reservists.  
Two surgeons¶ logs remain from the Squadron.30  They found themselves dealing with 
the usual injuries from typical shipboard accidents, minor operations and sports 
injuries, as well as the usual diseases of the time which included venereal diseases. 
Aboard Almanzora during April 1916, Surgeon Parry Price found the need to inspect 
the VKLS¶VFRPSDQ\GDLO\GXHWRDQRXWEUHDNRIPHDVOHVIt is noted that during the long 
winter nights, when the ships were darkened, the number of accidental injuries 
increased.   
Surgeon Parry Price reviewed the health aboard Almanzora as follows: 
In considering the physical condition of the crew one must bear in mind the fact 
that they are made up of mercantile ratings and pensioners and a sprinkling of 
R.N.R. ratings and some dozen or so active service ratings, with some 40 boys. 
These boys are amongst the cleanest and healthiest I have ever seen. Their 
weights and chest measurements are well up to the average for boys of their 
age. Their physical development even in a period of three months has often  
EHHQ YHU\ PDUNHG  «««««««««««««  The firemen, who were 
mercantile ratings, and were for the most part people rejected by the navy were a very  
poor lot physically. Most of the venereal disease was found amongst these ratings and 
 there were several attempts at malingering. The marines who were either pensioners or                 
recruits were very healthy, and there was very little illness amongst them. 31 
                                                 
28
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29
 ADM 137/298   Tupper to Admiralty  25 April 1916  196-207 
30
 TNA ADM 101/405 H.M.S. Almanzora 0HGLFDO2IILFHUV¶-RXUQDO+3DUU\3ULFH6XUJHRQ51 (Temporary) 
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WR$XJXVW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Fleet Surgeon :DONHU¶VORJDERDUGWKHIODJVKLSAlsatian covered a whole year and from 
the medical viewpoint is very comprehensive.  In his summary in the section on 
stomach disorders he noted: 
It is observed that Mercantile Ratings HVS )LUHPHQ¶V %UDQFK GULQN PD\ ""
when ashore on leave and their conditions of life (home life) is often  ?............? 
 of satisfactory or conducive to good health.32 
The constant heat of the stokehold and the incessantly rising coal dust in the dark 
bunkers would have done little to sustain the health of these engine room ratings. 
 
The link between food and health is obvious and this was at the heart of Captain 
Vivian¶V complaint about food standards aboard the Patia. A constant worry is the risk 
of food poisoning and Patia had experienced an outbreak of enteric fever in the crew.33 
Such outbreaks, whilst debilitating to individuals, ZHUHDOVRDKHDY\GUDLQRQWKHVKLS¶s 
operating efficiency, which no doubt helped ensure a response to 3DWLD¶V problems 
from the Admiralty. It is worth noting whilst both Surgeons from Almanzora and 
Alsatian reported a few individual cases of enteritis but nothing on the scale of an 
outbreak like that aboard Patia.  Vivian, in command of Patia, wrote to de Chair and 
praised the dedicated work of Staff Surgeon Scribner together with Auxiliary Sick 
Berth Reserve Attendant P.C.Grills. The correspondence reveals that these two men 
coped with an outbreak of enteric fever, lasting three weeks whilst on patrol. Being one 
of the smaller ships, 3DWLD¶V hospital had only four cots and many of the sick had only 
PDWWUHVVHV LQ WKH DOOH\ZD\V FKRFNHG XS DJDLQVW WKH VKLS¶V UROOLQJ PRWLRQ34  The 
presence of a qualified medical practitioner removed doubts a commanding officer may 
have had about health issues. Surgeons RIWHQ EROVWHUHG WKH PRUDOH RI WKH VKLSV¶
companies with support and organisation for the many leisure activities detailed later in 
this chapter. 
                                                                                                                                              
    TNA ADM 137/969 AMC Policy re Boy Seamen. 69  
    In September 1914,  it had been noted that 1,100 Boys were in depôts and proposals were made to draft them to   
    the Third Fleet to release active service seamen and R.F.R. ratings but not exceeding 20% of the seaman. A     
    reduction in fighting efficiency was accepted against the training value for the Boys. Surely another  political  
    expediency?  (See also footnote overleaf)  
TNA ADM 137/822 Squadron Standing Orders 56.  88 
     1. As a general rule Boys were not allowed as part complement of ships, in the Tenth Cruiser Squadron only  
         being drafted as such when Seamen were not available. They were, however, sent as additional to complement     
         when so desired, and if numbers permitted, with a view  to their being trained and generally assisting in the  
         work of the ship. 
    2. All Boys were to be discharged to depôt on being rated Ordinary Seamen, those forming part complement being   
        relieved by Seamen R.N.R.., R.N.V.R.., or ratings entered for hostilities only, and those additional by other   
        Boys, if possible. All of which confirms expediency and the ongoing reliance on Reservists. 
32
 TNA ADM 101/405  H.M.S. Alsatian  0HGLFDO2IILFHUV¶-RXUQDO:3:DONHU)OHHW6XUJHRQ*HQHUDO5HPDUNV 
33
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Accommodation 
Once taken up from trade, to reduce fire risk, the cruisers were stripped of all furniture 
and fittings in passenger accommodation as well as public room decorations and 
amenities. The result was a significant amount of available space for naval use. 
Although Navy ships used hammocks for crews, by 1914 this practice had long since 
ceased in merchant ships where everyone had a fixed bunk. Even though the crew 
accommodation was subject to Board of Trade surveys and measurement, crew areas 
were sometimes cramped, especially on passenger ships which carried large catering 
staffs. There seems to have been no discernable policy as to how the vacated passenger 
space was WR EH XVHG EXW WKH LQGLFDWLRQV DUH WKDW WKH 6TXDGURQ¶V FUHZV HQMR\HG
µVSDFLRXVOLYLQJ¶FRPSDUHGZLWKQRUPDOQDYDOYHVVHOV 
 
Whilst there were variations two descriptions give an insight the life style. Cedric was 
actually the largest ship in the Squadron and Commander Grenfell¶VGLDU\recorded: 
 I occupy the suite of rooms on the port side of C deck, close to the Enquiry Office 
 which has been converted to the SKLS¶s Office ------- I have a sleeping cabin, bathroom 
 	ZULWLQJURRPDOOYFRPIRUWDEOH7KHRWKHUFDELQVRQWKLV	WKHGHFNDERYH««" 
7KH &DSWDLQ¶V FDELQ XQGHU WKH EULGJH LV however, small. We mess in a part of the 
Saloon, boarded off as a ward room & the messing is top holes ±-- The men are all in 
FDELQVWKH32¶V	6HUJHDQWVLQnd Class the men in 3rd Class saloon.35      
 
Later, on 28 May1915, Grenfell wrote a revealing entry:  
Today I am shifting the Firemen into the new quarters (3rd Class Cabins) I have been 
cleaning for them. They will all receive new beds & bedding and their clothing will be  
fumigated before being transferred. Cartledge- DQH[1DY\/HDGLQJ6WRNHU«««has 
been placed in charge of the FiUHPHQ	WKHLUTXDUWHUV	JLYHQD32¶VEDGJHWRZHDU
He seems to shape well & cottons to the idea of making the Firemen conform to 
Service ways & ideas as to cleanliness.  The Chief Engineer has got wind of this & 
came to me yesterday expressing much anxiety as to the cleanliness of the firemen, 
their welfare etc..  When I mooted the idea to him some while ago he was all for that 
\RXFRXOGQ¶WGRDQ\WKLQJZLWKD/LYHUSRROILUHPDQ	WKDWLWZDVQ¶WZRUWKZKLOHWRWU\ 
that WKH\ZHUHVFXP	GHVHUYHGQRWKLQJ'LIIHUHQWWXQHQRZEXWWKDW¶VWKH&KLHIand  
             the Merchant Service ± Get the work out of the men & for the remainder let them go to       
             hell their own way.36    
 
This is a most telling extract which revealed WKHJXOIEHWZHHQWKH5R\DO1DY\¶VDQG
0HUFDQWLOH0DULQH¶V understanding of each other and their different attitudes to man 
management and welfare.  
 
$OPDQ]RUD¶V Surgeon gives a clear picture as to how living was aboard his ship and by 
inference, aboard Alcantara, Andes and Arlanza. 
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This ship [Almanzora] was under construction at the time of outbreak of hostilities and 
she was taken over whilst on the stocks. That being the case she has never had the 
fittings of an ordinary passenger ship and she remains almost a bare shell. 
She is ideally suited for this work of patrol as there is very little woodwork to take fire 
in case of action. 
7KHDFFRPPRGDWLRQ IRUERWKRIILFHUV DQGPHQ OHDYHV OLWWOH WREHGHVLUHG7KHPHQ¶V
quarters are both roomy and airy, though at times we have had difficulty in keeping 
them warm enough.  There are rather too many dark unoccupied spaces which from 
their unhealthy smell suggest that men, such as the mercantile Liverpool firemen use 
them as urinals when too lazy to go to the urinals provided.  The ventilating 
arrangements are excellent when taken advantage of, but great difficulty has been 
experienced  in persuading the men to take advantage of them and air their quarters. 
The accommodation for the crew is most roomy and excellent particularly is this so in 
the case of the boys. 
Their sleeping quarters are situated on the main deck amidships where their hammocks 
are hung in a space which could easily accommodate twice their number. Their mess 
GHFNLVIRU¶UGwell warmed and easily ventilated. 
7KH ILUHPHQ¶V TXDUWHUV DUH YHU\ URRP\ EXW ZLWK WKH QHFHVVDU\ FKDQJHV DPRQJ WKHLU
numbers every two months, owing to the fact that they are mercantile ratings, it has 
been more difficult to make them keep their quarters clean and airy. They show no 
enthusiasm for letting fresh air into their quarters.  The galleys are most excellently 
fitted out in all cases with tiled floors which can be easily scrubbed out, and I have 
always found them spotlessly clean. This is also the case with all their utensils.  All 
lavatories are provided with ample flushing arrangements. 37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              Fig.54  0HQ¶V6OHHSLQJ)ODW- µ%¶'HFN 
 
The stark atmosphere aboard Almanzora is confirmed by the sketch of sleeping 
accommodation above by one of her Signalmen Phillip Needell R.N.V.R. and the 
following description by Commander W.C.Tarrant R.N.R..38  
As fitted out for Naval Service the Ship was a mere shell of hull and engines, and the 
luxurious accommodation common to passenger steamers of this class was conspicuous 
by its absence; only absolute necessities such as magazines, store rooms, and 
accommodation for officers and crew being installed. These necessities occupied only a 
comparatively small portion of the huge vessel, and a walk through the spaces, which 
will eventually be utilised by passengers, left the impression of having passed through 
a series of great steel tanks. 
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Such was the world of Tarrant, Fry and Needell all of whom served aboard together.  
 
However, both de Chair and Tupper encouraged the ships to make maximum use of the 
available space and whenever possible use one of the former public rooms as an 
µassembly space¶SUHIHUDEO\ZLWKD VWDJHDWRQHHQd, for divisions or prayers in cold 
weather, church on Sunday and lantern lectures.39   
 %HORZDUH1HHGHOO¶VVNHWFKHVRIDUUDQJHPHQWVDERDUGAlmanzora.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           Fig.55  The Theatre -  (First Class Lower Smoke Rom)40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              Fig.56 The Boxing Ring  (First Class Social Hall) 41 
 
Pastoral 
Religion and church attendance played a fuller part in the national life of 1914-1918 
than it does today. In tune with that, the Navy laid down precise arrangements for 
prayer and pastoral care of naval personnel.42  In the Squadron, every effort was made 
to comply with the requirement to hold morning prayers every weekday after morning 
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quarters or divisions and Divine Service on Sundays. The Liturgy of the Church of 
England was adopted within the Navy.   Officers and men not on duty were required to 
attend this service, unless permission to be absent had been obtained. For active service 
personnel, naval pensioners and reservists this would have been a normal aspect of 
their shipboard lives. Mercantile Marine personnel were never under such requirements 
aboard a normal merchant ship as explained earlier.43 In ships without Chaplains, a 
senior officer or the captain read prayers on these occasions. In port, all denominations  
were encouraged to attend worship ashore on Sundays and the logbooks record the 
landing of church parties and their return.  Mercantile ratings on shore leave at 
Liverpool and the Clyde were more likely to attend the local Missions to Seamen and 
Stella Maris clubs. Here religious worship was not under any compulsion but 
encouragement. The Seamen¶V Missions were also meeting places for the Mercantile 
Ratings to hear about pay and conditions in ships still trading as independent merchant 
vessels. They could reveal any misgivings or grievances they held about serving in the 
Tenth Cruiser Squadron to other mercantile ratings, who might be approached later to 
serve in the Squadron.  
 
In the Squadron Alsatian had a permanent Chaplain appointed and a Chaplain was 
attached to each of the three Divisions in the Squadron. These attached Chaplains were 
dispersed as required by the Flag Officer or Commodore of the Division to which they 
belonged. Whenever the ships were in the coaling station at Busta Voe, the Chaplains 
were required to conduct a short service and administer Holy Communion aboard the 
base ship Gibraltar.  In addition, two Roman Catholic Chaplains were appointed for 
duty with the Squadron and they embarked when opportunities offered.44    
 
The Squadron Orders also reveal that when in the Clyde, the Rev.R.Irons, Rector of 
6W-RKQ¶V&KXUFK&ranston Hill, Glasgow, near the docks was willing to entertain boys 
landed from ships of the Squadron, and provide them with healthy amusement when on 
shore.45  7KHUHLVEULHIPHQWLRQLQ$GPLUDO7XSSHU¶V reports of the prospect of a Church 
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Army Recreation Hut being built at Swarbacks Minn but beyond laying of its 
foundations nothing more was reported.46    
Naval Chaplains are charged ZLWK µbeing regarded as a friend and adviser by all on 
ERDUG¶7RWKLVHQGWKHLUXQLIRUPVFDUU\QRVLJQRIUDQN, being devoid of brass buttons 
and gold lace. Like Surgeons, they often add a crucial dimension to the morale of a 
VKLS¶VFRPSDQ\and both are entrusted with confidences given to no others.  Often a 
FRPPDQGLQJ RIILFHU FDQ µXQEHQG¶ WR WKH &KDSODLQ DQG 6XUJHRQ and may feel the 
Chaplain is a valued friend.  Brocklebank recorded a Chaplain, Rev. Grundy, was on 
board Changuinola in February, 1917.  Brocklebank, a stickler for Divine Service on 
Sundays, SUREDEO\ IRXQG WKH &KDSODLQ¶V company more stimulating than the R.N.R. 
officers and had him sit next to him at table. In January Brocklebank wrote: 
 I have been at sea in this ship for over two years now and feel myself sinking to the  
level of the R.N.R., good fellows, worthy and honest though they be, constant 
association with them does not tend to liven any brain or thoughts one may have.  
 
In April, 1917, Changuinola had a Roman Catholic priest named Kelly appointed. 
Brocklebank described KLP DV D µIXQQ\ OLWWOH ,ULVKPDQ¶ DQG EXW ZDV careful not to 
discuss Home Rule whilst talking DERXW .HOO\¶V zeal in converting Protestants to the 
Roman Catholic Church.47 
Discipline. 
The Naval Discipline Act is an Act of Parliament for the preservation of good order and 
discipline in the Service and augments the ordinary Law of England so that Service 
3HUVRQQHOPD\EHSURFHHGHGDJDLQVWDWKRPHDQGDEURDGIRUSXUHO\µ1DYDO2IIHQFHV¶DV
well as offences recognisable under ordinary Law.48  All persons belonging to the Navy 
and borne on the books of one of H.M. Ships in commission are subject to the Act, 
including Royal Marines when borne aboard. Thus all R.N., R.N.R., R.N.V.R.  and 
50LQWKH6TXDGURQ¶s ships were covered by the Act.  
 
Given the above definition, this left the Mercantile Personnel carried aboard to be 
considered.  In fact, they were also subject to the Act having signed one or other variant  
of the T124 Agreements used. This had been the subject of debate, as well as legal 
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confirmation, and there is little doubt many Mercantile Ratings serving aboard the 
armed merchant cruisers, did not realise they were bound by the Act, until they fell foul 
RILWVSURYLVLRQV.LQJ¶V5HJXODWLRQVDQG$GPLUDOW\,QVWUXFWLRQV.5	$,GHWDLOHG
DOO WKH µ1DYDO 2IIHQFHV¶ DQG WKH DSSURSULDWH SXQLVKPHQWV WRJHWKHU ZLWK WKHLU
FRQVHTXHQWLDO HIIHFWV RQ D PDQ¶V FDUHHU $OVR GHILQHG ZHUH WKH GHJUHHV WR ZKLFK DQ
individual officer can punish without reference to a higher authority. The more serious 
offences ZHUHVXEMHFWWRWKHLVVXHRID:DUUDQWZKLFKZDVUHDGWRWKHDVVHPEOHGVKLS¶V
company before the punishment was carried out. A Warrant required the confirmation 
RI DQ RIILFHU RI FDSWDLQ¶V UDQN DQ LPSRUWDQW FRQVLGHUDWLRQ ZKHQ VR PDQ\ RI WKH
6TXDGURQ¶V VKLps were commanded by only commanders. Warrant punishments can 
KDYH VHULRXV DQG ORQJ ODVWLQJHIIHFWV RQDPDQ¶V UHFRUd which is why they are taken  
seriously, e.g. his pension could be affected.  
 
British merchant ships were also subject to a disciplinary code laid down by the 
Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, which was drastically revised in 1906.49  Therein was a 
list of shipboard offences and the punishments. Some of these could be dealt with by 
WKHYHVVHO¶VPDVWHUHJZKHUHWKHRQO\SXQLVKPHQWZDVDZDJHVGHGuction. For more 
serious offences such as assault of the master, officer or certificated engineer where 
imprisonment for 12 weeks was the punishment, reference had to be made to a 
0DJLVWUDWH¶V&RXUWRUD1DYDO&RXUWIRUDVHQWHQFH50   The inevitable delays that court 
procedures created were unwelcome to ship-owners and so it has to be admitted that 
discipline in merchant ships was not pursued with the same rigour as in the Royal 
Navy.  
 
2QH RIIHQFH ZKLFK WKH 1DY\ QHYHU LJQRUHV LV µ/HDYH-EUHDNLQJ¶ LH IDLOure to return 
from leave at the right time, in a sober state and fit for duty. Transgressions of up to 36 
hours were dealt with on a scale largely involving mulcts of pay and/or stoppage of 
leave privileges. Aggravated offences and over 36 hours resulted in a Summary 
Warrant Punishment.51   
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,QPHUFKDQW VKLSV WKH0HUFKDQW6KLSSLQJ$FWVDQG WKHVKLS¶V$UWLFles of Agreement 
for the voyage also laid down the penalties for a seaman being Absent without Leave.  
 
Somewhat akin to the Royal Navy, these included a deduction of pay on a scale related 
to the length of absence.52  However, in the world of merchant shipping as far back as 
1593, failure to join on time and in a sober state has been a problem.53 It is always a 
minority which creates this problem which the master, officers and sober shipmates are 
expected to tolerate. The problem became enlarged when transports, which were not 
under the Naval Discipline Act but taking troops and vital supplies to Europe were 
disrupted. One suggestion was for all men in the Mercantile Marine to be conscripted 
into the R.N.R. in order to bring the troublesome minority under control. The National 
6DLORUV¶ DQG )LUHPHQ¶V 8QLRQ gave the response ³&HUWDLQO\ QRW´ 54   However, the 
Union was mindful of the problem and cooperated to find a solution especially for 
vessels requisitioned for whatever government purpose.55  So the effect was there were 
two separate codes of discipline, the Mercantile Marine ratings not serving in the 
Squadron enjoying the one which was more leniently applied, due to the threat of 
potential industrial action.    
   
The Squadron was not immune and a small reserve of mercantile ratings was kept in a 
depot at Liverpool on the initiative of Rear Admiral Stileman the Senior Naval Officer 
there.  When Cedric was in Liverpool, Grenfell was contacted for help in supplying 50 
firemen, urgently needed for Teutonic. He records in his diary: 
«DWWKHVDPHWLPH,VHQWWKH2IILFHURIWKH'D\6WXDUWWKHVKLS¶VFRUSRUDO	DQ
N.C.O. & private on shore to beat up the FiremHQ¶VKDXQWV(YHQWXDOO\RQHRIRXUPHQ
ZHQW 	 6WXDUW¶V SDUW\ ZHUH DEOH WR VHQG GRZQ D QXPEHU RI PHQ EHORQJLQJ WR RWKHU
ships and some civilians.    
 
The next day, 21st May 1915, Grenfell found himself and Cedric on the receiving end 
of the problem: 
  
 The usual violent hustle to get things ready for sea. We only finished coaling at 10 a.m.     
             «««««««0HDQZKLOHDZLOGpanic for firemen, orders & counter orders pouring   
in from the Office. [Squadron Office, Liverpool] Eventually they rounded up 15 men 
from the Andes & mustered aft in a state of serious intoxication after we had anchored  
LQ WKH ULYHU«««(YHQWXDOO\ WR VHD DW  SP 	 YHU\ WKDQNIXO WR JHW DZD\ IURP
Liverpool.56   
The experience must have been known to other ships in the Squadron. 
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In his autobiography µReminiscences¶$GPLUDO7XSSHUZURWH 
 Man-R¶-ZDU¶VURXWLQHZDVHQWLUHO\VWUDQJHWRWKHVHPHQEXWWDNLQJLWDOO 
 round, the discipline of the lower decks of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron   
 was excellent. 57 
 
No Monthly Punishment Returns can be found in the National Archives which might 
KDYH WKURZQ OLJKW RQ 7XSSHU¶V SHUFHSWLRQ RI µH[FHOOHQW¶  6LQFH LW ZDV FXVWRPDU\ WR
record the reading of warrants LQ WKH VKLS¶V ORJERRN WKHVH ZHUH H[DPLQHG IRU WKH
6TXDGURQ¶V VKLSV DQG WKH results are shown in Appendix 12, Part A. In this way an 
attempt has been made to establish an µaverage PRQWKO\UDWH¶IRUZDUUDQWVEHLQJUHDG 
which proved to be 2.4.  Whilst no conclusive correlation between the number of 
warrants and rank of the commanding officer can be seen, the inference is that ships 
with the higher scores were those were those with captains in command. Could this 
have meant that ships with only commanders in command were more lenient, being 
deterred by the need to make reference to higher authority for confirmation?  Looking 
at the Changuinola, where for most of the time Brocklebank was only a commander 
before being promoted to acting captain it seems not. Nor in the case of Caribbean, 
where Commander Walter scored 31 warrants in only five months!     
Part B of Appendix 12 lists the courts martial with tragic cases which sometimes 
brought harsh punishments to bear on offenders. 
 
Recreation. 
Considering the repetitive and sometimes boring demands of watch-keeping at sea, 
together with the daily dawn and dusk call to action stations, it is surprising the 
squadron crews had time or energy for recreation. However, both collective and 
individual recreational activities are evident in preserved diaries. This was an age when 
entertainment and recreation was down to individual effort, often no more than a family 
sing song around a piano. Music was only heard by most people at church, the local 
band stand or music halls and theatre shows. In the Squadron it became the practice to 
turn one of the vacated passenger public rooms into a communal recreation room with a  
stage at one end.58 ,WZDVDOVRXVXDOIRUWKHVKLSWRµDFTXLUH¶DSLDQRRUSLDQRODWRFUHDWH
music. Add to this the fact that many Mercantile and R.N.R. officers and crew had 
experience of supervising deck games for passengers and the basis for organised 
recreation was created.  
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Once the northern base at Swarback Minns was established it was common for inter 
ship football matches to be played there.  Brocklebank records that a makeshift golf 
course was created which had no bunkers but plenty of natural hazards, helpfully a  
local byelaw decreed µDLUVKRWV¶GLGQRWFRXQWLQVFRUHV59  Many naval officers enjoyed 
golf and aboard Cedric Commodore Benson KDGDFDQYDVVFUHHQULJJHGRQµ$¶GHFNIRU
his golf practice.60 According to Grainger, walks ashore at Busta Voe were taken by an 
A/B Style and Dr. Shaw with different opinions as to its enjoyment qualities.61  
 
Most ships developed a miniature rifle 25 yard range in a vacant hold space and ran 
inter department competitions for miniature rifle and pistol shooting. This activity was 
so popular the crews were prepared to buy the practice ammunition themselves.62  
 
Reading was a popular activity. Brocklebank aboard Changuinola set himself the task 
of reading Motley¶V µ5LVH DQG )DOO RI WKH 'XWFK 5HSXEOLF¶ IROORZHGE\ 7UHLWVFKNH¶V
µ+LVWRU\ RI *HUPDQ\¶63 On board Cedric, Commander Grenfell succeeded in 
persuading White Star Line to return the 2nd Class Passenger library and ensured the 
men were supplied with literature. He also records a large parcel of books and papers 
received with compliments to all ships by W.H.Smith & Sons.64  +RZHYHU*UHQIHOO¶V
attempt to organise subscriptions to a newspaper fund foundered as a result of 
squabbling between the Deck Officers and Engineers.65     
 
$QRWKHU SRSXODU SDVWLPH ZDV RUJDQLVLQJ VKLS¶V FRQFHUWV 7KHVH EURXJKW WR OLJKW WKH
musical talent amongst the crews. Both Brocklebank of Changuinola and Grenfell 
aboard Cedric regularly report concerts in the diaries. They were usually held on 
Saturday nights whether the ships were on patrol or in Busta Voe. Grenfell reports that 
when in Busta Voe, the Port Admiral and his wife were guests to the concert, possibly 
because &HGULF¶V captain was Second in command of the Squadron.  For R.N.V.R. 
Leading Signalman Philip Needell aboard Almanzora his artistic talents were put to 
work painting scenery made by the carpenters.66   
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 *UHQIHOO¶VSDSHUs include a programme reproduced below. 
 
                                                 Programme 
1.   Coons Parade                                                                     Banjo- Mandolin and Piano           
2.   Song                                                                                 Stoker Young 
3.   Dance                                                                               Seamen Tyrell and Penston  
4.   Song              µ:KHUHWKH5LYHU6KDQQRQ)ORZV¶            Cook Norman 
5.                                                  CINEMA 
6.   Song                                                                                  Signalman McGill 
7.   6RQJµ7KH&XUVHRIDQ$FKLQJ+HDUW¶                 Steward Taylor 
8.   Song                                         Selected                             M. Loftus 
9.   6RQJµ7KH2OG%ULJDGH¶                               Steward Williams 
10.  6RQJµ2XU6LGH¶                               Steward Flusk 
6RQJµ$Q\5DJV¶                               Sub Lieut. Ollerhead 
12.                                                  CINEMA 
13.  Song               µ6KLS$KR\¶                               Private Cox 
14.  Song                Song                                                            Sub Lieut. Pearce 
15.  Song                Song - Dance                                               M.Loftus 
                                         GOD SAVE THE KING  
                                   H.M.S. CEDRIC  30th July 1915    
                                     Fig.57  Concert Programme H.M.S. CEDRIC  30th July 1915  67  
 
The first concert ZKLFKLQFOXGHGµFLQHPDWRJUDSKHQWHUWDLQPHQW¶KDGEHHQJLYHQHDUOLHU.  
on the Friday July 9th 1915 when the pattern of alternate films and songs was started 
aboard Cedric.68  Clearly some of the content would not be politically correct today, 
QRUSHUKDSV*UHQIHOO¶VUHYLHZRIDFRQFHUWRQ)ULGD\0DUFKth 1915 when he wrote: 
 A most VXFFHVVIXOFRQFHUWIURPWRHQGLQJZLWKDµNQRFNDERXW¶WLPH 
 WKDWIDLUO\EURXJKWWKHµKRXVH¶GRZQ2OOHUKHDG v.good as a Somerset farmer. 
 Steward Loftus with his Coon songs was as usual the feature of the Entertainment.69  
 
6LQFHWKH$GPLUDO¶VZLIHRIWHQDWWHQGHGWKHVHFRQFHUWVLWFDQEHDVVXPHGWhe film titles 
were appropriate. The projector may have been bought by a shipboard collection or 
even a generous benefactor. 
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John Shuter, &KDQJXLQROD¶V First Lieutenant, bought himself a set of woodworking 
tools and became creative after taking XSµFDUSHQWHHULQJ¶. His diary proudly reports on 
3 ASULOWKDWµKHKDGILQLVKHGWKHERRNFDVHDQGPDGHDJRRGMRERILW¶70  There is 
no indication whether it was for KLVFDELQRUWKHRIILFHU¶VZDUGURRP. 
 
Merchant ships in peacetime comprised three main departments ± deck, engine and 
catering. Outside of working hours there was little social interaction between the three 
sections e.g. it was rare for a merchant ship to field a football team.   In the Squadron  
VKLSVRUJDQLVHGLQWHUPHVVRUGHSDUWPHQWDOµGHFNVSRUWV¶FRPSHWLWLRQVILHOGLQJWKHOLNHV
of tug-of-war teams, boxing, deck tennis and shuffleboard. Both officers and ratings  
regularly undertook physical exercises. $QLQGRRUERDUGJDPHFDOOHGµXFNHUV¶DW\SHRI
µ/XGR¶ ZDV SRSXODU ZLWK UDWLQJV 2IILFHUV KDYH EHHQ SKRWRJUDSKHG SOD\LQJ µGHFN
KRFNH\¶XVLQJZDONLQJVWLFNV7KHVSDFLRXVGHFNVDQGSXEOLFURRPVZRXOGEHDOX[XU\
GHQLHG PRVW µQRUPDO¶ ZDUVKLSV $OO WKLV KHOSHG WR GHYHORS the cohesion needed in 
wartime and stave off boredom. The range of recreational activities was typical of the o 
Navy and cannot be considered in any way unique to the Tenth Cruiser Squadron.  Inter 
watch or inter departmental team competitions would include both officers and ratings. 
 
Monotony  
A further reason for encouraging recreational activities was to alleviate monotony.  
The diaries of both Brocklebank of Changuinola and Grenfell aboard Cedric. 
frequently alluded to this aspect of the blockade work. As stated earlier in this paper, 
intercepting merchant ships was not seen as ¶real war fighting¶ in the eyes of the 
regular naval officer. Although his diary shows him to be a caring officer working to 
motivate the men, Grenfell reveals just how much he was affected by the monotony: 
 «ZHDUHDOZD\VDWVHD	FRQVWDQWO\H[SRVHGWKHUH	Hntering ports to the 
 chances of the weather, to submarines & mines. That is all part of the fun, 
 but still, one job, though no doubt highly important , is not exactly militarily 
satisfying ± even the chance of a little personal contact with the enemy in the 
shape of a submarine is a grateful change, & did us all good today.71  
 
The feeling now seems to be pretty general that this patrol business is hatefully 
monotonous, and each trip seems to get worse than the last. The novelty of 
rounding up ships & boarding them has entirely evaporated & with it all  
excitement. Each & all deplore the fact that we are apparently doomed to this  
for the remainder of the war.72  
  
 The monotony of this business is growing appalling.73 
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 May the moment for YUVOLU arrive soon! 74 
 Everyone is bored stiff with the war ± or the part we have to play in it & only 
 wishes the beastly submarine would turn up & give us a little excitement.75  
 
These entries show it had only taken from December 1914 to May 1915 to bring 
Grenfell to this state of mind. All the more to his credit that he worked tirelessly to 
LPSURYHWKHFUHZ¶VSHUIRUPDQFHPRUDOHDQGZHOIDUH± in particular, the welfare of the 
firemen.    
 
Comforts and News from Home and Colonies. 
Grenfell records in December, 1914 the arrival of warm clothing from the Navy League 
which he distributed together with that supplied from the Admiralty. He commented, 
µ*RRGVWXIIDOORILW± EXWIURPQRZRQWKHFUHZOLYHLQDPRVWTXDLQWSLUDWLFDOULJ¶76   
More arrived in February, 1915 when he wrote: 
 The Navy League has also sent 4 more parcels of warm clothing for the men;  
             and another box of comforters & gloves and a very nice letter from the Headmistress 
 of the Newton Abbott Girls Secondary School.77  
 
Grenfell was a stickler for the correct dress and in March 1915 he started to tighten up 
on the appearance of &HGULF¶V boarding crews: 
 Worrying people now about being in uniform in the daytime - the other ships ± 
 to judge from their prize crews that take passage on board of us ± still delight in 
 strange piratical, semi Arctic garments but the weather is now spring like & charming. 
7KHUH DUH , NQRZ VRPH ZKR WKLQN WKXV µ,W LV ZDUWLPH therefore we should wear 
VWUDQJHJDUE¶78     
 
On 1st November, 1915 with the war, blockade and Squadron well established, Grenfell 
revealed luxuries arriving from the West Indies: 
   At monthly payment today we distributed boxes of chocolates, the gift of the  
   Colonies of Trinidad, Grenada & St.Lucia to the Navy and Army.79 
 
Although Cedric seems to have done well in home support it was most likely repeated 
throughout the Squadron, as WKHSUDFWLFHRIµVXSSRUWLQJWKHWURRSV¶IURPKRPHEHFDPH
the custom. 
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Letters to and from home have always been sacrosanct in the Navy and the Squadron 
was no exception. Ships going home for coaling or repairs would often carry mail from 
ships remaining on patrol. Similarly, ships outward bound from coaling or repairs  
would carry mail to other ships. However, the introduction of wireless telegraphy 
introduced a further dimension for news in World War One for the Navy.  Late each 
evening a wireless broadcast was made from the Marconi Station at Poldhu in 
Cornwall. This was a censored account as to how the war was progressing for the 
benefit of the fleet. It was intended to summarise what might be read in the daily 
newspaper and was looked forward to each day. On occasions, the broadcast would not 
be received possibly due to equipment failure or bad atmospheric conditions. Whenever 
this happened, the diarists Brocklebank, Grenfell, Needell and Midshipman Scrimgeour  
never failed to say so in their diaries.80 Sometimes the gap would extend to three days 
and then the diarists often limited WKHHQWU\IRUWKHWKLUGGD\WRRQO\µ1R3ROGKX¶7KH
feeling of disappointment is palpable to the reader and underlines the isolation of being 
on patrol in those inhospitable northern waters. 
 
'HVSLWHWKHSULYDWLRQVLQ WKH6TXDGURQIURPEDGZHDWKHUZKLOVWEHLQJLQKDUP¶VZD\, 
the men fared very well compared with soldiers on the Western Front.  Reference to the 
horrific SKRWRJUDSKVLQ:LQWHU¶VZRUNThe Experience of World War 1 will soon dispel 
any doubts.81 
---------------- 
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The year 1917 proved WREHWKHVTXDGURQ¶Vfinal one in the form it had become known. 
By the year end, all the ships had been dispersed to other duties. 
 
Throughout the blockade shippers and ship-owners had tolerated the inconvenience of  
interception and search. The result was a costly loss of time and money. The deterrence 
of the interceptions ultimately forced them to recognise blockade requirements and 
regulations: in return, they received an expedited passage if they conformed 
voluntarily.1  Britain had progressively increased agreements and accepted guarantees 
from foreign trade associations as well neutral countries, One important development 
ZDVWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIµQDYLFHUWV¶RU µletters of assuUDQFH¶DQGWKLVPXVWKDYHEHHQD
useful reduction in the interception workload.  Before the United States entered the war 
American vessels were also VXEMHFWHGWRWKHµQDYLFHUW¶V\VWHP2 A minute from Captain 
Webb of Trade Division also revealed a running down of blockade activity: 
             In view of the danger to small sailing vessels from enemy submarines       
  such vessels need not be sent in unless carrying contraband goods of 
  an important nature to Scandinavia or Holland.3 
 
This meant a degree of prioritisation giving another reduction in the interception work,  
no doubt welcomed by Admiral Tupper.  0DUGHU UHYHDOV WKH EORFNDGH¶V SURJUHVV DV
follows: 
By autumn of 1916 the machinery of the blockade had reached a high degree of 
efficiency. \the various rationing agreements and agreements with neutral shipping 
lines were on the whole working well. ......................As regards food supplies, the 
winter of 1916-1917 is acknowledged by all to have been in Germany, the worst period 
of the war. 4 
 
Germany resumed unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1, 1917. The losses of 
Allied merchant ships jumped from 520,412 tons in February to a peak figure of 
860,334 tons in April 1917.5  There was a reluctance to adopt the well tried historical 
convoy system for three main reasons. First, Admiralty thinking preferred the new 
concept of µGHIHQGHG ODQHV¶ZKHUHE\Dpatrolling warship was allocated a sea area to 
respond to attacks on merchant ships. This was linked to the belief that a convoy 
presented a more vulnerable target for the attacking U-boat.6 Second, there was a 
shortage of escorting destroyers. Jellicoe retained destroyers as protective screens for 
the Grand Fleet battleships when they made periodic sweeps of the North Sea. Third, 
                                                 
1
 This meant a call at either Kirkwall or The Downs for inspection 
2
 Parmalee, M., Blockade and Seapower (London, 1924) 49-50 
3
 TNA ADM137/1275   Minute by Webb  436   2 June 1917 
4
 Marder A.J., From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow (London,1961) Vol.3 323-4 
5
 Carolan, V.,  WW1 at Sea  (Harpendon, 2007)  121-123    
6
 The reality was that an independent merchant ship could have been sunk a considerable distance 
   IURPWKHZDUVKLS¶VJXDUGDUHDDQGWKH8-boat escaped long before the  escort arrived at the attack. 
7KH6TXDGURQ¶V)LQDO<HDU                                                              Chapter 10. 
 
 237 
merchant ship masters were convinced that low speed, single screw merchant ships 
could not manoeuvre well enough, in close convoy formation, to match naval 
requirements. Nevertheless, Jellicoe mounted an experimental eight knot convoy from 
Gibraltar to Britain which arrived safely on May 20, 1917.  This meant the convoy 
system was adopted and created a turning point for the war and ultimately the Tenth 
Cruiser Squadron.7  
 
The United States entered the war on April 6, 1917 and an early contribution to the war 
effort by the U.S .Navy was to base destroyers at Queenstown, Ireland.8 The first 
arrived there on May 4, 1917, and the early weeks were spent in familiarisation with 
the waters to the south and west of Ireland together with British patrols. By September, 
1917, the convoy system was operating smoothly.9 A destroyer escort group would 
meet inbound convoys in the Western Approaches and also escort outbound convoys 
from this area.  This was where German U-boat activity took its toll on British and 
neutral shipping. The limited range of the destroyers was supplemented by an ocean 
escort for the convoys drawn from pre-dreadnought cruisers; these cruisers escorted the 
open ocean legs until the convoy was in range of the destroyer groups. Ships of the 
Tenth Cruiser Squadron were progressively withdrawn to help as ocean escorts starting 
in the spring of 1917. By August 7 1917, Tupper asked the Admiralty if the ten cruisers 
on detached convoy duty were to remain under his administrative command; he also  
proposed these vessels be interchangeable with those remaining on blockade patrol to 
relieve their monotony.10 
 
Seeing the direction the war was taking, Tupper prepared proposals for the future 
composition of the Squadron: this included a suggestion for Alsatian to be modified to 
be capable of carrying aircraft. This was another attempt by Tupper to incorporate air 
support. Unknown to him, a meeting at Scapa Flow was held on 27 July which decided 
the squadron should be reduced and to allowing some vessels to be transferred to 
convoy escort duty.11  Further reductions soon followed. In the event Alsatian was not 
converted for aircraft: two armed trawlers were retained to generate spurious signal 
traffic. This was intended to confuse approaching blockade runners, if listening, into 
thinking the strength of the blockade patrols was still significant. 
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How successful then was the blockade?  On 27 March 1917, the House of Commons 
debated the issues of War Measures with reference to the Blockade. After some 
members had spoken, Lord Cecil, the Minister for the Blockade, reviewed the progress. 
Whilst conceding a slow start to many of the measures, he asserted with some 
confidence that the blockade was now working effectively.12  After the war, in the eyes 
of politicians, it was totally successful. However, this was a conclusion influenced by 
the fact that Germany had come to the Armistice Table.  
  
One man, Rear Admiral M.W.W.P. Consett was uniquely placed to challenge the long 
accepted, complacent confidence about the state of the blockade efforts. He had served, 
in the rank of captain, as the Naval Attaché in Scandinavia throughout the war. As 
such, he was able to travel extensively and gather facts for his reports and book 
SXEOLVKHG LQ  ZKLFK SURYLGHG D GLIIHUHQW YLHZ RI WKH EORFNDGH¶V DFFODLPHG
success.13  His book examined the vital commodities in turn and provided facts 
showing Germany had obtained these, despite British naval operations and inter-
government agreements and guarantees. Consett provided clear and compelling 
arguments as to how, with stiffer political decision, the blockade could have been more 
effective and sooner.  Mention has already been made of the depressing effect these 
revelations had on Captain Brocklebank of Changuinola. It seems likely that other 
former patrol commanding officers were similarly affected on reading Consett.   In the 
course of his duties and reports to the Foreign Office, Consett had repeatedly pointed 
RXW WKHVH µOHDNDJHV¶ LQ WKH EORFNDGH but all to no avail. Indeed, on visits by Lord 
Faringdon to Scandinavia, Consett had personally stressed the serious situation. Despite 
this, on 23 February 1916, Lord Faringdon made the somewhat dilute statement to the 
House of Lords,  
µ«WKDWZLWKUHJDUGWRFRQWUDEDQGKHZDVFRQYLQFHGWKDWEXWOLWWOHZDVSDVVLQJDQGWKDW  
  neutrals were doing their best to regard their obligations.¶14 
 
&RQVHWW¶V ILQDO FKDSWHU revealed his sense of betrayal after Lord Faringdon and Lord 
&HFLOSHUVLVWHGLQSURMHFWLQJDUHODWLYHO\JORZLQJSLFWXUHRIWKHEORFNDGH¶VSURJUHVVWKH
QHHGWRµJRSXEOLF¶ZDVWKHPRWLYDWLRQIRUKLVERRN15    %HOO¶VRIIicial History of the 
Blockade of Germany, which was not declassified until 1937, gave but a passing 
UHIHUHQFHWR&RQVHWW¶VDVVHUWLRQV  
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In post war years there was much discussion about the morality of a blockade which 
was perceived to cause hardship to civilians in Germany. In reply others pointed out 
that Germany had, with her unrestricted U-boat destruction of allied ships, caused equal  
KDUGVKLS WR %ULWDLQ¶V FLYLOLDQV ,W ZDV QRW XQWLO 30 when Lieutenant Lois Guichard 
made the reality of modern war clear for his readers:  
Moreover, the sufferings entailed upon the civilian population by the action of the 
Allies would not have been so intensified but for the restrictions which the German 
Government, which controlled the food supplies of the whole Empire, imposed upon 
civilians for the sake of the army. 
 
This particular effect of the blockade is due unfortunately to the conditions of modern 
warfare, under which the whole of the vital forces of a nation are brought into play and 
non-combatants are directly affected.16  
 
As late as 1939, the blockade was still being debated and written about. From the 
Oxford University Pamphlets on World Affairs, came a succinct, yet full, account of 
the blockade through to 1919.17  The author, Mr. Arnold-Foster, came from long 
service in all parts of Whitehall¶V machinery throughout the war. From 1914, on the 
Contraband Committee where he served as an Admiralty representative until 1916; then 
followed service with the Black List, Main Licensing Committees, and finally the 
Restriction of Enemy Supplies Department. In 1919 he attended the Peace Conference. 
This was experience as unique as that of Captain Consett RUDQ\RQHRIWKH6TXDGURQ¶V
commanding officers and shows how many and varied shoulders bore the tasks of the 
blockade. The Armistice of 11 November 1918 was not the end of the war resulting in 
an immediate lifting of the blockade. The blockade machine was not finally scrapped 
until 12 July 1919 since it had needed a phased renewal of supplies to the various 
nations in the Central Powers. Anyone doubting the effects of the blockade on German 
civilians would be advised to read the closing pages of Mr. Arnold-)RUVWHU¶VSDPSKOHW 
The view of General Smuts who lived through the period provided a sound  verdict on 
the effects of blockade and counter-blockade when he declared:   
µ«Lt is the most awful spectacle in history, and no man with any heart or 
 UHJDUGIRUKXPDQGHVWLQ\FDQFRQWHPSODWHLWZLWKRXWWKHGHHSHVWHPRWLRQ¶18 
 
Beyond this no further judgement of the political success has been attempted in this 
paper.  The result was essentially an operational success by virtue of the deterrent value 
created by the STXDGURQ¶V constabulary type patrols.   
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What Were The Lessons For A Government? 
Elder statesmen, like retired admirals, were living in the prints depicting close 
EORFNDGHV LQ1HOVRQ¶VSHULRG:KHQ WKHFULHVRI µ/HDYH LW WR WKH1DY\ DQGDUUHVt all 
VKLSV¶ ZHQW XS they had not realised the total effects of global change in the 
nineteenth century. They seemed oblivious to advances in industrialisation which had 
led to the expansion in world trade; yet sub-consciously called for the defence of 
%ULWDLQ¶V VHD ODQHV DV LI WKH\ ZHUH PDUNHG RXW OLNH D PRWRUZD\    These changes, 
together with the interdependence of international trade agreements, increasingly 
affected by international politics and supported by the world telegraph links could not 
be ignored. 7KH\ZHUHWKHIRXQGDWLRQVRIWRGD\¶VJOREDOL]DWLRQ. 
  
Improved coastal gunnery, mines and torpedoes had removed the option of a close 
blockade: instead a turn was made to distant blockade supporting international 
diplomacy and politics guided by the Foreign and Colonial Office. Thus a nation which  
failed to analyse economic trade data between nations, and especially its own trading 
data, would be susceptible to self inflicted harm. A nation, whether contemplating 
instituting a blockade or not, needed to know which countries controlled its own supply 
of strategic goods and commodities. Failure to understand would leave it vulnerable 
and needing to find alternative sources: this could mean a loss of bargaining power and 
new suppliers taking their opportunity to increase prices.  Similarly, a nation should 
NQRZDSRWHQWLDO HQHPLHV¶YXOQHUDELOLW\ DQGGHSHQGHQFHRQ VWUDWHJLF FRPPRdities so 
that these facts could EH H[SORLWHG  ([DPSOHV DUH *HUPDQ\¶V GHVSHUDWH QHHG IRU
fertiliser to help with its home food production and Scandinavian ship owners¶
prHIHUHQFHIRU%ULWLVKVWHDPFRDO&RQVHWW¶VDQG*XLFKDUG¶VERRNVVXJJHVt the data was 
largely there and could have been consulted and exploited much sooner to make the 
blockade more effective: or was any tardiness experienced a sign of the Foreign 
2IILFH¶VPRUHDFXWHDSSUHFLDWLRQRIWKHSROLWLFDOLVVXHV" There was surely never better 
proof of the need for a nation to have a grip on its economic data on its imports and 
exports around the world, to enable a quick and planned response to the unexpected? 19 
There is little mention in the press at the time of the contribution made by Whitehall 
departments. It was in these departments that the political and diplomatic decisions 
were taken for the control of export or import licences, the keeping of black lists, mail 
interception, the approval for funds transfers and all matters connected with Trading 
with the Enemy legislation. Surely, this was the brunt of the blockade effort?  Instead 
                                                 
19
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7KH6TXDGURQ¶V)LQDO<HDU                                                              Chapter 10. 
 
 241 
the public was allowed to perceive the success fell to the ships and men of the Tenth 
Cruiser Squadron, being hailed as a singular naval success and a boost to national 
morale.  By April 1917 after the entry of the USA into the war the need for the 
6TXDGURQ ZDV FOHDUO\ UHGXFHG DQG WKH $OOLHV ZHUH QR DEOH WR FRQGXFW D µSDSHU¶
blockade from their Whitehall desks.20  
 
The Royal NDY\¶s Main Function In The Blockade. 
WhilsW %ULWDLQ¶V ZDUVKLSV H[HUFLVHG WKHLU ULJKW WR µVWRS DQG YLVLW¶ PHrchant ships 
worldwide, a vital function of the Navy was to control the Channel and Northern routes 
WRPDLQODQG(XURSH7KH1RUWKHUQ3DWUROZDVFRYHUHGE\WKH7HQWK&UXLVHU6TXDGURQ¶V
patrols which often had the Third Cruiser squadron in close proximity. However, it was 
the Grand Fleet in the background at Scapa Flow Anchorage which allowed the 
6TXDGURQ¶V URXQG WKH FORFN activities to continue. Although its designated identifier 
was not discloVHG LQ SXEOLF WKH 6TXDGURQ EHFDPH WKH 1DY\¶V proud face of the 
blockade effort. 7KH 6TXDGURQ¶V SHUIRUPDQFH DOVR VHUYHG DV VRPH OHYHO RI
compensation for the perceived poor performance by the Royal Navy in the North Sea 
engagements such as Jutland. 
 
However, Professor Ferguson¶VFODLP: 
« WKH naval blockade proved a much less lethal weapon than British navalists had 
assumed. No attempt was made at first to halt the flow of goods to neutrals which 
might then find their way to Germany. 21      
 
is reasonably justified when thinking of all three of the blockade components and 
FRPSOHPHQWV 0DUGHU¶V YLHZ WKDW WKH UDWLRQLQJ DJUHHPHQWV DQG WKH OLNH ZHUH QRZ
working well. 
  
Ferguson effectively confirmed the opinions of Consett and Guichard described earlier 
whereby WKHUHZHUH µOHDNDJHV¶ LQ WKHEORFNDGHHIIRUW  7KH7HQWK&UXLVHU6TXDGURQ¶V
function was primarily a constabulary role, serving to discourage blockade runners... Its 
presence to intercept blockade runners was intended to encourage neutrals to observe 
the Allied preference for voluntary LQVSHFWLRQ LQ WKH 'RZQ¶V $QFKRUDJH, rather than 
any attempt at searches on the open ocean. This was a point of singular dispute with the 
United States of America until it joined the Allies and entered the war.   
 
 
 
                                                 
20
 Black, N., The British Naval Staff in the First World War  (Woodbridge, 2009)  231 
21
 Ferguson, The Pity of War 252 
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How Successful Was The Tenth Cruiser Squadron? 
The immediate answer must be very successful. Its performance fell into two areas, 
firstly the number of interceptions achieved and secondly the management of the 
squadron given the varied background of those forming the crews and the range of 
vessels converted to armed merchant cruisers.  
 
Fayle records that in 1915 the Squadron intercepted 3,098 vessels. Of these 408 
(13.2%) were British or Allied ships; 817 (26%) were fishing craft; 1,130 (36.8) were 
neutrals which were allowed to pass after boarding or identification at sea.  The 
remaining 743 (24%) or just over two a day were sent to Kirkwall or Lerwick for 
examination. Of ships considered important for interception only 8 evaded the patrols.22  
 By 1917 there had been a dramatic reduction in activity; in the second quarter the total 
neutrals passing in or out of the North Sea was 611. The total for the September quarter 
was 346 and for the final three months of 1917 only 162  neutral vessels passed into or 
out of the North Sea. 23   Clearly the Squadron patrols were becoming less productive 
as the Whitehall efforts started to bear improved results for the overall blockade effort. 
The total interceptions achieved were 12,979 and this was 95.3% of the possible 
number. A further 2,039 vessels voluntarily reported to examination ports rather than 
attempt to evade the blockade.24  No other performance indicator is recorded, neither 
the number of ships placed before the Prize Court nor the quantities of contraband by 
either weight or value can be traced  Anyone venturing out into the open ocean will 
soon be aware of its vastness and it is something beyond the understanding of those 
who have never done so. Coupled with the frequent poor visibility and almost constant 
rough weather then a 100% sighting record was neither achievable nor realistic.  Added 
to this was the fact that the average number of vessels actually on patrol was only 
twelve, after allowing for refits, coaling and time on passage to and from base. 
Although the nominal number of ships allocated to the squadron was twenty four, this 
QXPEHU ZDV QHYHU µRQ SDWURO¶ DW DQ\ RQH WLPH 25  Other than the number of 
interceptions there is no tangible criteria of operational success except to acknowledge 
its presence released operational Navy vessels for other duties in the Northern waters. 
 
The second significant and vital factor ZDVWKHVXFFHVVIXOEXLOGLQJRIµHsprit de corps¶ 
both at squadron level and aboard individual ships. Whilst most of the crews had sea 
                                                 
22
 Fayle, C.E., Seaborne Trade  Vol.,2  149 
23
 Fayle, C.E., Seaborne Trade  Vol.,3  233 
24
 Tupper, R. Reminiscences  267  
25
 Appendix 14 for further selected patrol statistics. 
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experience of one sort or another, many had not experienced naval discipline and life 
aboard a warship. Especially whilst working continuously in such bad weather which 
few had experienced previously.   However, motivating such disparate backgrounds to 
the task in hand was not unique to the naval commanders.  Compared with counterpart 
commanders in the Army on the Western Front their efforts in the Squadron must have 
been easier. The Army also relied on many volunteer regiments and conscripts, usually 
having only limited military training, to serve in physical conditions far worse than the 
Squadron.26  It was not until the late 1920s that some understanding as to why workers 
respond well in very difficult conditions was found.27  Therein lay the explanation for 
the good response IURP WKH VTXDGURQ FUHZV 7KH SUHVV DOZD\V UHIHUUHG WR µRXU
EORFNDGLQJFUXLVHUV¶DQG$GPLUDOGH&KDLULQD8Qited States interview referred to the 
VKLSVDVµVSHFLDOO\DGDSWHG¶IRUEORFNDGHGXW\28  Such encouraging references created a 
sense of value to an otherwise mundane war duty. Nevertheless, the bringing together 
of armed merchant cruisers manned by many different seafarers was clearly a 
successful combination of expediency and improvisation.  It was the culmination of 
decades of discussion and deliberations over the need to use armed merchant cruisers 
and the need to establish naval reserves. Expediency is seldom the equal of a perfect 
solution and many earlier misgivings came to be justified. 
  
What Were The Lessons For The Royal Navy And The Reserves Engaged? 
An initial mistake by the Naval planners was to underestimate the number of 
interceptions required of the patrols to the north and west. The eight Edgar class 
cruisers were not only inadequate for the areas but too few for an effective patrol.  
TKH GHIHQFH RI WKH 6KHWODQGV LQFOXGHG LQ GH &KDLU¶V initial brief, was beyond his 
available resources and detracted from the patrol effort.  .    
 
Admiral Tupper considered there was a need for a better understanding of the Merchant 
Service and its function as a commercial industry, by the Royal Navy. In his final pages 
he records some of the suggested ideas to that end.29   Had there been better knowledge, 
many difficulties for the Navy and the Squadron may not have arisen.  
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 Winter, J.M., The Experience of World War 1 (London,1988) 2000 Edition. 
27
 Schein, E.H., Organizational Psychology. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 2nd Edition 1970)  31-35 
    The Hawthorne studies in the American Western Electric Company revealed, amongst other things, that workers  
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     UHDVRQSURYHGWREHWKDWµ&LQGHUHOOD¶ZRUNHUVIHOWLPSRUWDQWEHFDXVHWKH\ZHUHµRQVKRZ¶DQGEHLQJVWXGLHGIRU 
     the first time.   
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  BL. De Chair, D.R., How the British Blockade Works: An Interview with Admiral Sir Dudley de Chair. 
    (London, 1916)  (pamphlet)     
29
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For the Navy, a better understanding that merchant ships are often built for a specific 
trade or cargoes between two particular ports or countries. This could have prevented 
the selection of the short sea vessels, Calyx and Eskimo, but it had been expedient to 
requisition them since the number of vessels immediately available was limited.30  The 
advantages of the larger vessels were speed and bunker capacity. Even here, the larger 
passenger ships taken up from Royal Mail were relatively shallow draught ships to 
allow a passage up the River Plate to Buenos Aires.  DHVLJQHG IRU µEOXH ZDWHU 
VWHDPLQJ¶ WKHUH ZHUH QRW HQWLUHO\ suited for long service in the North Atlantic and 
Norwegian Sea in winter. However, as merchant ships have a lower level of watertight 
subdivision compared to warships, concern for their vulnerability in the event of attack 
from torpedoes or mines, was well founded as the losses proved. 31 The Navy needs to 
invest in the resources needed for a full understanding of the practical aspects of the 
world of merchant shipping. This is very important if it perceives a particular vessel 
may be taken up at some future date. Trades change and ships are bought and sold as 
profit and demand dictate to the owner. If a particular vessel is vital to the Navy then it 
must be prepared to pay the appropriate retention fees.   
 
Turning now to the VTXDGURQSHUVRQQHOWKH1DY\¶VIailure to appreciate the disparity of 
0HUFKDQW6HUYLFHUDWLQJV¶SD\DQGFRQGLWLRQVDQG WKHGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQFRPSDQLHV
and port areas was explained in the previous chapter. As the war progressed Merchant 
Service pay, due to war bonuses, outstripped the pay for ratings who had earlier  
signed T124 conditions; they were mainly engine room and catering departments. 
When replacements were needed they became harder to recruit due to this anomaly.  
 
One further deterrent to recruiting replacement crews and that was the tighter approach 
to discipline in the Navy. A long standing disciplinary problem on merchant ships was 
the µIDLOXUHWRMRLQ¶RUµMRLQLQJLQDVWDWHRILQWR[LFDWLRQ¶DWWKHWLPHRIVVKLS¶VVDLOLQJ32  
Whilst this offence cannot be condoned the usual view was that it represented an 
inconvenience to be tolerated by owners, shipmasters and the more responsible sober 
members of crew. In peace time it was unlikely for an owner to suffer financial loss 
from delay due to the efforts of the master and remaining crew. However, in wartime 
WKH µIDLOXUH WR MRLQ¶, for whatever reason, could mean convoys could be delayed. To 
their credit, the Unions made real efforts to discourage the behaviour. However, the 
                                                 
30
 The most common design of merchant ship available was the three island tramp built solely for cargo,  
    with a typical low speed of 10 knots, too slow for blockade pursuits.  
31
 See Appendix 15 for losses of Ships and Men. 
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Navy treated the offence as leave breaking and started to enforce the Naval Discipline 
Act in ships chartered or requisitioned by the Admiralty.33 The offences particularly 
affected transports taking men and supplies to battlegrounds.  An Admiralty attempt to 
create an emergency pool known as the µ6XQKLOO¶ scheme proved to be a failure. So the 
Navy was never clear of the problem when seafarers declined the prospect of lower pay 
and harder discipline of armed merchant cruisers in preference to a merchant ship in 
trade.34 In the end, like ship-RZQHUVWKH1DY\IRXQGLWKDGWRSD\WKHJRLQJµSRUWUDWHV¶  
 
Grenfell records an evening in May 1915 aboard Cedric whilst in Liverpool. Firemen 
ZHUHEUHDNLQJRXW GHVHUWLQJµULJKWDQG OHIW¶ \HW$GPLUDO6WLOHPDQUHIXVHGDOORFDWLQJ
R.N.R. Stokers from the depot. Search parties were mustered and an urgent signal from 
Admiralty required 50 firemen for Teutonic to sail later that evening. A volunteer from  
Cedric and three of her men under stoppage of leave were sent to make up numbers 
scoured in the port.35  The incident shows the problems that could emerge from poor 
discipline.  Liverpool firemen were always renowned for their belligerent attitudes and 
resented discipline.  
Firemen were a race apart with sole possessions of a pack of cards and a sweat rag they 
often had only the clothes they stood up in. They were quite impervious to cold or heat 
and scared of nobody. Invariably they were brought back by the local gendarmes, 
battered and bruised but in no way mollified. Come the night they would set off for a 
return bout.36     
 
There were three occasions when firemen reverted to their stereotype. First was aboard 
Changuinola whilst in Glasgow on 10 February 1916, shortly before Tupper took 
command of the squadron in March. The complaint was about food and Cdr. 
Brocklebank read the Naval Discipline Act after which they resumed work.37 The next 
was aboard Teutonic in Liverpool on 27 March 1916 when the complaint was that food 
was not up to the usual White Star standard and their pay was below port rates.38  
Finally, aboard Alsatian in Liverpool in October 1916 when the complaint was about 
pay. On both these latter occasions the men were returned to work at gun point and 
even ammunition was issued aboard Alsatian.39  Such was the resentment aboard 
Alsatian that Captain Smith, Admiral 7XSSHU¶V)ODJ&DSWDLQUHFRUGV 
 Although there was no further trouble, no fireman or trimmer would ever sing at any of 
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our concerts. They flatly declared that they would not sing for a captain who called on 
Marines with rifles and bayonets whenever there happened to be a bit of trouble 
about.40   
 
There can be little doubt word of these occurrences reached the waterfronts of the 
Clyde and Mersey, serving to discourage merchant seamen to engage on armed 
merchant cruisers. ,Q WKHPLQGVRI WKHµPHUFKDQW MDFNV¶D UHWXUQ to work at gunpoint 
brought echoes of the Press Gangs and the realisation that such legislation was still on 
the Statute Books.  In fairness to Tupper, he did agree the allowance of 1s 3d daily 
feeding allowance needed to be increased to 1s 6d and he promised to take the matter 
up. Subsequently, when making his squadron inspections, Tupper was at pains to 
HQVXUHWKHILUHPHQ¶VTXDUWHUVZHUHFOHDQDQGFRPIRUWDEOH 
 
In recording the Teutonic LQFLGHQW %HQVRQ KDG UHIHUUHG WR WKH ILUHPHQ DV µDOPRVW
ZLWKRXWH[FHSWLRQRIWKHORZHVWVFDOHRIKXPDQLW\IRXQGLQ*UHDW%ULWDLQ¶$FXULRXV
DWWLWXGH IRU D QDYDO RIILFHU WUDLQHG WR VHH WKH RUGLQDU\ UDWLQJ DV µWKH JUHDWHVW VLQJOH
IDFWRU¶This contrasted with the efforts of Grenfell aboard Cedric to create some self 
respect amongst her firemen. $ILUHPDQ¶VZRUNLQJFRQGLWLRQVDQGDFFRPPRGDWLRQ were 
very poor and despite the view of her Chief Engineer, Grenfell moved them into unused 
3rd Class passenger cabins. He noted:     
When I mooted the idea to him some while ago he was all for insisting that you 
FRXOGQ¶WGRDQ\WKLQJZLWKD/LYHUSRROILUHPDQ	WKDWLWZDVQ¶WZRUWKZKLOHWRWU\WKDW
they were scum & deserved nothing.41  
 
Just three days later Grenfell was rewarded in his diary note: 
 Firemen improving, WKHWUXWKRIµSXWDPDQLQDVW\	KHZLOOEHDSLJ¶ 
 Firemen painting out their cabins. The poor devils are quite thoroughly neglected 
in their own service & live a life of brutality & piggery that is horrid to think of. 42 
 
At least Grenfell had not forgotten that it was a QDYDORIILFHU¶Vduty to get the best from 
his men.  
 
It is also regrettable that there appears to have been an endemic aversion to R.N.R. 
personnel on behalf of some R.N. elements. It was revealed by all three diarists. 
Brocklebank was an officer in command and showed a patronising attitude to R.N.R. 
officers.43  Grenfell was an experienced, senior naval officer with misgivings about 
their naval experience and ability, which were later replaced by their willingness to 
learn and seek his guidance.  Scrimgeour, a midshipman with a privileged education 
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and background, revealed a snobbish attitude to his fellow midshipman drawn from the 
merchant service. The kindest thing in his case is to attribute his attitude to a youthful, 
over confident self assurance. 
 
Scrimgeour had some opinions about the R.N.R. at all levels starting with the ratings: 
 At two [14.00] the divisions went to rifle drill followed by squad and company 
drill. I shouted myself hoarse trying to instil into the wooden heads of the R.N.R. 
seamen from Newfoundland, etc., the elementary motions of the rifle, turning and 
marching. 44    
 
Writing to his mother he described his R.N.R. contemporaries aboard Alsatian in 
December 1914, he said: 
We have got several R.N. Reserve midshipmen (apprentices in various liners in peace 
time) on board, and they are rather uncouth in their manners and hardly what the world 
calls gentlemen, although I dare say most of them are all right really. However, they 
rub most of our active service people up the wrong way, and I shall have quite a nasty 
time preserving the peace in the gun-room, as I am still senior G.R. officer, there being 
no Sub-Lieutenants on board, worse luck.45    
 
Contrast this attitude with the opinion, included here for comparison, from one of the 
ratings he criticises. 1HZIRXQGODQGUHVHUYLVW6WHSKHQ'LFNHUµVOHWWHUKRPHIURPClan 
MacNaughton, is very revealing: 
I cannot say the treatment is good in this ship ± it LVIDUIURPLW«,ZRXOGOLNHWREH
WUHDWHGDVD0DQRXJKWWRDQGQRWOLNHDGXPEDQLPDO«ZH1HZIRXQGODQGHUVDUHQRW
used to a bugle and the consequence is, if we are a little adrift, we are run in for it and 
JHWVRPDQ\GD\VSXQLVKPHQW«6RPH1HZIRXQGODnders are always adrift and doing 
SXQLVKPHQW«7KH\GRQ¶WEHDGULIWLQWHQWLRQDOO\,¶PVXUHEXWWKHUHLVQRH[FXVHLQWKH
1DY\«>)RU@DPDQZKRKDVYROXQWHHUHGWRILJKWIRUKLV.LQJDQG&RXQWU\DQGWKHQWR
receive punishment in this way ± I say it is far from right. I would fight for my King 
and Country to the bitter end, but I would not like to be treated as I have seen some 
treated since I came aboard here.46    
 
An obsession with drill book procedures was unlikely to produce the best from 
reservists and particularly Commonwealth volunteers. They had been called up for 
VSHFLILFGXWLHVQDPHO\DVERDWV¶FUHZVXQLTXHVNLOOVZKLFKZHUHLQGLVSHQVDEOHLQERWK
World War One and later in World War Two. 
 
Moving up the R.N.R. ranks Scrimgeour shows a more balanced but equally revealing 
view of the R.N.R. and their R.N. counterparts, especially retained ship masters: 
 Had a long chat with old Outram. He is a dear old chap, and talks in a gruff voice; very 
interesting some of his anecdotes are. It must be rather unpleasant for him, as the 
Commodore of the Allan Line, now being a Commander, R.N.R. and junior to our 
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skipper and the Rear-Admiral, and treated as practically a nobody. He is a fine old 
seaman.47  
 
Similarly, the merchant ship watch keeping officers had been retained for their 
merchant ship knowledge needed for interceptions and boarding. Their R.N.R. 
commissions were temporary and did not guarantee prior naval training. *UHQIHOO¶V
diary confirms how serious the position was: 
De Chair in a private letter to the Captain (Benson aboard Cedric) which he showed 
me, said that it had come to his ears that some of the Captains of ships of the 10th C.S. 
were not treating their R.N.R. Officers very well ± that the latter were saying they had 
joined for the period of the war & were glad they had done so, but that they would be 
damned if they would be bullied by Naval Officers. Who? Captain thinks Booty in the 
Otway. At any rate it is most unfortunate.48 
  
The R.N.R. crew aboard Arlanza wrote direct to de Chair complaining they were 
denied smoking between decks and portholes (scuttles) never allowed to be opened. De 
Chair was not pleased and called for Captain Norris to see how things were done 
aboard Alsatian.49  
 
A better realisation that the world of shipping is a competitive business at all levels and 
a proper understanding of the difference between permanent R.N.R. Officers and those 
µODEHOOHG¶ ZLWK WHPSRUDU\ FRPPLVVLRQV WR VXLW WKH 1DY\¶V H[SHGLHQF\ ZRXOG KDYH
avoided problems.  
 
The return of peace brought a severe reducWLRQLQWKH1DY\¶VVL]HDQGIRUVKLS-owners a 
return to business followed all too soon by a shipping slump. Worthy ideals of 
FRRSHUDWLRQZHUHVRRQIRUJRWWHQDQGQRWSXUVXHGDQG$GPLUDO7XSSHU¶VKRSHVZHUHQRW 
to be.50 After all, everyone felt the world had left behind the war to end all wars!  
Nevertheless, the Reserves must have proved their worth. The interwar years saw the 
reforming and expansion of the R.N.V.R., whilst the R.N.R. retained support and 
encouragement from the major shipping companies.   
 
 
Westminster Appreciation for the Tenth Cruiser Squadron   
Recognition RIWKH6TXDGURQ¶VFKDOOHQJHVDQGDFKLHYHPHQWVFDPH at Government and 
National OHYHOZKHQWKH+RXVHRI/RUGVSURSRVHGDQGGHEDWHGµ$9RWHRI7KDQks to 
the Forces in March 1917. 
                                                 
47
 Scrimgeour,  Small Scribbling Diary 1914-1916  146 
48
 IWM P43  Diary Cdr F.H.Grenfell R.N.  H.M.S. Cedric  Part 2. 12 
49
 IWM P43  Diary Cdr F.H.Grenfell R.N.  H.M.S. Cedric  Part 2. 199 
50
 Tupper, Reminiscences 277 
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There is another aspect of the work of the Navy upon which I must speak for one 
moment, and that is the story of the Blockade. We hear the Blockade a good deal 
criticised and even attacked in the newspapers. I invite your Lordships to think for a 
moment of what a Blockade means to those who take part in it. Patrolling the ocean 
gateway 600 miles in width from Scotland to Iceland and Greenland, these vessels are 
exposed to incessant gales and to the perils of submarines. 
 
 Day and night it is their duty to stop and to board the ships that may be taking supplies 
to the enemy. The efficiency of the service may be gathered from the fact that, early in 
1915, 256 out of 1,400 ships managed to slip through the patrol; at the end of 1916 
only 60 out of 3,000 passed without being intercepted. The large majority of the men 
who are engaged in this work were before the war in the Mercantile Marine. 
For a difficult task well done, this was singular praise, hard won and well deserved. 
____________________________ 
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Rewards 
Admiral Jellicoe was conscious of the hardships for the Squadron from the outset and early in 
1915 he encouraged Admiral de Chair to make recommendations for the most deserving to be 
awarded decorations.1 Jellicoe particularly wanted officers and ratings serving as Mercantile 
Marine personnel to be fairly rewarded. A disappointing initial response was a handwritten 
memo; the writer claimed whilst the Squadron suffered hardship, there was no record of it 
having been at risk from mines or submarines. Jellicoe required de Chair to resubmit the 
UHFRPPHQGDWLRQVZLWKDIXOOHUDFFRXQWRIWKH6TXDGURQ¶VDFWLYLWLHVVKRZLQJWKHORVVHVVRIDU
including Hawke. This was done on the 5 May 1915, by which time the Bayano had been 
torpedoed on 11 March 1915. After some protracted correspondence, a modified list was 
approved and the awards appeared in The London Gazette for 6 August 1915 to be effective 
the next day.2  Subsequent recommendations for the Squadron awards were accepted less 
JUXGJLQJO\DQGD µVFDOH¶RIDZDrds was published for the guidance of commanding officers 
making recommendations.  
 
Remembrance 
At this point it is appropriate to review the total losses of the Squadron. When the Squadron 
was de-commissioned it had lost nine armed merchant cruisers; two through stress of weather 
and seven from enemy action.3 In addition, Oceanic had been lost through grounding and to 
this must be added the loss of the Edgar class cruiser, Hawke, having been torpedoed before 
the Squadron relied on the armed merchant cruisers, The final total loss of officers and men 
was 1,690 including 525 from H.M.S. Hawke.  
 
Professor Jay Winter in his book µ5HPHPEHULQJ:DU¶ defines the first quarter of the twentieth 
FHQWXU\DVµ7KH)LUVW*HQHUDWLRQRI0HPRU\¶UHIOHFWLQJWKHQHHGWRUHPHmber those who died 
in the Great War.4  Unfortunately, memorials for the Tenth Cruiser Squadron range from 
geographically dispersed to non-existent and such as exist are detailed in Appendix 16. 
Research reveals Mercantile Ratings serving in the Squadron who lost their lives are recorded 
on an equal basis as RN, RNR, RNVR ratings on the port Naval War Memorials.  For 
example H.M.S. Alcantara manned by Plymouth Division, was sunk in the action against the 
Greif.  The Alcantara lost 69 ratings, of which 33 were Mercantile Ratings on T124 
agreements. Of these 33 Mercantile Ratings there are 25 names recorded on the Plymouth 
War Memorial and the 8 unrecorded will have graves other than the sea.   
                                                 
1
 ADM 137/185   C-in-C Grand Fleet to Secretary, Admiralty  452 & subsequent papers 
2
 See Appendix 16 Decorations and Awards. 
3
 See Appendix 15. 
4
 Winter, J.M., Remembering War (London,2006)  20 
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No Veterans Association ever existed for the Tenth Cruiser Squadron. Seafarers of the 
Mercantile Marine which included both permanent and temporary RNR Officers as well as all 
T124 personnel were not given to such associations. Many of these personnel would sail 
again in peacetime for the same owners and possibly on the same ships. They were unlikely to 
meet up with ships taken up from other owners.  Merchant seamen often refer to each other as 
Board of Trade Acquaintances and the Squadron experience would be seen as just another 
µKDLO DQG IDUHZHOO¶ LQ D OLIHORQJ VHULHV 7he RN personnel and the Fleet Reservists recalled 
from retirement would welcome return to retirement and probably felt more at home with 
their former RN shipmates. Appendix 16 gives details of Veterans Associations which arose 
much later.   
 
Retrospection 
Finally, a retrospective account of four diarists and two of the ships involved after Squadron 
service. 
 
Midshipman Alexander Scrimgeour R.N. wrote to his mother on 23 July 1915 from H.M.S. 
Invincible, a battle cruiser of 17,250 tons. He had escaped from the tedium of blockade and 
wearying IRXURUILYHZHHNVDWVHDDERDUGWKHµWLQFDVWOH¶Alsatian. To serve aboard a battle 
cruiser and have the excitement of action against the enemy had been his ambition. After 
action in the Heligoland Bight, the Falklands Isles and the Dardenelles,  Invincible was now 
the flagship of the Third Division of the Battle Cruiser Squadron stationed in the North Sea. 
Again aboard a flagship and being for the third time, the senior midshipman in his ship, 
together with an action station in the 12 inch twin turret,  Scrimgeour must have felt his career 
had taken a turn for the better.5 Invincible next saw action at the Battle of Jutland. After 
inflicting hits on the German Lützow and Derfflinger, an incoming shell penetrated one of 
InYLQFLEOH¶Vmidships turrets, bursting inside and relay igniting the magazine. The explosion 
cut the ship in half, the bow and stern sections collapsed inwards and downwards. Of the six 
survivors of ,QYLQFLEOH¶V company of 1,032, Alexander Scrimgeour was not one of them. 6 
 
Post war Leading Signalman Phillip Needell R.N.V.R., born in Islington in 1886, returned 
home and resumed his employment as a clerk in Barclays Bank. His diary had been intended 
for his wife but daily entries were often no more than descriptions of sunrise and sunset. No 
Doubtless for reference when his artistic interests continued in peace time. He became an 
                                                 
5
    Scrimgeour, A.,  6FULPJHRXU¶V6PDOO6FULEEOLQJ'LDU\-1916  (London, 2008)  189-191 
     This diary gives a rare insight to 10th Cruiser Squadron life. Its value lies in the perceptions of a young officer in    
      his late teenage years clearly showing promise and maturity. He had  a privileged upbringing and gives a  
      wonderful insight into the social life and naval training of a midshipman at sea in those days  
6
    Gordon  The Rules of the Game   450 
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active member of the respected Wapping Group of Artists, which still remains active in 
2011.7 
 
On being recalled to the Navy in 1914, Commander Francis Henry Grenfell R.N., soon 
found himself to be second in command of H.M.S. Cedric, the largest armed merchant cruiser 
in the squadron. Like many R.N. officers he yearned for more direct contact with the enemy 
than blockade patrols. He volunteered for service in Q ships commanded H.M.Q-Ship 
Penshurst in which he became one of the most successful Q ship captains.  In addition to 
accounting for two enemy submarines Penshurst was engaged in action against several others. 
Grenfell was decorated with the D.S.O. and Bar and promoted to captain on the retired list. 
Post war he returned to the Board of Education taking charge of the physical training section 
until he retired 16 years later. He was a keen mountaineer and a lover of music and art. When 
he retired at age sixty he trained as a sculptor at the London Polytechnic and within 18 
months his work was accepted for the Royal Academy. +LV µ&HGULF¶ diaries frequently 
recorded the bad weather on patrol ± µLWLVGLIILFXOWWRNQRZZKHQRQHJDOHFHDVes and the next 
RQHVWDUWV¶ he wrote. He frequently recorded the changing sky colouring at dawn and sunrise 
in great detail, perhaps a clue to the more artistic side of his nature. He never married and died 
at the age of 71 in 1946.8 
 
Captain H.C.R. Brocklebank C.B.E. R.N. commanded H.M.S. Changuinola  from 
December 1914 to the end of the war. Changuinola was one of the smaller armed merchant 
cruisers and one of the hardest worked in the squadron. Pre-war Brocklebank had been passed 
over for promotion from commander to captain but a fitting reward of promotion to Acting 
Captain came in 1916 and the rank was confirmed on his retirement from the Navy. His last 
appointment was as Naval Attaché at the Hague 1918-1919. In retirement he spent many 
happy hours in local public service, country pursuits and sailing. His main preoccupation was 
with Freemasonry.9 +LVGHSUHVVLRQRQ UHDGLQJ WKH UHYHODWLRQV LQ&DSWDLQ&RQVHWW¶VERRNRQ
the blockade has already been mentioned. Like other diarists he commented on the weather 
but not just the bad weather; he took care to note the brilliant sunshine and clear air in 
northern waters on good days. One entry in particular suggests Squadron personnel could 
have good memories as well as bad. On 8 November 1915 Brocklebank wrote: 
 Blowing very fresh with a lively sea: passed about five miles off the Faroes, sheer cliffs rising    
             hundreds of feet, snow clad with a low sun casting rainbows through the mist and driving rain    
            leaving deep shadows in the valleys, a sight one is thankful to have seen.  10  
                                                 
7
  RNM Ref.1977/233 Papers of Leading Signalman Phillip Needell  
8
  The Times, May 22, 1946 pg 7 
9
  Brocklebank, Tenth Cruiser Squadron ii-iii   
10
 IWM  PP/MCR/53  Capt  H.C.R. Brocklebank RN   H.M.S. Changuinola      
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Captain Brocklebank died on 30 January 1947 aged 84. 
  
H.M.S. Alsatian, the Squadron Flagship, emerged from war service to be renamed R.M.S. 
Empress of France and find herself under new owners, the Canadian Pacific Railway 
Company.11 After refitting and refurbishment she continued on the North Atlantic passenger 
service between England and Canada until 1934 when she was scrapped. 
 
H.M.S. Almanzora had been taken up as an armed merchant cruiser on leaving the builders 
and without any finish to her public rooms. It was not until 1920 with her passenger 
accommodation completed that she was able to sail on her maiden voyage from Southampton 
to South America. She remained on that service until 1939 when Royal Mail Lines had 
planned to take her out of service.  Almanzora was frequently the subject of the posters 
SDLQWHGE\ WKHPDULQH DUWLVW.HQQHWK6KRHVPLWK IRU WKH FRPSDQ\¶VSXEOLFLW\ World War II 
saw Almanzora at war again, this time serving as a troopship until 1945. She remained on 
charter as a Government Emigrant ship until 1948 when she was scrapped.  
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
 
 
                                                     Fig. 58 The $OPDQ]RUD¶V Bell 
 
Because of her war service in both World Wars, Royal Mail Lines decided to incorporate 
$OPDQ]RUD¶V EHOOLQWRWKHFRPSDQ\¶VWZR:DU0HPRULDOVWRGD\WKHVHWRJHWKHUZLWKWKHEHOO
DUHSUHVHUYHGLQ6W*HRUJH¶V&HQWUH&KDWKDP7KH&HQWUHLVDGMDFHQWWRWKHHQWUDQFHDWWKH
Medway Campus of the University of Greenwich.   During World War I, the Navy Lists show 
                                                 
11
 Scarth A.J.,  The Ship Model Collection, Merseyside Maritime Museum (Liverpool, 1995)  63 
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Almanzora ZDV D µ&KDWKDP PDQQHG¶ VKLS LW VHHPV ILWWLQJ WKDW KHU EHOO SRVVLEO\ WKH ODVW
physical item remaining from the 10th Cruiser Squadron, should have come to rest in the 
IRUPHU&KDWKDP1DYDO%DUUDFNV¶FKXUFK 
                                                  ----------------------------- 
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1914 
2 August 
Rear Admiral de Chair hoisted his flag aboard Crescent and took command of the Tenth Cruiser 
Squadron, ordered to Scapa Flow.   
  
2 August  
2UGHUVJLYHQWRµ0RELOLVH1DYDO5HVHUYHV¶ 
 
4 August 
Ultimatum to Germany expired at midnight, when hostilities commenced.  
 
6 August 
United States proposed belligerent governments adopt that Declaration of London. Britain declined to 
agree. 
 
8 August 
All ships of Tenth Cruiser Squadron on station, comprising Edgar, Hawke, Endymion, Royal Arthur, 
Crescent, Grafton, Gibraltar and Theseus.  
 
18 Aug.  
Four armed merchant cruisers, Alsatian, Mantua, Oceanic and Teutonic to join and assist the Squadron.     
 
20 August  
Britain issued an Order in Council to substitute its own list of absolute and conditional contraband. 
 
28 August 
The Battle of Heligoland Bight 
 
8 September   
Oceanic aground Foula Island. Declared a total loss.  
 
22 September  
Cruisers Aboukir, Hogue and Cressy torpedoed by U-boat within one hour, whilst  off the Dutch coast.   
 
15 October  
Hawke torpedoed by U-9. 
 
20 October 
British steamship Glitra, became the first merchantman sunk by a submarine, U-17, off the Norwegian 
coast. Carried out in accordance with international law. 
 
21 October 
First Meeting of the Contraband Committee. 
 
2 November 
North Sea declared a military area. 
 
11 November  
Very severe gales battered the Edgar class cruisers causing serious damage. 
 
18 November 
Northern Patrol to be continued with 24 armed liners, making up the restructured Tenth Cruiser 
Squadron under Rear Admiral de Chair. 
 
20 November  
Admiralty orders the Edgar class cruisers to be paid off. 
 
28 December 
United States of America: Note protesting against British interference with American commerce. 
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1915 
 
13 January 
Viknor (ex Viking) lost off Irish Coast, possibly mined.   
 
24 January 
The Battle of Dogger Bank 
 
3 February  
Clan MacNaughton  believed to have foundered in N. Atlantic. 
 
4 February 
Germany declared a war zone round the British Isles in which ships would be sunk without warning. 
All formalitiHVRIµYLVLWDQGVHDUFK¶ would be ignored, neutrals warned their shipping was at equal risk.  
 
10 February 
United States of America: protest against German declaration of a war zone round Great Britain. 
 
11 March 
Bayano sunk by Submarine off Corsewall Pt., Galloway. 
 
7 May 
Lusitania sunk by U-Boat. 
 
13 May  
Export of coal to all foreign countries prohibited. 
 
23 July 
British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs reviews question of establishing a blockade under modern 
conditions. 
 
8 August 
India sunk by Submarine off Norwegian Coast. 
 
20 August 
Cotton declared contraband. 
 
During August 
Allied conference on economic warfare; first rationing list drafted. 
 
18 September 
German submarines recalled from the west coast of Great Britain; followed by the recall of all U-boats 
in home waters. 
 
During September 
Postal parcels inspection instituted. 
 
5 November 
United States of America: Note of protest as to rights of belligerents. 
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1916 
 
January 
Parliament passed the first conscription laws (compulsory enrolment) ever passed in Britain. At first 
only single men and childless widowers aged 18 to 41 were called up. By 1918 compulsory service had 
been extended to include all men aged 18 to 51. More than 2.3 million conscripts were enlisted before 
the end of the war in November, 1918. (Conscription did not apply to Ireland) 
 
23 February 
Ministry of Blockade created. 
 
29 February 
First instalment of the statutory black list published. 
 
29 February 
Vice Admiral Sir Reginald Tupper relieved Rear Admiral Sir Dudley de Chair in command 10th Cruiser 
Squadron.  De Chair promoted to Vice Admiral and sent to assist Lord Robert Cecil the Minister of 
Blockade in London.  
 
29 February 
Alcantara sXQNLQDFWLRQDJDLQVWWKH*ULHILQ/DWÛ¶1/RQJ¶( 
 
February-March 
Forcible rationing: Ministry of Blockade issue two orders that govern the blockade of Germany during 
1916.  
 
13 March 
 New orders for German submarine warfare issued.  
 
16 March 
/HWWHUVRI$VVXUDQFH³QDYLFHUWLQJ´V\VWHPLQVWLWXWHG. 
 
14 April 
British reply to American Note of 5th November 1915 on rights of belligerents.  
 
16 May 
Agreement with Iceland concluded: all exports deflected from Germany. 
 
31 May 
Battle of Jutland 
 
During June 
Admiral Sir John Jellicoe promoted to First Sea Lord and Captain David Beatty took over as 
Commander-in- Chief of the Grand Fleet.  
 
28 July 
United States of America: Note of protest at inclusion of American firms on the British black list.  
 
31 August 
 German Government in council reconsider submarine warfare. 
 
6 October  
German order to restart submarine warfare in home waters. 
 
12 December  
Peace overture by the Central Powers. 
 
18 December 
American invitation to a general negotiation for peace. 
 
23 December 
Coal exports to Norway stopped. 
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1917 
 
7 January 
German Government decide to begin unrestricted submarine  warfare on 1st February. 
 
1 February  
German unrestricted submarine warfare began. 
 
17 February  
Embargo on coal for Norway raised. 
 
6 April 
United States of America declared war on Germany.  
 
During April  
American War Trade Committee appointed.  
 
25 May 
Hilary sunk by submarine in Atlantic.   
 
14 June 
Avenger torpedoed by U-69 in N.Atlantic on passage to Scapa Flow. 
 
23 July 
Otway sunk by submarine in N.Atlantic.  
 
28 July 
Almanzora, Andes, Arlanza, Armadale Castle, Columbella, Kildonan Castle, Victorian and Virginian  
detached from Squadron for duty as convoy escorts in North Atlantic.      
 
9 October 
Oropesa (Re-named Champagne) sunk by submarine in Atlantic. 
 
29 November 
 Admiralty approve abolition of Tenth Cruiser Squadron. 
 
14 December 
Alsatian and Orvieto now part of the Second Cruiser Squadron which included HM Ships Minotaur, 
Shannon, Amsterdam and Duke of Cornwall. The new squadron had the support of twelve trawlers. All 
continued to make fake, coded radio messages to simulate genuine signal traffic from former Tenth 
Cruiser Squadron patrols lines.    
 
 
-------------------------- 
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Extracts from the Naval Staff Monograph, Trade Division, and May 1920. 
The Economic Blockade 1914-1919    
 
7KH'RZQVZDVGLYLGHGLQWRWZRµSDWUROV¶± the North Patrol dealing with southbound 
(west going traffic), and the South Patrol dealing with north-bound (east going traffic). 
In each patrol there was a guard ship (armed merchant steamer) and two tugs on duty 
with a torpedo boat in support. The guard ship on the North Patrol was some 3 miles 
from the Navy Office in Ramsgate, the guard ship on the South Patrol about 6 miles. 
 
9HULILFDWLRQRIWKH6KLS¶V0DQLIHVW± Immediately a ship entered the Downs, it was 
signalled to stop or usually stopped and anchored of its own accord.  A boarding officer 
and witnessing officer went alongside in a tug almost immediately and took 
preliminary particulars, such as name of the ship, its nationality, the name of the 
master, whither bound, where from, and a brief summary of the cargo. These 
particulars were wirelessed by the tug at once to the Navy office, and telephoned by the 
Boarding Office by direct line to the Trade Division. This constituted the preliminary 
boarding and took some ten minutes to half an hour. The boarding officer took off the 
manifest, bills of lading, and a copy of the crew list and passenger list, and sent them to 
the guard ship which despatched to the Navy Office by motor launch. The ship was 
placed on the list of ships detained, and the master given a copy of the local 
Instructions for Detained Ships. 
 
The manifest went ashore and was sent to the Manifest Office to be summarised in a 
form suitable for the Contraband Committee. This might take from half an hour to six 
hours, depending on the length of the manifest, the language used, and the pressure of 
work. It passed to the Post Office to be telegraphed to the Trade Division for the 
Contraband Committee, who subjected it to skilled analysis.1  It may appear that too 
much reliance was placed on the manifest, but the information it supplied was checked 
by other sources, such as intercepted wireless and cable messages, and by 
supplementary details which genuine consignees were prepared to give, and in 
numberless cases ships lay in the Downs or at Kirkwall, not merely for days, but for 
weeks, and occasionally months, because such information and satisfactory guarantees 
were not forthcoming.2       
 
                                                 
1
  See Page 149 for details of telegraphic transmission speeds 
2
 This post war admission of the delays explains the objections by shipowners generally and particularly   
   those of the USA Government. 
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There always remained the possibility of unmanifested cargo being hidden in the holds, 
especially under cargo in bulk, but any such action constitutes in every country an 
infringement of the law, and there can be no doubt that the larger ships and shipping 
companies were averse from illegitimate courses, when they could make big profits in 
legitimate trade. Without the connivance of the company, the smuggling that a single 
officer could do in the holds was comparatively small, for the space was too valuable to 
permit an unauthorised use of it to be made without discovery. Still there was a 
possibility of a small quantity of unmanifested cargo passing in the holds, and the only 
safeguard against such an occurrence seems to be a careful consular supervision of the 
loading and a guarantee of lading on similar lines to the guarantees and letters of 
assurance afterwards given for some items of the cargo. 
 
Search of Ship. -  Supposing the manifest to be correct and in strict accordance with 
the contents of the hold, there still remain numerous spaces, such as bunkers, tanks, 
store rooms, the peaks, and double bottoms where unmanifested goods might be 
hidden.   An indication of this may be obtained theoretically by comparing the weight 
of cargo according to the manifest with the weight calculated from the draught and 
deadweight scale.  This was regularly carried out at Port Said, and if the discrepancy 
was more than 50 tons, full details were endorsed on the manifest, and the Admiralty 
were informed; but in the Downs, as it was often difficult to get the exact draught on 
account of the swell, the value of the method was somewhat discounted, and more 
UHOLDQFHZDVSODFHGRQWKHZRUNRIWKHµVKLSVHDUFK¶SDUW\ 
 
Tanks were tested by sounding. The capacity of any particular tank could also be tested 
by running a definite quantity of water (if empty), or by running a definite quantity out 
(if full), and comparing the time actually required to effect an alteration in depth with 
the time estimated from the dimensions of the registered plan.  It must be remembered, 
however, that any alteration in the construction of tanks, and their use to any large 
extent for the carriage of oil or contraband, would involve the connivance of a number 
of persons and it is doubtful if it could continue for any length of time without 
discovery.             
The Examination and Search of a Ship. ± As soon as possible after the boarding 
officer had left, or sometimes when he was still on board, drifters began to come 
alongside with the examining and search party in charge of an examining officer. In 
case of a large liner, the work was divided into five sections, though the personnel were 
not rigidly confined to the same sphere of work. 
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Section A. -- Naval control officer in charge with intelligence officer and two petty        
             officer orderlies. 
 
Section B. ± Examining section for examination of officers, passengers, 
            and crew:- 
 Officer interpreters (lieutenants, R.N.V.R.) - - - - 2 
 Interpreters (civilian or seamen)  - - - - - 2 
 Detective sergeants - - - - - - - 2 
 Petty officers  - - - - - - - 2 
 Orderlies - - - - - - - - 2 
                                                                                                                          10                                                                                                                        
 
 
 
 
Section C.²Cabin section for search of saloons, cabins, cabin luggage, and  
             VWHZDUGV¶URRPV-  
 Lieutenants, R.N.V.R. - - - - - - - 2 
 Interpreter - - - - - - - - 1 
 Chief petty officer - - - - - - - 2 
 Petty officers - - - - - - - - 6 
 Men - - - - - - - - - 6 
 Lady searcher - - - - - - - - 1 
 Tool carriers - - - - - - - - 2  
                                                                                                                                   20   
 
Section D.²Baggage section for search of baggage, and baggage rooms:-  
 Officer interpreter, lieutenant, R.N.V.R. - - - - 1 
 Petty officers - - - - - - - - 4 
 Men - - - - - - - - - 4 
 Customs officers - - - - - - - 1 
 Tool carrier - - - - - - - - 1 
 Gangway petty officer - - - - - - 1 
 Gangway orderly - - - - - - - 1  
                                                                                                                                    9 
 
Section E. ± Ship section for search of ship spaces (except those allotted to Sections C.    
and D.), including tanks, double bottoms, engine and boiler rooms, bunkers, 
ventilator casings, and storerooms:- 
Lieutenant, R.N.R.  - - - - - - - 1 
Chief petty officers - - - - - - - 1 
Petty officers - - - - - - - - 2 
Able seamen - - - - - - - - 2 
Chief stoker - - - - - - - - 1 
Stokers  - - - - - - - - 4 
Tool carrier - - - - - - - - 1  
                                                                                                                     12  3 
----------------------------------- 
                                                 
3
  AL Naval Staff Monograph,  The Economic Blockade 1914-1919  (Trade Division, May 1920.) 109-110 
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Researcher¶VComment.  The paragraphs above have been extracted and reproduced 
to show the work pattern in the Downs. They demonstrate the need for reasonably 
sheltered water for an efficient search, in contrast to the open oceans patrolled by the 
Tenth Cruiser Squadron where a full search could not possibly be achieved. A proper 
search needed a total of 55 personnel.  In addition to this staff, the Navy needed to 
provide the resources of adequate ships, a shore office and boarding tugs and drifters. 
This would be needed round the clock. It shows the extent of challenges for the Navy in 
the south in order to complement the large resources committed to the Northern Patrol.  
Ships sent into Kirkwall and Lerwick would be subject to a similar attention.   
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Historical Background. 
The Declaration of Paris, April 18, 1856, confirmed the practice of Anglo-French 
cruisers during the war of 1856, in that:  
             a neutral flag covers enemy goods with the exception of contraband of war;  
             and that neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable   
             to capture XQGHUDQHQHP\¶VIODJ 
 
7KLVGHFODUDWLRQKDG VDFULILFHG%ULWDLQ¶V WUDGLWLRQDO ULJKWZKHUHE\ VKHZDV HQWLWOHG WR
seize enemy property on board neutral ships: in return, privateering was abolished.1    
 
%\HLWKHUGHIDXOWRUGHVLJQWKHQHJRWLDWRUVGLGQRWGHILQHµWKHH[FHSWLRQRIFRQWUDEDQG
RIZDU¶,WLVUHDVRQDEOHWRDVVXPHWKHLULQWHQWLRQZDVWKDWJRRGVDQGVXSSOLHVPRVW 
Directly used in wars of that time, such as arms, military equipment, harness, haulage 
carts and ammunition.  The Hague Convention of 1907, aimed to agree the terms of 
eight conventions concerning maritime war. These were: I, Blockade; II, Contraband; 
III, Un-neutral Service; IV, Destruction of Neutral Prizes; V, Transfer to a Neutral 
Flag; VI, Enemy Character; VII, Convoy; VIII, Resistance to Search.  An important 
point was the creation of an International Prize Court to look after the interests of 
neutrals in wartime. Although supported by the British representatives, the terms were 
not supported by a large body of opinion at home. The hope was that the international 
court should base its findings on the general principles of law and equity.  
 
The Government, at the request of Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, who was 
unsure of British support for an international court unless its powers were strictly 
defined, decided to call a conference in London by his note of February 28, 1908.   
Germany, Spain, Italy, Russia, France, Japan, Austria, the United States and the 
Netherlands were invited to send representatives. Discussions lasted from December 4, 
1908 until February 28, 1909 when the delegates signed a declaration of rules. The 
FRQIHUHQFH EHOLHYHG WKDW WKH UXOHV µFRUUHVSRQGHG LQ VXEVWDnce with the generally 
UHFRJQLVHGSULQFLSOHVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ¶DQGWKHSURYLVLRQVRIZKLFKµPXVWEHWUHDWHG
DVDZKROHDQGFDQQRWEHVHSDUDWHG¶2  In the event, neither the Declaration of London 
nor the Convention received a single ratification. 
 
Blockade, the Essential Requirements. 
In order to establish a blockade, it is necessary to issue a Declaration of Blockade. (Art.8) 
                                                 
1
    Guichard,  The Naval Blockade  8 
2
    Guichard,   The Naval Blockade  9-10 
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This may be done either by the Government of the blockading power or the Officer in 
command of the naval forces acting in the name of the Government.   (Art.9)    
 The Declaration must specify: 
 (a) The date the blockade begins. 
 (b) The geographical limits of the blockaded area and these must not extend beyond 
       the ports and coasts occupied by the enemy (Art.1), neither must the blockaded area 
       bar access to neutral ports or coasts. (Art.18) 
  
 (c) The period within which neutral shipping may come out. 
 
Further, this Declaration must be communicated to all neutral Powers and to the local 
Authorities at the point or points of blockade; the responsibility for the performance of the 
latter obligation rests with the Officer commanding the Blockading force. (Art.11)  
 
Provided the blockade is established on the date and over the area specified, it becomes 
effective and remainV VR XQWLO VXFK WLPH DV LW EHFRPHV QR ORQJHU µHIIHFWLYH LQ IDFW¶ LV
voluntarily raised (Art. 8 and 13), or is annulled by an act in contravention of Article 5, which 
lays down that  µ$EORFNDGHPXVWEHDSSOLHGLPSDUWLDOO\WRVKLSVRIDOOQDWLRQV¶ 
 
One exception to these laws is admitted ± namely, that should the blockading force be 
temporarily withdrawn due to stress of weather the blockade is not thereby raised. (Art.4) 
 
A blockade once raised from any cause can only be re-established by a repetition of the above 
procedure. 
 
Having established an effective blockade, it might be supposed that the duty of the blockading 
force was limited to the capture of all vessels found within or attempting to gain access to the 
blockaded area.  
 
Such, however, is not the case. 
 
The attempt to break a blockade is regarded as a hostile act, and it is therefore punishable by 
the condemnation of both ship and cargo (Art.21); but common justice suggests that no 
punishable offence can be committed unless a knowledge of the blockade exists, and 
consequently capture is not allowed, unless the ship has actual or presumptive knowledge of 
the blockade (Art.14), which can only be assumed if the ship left a neutral port subsequent to 
the Declaration being conveyed to the power owning the port.  Similarly the cargo is innocent 
of offence if the shipper neither knew nor could have known of the intention to break the 
blockade. (Art.21) 
 
The action to be taken is simple: 
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(a) If the ship has actual or presumptive knowledge of the blockade, capture her and 
leave the question of the cargo to the decision of the Prize Courts. 
 
 (b) If she has not this knowledge, give it to her officially by an insertion in her log, 
being careful to state the date, hour, and  geographical position of the ship. (Art. 16), 
and then allow her to proceed on her way; but naturally not into the blockaded area. 
 
Finally, the extent to which a ship is liable to be punished for her offence is limited, success 
being held to remit the offence entirely, and consequently an offending ship is only liable to 
capture so long as she is pursued by a ship of the blockading force; and if pursuit is abandoned, 
or the blockade raised her capture is no longer legal. (Art.20)3  
 
The preceding paragraphs have been extracted directly from (JHUWRQ¶V SRFNHW ERRN
intended to help boarding officers involved in blockade tasks. They combine the 
intended requirements of the Declaration of London, to which the Article numbers 
refer, and some practical advice on the application of those requirements. The Articles 
clearly refer to the concept of a close blockade and the differences between such 
requirements and actions of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron are clear. These differences 
ZHUH XVHG E\ *HUPDQ\ DV JURXQGV IRU FODLPLQJ WKH %ULWLVK µGLVWDQW¶ EORFNDGe was 
LOOHJDO$VWKHEORFNDGHSURJUHVVHGWKH%ULWLVKFKRVHWRµILQHWXQH¶WKHUHTXLUHPHQWVE\
the issue of Orders in Council detailing further modifications and additions.4             
 
Contraband, the Essential Definitions 
A key outcome from the Declaration of London was the setting up two lists: one of 
µDEVROXWHFRQWUDEDQG¶DQGWKHRWKHUGHHPHGµFRQGLWLRQDOFRQWUDEDQG¶7KHUHZDVDOVRD
µ)UHH/LVW¶ containing articles that could not be made contraband.5   Article 22 of the 
Declaration detailed a compreKHQVLYH OLVW RI HOHYHQ FODVVHV RI µDEVROXWH FRQWUDEDQG¶
the items being: 
 
 1. Arms of all kinds, including arms for sporting purposes, and their distinctive 
                 component parts. 
 
 2. Projectiles, charges and cartridges of all kinds, and their distinctive component  
                 parts. 
 
 3. Powder and explosives specially prepared for use in war. 
 4. Gun mountings, limber boxes, limbers, military wagons, field forges, and their  
                 distinctive component parts. 
 
 5. Clothing and equipment of a distinctively military character. 
 6. All kinds of harness of a distinctively military character. 
                                                 
3
 Egerton, Contraband  of  War  1-4 
4
 Egerton, Contraband  of  War  31-34  
5
 Consett, M.W.W.P. The Triumph Of Unarmed Forces (1914-1918) (London 1923)  12 
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 7. Saddle, draught, and pack animals suitable for use in war. 
 8. Articles of camp equipment, and their distinctive component parts. 
 9. Armour plates. 
           10. Warships, including boats and their distinctive component parts of such a nature  
                 that they can only be used on a vessel of war. 
 
           11. Implements and apparatus designed exclusively for the manufacture of munitions  
                 of war, for the manufacture or repair of arms, or war material for use on land 
                 or sea. 
 
Articles for the exclusive use in war could be added to the list by further declarations but 
Article 23 laid down that a notification made after the outbreak of hostilities need only be 
addressed to neutral powers.6   
            
$UWLFOH  RI WKH 'HFODUDWLRQ GHWDLOHG D FRPSUHKHQVLYH OLVW RI HOHYHQ FODVVHV RI µFRQGLWLRQDO
FRQWUDEDQG¶ZKLFKZHUHDUWLFOHVKDYLQJYDOXHIRUHLWKer war or peace. The items were: 
 
 1. Foodstuffs. 
 2. Forage and grain, suitable for feeding animals. 
 3. Clothing, fabrics for clothing, and boots and shoes, suitable for use in war. 
 4. Gold and silver in coin or bullion; paper money. 
 5. Vehicles of all kinds available for use in war, and their component parts. 
 6. Vessels, craft, and boats of all kinds; floating docks, parts of docks and their  
                 component parts. 
 
 7. Railway material, both fixed and rolling-stock, and material for telegraphs,  
                 wireless telegraphs, and telephones.  
 
 8. Balloons and flying machines and their distinctive component parts, together with  
                 accessories and articles  recognizable as intended for use in connexion with  
                 balloons and flying machines. 
 
 9. Fuel; lubricants. 
           10. Powder and explosives not specially prepared for use in war. 
           11. Barbed wire and implements for fixing and cutting the same. 
           12. Horseshoes and shoeing materials. 
           13. Harness and saddlery. 
           14. Field glasses, telescopes, chronometers, and all kinds of nautical instruments. 
/LNHWKHµDEVROXWHFRQWUDEDQG¶OLVWWKHµFRQGLWLRQDOOLVW¶FRXOGEHYDULHGE\GHFODUDWLRQV
as laid down in Article 23.7  7KHµFRQGLWLRQDO¶OLVWLVFRPSUHKHQVLYHEXWUHYHDOVWKH 
 
                                                 
6
    Pyke, H.R. The Law Of Contraband Of War (Oxford 1915)  167 
      Note the expected heavy reliance by belligerents on horses and horse drawn vehicles rather than the developing  
      motor transport.    
7
    Pyke  The Law Of Contraband Of War 170 
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potential for the new technologies such as aircraft and wireless becoming an important 
aspect of war. However, industrialisation and the twentieth century had started to 
absorb many other goods and supplies into the performance of war.8 The concept of 
ZDUEHLQJFRQGXFWHGRQDEHOOLJHUHQW¶VEHKDOILQVRPHUHPRWHEDWWOHILHOGRUFRXQWU\ZDV
changing. The arrival of World War I zeppelin raids and coastal bombardment brought 
ZDU WR %ULWDLQ¶V GRRUVWHS 7Ke ever increasing use of goods and factories employing 
more and more civilians to produce an ever increasing range of warlike weapons and 
materials made the idea of total war a reality. It was this reason the Declaration allowed 
WKHµDEVROXWH¶DQGµFRQGLWLRQDO¶ OLVWV WREHYDULHGDVDEHOOLJHUHQWVDZILW 7KLVPHDQW
that neutral shipping had a problem in keeping up to date with the contraband lists if it 
was to avoid being stopped by blockading ships and becoming embroiled with the prize 
courts.  It was no VPDOO FKDOOHQJH WR WKH VTXDGURQ¶V ERDUGLQJ RIILFHUV WR NHHS
themselves up to date with any new changes in the lists.   
 
7KH'HFODUDWLRQ¶V$UWLFOHKDGODLGGRZQWKDWDUWLFOHVQRWµVXVFHSWLEOHRIXVHLQZDU¶
could not be declared as contraband and Article 28 specified seventeen classes of 
DUWLFOHRQWKHVRFDOOHGµ)UHH/LVW¶7KHLWHPVZHUH 
  1. Raw cotton, wool, silk, jute, flax, hemp, and other raw materials of textile  
                industries, and yarns of the same.  
 
2. Oil seeds and nuts; copra. 
3. Rubber, resins, gums and lacs, hops. 
4. Raw hides and horns, bones, and ivory. 
5. Natural and artificial manures, including nitrates and phosphates for agricultural 
    purposes. 
 
6. Metallic ores. 
7. Earths, clays, lime, chalk, stone, including marble, bricks, slates and tiles. 
8. Chinaware and glass. 
9. Paper and paper-making materials. 
           10. Soap, paint, and colours, including articles exclusively used in their manufacture,  
                 and varnish.  
 
           11. Bleaching powder, soda ash, caustic soda, salt cake, ammonia, and sulphate of  
                 copper. 
 
           12. Agricultural, mining, textile, and printing machinery. 
           13. Precious and semi-precious stones, pearls, mother of pearl, and coral. 
           14. Clocks and watches, other than chronometers.  
            15. Fashion and fancy goods. 
16. Feathers of all kinds, hairs, and bristles. 
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17. Articles of household furniture and decoration; office furniture and requisites.9 
Whilst most items on this list clearly belong to peaceful activities, debate developed 
over items such as machinery, rubber and particularly fertilisers for a Germany which 
was not self sufficient in this commodity.  Cotton was especially controversial since it 
had use in clothing but more especially its use in gun cotton.  The leading neutral 
cotton supplier was the United States of America, the very nation which Britain sought 
to upset least of all. 
 
--------------------- 
 
                                                 
9
  Pyke   The Law Of Contraband Of War   174-175 
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1
 Sources:  Navy Lists,  Mercantile Navy Lists,  Lloyds Register,  Company War    
                   +LVWRULHVDQG6KLSV¶/RJERRNV 
  Note:  Vessels  underlined formed the original components of the 10th Cruiser   
  Squadron others were replacements for losses or unsuitable vessels.  
  Oceanic  is included for completeness. 
 
Ship1                Built      
 
 
Commanding 
Officers 
Line Gross 
Reg. 
Tons 
Max 
Tons 
Coal 
Full    
Spd 
 
Max  
Pos.         
Lng         
Trip 
Radius  
 
 @ 
10Kts                           
12Kts                             
Full  
Speed  
Armament 
                       
             Patrol  
Alcantara         1914 
Cdr. TE Wardle 
RMSP 16,034  17 
 
   
Almanzora       1915 
Cpt. WD Church 
RMSP 16,034  17    
Alsatian           1913   
Cpt. VEB    
          Phillimore    1. 
Cpt. V Trewby       2. 
Cpt. HH Smith       3. 
Allan  18,500 3,400 19.5            
 
18 
12,000      
11,000       
  8,000  
[´%/VII 
2 x 6 pdr.            
                        
                     A 
Ambrose          1903 
Cdr. CW Bruton    1.    
Cdr. VL Bowring  2.   
Booth    4,590 1,531 15               
 
14.5 
9,100        
  8,000       
  6,200 
[´ 
2 x 6 pdr. 
                     D                         
Andes               1913 
Cdr. CW 
             Trousdale  1. 
Cpt. GBW  
                Young    2. 
RMSP 15,620  17    
Arlanza            1911 
Cpt.DT Norris       1. 
Cpt.GM Marston   2. 
RMSP 15,044  17    
Armadale         1903    
             Castle    
R.Ad. OF Gillett   1. 
Cdr.SAG Hill        2. 
Cpt. JF  
      Grant-Dalton   3.  
U.C. 12,973  14   [´4) 
Avenger           1915         
Cdr. AL Ashby 
U.S.S. 13,415  17   
Bayano            1912 
Cpt. HC Carr 
E & F   6,100 1,300 15.5          
 
14 
10,000        
  8,600       
  6,000 
[´4) 
2 x 3 pdr 
                     C            
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Ship                  Built      
 
Commanding 
Officers 
Line Gross 
Reg. 
Tons 
Max 
Tons 
Coal 
Full    
Spd 
 
Max  
Pos.         
Lng          
Trip 
Radius  
 
 @ 
10Kts                           
12Kts                             
Full  
Speed  
Armament 
                       
             Patrol  
Calyx                1904 
(Ex Calypso)       
Cdr. TE Wardle 
Wilson  2,870   525 14             
 
13.5 
5,000        
  4,000       
  3,700 
[³ 
2 x 3 pdr. 
                               
                     D 
Caribbean        1889 
(Ex Dunnotar 
Castle) 
Cdr. FH Walter 
RMSP  5,820 1,577 16             
 
15 
10,800        
  9,500       
  6,100 
[³ 
2 x 6 pdr. 
                            
                     B 
Cedric               1903 
Capt. RER Benson 
WS 21,000 5,400 17             
 
16 
15,000      
12,600       
  8,000 
[´4) 
2 x 6 pdr.            
                     B  
Changuinola    1912 
Cdr HCCR      
             Brocklebank 
E & F   6,200 1,100 15.5         
 
14 
8,100        
  6,900       
  4,800 
[´4) 
2 x 3 pdr. 
                           
                     C 
Clan                  1911   
 Mcnaughton   
Cdr. R Jeffreys 
Clan  4,980 1,550 13.5          
 
13 
9,500         
  7,400      
  6,600 
8 [´ 
2 x 3 pdr.            
                     D 
Columbella       1902      
1902 
(Ex  Columbia) 
Cpt. HLP Heard    1. 
Cpt. A Bromley     2. 
Cpt. HL  
          Watt-Jones   3.  
Cpt. GE Corbett     4.  
Anchor  8,290 2,500 18             
 
16.5 
14,500       
11,900      
  7,000 
[´4) 
2 x 3 pdr. 
                           
 
 
 
           
                     A  
Digby                1913            
(Re-named  Artois) * 
Cdr. RFHH  
                Mahon   1. 
Cdr. AG Warren    2. 
Cpt. de Frégate 
  J de Marguéray    3. 
Cdr. H Cardale      4. 
FW   3,960 1,350 14.5           
13 
8,500          
  8,000      
  4,500 
[´4) 
2 x 6 pdr. 
 
 
 
                            
                     
                     C 
Ebro                 1914 
Cdr. EVFR   
           Dugmore    1. 
Cdr. CAW 
          Wrightson   2. 
RMSP  8,489  -----   
 
 
 
 
Eskimo             1910 
Cdr. CW Trousdale 
Wilson    3,320   600 17               
 
16 
5,500        
  4,500      
  2,700 
[´4) 
2 x 6 pdr. 
                           D 
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Ship                  Built      
 
Commanding 
Officers 
Line Gross 
Reg. 
Tons 
Max 
Tons 
Coal 
Full    
Spd 
 
Max  
Pos.         
Lng          
Trip 
Radius  
  
@ 
10Kts                           
12Kts                             
Full  
Speed  
Armament 
                       
             Patrol  
Gloucestershire     
                          1910     
Cdr.NL Stanley     1. 
Cdr.TA Williams  2. 
Bibby    8,124  15   
Hilary               1908 
Cdr. RH Bather     1. 
Cpt. FW Dean       2. 
Booth  6,330 1,781 15           
14.5 
8,800        
  8,000        
  6,700 
[´%/ 
2 x 6 pdr.             
                     C 
Hildebrand       1911   
Cpt. H Edwards    1. 
Cpt. JF 
      Grant-Dalton   2. 
Cpt. HC Watson    3. 
Booth  6,990 2,197 15.5        
14.5  
10,900       
  9,700       
  8,300 
[´ 
2 x 6 pdr.            
 
                      
                     D 
India                 1896 
Cdr. WGA Kennedy 
P & O  7,940  -----   
Kildonan          1899    
         Castle       
Cdr. HS Cardale    1. 
Cpt. JF Warton      2. 
U. C.  9,692  16   
Laurentic 
Cpt. VG Gurner     1. 
Cpt. RA Norton     2. 
WS 14,900 4,200 17.5         
16.5 
15,600     
13,000       
  8,000 
[´4) 
2 x 6 pdr.             
                     A 
Mantua             1909 
Cpt. C  Tibbits       1. 
Cpt. GM Marston  2. 
Cpt. ABF Dawson 3. 
P & O 10,900 2,500 17.5         
16 
10,000       
  9,000       
  5,500 
[´ 
2 x 6 pdr.             
                      
                    A   
Moldavia          1899 
Cdr. AH Smyth 
P & O    9,500  17   
Motagua           1912       
Cpt. VEB  
           Phillimore   1.  
Cpt.JA Webster     2. 
Cpt. LL Dundas     3. 
E & F  6,200 1,100 15.5         
14 
8,100       
  6,900       
  4,800 
[´4) 
2 x 3 pdr. 
                           
 
                     C  
Oceanic            1899    
Cpt. W Slayter 
WS 17,274  19.5   
  
Orcoma            1908       
Cdr. CW Bruton    1. 
Cpt. RH 
          Coppinger    2. 
PSNC 11,546  14.5   
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Ship                  Built      
 
Commanding 
Officers 
Line Gross 
Reg. 
Tons 
Max 
Tons 
Coal 
Full    
Spd 
 
Max  
Pos.         
Lng          
Trip 
Radius  
  
@ 
10Kts                           
12Kts                             
Full  
Speed  
Armament 
                       
             Patrol  
Oropesa            1895 
(Re-named 
Champagne) ** 
Cdr. NL Stanley    1. 
Cpt. de Frégate 
        C Berthelot    2. 
Cpt.  PG Brown     3. 
PSNC 
 
 5,360 1,665 14.5         
13.7
5 
10,500       
  7,600       
  6,000 
[´4) 
2 x 6 pdr. 
 
 
 
                            
                     C 
Orotava            1899 
Cdr. GE Corbett 
RMSP  5,980 1,859 15            
14 
12,000       
  8,300       
  6,500 
[´4) 
2 x 6 pdr.             
                     B 
Orvieto             1909 
Cpt. HH Smyth     1. 
Cpt. GP England   2. 
R Ad.  
    Morgan Singer  3. 
Cpt. GP England   3. 
(Flag) 
Orient  12,130  ----   
Otway               1909 
Cpt. EL Booty       1. 
Cpt. PH Colomb    2. 
Orient 12,000 3,150 18.5          
17.5 
17,000     
14,300       
  7,300 
[´4) 
2 x 6 pdr.            
                     A 
Patia                 1913              
Cpt. GW Vivian    1. 
Cdr. RFH  
Hartland-Mahon    2. 
Cdr.VL Bowring   3. 
Cdr. WG Howard  4. 
E & F   6,100 1,300 15.5           
14 
10,000       
  8,600       
  6,000 
[´4) 
2 x 3 pdr.             
                      
 
 
                     B 
Patuca              1913 
Cdr. CH France-
Hayhurst (Died)     1. 
Lt.Cdr. JH Nield    2.  
Cdr. PG Brown      3.  
Cdr.T Dannreuther 4 
E & F   6,100 1,300 15.5           
14 
10,000       
  8,600       
  6,000 
[´4F 
2 x 3 pdr 
 
                           
 
                     
                     D 
Teutonic           1889     
Cpt.H Chatterton   1. 
Cpt.GP Ross          2. 
Cdr. AH Smyth     3. 
Cpt. RER Benson  4. 
Cpt. JS  Luard        5. 
W.S. 10,000 4,500 19        
18 
15,000     
14,000       
  8,000 
[´4) 
2 x 6 pdr 
 
 
                                          
                     B    
Victorian          1904             
Cpt. HBJ 
           Somerville  1.  
Cdr. FH Walter      2. 
Allan 10,635  18  8 x ´4) 
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Allan           Allan Steamship  
Anchor        Anchor Line 
Bibby          Bibby  
Clan            Clan Line 
E&F            Elders & Fyffes 
FW              Furness, Withy & Co 
Orient         Orient Steam Navigation Company 
P&O            Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company  
PSNC          Pacific Steam Navigation Company   
RMSP         Royal Mail Steam Packet Company    
UC              Union Castle   
Viking         Viking Cruising Co. 
Wilson         Wilson Line 
WS              White Star Line 
 
*    Digby/Artois  
**  Oropesa/Champagne 
The name changes for Digby and Oropesa were the result of American influence in making the 
SRLQW WKDW D PRUH µ$OOLHG DSSHDUDQFH¶ WR WKH 6TXDGURQ PLJKW PDNH WKH EORFNDGH PRUH
acceptable to the neutral powers. In February 1915, the American Ambassador in London 
indicated the planned interception of the Hamburg-Amerika liner Dacia, bound for Rotterdam 
with cotton and flying the American flag, might be better challenged by a French cruiser.  
Dacia was taken in to a French port and no protest came from the United States. The vessel 
was condemned by the French Prize Court which felt no cause for any leniency.  Subsequently, 
in October 1915, Digby was renamed Artois and placed under a French crew and continued to 
work with the Squadron but not without difficulties.  In December 1915, Oropesa was 
renamed Champagne and placed under a French crew. Much of her time was spent working 
between France and Archangel under French orders.2  
 
The transfer to French control was another Foreign Office act to placate American officialdom  
EXWWKHµKLQW¶E\WKH$PHULFDQ$PEDVVDGRUVKRZHGWKDWEHKLQGWKHµSDUW\OLQH¶VRPHV\PSDWK\
existed for the British approach to the blockade.  In June 1917, both Artois and Champagne 
were re-commissioned with British crews for further service with the Squadron.      
                                                 
2
 De Chair,  The Sea is Strong  203-204 
Ship                  Built      
 
Commanding 
Officers 
Line Gross 
Reg. 
Tons 
Max 
Tons 
Coal 
Full    
Spd 
 
Max  
Pos.         
Lng          
Trip 
Radius  
 
 @ 
10Kts                           
12Kts                             
Full  
Speed  
Armament 
                       
             Patrol  
Viknor              1888      
(Ex Viking)  
Cdr. EO Ballantyne 
Viking    5,380 1,700 15              
14 
8,100       
  7,400       
  7,000 
[´ 
2 x 3 pdr.                         
                     B 
Virginian          1905          
Cpt. GN Garnett    1. 
Cdr. H.H.Smith     2. 
Allan  11,000 3,040 17.5           
16.5 
8,100       
  7,300       
  5,400 
[´ 
2 x 6 pdr.                         
                     A 
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1
 Sources:  Navy Lists, Toghill, G. Royal Navy Trawlers part 2 and  
                   Grainger  The Maritime Blockade of  Germany  in the Great War.    
 
NAME 1              
Admiralty 
No.   
Port  Register              
Grs  
Reg. 
Tns 
Blt. Owners  Naval 
Commanding  
Officers 
Armament 
Arley 
591                              
FD44 
304 1914 Wyre S 
.T.C. 
Fleetwood 
Lt. RJ Mortimer  
RNR 
 
1x 12 pdr.  1x 6 pdr 
[´ Bomb  
Thrower 
(A/S Howitzer) 
Robert Smith 
---                                
--- 
211 1915 --- Lt. J  Macintosh  
RNR 
----------------------- 
 
Rushcoe 
1546                         
GY522 
338 1915 Earl S.F.C. 
Grimsby 
Skipper  
SJ Brittain  
RNR 
1x 12 pdr. 
 
Saxon  II 
627                           
FD 159 
239 1907 Saxon 
S.T.L. 
Fleetwood 
Skipper  J 
Glentworth   
RNR 
1x 12 pdr. 
[´%RPE 
Thrower 
(A/S Howitzer) 
Tenby Castle 
977                             
SA 53 
256 1908 Consolidat
ed 
Fisheries, 
Grimsby 
Lt. WA Smith   
RNR 
1x 12 pdr. 
[´%RPE 
Thrower 
(A/S Howitzer) 
Walpole 
1625                        
GY 269 
302 1914 --- Skipper 
JW Austen  
RNR 
1x 12 pdr. 
[´%RPE 
Thrower 
(A/S Howitzer) 
Corrie Roy 
3218                       
GY 635 
327 1915 Orient 
S.F.C. 
Grimsby 
Skipper  
EB Timby   
RNR 
1x 12 pdr. 
[´%RPE 
Thrower 
(A/S Howitzer) 
Sitvel 
197                             
FD 49 
290 1914 Marr 
Fleetwood 
Skipper 
J Ford  
RNR 
1x 12 pdr. 
[´%RPE 
Thrower 
(A/S Howitzer) 
St.Denis 
3326                        
H 228 
294 1915 J.F. Storr 
Hull 
Skipper  
E Jefferson  
RNR 
1x 12 pdr. 
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Ship    
          Officers 
 
 
 
R
N 
 
R 
N 
R 
 
R 
N 
V 
R 
Sea-
men 
 
Boys 
 
Mar 
  -ines 
Eng. 
Room 
 
Other 
Rates 
Tot.  
Rat- 
ings 
Est 
µmt 
Alcantara             
 
3 34 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 300 338 
Almanzora           
 
   n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a   
Alsatian        
As Flagship             
1
7 
 
48 2 124 
171 
- 
27 
39 
48 
128 
128 
38 
83 
 371 
524 
Ambrose   
                    
3 29 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 260 293 
Andes   
                          
4 33 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 300 338 
Arlanza                        4 33 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 220 258 
Armadale  
Castle    
3 26 2 120 - 38 115 6 279 310 
Avenger               3 34 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Bayano                       3 14 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Calyx 
 (Ex Calypso)    
3 14 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Caribbean                  
 
3 25 2 106 42 36 53 28 265 295 
 
Cedric                           5 42 - 139 - 38 91 60 338 375 
Changuinola           4 14 1 110 - 22 37 33 202 221 
Clan 
 Mcnaughton   
5 15 - n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 257 277 
Columbella              4 22 - 112 16 26 76 42 272 298 
Digby                            
(Re-named  
 Artois) 
3 19 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 210 233 
Ebro                              3 28 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 230 262 
Eskimo                        4 19 - 57 28 22 41 38 186 209 
Gloucestershire         3 29 2 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Numbers of Officers and Ratings of the 10th Cruiser Squadron.          Appendix  6. 
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 Source: Collated from Navy Lists (NMM)(VWDEOLVKPHQWVVHWRXWLQ6KLS¶V/RJV  
              (TNA) and where these were not available recourse was made to Chatterton,   
               The Big Blockade  171 
Ship    
          Officers 
 
R
N 
 
R 
N 
R 
 
R 
N 
V 
R 
Sea- 
men 
 
Boys 
 
Mar   
  -ines 
Eng. 
Room 
 
Other 
Rates 
Tot.  
Rat- 
 ings 
Est 
µmt 
Hilary                   
 
4 22 - 90 29 22 36 40 217 243 
 
Hildebrand               
 
3 26 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 270 300 
India                    
           
3 28 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 270 302 
Kildonan  
Castle       
2 34 2 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Laurentic 
 
   n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Mantua                   
 
3 40 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 320 364 
Moldavia                     
 
3 31 2 n/a n/a 28 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Motagua                      
 
4 14 1 n/a n/a 22 n/a n/a 200 219 
Oceanic                
 
   115 - 38 186 51 390 439 
Orcoma                       
 
4 33 1 n/a 20 n/a n/a n/a 280 318 
Oropesa                    
(Re-named 
Champagne) 
3 30 1 90 26 22 40 41 219 253 
Orotava                        
Subsidised 
3 21 2  76 28 22 48 
26 
37 
25 
211 237 
Orvieto                          
 
9 19 - n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Otway                           
 
4 39 - 137 
 
- 38 85 46 306 349 
Patia                               
 
5 14 - 108 23 21 48 15 215 234 
Patuca                          
 
4 18 - 108 22 22 32 26 210 232 
Teutonic                 
 
4 48 1 137 - 38 185 47 407 460 
Victorian                     
 
3 39 2 114 
 
- 38 75 44 271 315 
Viknor                    
 
4 17 - n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Virginian                    
 
4 35 - 155 15 38 86 31 325 364 
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                                                              Fig. 59  Muckle Flugga Lighthouse 
 
 
            Light Established                                        Engineer 
            1854                                                              Thomas & David Stevenson 
 
            Position                                                        Character 
            /DWLWXGH¶1                                      Flashing (2) White every 20 secs 
            Longitude ¶: 
 
            Elevation                                                      Nominal Range 
            66 metres                                                       22 miles 
 
            Structure 
            White tower 20 metres high. There are 71 steps to top of tower. 
 
            History  
             The establishment of a lighthouse at Muckle Flugga, which is the most northerly rock     
             in the British Isles, was considered by the Commissioners as far back as 1851, but due   
             to difficulties in determining the exact site for the Lighthouse, no work had been   
             undertaken by 1854. During the Crimean War the Commissioners were urged by the   
             Government to erect a light at Muckle Flugga with a view to the protection of Her  
             Majesty's ships. A temporary light was therefore established and first lighted on 11  
             October 1854. The light sits on a jagged outcrop of Skerries a mile north of Unst and  
             right in the path of the Atlantic storms. It was first named "North Unst" but changed in  
             1964 to Muckle Flugga. The lighthouse cost £32,000 and was automated in March         
             1995. 1 
                                                 
1
 www.nlb.org.uk/ourlights/history/muckle.htm     www.nlb.org.uk/ourlights/history/muckle.htm      
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1. Standard Merchant Navy System 
       
 
Inflexible hours based on one watch on and two watches 
off.  Allocated on the basis the least experienced officer 
is on duty when the Master is likely to be up and about. 
Constant Middle watch for Second Officer becomes very 
tiring.  Each watch-keeper always keeps 8 hours in every 
24.  Ratings follow similar pattern but change watches 
part way through a voyage.  Officers and Engineers 
always kept the same watch. 
 
       
2. Normal Royal Navy Three Watch System (Red, White, Blue)  
 
Name  Times Day 1     ų Day 2   ų Day 3   
  R W B ų R W B ų R W B 
Middle 0000-0400 *   ų  *  ų   * 
Morning 0400-0800  *  ų   * ų *   
Forenoon 0800-1200   * ų *   ų  *  
Afternoon 1200-1600 *   ų  *  ų   * 
First Dog 1600-1800  *  ų   * ų *   
Last Dog 1800-2000   * ų *   ų  *  
First 2000-2359 *   ų  *  ų   * 
     Hours per Day =    12 6 6 ų 6 12 6 ų 6 6 12 
 
)ROORZVWKHVDPHSULQFLSOHRIRQHZDWFKRQDQGWZRZDWFKHVRIIEXWE\VSOLWWLQJWKHµ'RJV¶WKHZDWFK-
NHHSLQJKRXUVµF\FOH¶URXQG2QFHLQHYHU\WKUHHGays each watch has a 12 hour stint but two days out of 
WKUHHHDFKZDWFKDYRLGVWKHJUDYH\DUG0LGGOHZDWFK2IILFHUVDQGUDWLQJVNHHSWKHVDPHµFRORXU¶ZDWFK
and this allows a closer team building opportunity.  (* indicates watch on duty) 
 
 
3. Four Watch System (Red,White,Blue,Green) HMS Alsatian  
 
Name  Times Day 1       ų Day 2    ų Day 3    
  R W B G ų R W B G ų R W B  G 
Middle 0000-0400 *    ų    * ų   *  
Morning 0400-0800  *   ų *    ų    * 
Forenoon 0800-1200   *  ų  *   ų *    
Afternoon 1200-1600    * ų   *  ų  *   
First Dog 1600-1800 *    ų    * ų   *  
Last Dog 1800-2000  *   ų *    ų    * 
First 2000-2359   *  ų  *   ų *    
     Hours per Day =    6 6 8 4 ų 6 8 4 6 ų 8 4 6 6 
 
This watch system seemed to have been exclusive to Alsatian for her bridge watch-keeping officers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Name Times Usual Bridge 
Watchkeeper 
Middle 0000-0400 Second Officer 
Morning 0400-0800 Chief Officer 
Forenoon 0800-1200 Third Officer 
Afternoon 1200-1600 Second Officer 
Dogs 1600-2000 Chief Officer 
First 2000-2359 Third Officer 
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Ordinary Daily Routine.1 
 
7 to 9 a.m.    - Clean ship, breakfast, etc. 
 
9.15 a.m.      - Divisions, inspection of the men, prayers, inspection 
                        of the ship below deck. 
 
9.30 to 11.30 a.m.  - Various drills and cleaning various parts of the ship. 
 
11.30 a.m.   - Clear up decks. 
 
12 noon       - Dinner and pipe down until 3.30 p.m. 
 
3.40 p.m.     - Clear up decks. 
 
4.0 p.m.       - Quarters, inspection of men and mess decks 
                       Physical drill, etc. 
 
4.15 p.m.     -  Supper recreation. 
 
9.0 p.m.       -  Pipe down for the night. 
 
This routine represented a framework for the day.  The activities would be subject  
many short notice changes such as action stations for a boarding or trimming coal in the 
holds. The afternoon break after dinner was unlikely to be any sort of siesta. 
 
Mercantile Ratings and any new R.N.V.R. would need to learn quickly the meaning of 
WKHYDULRXVFDOOVIURPEXJOHDQGER¶VXQ¶VSLSH 
   
Boarding Routine 
 
Boarding boats were manned by Newfoundland Royal Naval Reserve men. 
For an ordinary moderate sizes steamer the armed search party was made up of  one 
lieutenant or sub-lieutenant with a midshipman and six or eight men, in addition to the 
boarding officer. Officers carried revolvers; the men had rifles, bayonets and 
ammunition. 2 
   
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Tupper, Reminiscences  237 
2
 Tupper, Reminiscences  240 
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Fig. 60  Patrol Lines as at 1 January 1915 1  
 
 
 
Arctic Circle   ___   Patrol Lines   ___      
 
Any vessel inside this line would be torpedoed on sight by Germans  ____ 
 
Area                   Eastern Base Line of Area        Ships allotted to area. 
A. Between         Meridian of 5Û¶:                    Alsatian 
     Faroes                                                                Mantua 
     and                                                                      Otway 
     Iceland                                                                Virginian, Columbella 
 
%1RUWK0HULGLDQRIÛ¶:Teutonic 
    of                                                                          Cedric 
    Shetland                                                               Caribbean, Patia 
    Islands                                                                  Orotava, Viknor 
 
C. South              Line joining Sydero                     Motagua 
    of                     and Sule Skerry                           Oropesa 
    Faroe                                                                    Bayano, Chamguinola 
    Islands                                                                  Digby, Hilary     
      
D. West of           NNW from St. Kilda                   Hildebrand, Calyx 
     Hebrides                                                              Eskimo, Ambrose 
                                                                                 Clan McNaughton, Patuca 
                                                 
1
 TNA ADM 137/1081 C-in-C Home Fleet to Admiralty  1 January 1915    10-12 
  Chatterton,  The Big Blockade  86 
  This initial disposition shows that neutrals passing north of the Faroes will encounter two patrol lines. Likewise, 
  those intending to pass through the Fair Island passage or the Pentland Firth will also meet two patrol lines. 
  Note that Patrol Areas C and D are inside the danger line which Germany would soon afterwards declare. Not all   
  allotted ships would be on patrol together. There would be gaps whilst vessels returned to the Clyde or Liverpool    
  for coaling and repairs. At this time of year the Denmark Strait between Iceland and Greenland would be frozen.  
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Fig.61 Patrol Areas as at October/November 1917 2 
 
Arctic Circle   ___   Patrol Lines   ___     Two Armed Trawlers     z 
Any vessel inside this line would be torpedoed on sight by German forces  ____ 
 
 
 
A Patrol  Teutonic,  
 
B Patrol  Alsatian, Patuca, Orcoma, Hildebrand, Victorian, Patia  
               30 miles apart, steering 070Ûand 250Ûcrossing the line at noon and midnight  
 
C Patrol  Virginian, Columbella, Artois, Ebro , Arlanza 
              30 miles apart, steering 080Ûand 260Ûcrossing the line at noon and 6 p.m.  
 
D Patrol  Changuinola, Champagne  
 
E Patrol  No allocation 
 
Speed 13 Knots  
 
Note: A, D, E are examples of the Cross Patrol (Line Ahead) 
          B, C  are examples of the In and Out Patrol. 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Tupper, Reminiscences extracted from map facing page 246  
   By this date, the Squadron was nearing the end of its existence and increasing use was made of armed trawlers. 
   The shipping traffic was decreasing and as the Armed Merchant Cruisers were withdrawn for convoy escort duties, 
   the remaining ships and trawlers made use of bogus wireless traffic between themselves. This was to create the   
   impression of a greater number of vessels were on patrol to approaching neutrals and was another early use  
   electronic warfare.     
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Different authors reproduce different patrol charts (e.g. Chatterton, Grainger and Hurd) 
and the explanation for this lies in the following:  
 Patrol Configurations were often moved 30 or 40 miles eastward or westward 
 depending on the perceived submarine threat as advised by the C-in-C. 
 
            Patrols were often moved to provide an element of surprise to approaching 
            neutral shipping. 
 
            Seasonal changes were made to the positioning, for example in the ice season 
 patrols around Iceland and of the Denmark Strait were suspended. 
 
 In the worst winter months, the armed trawlers were withdrawn closer to the 
 Orkneys and Shetlands. 
 
-------------- 
   
Fig 62  Ship Formations 
 
Line Ahead 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Line Abreast 
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Declaration of London. 
Article 32 of the DHFODUDWLRQRI/RQGRQSURYLGHVWKDWWKHVKLS¶VSDSHUVDUHFRQFOXVLYH
proof as to the voyage on which a vessel is engaged unless she has deviated in a 
manner that cannot be satisfactorily explained. This assumes the papers to be correct 
and no evidence of fraud having taken place.1  R.N. officers have little experience of 
this documentation and it was another reason which made the R.N.R officers, with 
their Mercantile Marine origins, better suited for the task of Boarding Officer. The 
papers reveal everything about the vessel and her cargo needed by the Boarding 
Officer and, if needs be, the Prize Court.  Namely: 
 Her Nationality. 
 Date of Registry. 
The nature of her cargo. 
Where and when the cargo was shipped. 
The port or ports of discharge. 
To whom the goods are consigned. 
The weight, freight, volume and value of the cargo.2 
 
The usual papers found aboard a British merchant ship and their purpose, are given 
below. Similar documents were found on foreign vessels.3   
 
(1) Certificate of Registry. British vessels are required by law to carry a Certificate 
of Registry, which may be described as the Birth Certificate and Life History Sheet of 
the vessel. It shows the nationality of the vessel, and therefore regulates the flag 
which she is entitled to fly, and further, in the case of transfer, it shows when the 
transfer took place and the previous nationality of the vessel. 7KHVKLS¶VQDPHPXVW
be painted on both bows, the port to which she belongs on her stern and her official  
number and tonnage must be cut into her main beam 
 
(2) Agreement with Crew. This contains the nature and duration of the voyage or 
engagement, and the number and description of the crew and the capacity in which 
each is to serve. At the commencement of each voyage a copy must be posted in the 
ship in a position accessible to the crew.  
 
(3) Official Log Book. This is required to be kept in a Board of Trade format and 
records certain matters required by law on the conduct of the voyage. Separate and 
distinct from the Official Logbook is the 6KLS¶V'HFN/RJ%RRNThis is kept in a 
format laid down by the owners and covers the navigation, weather experienced, 
cargo loading or discharge and other commercial events. The navigational data is 
material to the Boarding Officer to check the vessel has followed a course appropriate 
for her declared destination.  
 
(4) Builders Contract. This will usually be found on a vessel which has not changed 
hands since she was built.  
 
                                                 
1
 Pyke, The Law Of Contraband Of War 168 
2
 Egerton, Contraband  of  War 23  
3
 Hall, The Law of Naval Warfare  114-116 
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(5) Bill of Sale. This is the document by which a vessel is transferred to a purchaser.   
In the case of an alleged transfer, the date of it will enable the visiting officer to judge 
whether the transfer is to be recognised as valid or not. [e.g. Was it made in 
anticipation of hostilities or of convenience to minimise interception such as German 
tankers transferred to  Standard Oil and the US flag.] 
 
(6) Clearance Certificate. This must be obtained from Customs by every vessel 
sailing from a British port. It cannot be obtained until the master of such a vessel has 
declared to Customs the name of the nation to which he claims the vessel belongs 
whereby the Customs Officer will enter that name on the clearance. 
 
(7) Charter Party. Only held if the vessel is chartered. This document is the written 
contract for the hiring of the vessel made between the owner or master and the 
charterer. It may be for a specific voyage or a given time and usually contains the 
names of the owner or master, the charterer and the vessel, the port in which she was 
at the time it was made, the nature of the cargo, the place of loading and delivery.  It 
may also show the amount of freight to be paid. 
  
(8) Bill of Lading. This is a receipt given by the master of the ship to each shipper of 
a parcel of goods. It is usually made out in triplicate and one copy is retained by the 
master. It specifies the name of the master and the vessel, the name of the shipper and 
place of shipment, the name of the consignee and place of delivery, and the nature 
and amount of the goods. It is a document of title and can be negotiable so that the 
ultimate owner may not be known until the ship arrives at the discharge port. This 
attribute could have added to the workload of the Contraband Committee in any 
investigations.  
    
(9) Manifest. This is made up from the various bills of lading and is a schedule of the 
whole cargo containing the particulars set out in the bills of lading.  
 
(10) Bill of Health. The Bill of Health states to what port the ship is bound and a 
fresh one is necessary on leaving each and every port of call, it can form a useful 
source from which to corroborate the apparent destination of a vessel as indicated in 
the Bills of Lading.  
 
All the necessary information can be taken from these papers. If they show any 
inconsistency which might be lawful grounds for capture the vessel should be 
detained. If the ship is clearly innocent she should be released immediately.  
 
It rests with the commanding officer of the warship to decide whether the vessel 
visited should be detained. Where the evidence derived from the vessel herself, her 
cargo, her papers or her position affords him reasonable ground for believing her to be 
guilty, he should detain every vessel, whatever her nationality which: 
 Is guilty of spoilation of papers. 
 Carries false papers.    
Carries defective or irregular papers, without satisfactory explanation.4 
                                                 
4
 Hall, The Law of Naval Warfare  118 
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Midshipman Francis Poole R.N.R., has left a full description of the fire control arrangements 
aboard Alcantara which were replicated throughout the squadron: 
  
 I had a very interesting job ± in charge of the T.S. or Transmitting Station, the heart of the   
            gunnery system. The T.S. (Transmitting Station) was a large room two decks below the    
             navigating bridge. Originally the RIILFHU¶VTXDUWHUVLWKDGEHHQJXWWHGRXWIRUWKHSXUSRVH,Q 
             the centre was a table and chair (for me) and on the table was a range clock and a Dumaresq.      
            The only instruments I had to operate with. 
 
 $URXQGWKHVWHHOEXONKHDGZHUHVL[´LQGLDPHWHUIOH[LEOHVWHHOYRLFH-pipes, one for each gun   
            with a boy seaman voice-pipe operator manning each. Above my head was the voice-pipe  
            from the Gunnery Control Officer (G.C.O.) at his station on top of the bridge. He being the  
            brains of the gunnery system. 
 
 The range clock, 12 inches in diameter and six inches high, sat on a heavy rubber ring 
 to negative vibration. From it was taken the corrected ranges to be passed via the v.p. (Voice    
             pipe) operator to the sight-setter at each gun. Four on the foredeck, two each side and one each  
            side aft.  
 
            7KHUDQJHVZHUHµFXWLQ¶LQKXQGUHGVRI\DUGVRQWKHEODFNFORFNIDFH$QLQFKDSDUWDQGDW 
            right angles to the outer rim. A large black pointer, a little shorter than the diameter of the  
            clock, ZKLFKZDVDGMXVWDEOHZDVEDODQFHGLQWKHFHQWUHDQGLW¶VVSHHG actuated by the rate   
             (taken from the Dumaresq) and adjusted at the side of the clock.  The larger the rate the faster    
             the clock ran. As the needle circled, when it pointed to a  range that was the correct range to  
            send down to the guns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          Fig.63  A Range Clock 1 
                                  
 The Dumaresq (pronounced dumerrick after the naval officer who invented it) stood 
 alongside the clock. From it was taken the rate of speed for the clock and the deflection.   
7KHODWWHUEHLQJWKHDGMXVWPHQWWREHSODFHGRQWKHJXQVLJKWWRFRPSHQVDWHIRUWKHHQHP\¶V 
movement to the right or left of his line of bearing from us.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       Fig.64  A Typical Dumaresq  2  
                                                 
1
 Admiralty, Notes on Gunnery for Defensively Equipped Merchant Ships 55 
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 The data used to get these two were ± $ 2XU RZQ VKLS¶V VSHHG % -- the estimated 
 speed of the enemy  and  C ± WKHLQFOLQDWLRQRIWKHHQHP\¶VFRXUVHWRWKHULJKWRUOHIWRI 
 his line of bearing. If  head directly away, it would be zero. If at right angles to the left,  it  
             would be OH NINE OH LEFT (90 degrees) if 43 degrees to the right it would be OH FOUR  
             THREE RIGHT. 
 
 The Dumaresq was a light circular metal plate fitted on a heavy circular metal base, a little   
             over 12 inches in diameter, with criss cross lines cut in it. One set of lines were  read off for  
             the rate the other for the deflection. A heav\ZLGHLQYHUWHG³8´VKDSHGEDUwas secured over  
             the top marked plate with its centre six inches above it. On this were two small adjustable bars  
± one for our own speed and the other fRUWKHHQHP\¶VVSHHGDQGLQFOLQDWLRQ7KHVHZHUH  
connected to a vertical pointer which pointed down to the criss cross markings from which the 
rate and deflection were read off. 
    
 In ACTION the G.C.O. would first order me to start the clock (with no adjustments) 
to see if it was working correctly. He would then call down the initial range, which I put on 
the clock, then the data from the Dumaresq. In a matter of seconds I had read off  the rate and 
deflection from  the Dumaresq and informed him as I adjusted the clock  for the rate. He 
would then order ±SHOOT!  At that I would call out the ranges as the pointer came to them; 
actually a second or so before to allow for the time lag, plus the  deflection for the first one, 
such as ± Range FIVE FOUR DOUBLE OH (5400 yards)  ONE FIVE RIGHT ± SHOOT. 
This the v.p. operators passed down to the sightsetters standing on the right hand side of the 
guns, who repeated them as they adjusted their sights. Incidentally, when the ranges arrived at 
the highest on the clock face, by turning  a knurled knob, the next set of ranges were brought 
into sight.  
 
Meanwhile the gun-layers, seated on the left of the gun, adjusted their guns vertically to keep 
the cross wires of their telescopic sights on the target. The trainers, seated on the right of the 
gun, training it to the right or left to keep their cross wires on. When the  gun-layer saw both 
vertical and horizontal cross-wires on the target ± they pressed the trigger. 
 
 The reason for the order SHOOT instead of FIRE is obvious.3  Meanwhile I continued to call   
out the change of range. When the G.C.O. observed the fall of shot (splashes) from the salvo, 
if it was a straddle (all round the target) he would order SALVOES!  
           
At that the gun-layers would continue as fast as their guns were loaded and the cross wires on 
the target. 
  
 Should the salvo fall short, G.C.O. would make a correction upwards, such as ±  
UP EIGHT HUNDRED ± SHOOT!  Always an even hundred.  If it was over it would be 
DOWN EIGHT HUNDRED SHOOT! (800 yards).  If it fell to the right he would order a 
correction to the deflection of say ± LEFT TEN ± or whatever it was in knots to bring the guns 
back in line again. I would then call out DEFLECTION FIVE RIGHT ± applying the 
correction to the original deflection to be passed to the guns. At the same time adjust the 
correction to the deflection on the Dumaresq which would give a new rate which I 
immediately applied to the clock, informing the G.C.O. accordingly.   
 
Immediately I received a range correction I would adjust it on the outer superimposed  ring 
on the clock face marked in ranges of a hundred yards up or down as necessary.  Then with a 
small handle bring the original ranges on the clock face to agree with the  superimposed ring 
then continue to call out the ranges showing on the clock face. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
2
 Admiralty, Notes on Gunnery for Defensively Equipped Merchant Ships 52 
3
 The call FIRE will result in crew grabbing extinguishers, fire buckets and hose. The word is followed      
    ZLWKWKHORFDWLRQHJµ),5(LQWKHJDOOH\IODW¶6LQFHILUHFRXOGRFFXUDWDQ\WLPHWKHRUGHU6+227 
    is used to commence firing at Action Stations. 
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 This all may sound a little complicated but actually it was a simple operation taking very little 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
time and perfectly suitable for the type of Action we would be expected to fight. Why I have 
been so particular in describing it is because it actually proved its worth when WE DID GO 
INTO ACTION as you will read later.4 
 
7KLVZDVNQRZQDVWKHµEUDFNHW¶RUµVSRWWLQJ¶V\VWHP6ORZDQGWRUWXRXVWKRXJKLWPD\KDYH
seemed, Poole made the point that it was used at the Battle of Jutland but proved too slow for 
a battle with big ships.  
 
                                                 
4
 IWM  DS/MISC/98    Microfilm  Mid. Francis Poole  R.N.R.  H.M.S. Alcantara 16-20 
    Poole , born in Hartlepool in 1896, was an apprentice with a North East of England shipowner in  
    January,1914. He joined the Royal Navy in October, 1915 as a Midshipman R.N.R., after the    
    $GPLUDOW\KDGLQYLWHGDSSOLFDWLRQVIURP0HUFKDQW1DY\DSSUHQWLFHVZLWKRQH\HDU¶VVHDVHUYLFH 
    Attendance at a mess dinner in Chatham Barracks,  where he attended a gunnery course, had been a  
    cultural revelation for Poole.  Alcantara was his first naval ship and  must have been a huge contrast  
    with life in a tramp steamer. His service aboard Alcantara provided experiences more than many have  
    in a lifetime. (See also Chapter 6, page 157) 
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Part A    Warrant Analysis  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ship  
 
Commanding Officers 
No. 
Months  
Observed 
Total 
Warrants  
Read 
Monthly 
Average 
Read 
Alcantara         
Cdr. TE Wardle 
      10      18      1.8 
Almanzora        
Cpt. WD Church 
      26      42      1.6 
Alsatian           
Cpt. VEB Phillimore             1. 
Cpt. V Trewby   (Flag)          2. 
Cpt. HH Smith   (Flag)          3. 
      39       138      3.5 
Ambrose          
Cdr. CW Bruton                    1.    
Cdr. VL Bowring                  2.   
       14        19       1.4 
Andes                
Cdr. CWTrousdale                1. 
Cpt. GBW Young                  2. 
        31         51        1.7 
Arlanza             
Cpt.DT Norris                       1. 
Cpt.GM Marston                  2. 
        31         139         4.5 
Avenger           
Cdr. AL Ashby 
         9          15         1.7 
Caribbean        
(Ex Dunnotar Castle) 
Cdr. FH Walter 
         5            31        6.1 
Cedric                
Capt. RER Benson 
         15          31        2.1 
Changuinola     
Cdr HCCR Brocklebank 
         29          105        3.6 
Columbella              
(Ex  Columbia) 
Cpt. HLP Heard                     1. 
Cpt. A Bromley                     2. 
Cpt. HLWatt-Jones                3.  
Cpt. GE Corbett                     4.  
         3          9        3 
Ebro                 
Cdr. EVFR Dugmore            1. 
Cdr. CAW Wrightson           2. 
         24           98        4    
Eskimo              
Cdr. CW Trousdale 
         4           2        0.5 
Hilary                
Cdr. RH Bather                     1. 
Cpt. FW Dean                       2. 
         30           43        1.4 
Hildebrand       
Cpt. H Edwards                     1. 
Cpt. JF Grant-Dalton             2. 
Cpt. HC Watson                    3. 
         35           92        2.6 
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Part A    Warrant Analysis  (Cont.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                  
                                                                         Monthly Average  2.4 
 
The logbooks for Armadale Castle,Calyx, Digby, Gloucestershire, Moldavia,  
Oropesa, Orvieto, Teutonic, and Victorian show no entries for Warrants  being read.  
This must have been an oversight since it is difficult to believe there were no such 
offences on these ships. The logbooks for Bayano, Clan Mcnaughton, Laurentic and 
Viknor were not available for examination. 
 
Admiral Tupper assessed the discipline of the lower decks in the Squadron as 
excellent.1 
                                                 
1
  Tupper,  Reminiscences  265 
Ship  
 
Commanding Officers 
No. 
Months  
Observed 
Total 
Warrants 
Read 
Monthly 
Average 
Read 
Kildonan  Castle       
Cdr. HS Cardale                    1. 
Cpt. JF Warton                      2. 
        13        33        2.5  
Mantua             
Cpt. C  Tibbits                       1. 
Cpt. GM Marston                  2. 
Cpt. ABF Dawson                 3. 
        25       54        2.2 
Motagua 
Cpt. VEB Phillimore             1. 
Cpt.  JA Webster                   2. 
Cpt. LL Dundas                     3.  
        35         58        1.7 
Oceanic 
Cpt. W Slayter 
         1         3        3 
Orcoma 
Cdr. CW Bruton                    1. 
Cpt. RH Coppinger               2. 
         31          56        1.8 
Orotava 
Cdr. GE Corbett 
         35          63         1.8 
Otway 
Cpt. EL Booty                       1. 
Cpt. PH Colomb                    2. 
         30         59          1.9 
Patia 
Cpt. GW Vivian                    1. 
Cdr. RFH Hartland-Mahon   2. 
Cdr.VL Bowring                   3. 
Cdr. WG Howard                  4. 
         36          78        2.2 
Patuca  
Cdr. CH France-Hayhurst     1. 
Lt.Cdr. JH Nield                    2.  
Cdr. PG Brown                      3.  
Cdr.T Dannreuther                4. 
         35          72         2.1 
Virginian 
Cpt. GN Garnett                    1. 
Cdr. H.H.Smith                     2. 
          2           5        2.5  
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Part B    Courts Martial 2 
 
No. 3054                                                                        Court Martial 
 
Date of Trial  November 18-19,1914 HMS PRINCE GEORGE at Devonport  
 
Name   BLAIR, David  
Rank    Lieutenant, R.N.R.   
 
Name of Ship  OCEANIC 
 
Substance of Charge Preferred  Negligently or by default stranding or suffering to be  
                                                   stranded  
 
Sentence  Proved. Adjudged to be reprimanded. 
   
Page 6 
 
 
 
No. 3054                                                                         Court Martial 
 
Date of Trial  November 19,1914 HMS PRINCE GEORGE at Devonport  
 
Name   SMITH, Henry  
Rank    Commander, R.N.R.   
 
Name of Ship  OCEANIC 
 
Charge  Negligently or by default stranding or suffering to be stranded  
 
Sentence  Not proved. Acquitted. 
   
Page 6 
 
 
No. 3054                                                                         Court Martial 
 
Date of Trial  November 20,1914 HMS PRINCE GEORGE at Devonport  
 
Name   SLAYTER, William F.  
Rank     Captain, R.N.   
 
Name of Ship  OCEANIC 
 
Charge Negligently or by default stranding or suffering to be stranded  
 
Sentence  Not proved. Acquitted.   
 
Page 6 
 
 
                                                                                                                                              
 
2
 AL H.M.S.O. Officers tried by Naval Courts Martial and Disciplinary Court from  
        1 January 1914-31 December 1923  (London, 1923) Trial and page numbers quoted  
        in each case refer to this publication    
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Part B    Courts Martial  (Cont.) 
 
No. 3080                                                                         Court Martial 
 
Date of Trial  April 17, 1915       HMS EAGLE   
 
Name   ARMSTRONG John J.  
Rank    Engineer, R.N.R.   
 
Name of Ship  AMBROSE 
 
Charge   Act to the prejudice of good order and naval discipline in conversing in an  
               improper manner with the firemen and trimmers. 
 
Sentence Not proved. Acquitted. 
 
The Court were of opinion that the under-mentioned witnesses for the prosecution gave 
false evidence and conspired together to commit perjury:- 
Henry GRANT, Trimmer                               James DUFFY, Fireman 
:LOOLDP&255,*$17ULPPHU3DWULFN2¶)$5(//7ULPPHU 
David GRAHAM, Fireman    
    
Page 8 
 
 
No. 3238                                                                         Court Martial 
 
Date of Trial  April 17, 1915        
 
Name   WARDLE, Thomas E. and all the serving Officers and crew.  
Rank     Captain, R.N.   
 
Name of Ship  ALCANTARA 
 
Charge  7RLQTXLUHLQWRWKHORVVRI+LV0DMHVW\¶V6KLSALCANTARA 
 
Sentence 7KH&RXUWIRXQGWKDW+LV0DMHVW\¶V6KLSALCANTARA was sunk in action by 
     an enemy vessel, which was subsequently ascertained to be a German armed  
     raider. 
     Fire was opened by the enemy vessel over Norwegian Colours, which were 
     painted on her bow and quarter. The evidence was conflicting as to when the 
     German Naval Ensign was hoisted, but it is clear that it was flying shortly 
     after the action commenced. 
     7KH&RXUWZDVRIRSLQLRQWKDWWKH2IILFHUVDQGPHQRI+LV0DMHVW\¶V6KLS
     ALCANTARA showed promptitude and resource in the circumstances, and 
     fought their Ship in a creditable manner, until forced to abandon her by her 
     lying on her beam ends.  
     The Enemy Vessel was put out of action and abandoned by her crew. She 
     was afterwards sunk. 
     The Court found that no blame was attributable to Captain Thomas E.Wardle, 
     5R\DO1DY\DQGWKH2IILFHUVDQGFUHZRI+LV0DMHVW\¶V6KLSALCANTARA 
     for the loss of their ship, and acquitted them accordingly.    
    
Page 21 
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Part B    Courts Martial  (Cont.) 
 
No. 3415                                                                        Court Martial 
 
Date of Trial  November 21, 1916  
 
Name   DIXON, Joseph  
Rank     Lieutenant Commander, R.N.R.   
 
Name of Ship  HILDEBRAND 
 
Charge Drunk on board. 
 
Sentence  Pleaded guilty. Adjudged to be severely reprimanded and to be dismissed his 
      ship   
 
Page 41 
 
 
No. 3564                                                                         Court Martial 
 
Date of Trial  April 17, 1917 
 
Name   POMEROY, Harrison H.  
Rank     Assistant Paymaster, R.N.R.   
 
Name of Ship  CRESCENT late HILDEBRAND 
 
Charge First.      Wilfully and with intent to defraud, altering a material particular in the 
                ledger of HMS HILDEBRAND. 
             Second. Wilfully and with intent to defraud, making a false entry in the ledger    
                           of HMS HILDEBRAND. 
  Third.    Wilfully and with intent to defraud, omitting a material particular from 
                                        the ledger of HMS HILDEBRAND. 
             Fourth.  Wilfully and with intent to defraud, falsifying the Certificate of  
                           Payment to the Officers and crew of HMS HILDEBRAND. 
             Fifth.     Embezzlement.  
             Sixth.    Dissertion. 
  
Sentence  Accused pleaded guilty. Adjudged to be imprisoned without hard labour for  
                 12 calendar months. The Court directed that the clothes and effects which  
                 the accused might have left on board HMS HILDEBRAND should not be  
                 forfeited.  
 
Page 56 
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Part B    Courts Martial  (Cont.) 
 
 
No. 3584                                                                         Court Martial 
 
Date of Trial  June 14-15, 1917 
 
Name   MIDDLEMASS, James B.   
Rank     Temporary Midshipman, R.N.R.   
 
Name of Ship  PATIA 
 
Charge First.      Theft of the sum of £34-14s. the property of His Majesty the King. 
             Second. Returning on board from leave drunk. 
  Third.    Act to the prejudice of good order and naval discipline in telling a lie 
to the Commanding Officer of HMS PATIA, thereby obtaining leave                 
under false pretences. 
               
Sentence  Accused pleaded guilty to the second and third charges. First charge partly 
      proved, in as much as he stole the sum of £13-10s the property of His     
      Majesty. Accused adjudged to be imprisoned and kept to hard labour for 6 
      months, and to be dismissed with disgrace from H.M.Service. 
 
Page 56 
 
 
No. 3588                                                                        Court Martial 
 
Date of Trial  June 19, 1917  
 
Name   ASHBY, Arthur L., and all remaining surviving officers and crew of HMS  
             AVENGER  
Rank     Commander, R.N.   
 
Name of Ship  AVENGER 
 
Charge   To inquire into the loss of HMS AVENGER on 14th June 1917, and to try 
               Commander Arthur L. ASHBY R.N., and all the remaining surviving officers 
    and crew of that vessel 
 
Sentence The Court found that on the 14th June 1917, HMS AVENGER was struck by a 
     torpedo fired from an enemy submarine, and that as a result of the damage 
     caused by the explosion the ship sank. The Court further found that no    
     blame attached to Commander Arthur L.Ashby, R.N., or any of the remaining 
     surviving officers and crew, and acquitted them accordingly; that special 
     precautions were in force to provide safety against submarine attack and that 
     after being struck, everything possible was done to try and save the ship. The 
    Court was also of opinion that the conduct of all on board was in accordance 
    with the tradition of the service, and that the organisation and discipline were 
    of a high order. 
 
Page 58 
 
 
 
Discipline and Punishments Records.                                                      Appendix 12. 
 
 295 
 
Part B    Courts Martial  (Cont.) 
 
 
No. 3643                                                                        Court Martial 
 
Date of Trial  July 25, 1917  
 
Name   BALLARD, James  
Rank    Gunner, R.N.   
 
Name of Ship  COLUMBELLA 
 
Charge Drunk on board. 
 
Sentence  $FFXVHGSOHDGHGJXLOW\$GMXGJHGWRIRUIHLWPRQWK¶VVHQLRULW\, to be    
      severely reprimanded and to be dismissed his ship.   
 
Page 64 
 
 
 
No. 3681                                                                       Court Martial 
 
Date of Trial  September 28, 1917  
 
Name   GEE, William S. 
Rank     Temporary Acting Lieutenant, R.N.R.  
 
Name of Ship  MANTUA 
 
Charge First.      Drunk on board. 
             Second. Conduct unbecoming the character of an officer in using obscene and 
                disgusting language in the presence of ladies. 
  Third.    Fraudulently converted to his own use and benefit part of a sum of 
                money with which he had been entrusted.  
             Fourth.  Act to the prejudice of good order and naval discipline in erasing             
                from the Daily Wine Book of the Wardroom Mess entries showing 
                liquor consumed by him. 
             Fifth.     Act to the prejudice of good order and naval discipline in directing two 
                Wardroom Wine Stewards, Mercantile Marine, not to enter liquor, 
                which he had consumed, against him in the Wine Book.  
              
Sentence  Accused pleaded guilty to the first, second, fourth and fifth charges. Third 
      charge not proved. Accused adjudged to EHGLVPLVVHG+LV0DMHVW\¶V6HUYLFH 
 
Page 64 
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Part B    Courts Martial  (Cont.) 
 
No. 3700                                                                        Disciplinary Court 
 
Date of Trial  August 11, 1917  
 
Name   OWEN, Thomas F.  
Rank    Temporary Engineer Sub-Lieutenant R.N.R.  
 
Name of Ship  MANTUA 
 
Charge  Wilful disobedience of lawful command. 
 
Sentence  &KDUJHSURYHG$FFXVHGDGMXGJHGWRIRUIHLWPRQWK¶VVHQLRULW\DQGWREH 
      severely reprimanded.   
 
Page 70 
 
 
 
No. 3705                                                                        Disciplinary Court 
 
Date of Trial  August 11, 1917  
 
Name    JONES Robert V.  
Rank    Temporary Engineer Sub-Lieutenant R.N.R.  
 
Name of Ship  ANDES 
 
Charge  First.     Using insulting language to his superior officer. 
             Second.  Drunk on board 
 
Sentence  First charge proved. Second charge not proved. Accused adjudged to be 
      severely reprimanded and to be dismissed his ship. 
 
Page 70 
 
 
 
No. 3729                                                                         Court Martial 
 
Date of Trial  October 24, 1917   
 
Name   LAMB, Ernest N.  
Rank    Temporary Warrant Telegraphist, R.N.R.   
 
Name of Ship  ARLANZA 
 
Charge   First.      Improperly leaving his ship. 
               Second. Absence without leave. 
               Third.   Negligently performing the duty imposed upon him.  
 
Sentence  First and second charges proved. Third charge not proved. 
                 Accused adjudged to be reprimanded and to be dismissed his ship. 
   
Page 70 
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Part B    Courts Martial  (Cont.) 
 
No. 3740                                                                        Court Martial 
 
Date of Trial  November 12, 1917  
 
Name   BROWN Percy G., and all the surviving officers and crew of  
  HMS CHAMPAGNE 
Rank    Acting Captain, R.N.   
 
Name of Ship  CHAMPAGNE 
 
Charge  To enquire into the cause of the loss of HMS CHAMPAGNE and to try Acting 
   Captain Percy G. Brown R.N. and all the surviving officers and crew of that 
   ship. 
 
Sentence The Court found that on the 9th October the CHAMPAGNE was struck by a 
     torpedo from an enemy submarine, the explosion causing the engine and 
     boiler rooms to be flooded, breaking all steam pipes and stopping main     
     engines and auxiliary machinery, and putting W/T and auxiliary sets out of 
     action.  About 15 minutes later a second torpedo struck the ship and broke 
     her in half, the vessel sinking almost at once. 
 
     The Court was of opinion that the ship was well organised, and was only 
     abandoned when absolutely necessary. The Court considered that no blame  
     was attached to Acting Captain Percy George BROWN R.N., or any of the 
     other serving officers and crew and therefore acquitted them of the same.  
     The Court further considered that the conduct and behaviour of the officers 
     and men of HMS CHAMPAGNE were all that could be desired and in    
     accordance with the best traditions of the service.  They especially desired to 
     record the conduct of Acting Captain Percy George Brown who remained on 
     board until his ship sank under him; also that of Able Seaman Oliver WARD 
     R.N.V.R., Able Seaman RYAN R.N.V.R., Leading Seaman Watkins R.N.R.    
                and Leading Seaman William John COX R.N.R. (of whom the last-named   
                was the only survivor), when after the order to abandon the ship had been  
                given, volunteered and manned one of the 6 inch guns and took offensive  
                action against the submarine when the ship was actually sinking.   
 
 Page 74 
 
 
 
No. 3747                                                                        Court Martial 
 
Date of Trial  November 26, 1917  
 
Name    BICKERSTETH Roy  
Rank     Temporary Midshipman R.N.R.  
 
Name of Ship  ANDES 
 
Charge  Theft 
 
Sentence  &KDUJHSURYHG$FFXVHGDGMXGJHGWREHGLVPLVVHG+LV0DMHVW\¶V6HUYLFH 
 
Page 75 
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Part B    Courts Martial  (Cont.) 
 
 
No. 3827                                                                        Court Martial 
 
Date of Trial  January 19, 1917  
 
Name    HART,  Ronald G.  
Rank     Lieutenant R.N.R.  
 
Name of Ship  ALMANZORA 
 
Charge  Drunk on board. 
 
Sentence  Charge not proved. Accused acquitted.  
 
Page 86 
 
------------------------- 
 
The records above were extracted from µ2IILFHUVWULHGE\1DYDO&RXUWV0DUWLDODQG
Disciplinary Court from 1 January 1914-'HFHPEHU¶.  
 
During the period 22 August 1914 and 31 December 1917 covering the lifetime of the 
Tenth Cruiser Squadron there were a total of 737 courts recorded.  Of this total, some 
301 involved R.N. officers whilst the remaining 436 involved Reserve officers. Those 
involving Reserve officers were mainly charges involving drink and/or absence from 
duty and the offenders were predominantly trawler skippers. 
 
There were 19 courts which affected Tenth Cruiser Squadron officers, charged for 
many different reasons.  Some are quite tragic and some sentences seem harsh by 
WRGD\¶VVWDQGDUGVEXWWKH\ZHUH intended to send a clear message to all.     
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Detailed economic statistics have not been included in this paper which is primarily 
concerned with the daily execution of the patrols of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron.  The 
following sources will provide figures which may assist researchers concerned with this 
aspect of the blockade. 
 
1. Bell,A.C. A History of the Blockade of Germany and the Countries Associated with  
                    her in the Great War, Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey, 1914-1918  
                    (London, 1937).  
 
                    This work is the official account of the blockade and was commissioned by   
                    the Historical Section, Committee of Imperial Defence. It was a classified   
                    document when written. Copies have been traced to the National Maritime   
                    Museum and the Admiralty Library, Portsmouth. It can be considered the  
                    official history and has the most extensive and detailed statistics of the  
                    publications listed here. 
 
2. Consett, M.W.W.P.,The Triumph Of Unarmed Forces (1914-1918) (London,1923) 
    
                     This author served as the British Naval Attaché in Sweden throughout the    
                      War. His text has several statistical tables as well as extensive appendices 
                      dealing with trade affecting all the bordering neutral countries. For  
                      researchers unable to access Bell it is a good substitute. Some opinions  
                      were seen by his contemporaries as contentious.    
 
3. Parmalee, M  Blockade and Seapower (London, 1924) 
 
                      This American author was a member of the American delegation to the 
                      Allied Blockade Committee and held other official post connected with   
                       the blockade. Some statistical tables are used to support his account of  
                       the blockade.  
 
4  Guichard, L., The Naval Blockade 1914-1918  (New York,  1930)  
 
                       This author served in the French Navy and was attached to the 
                       Historical  Section of the French Ministry of Marine. Some statistics 
                       are included to illustrate the text.    
 
5.    Fayle, C.E., Seaborne Trade  Vols 1,2 & 3 + maps  (Nashville, Reprint 1997) 
 
              This series includes extensive statistics mainly connected with  
                         British shipping losses throughout the whole war and also includes 
                         tables listing the imports of major commodities as the war progressed.                        
 
-------------------- 
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1. Statistics extracted from Admiral 10th Cruiser Squadron Weekly Reports. 1 
 
1915 Reports in period 
from  
14 February to 26 
December 
Report 
Averages 
 Extremes 
Highest 
In Period 
Lowest 
Total Ships in Squadron 22  24 17 
On Patrol 13  17 8 
In Transit 2  4 0 
In Port  (Coaling or refit) 6  11 3 
Vessels Intercepted 57  115 11 
Vessels Sent In 14   29 4 
 
1916 Reports in period 
from  
2 January to  31 December 
Report 
Averages 
 Extremes 
Highest 
In Period    
   Lowest 
Total Ships in Squadron 21  24 20 
On Patrol 11  17 5 
In Transit 3  6 0 
In Port (Coaling or refit) 7  17 3 
Vessels Intercepted 60  162 17 
Vessels Sent In 17  72 5 
 
1917 Reports in period 
from 
7 January to  22 April  
Report 
Averages 
 Extremes 
Highest 
In Period    
   Lowest 
Total Ships in Squadron 23  25 8 
On Patrol 11  14 8 
In Transit 2  4 0 
In Port (Coaling or refit) 11  22 7 
Vessels Intercepted 43  65 23 
Vessels Sent In 10  16 2 
 
Comment. 
 
The total interceptions achieved were 12,979 and this was 95.3% of the possible 
number. A further 2,039 vessels voluntarily reported to examination ports rather than 
attempt to evade the blockade.2  The tables above have been constructed to show the 
average and extreme figures for the Squadrons activity.   
 
2. Activities of H.M.S. Changuinola  1915 & 1916. 3  
 
Changuinola  was chartered from Elders & Fyffes and was one of the smaller armed 
merchant cruisers in the squadron. The tables below are from figures recorded by 
Commander Brocklebank and  give a good insight into the workload of a single ship. 
                                                 
1
 Compiled from reports cited in  Grainger, The Maritime Blockade of Germany in the Great War    
2
 Tupper, R. Reminiscences  267  
3
 Data extracted from the diaries of Capt. Brocklebank at 
   IWM  PP/MCR/53  Capt.  H.C.R. Brocklebank RN  H.M.S. Changuinola      
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H.M.S. Changuinola  Boarding Statistics 
 
Year    1915 1916 
Total Ships Boarded 
Comprising: 
159 175 
Steam 136   69 
Sail   23   20 
Fishing Vessels  
   ?   86  
   
Total Ships Sent In 
Comprising: 
  50   59 * 
Steam   48 
   ? 
Sail     2 
   ? 
   
Allowed to Proceed 
Comprising: 
109 116 
Fishing Craft   31 
   ? 
Trading Vessels   78 
   ? 
* With Armed Guard 
 
H.M.S. Changuinola  Steaming Statistics 
 
Year  1915 1916 
Distance Run 69,991.5 69,446.0 
Hours under Steam   6,170.9   5,994.9 
Average Speed (knots)        11.4        11.6 
Nights in Harbour         94      ? 
Coal Consumed  (tons)          ? 18,741 
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jSUPPLEMENT To The London Gazette Of FRIDAY, the 6th of AUGUST, 1915 
Admiralty, 7th August, 1915 
 
       The KING has been graciously pleased to 
give orders for the following appointments to 
the Distinguished Service Order and for the 
award of the Distinguished Service Cross to the 
under-mentioned Officers in recognition of 
their services in the Patrol Cruisers since the 
outbreak of war:- 
 
To be Companions of the Distinguished Service 
Order. 
Captain Hugh Lindsay Patrick Heard, R.N. 
Captain George Trewby, R.N. 
Captain Hugh Edwards, R.N. 
Commander Edmund Outram, R.N. 
Lieutenant-Commander Frank Morgan Main, 
R.D., R.N.R. 
Lieutenant-Commander Henry Philip Basden 
Smith, R.D., R.N.R. 
Lieutenant-Commander Sidney Kenrick Bacon, 
R.N.R. 
Chief Engineer Robert Wilson, R.N.R. 
Chief Engineer Elias Stephenson Dixon, R.N.R. 
 
To receive the Distinguished Service Cross 
Lieutenant Samuel Bolton, R.N.R. 
Lieutenant Bernard Herbert Symns, R.N.R. 
Lieutenant Percy Reginald Vaughan, R.N.R. 
Lieutenant (Acting) Herbert Spencer, R.N.R. 
Lieutenant (Acting) Charles Walter Cartwright, 
R.N.R. 
Lieutenant (Acting) Edwin Alexander Stuart, 
R.N.R. 
Lieutenant (Acting) Robert Hobson, R.N.R. 
Warrant Telegraphist Samuel Lemon, R.N.R. 
 
The following awards have also been made:-  
 
To receive the Distinguished Service Medal 
Chief Petty Officer Alfred Treadway, R.F.R. 
    O.N. 129947. 
Chief Petty Officer William Thomas Lobb, 
    O.N. 159615. 
Acting Chief Petty Officer William James     
    Shilcott, O.N. 179902. 
Chief Petty Officer Edward Thomas Hardy, 
    O.N. 159872. 
Chief Shipwright Francis Felix Quin,  
    O.N. 138136. 
Colour-Serjeant William Seabrook, R.M.L.I. 
    Ply./7782  
Colour-Serjeant Thomas Boffey, R.M.L.I. 
    Ply./9579 
Petty Officer, 1st Class, John Hazard Cole, 
   O.N. 165163 
Petty Officer Telegraphist Henry George      
    Brewater, O.N. 240203 
 
 
 
 
Petty Officer, 2nd Class, William Dalley Harris 
    O.N. 170438 
Petty Officer, 1st Class, George Jenkins, R.F.R., 
    O.N. 111302 
Petty Officer James Packham, O.N. D/175674 
Petty Officer Henry Prince Skedgel,  
    O.N. 213825   
Petty Officer, 2nd Class, Richard Putt, R.F.R. 
    O.N. 144205 
Leading Seaman Charles Frederick Summers, 
    O.N. D/C.S. 209276 
Leading Seaman Joseph Lesslie, R.N.R., 
    No. 2998 B 
Leading Seaman Timothy McCarthy,  
    O.N. 203062 
Leading Seaman Alexander H. Dundas, R.F.R. 
    O.N. 199495 
Leading Seaman William Downing, 
    O.N. 207726 
Leading Seaman Bernard Squibb, R.F.R., 
    O.N. J 603 
Leading Seaman Albert Jarvie, R.N.R., 
    O.N. 3688 C. 
Leading Seaman James Magnus Johnson, 
R.N.R.,  O.N. 2049 D. 
Corporal George Finch, R.M.L.I., Ply./14220 
Private William Reynolds, R.M.L.I., 
    Ply./6548 
Able Seaman Leander Green, R.N.R.,  
(Newfoundland), No.992 X. 
Seaman William Smith, R.N.R., No.4041 A. 
Engine-Room Artificer Joseph Arthur Ander-      
    son, R.N.R., O.N. E.C. 120. 
Engine-Room Artificer Thomas Dale, R.N.R., 
    O.M. E.A. 1516. 
Engine-Room Artificer Alexander Miller   
    Gemmell, R.N.R., O.N. E.B. 130. 
Engine-Room Artificer George Albert Cole, 
    R.N.R., O.N. E.A. 1521 
Engine-Room Artificer Robert Tytler, 
    R.N.V.R., (Tyneside Division), O.N. 5/237. 
Leading Fireman Thomas Miller, B.T. No. 
    787887 
Leading Fireman Edward Cropper, B.T. No. 
    692566 
 
    The Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets, 
speaks in the highest terms of the manner in 
which the Patrol Cruisers have performed their 
arduous task, especially during the winter 
months under exceptionally bad weather 
conditions. They have suffered severe losses 
both in Officers and men, and have been 
exposed continually to dangers from mines and 
submarines.     
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SUPPLEMENT To The London Gazette Of FRIDAY, the 31st of MARCH, 1916. 
 
CENTRAL CHANCERY OF THE ORDERS 
                     OF  KNIGHTHOOD           
 
Petty Officer, 2nd Class, Percy Henery Whale,     
 
              /RUG&KDPEHUODLQ¶V2IILFH 
                  6W-DPHV¶V3DODFH6: 
                     15th March, 1916. 
 
The KING has been graciously pleased to give 
orders for the following appointment to the  
Most Honourable Order of the Bath in 
recognition of the services of the under-
mentioned Officer during the War:- 
 O.N., 191158 (R.F.R., Ch/B.5831). 
Leading Seaman George Boon, O.N., 172758 
   (R.F.R., Dev/B.1770). 
Senior Reserve Attendant Philip Charles Grills, 
   O.N., M/9854, R.N.A.S.B.R. 
Able Seaman Cluny Cameron Campbell,    
   O.N.,191210 (R.F.R.,Ch/B.7645). 
Leading Seaman Andrew Seaward (R.N.R., 
7013 A.). 
Serjeant William Samuel Elliott, R.M.L.I. 
  To be an Additional Member of the Military 
Division of the Third Class, or Companions:- 
Commodore Robert Edmund Ross Benson, 
R.N. 
     
        Admiralty,S.W., 31st March, 1916 
  
   The KING has been graciously pleased to give 
orders for the following appointments to the 
Distinguished Service Order and for the award of the 
Distinguished Service Cross to the undermentioned 
Officers in recognition of their services in the Patrol 
Cruisers, under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir 
Dudley R.S.De Chair, K.C.B.,M.V.O., during the 
period ending the 31st December, 1915:- 
 
To be Companions of the Distinguished Service  
                                 Order 
Fleet Paymaster Vincent Adrian Lawford, R.N. 
Captain Edward Gillespie, R.M.L.I. 
 
To receive the Distinguished Service Cross 
Lieutenant Marshal Llewelyn Clarke, R.N. 
Acting Lieutenant Percy Palfrey Crawford, 
R.N.R. 
Probationary Midshipman Cyril Assafrey 
Bamford, R.N.R. 
 
The following awards have also been made:- 
 
To receive the Distinguished Service Medal 
Chief Petty Officer John Mildon, O.N.,145115 
    (R.F.R., Dev/A.3659). 
Chief Petty Officer John Willey, O.N.,117899 
   (R.F.R., Po/A.1137). 
Chief Petty Officer Henry Charles Endacotte, 
   O.N.,121488 (R.F.R., Ch/A.998). 
Master-at-Arms Frank Sprake, O.N., 150887 
Chief Yeoman of Signals John Burnard Gunn, 
   O.N.,189705. 
Petty Officer, 1st Class, John Hutchison Turner, 
   O.N., 165656 (R.F.R., Ch/B.3910). 
Petty Officer, 1st Class Arthur Hodges, O.N., 
    148458. 
Petty Officer, 1st Class, Robert Niven Ritchie,  
  O.N., 118025 (R.F.R., Po/A 1900).  
Petty Officer, 2nd Class, Alexander Kerr, 
  O.N.,126018 (R.F.R., Dev/A.1718). 
   (R.F.R., Ply/1499). 
Seaman Albert Gregory, R.N.R., X719 
(Newfoundland). 
Greaser James Barrett (Mercantile Rating). 
 
   The following Officers and men have been 
mentioned in despatches by Rear-Admiral Sir 
Dudley De Chair for good services in the Patrol 
Cruisers:- 
 
Commander Eric Valentine Frederic Radclyffe 
Dugmore, R.N.  
Engineer Commander Thomas Pierce Pover, 
R.N.R. 
Staff Surgeon Robert Bernard Scribner, R.N. 
Midshipman Peter Booth Clarke, R.N.R.  
Probationary Midshipman Sidney Albert   
   Bagley, R.N.R. 
Chief Petty Officer William John Henry Worth,  
   O.N., 150654., Dev/A. 4247). 
Master-at-Arms George John Marsh, O.N.,   
   183125. 
Petty Officer, 1st Class, Philip Arthur Grandin,  
    O.N., 139364 (R.F.R., Po/A. 4183). 
Leading Signalman Herbert Henry Thompson,  
   O.N., 236433. 
Leading Seaman Daniel Keggin, R.N.R.,  
   2025 C 
2nd Writer William Paecy Jones (Mercantile  
   Rating) 
Seaman Murdo McKay, R.N.R., 2769 B. 
Able Seaman Robert Reginald Lawrence,  
    R.N.V.R., O.N., London/9/2346.  
Seaman George Boutcher, R.N.R.,  
   (Newfoundland), 964 X. 
Seaman Edward James Woodrow, R.N.R.,  
   1883 D. 
Able Seaman Henry Joseph Jordan,  
   O.N., 194113 (R.F.R., Dev/B.4200).  
Leading Fireman George Hooper (Mercantile 
Rating) 
Fireman Sidney Birch (Mercantile Rating) 
Fireman Charles Davies (Mercantile Rating) 
Serjeant William Kenyon, R.M.L.I. Ply/10230 
Private Thomas Simpson, R.M.L.I. Ch/14282 
    (R.F.R., Ch/B.1734) 
Private Henry James Fawkes, R.M.L.I.   
   Ch/15475 
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SUPPLEMENT  To   The London Gazette Of FRIDAY, the 20th of APRIL, 1917
         Admiralty, S.W.,  21st April, 1917 
 
 
   The KING has been graciously pleased to 
give orders for the following appointments to 
the Distinguished Service Order and for the 
award of the Distinguished Service Cross to the 
under-mentioned Officers in recognition of 
their services in the Patrol Cruisers, under the 
command of Vice-Admiral Reginald 
G.O.Tupper, C.B., C.V.O., during the period 1st 
July- 31st December, 1916:- 
 
To be Companions of the Distinguished Service 
Order. 
                                                                                      
Capt. Humphrey Hugh Smith, R.N. 
Eng.Cdr Walter Jordan, R.N.R. 
 
To receive the Distinguished Service Cross. 
Asst. Payr. (now Payr.) Frank Lankester Horsey  
R.N. 
Lieut. Howard Uncles, R.N.R. 
Mid. Thomas Edwin Hunter Grove, R.N.R. 
 
To receive the Distinguished Service Medal 
C.P.O. William John Curley Poole (alias Wil- 
    iam John Curley), O.N.133945 (R.F.R.,  
    Dev./A2852). 
P.O., 1st Cl., Arthur Banfield James, O.N.    
    189089(R.F.R., Dev./B1202).   
P.O. William Henry Baker, O.N. 163292 (Po). 
P.O. Ernest Knight, O.N. 198006 (R.F.R.,   
    Po./B5341). 
Ldg. Sea. Howard Edward Osgood, O.N.  
    236853 (Po.). 
Ldg. Sea. George Francis Reddings, R.N.R., 
    O.N. 2702A 
Sea. Charles William Victor Potter, R.N.R., 
    O.N. 4599A 
Ldg. Sig. William Thomas Isaac, O.N. 184506 
    (R.F.R., Dev./B636). 
Ldg. Sig. Edgar Charles Saunders, O.N.  
    124595 (Dev.). 
Ch. Arm. William Henry Harrington, O.N. 
    143238 (Ch.). 
M.A.A. George Francis Cook, O.N. 121490 
    (R.F.R.,  Po./16833. 
Lce.-Corpl. Reginald Dennis Hale, R.M.L.I., 
    No. Po./16833 
Pte. Richard Burns, R.M.L.I., No.Po./8167 
Ch. Carp. Alexandere R.Fraser (Mercantile  
    Rating). 
Ldg. Fireman Robert Charles James (Mer- 
    cantile Rating). 
Donkeyman Archibald McDonald (Mercantile 
    Rating). 
 
The following Officers and men have been 
mentioned in despatches by Vice-Admiral 
Reginald G.O.Tupper, C.B., C.V.O., for good 
service in the Patrol Cruisers:-  
Eng.Cdr. George Thompson Greig, R.N.R. 
Asst.Payr. Jack Barton , R.N.R. 
Sub-Lieut. Charles John Leonard Haywood, 
    R.N.R. 
Sub-Lieut. Arthur Mallorie Coleman, R.N.R. 
Sub-Lieut. William Mill Ruxton, R.N.R.   
C.P.O. Jeremiah Wafer, O.N. 140125 
    (R.F.R.,Po./A3089).  
P.O., 1st Cl., Thomas James Bailey, O.N. 
    140715 (R.F.R., Po./A3388). 
P.O. William Oliver. O.N. 198505 (R.F.R., 
Po./B5763). 
Ldg. Sea. James Savage, O.N. 199651 (Po.). 
Ldg. Sea. John Mackenzie, R.N.R., O.N. 2303D 
Act. Ldg. Sea. Edward Henry Shute, R.N.V.R.,  
    O.N. 2636 (Clyde) 
A.B. Ernest Bennett, O.N. 209614 (R.F.R.,  
    Ch./B4946). 
A.B. John Frederick Gaisford, O.N. 192325 
    (R.F.R., Dev./B3059). 
Sea. Arthur Evans, R.N.R., O.N. 5093A. 
Sea. Ence Ryan, R.N.R. (Newfoundland), 
    O.N. 711X 
Yeo. Sigs. William Sidney Austin, O.N.204967 
    (R.F.R., Ch./B10156) 
Elect.Art., 4th Cl., Edward Brooks, O.N. 
    M.10794 (Ch.). 
Ch.Arm. Edwin Norris, O.N. 114281 (Po.). 
Lce.-Corpl. Frederick Charles Louis Wye, 
    R.M.L.I., N0. Po./19906 
Ldg. Fireman William Purseglove (Mercantile 
    Rating). 
Ch. Carp. Alfred Martin (Mercantile Rating). 
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SUPPLEMENT To The London Gazette Of Tuesday, the 18th JUNE, 1918
Admiralty, S.W.,  21st June, 1918 
 
HONOURS  FOR SERICE IN PATROL CRUISERS  
The KING has been graciously pleased to give 
orders for the following honour, decorations 
and medals for services in the Patrol Cruisers, 
under the command of Vice-Admiral Reginald 
G.O.Tupper, K.C.B., C.V.O., and Vice-Admiral 
Sir Montague E. Browning, K.C.B., C.V.O., 
during the period 1st January 
to  31st December, 1917:- 
 
To be Companions of the Distinguished Service   
                               Order.                                                                      
Lieut.-Cdr. Harry Thring Bennett, R.N. 
 
To receive the Distinguished Service Cross. 
Lieut. Joseph Arthur Wallis, R.N.R.  
Sub-Lieut. Charles John Leonard Hayward, 
    R.N.R. 
Asst. Payr. Thomas Johnston Elliot, R.N.R. 
 
To receive the Distinguished Service Medal 
Ord.Sea. Benjamin Arnold, R.N.V.R., O.N. 
     (Tyneside), Z10332. 
Ldg.Sea. Arthur Ayer, O.N. 184080 (R.F.R. 
     Ch./B3776). 
Sig. Thomas Edward Burrows, R.N.V.R., 
    O.N. (Mersey), Z1968 
A.B. David V. Cargill, O.N. 189843 (R.F.R. 
    Ch./B6101). 
Sea. Morris Cooper, R.N.R., O.N. 7373A. 
Ldg. Sea. John Ferguson, R.N.R., O.N. 
    1928C 
A.B. John Frederick Gaisford, O.N. 192325 
    (R.F.R. Dev./B3059 
Ldg. Sea. Daniel Keggin, R.N.R., O.N.2025C  
M.A.A. George Ledson, O.N.128993 (R.F.R. 
    Po./A2203). 
Ldg. Sea. William Leslie, R.N.R., O.N.2008D 
Sea. Michael Lynch, R.N.R., O.N. 2486G 
P.O. Charles Edward Marjoram, O.N. 189641 
    (Po.). 
1st Engmn. Joseph Van Sertima. 
Pte. John Wilson, R.M.L.I., No. Po./18744 
     
The following Officers and men have been 
mentioned in despatches:-  
Capt. (Cdre., 2nd Class) Contland Herbert 
    Simpson, R.N.R. (Rear-Adml., retd.) 
Capt. Henry Boyle Townshend Somerville, 
    R.N. 
Capt. Frederic Aubrey Whitehead, R.N. 
Capt. William Drummond Church, R.N. 
Capt. Victor Gallafent Gurner, R.N. 
Capt. William Bowden Smith, R.N. 
Cdr. (actg. Capt.) Godfrey Edwin Corbett, 
    R.N. 
Cdr. (actg. Capt.) Thomas Acland Williams, 
   R.N. 
Cdr. Harry Tylden Mosse, R.N. 
Eng-Cdr. James Henry Barber, R.N. 
Cdr. Alexander Rennie, R.N.R. 
Cdr. Frederic Ernest Storey, R.D., R.N.R.   
Eng-Cdr. Claud Lapsley Stewart, R.N.R. 
Lieut.-Cdr. (actg. Cdr.). Harold Dallas Adair- 
    Hall, R.N. 
Lieut.-Cdr. (actg. Cdr.) Henry George Kendall,    
    R.N.R. 
Lieut.-Cdr. Jehoiada Jeafferson Brewer, R.N. 
Lieut.-Cdr. Arthur Douglas Harry Dibben, 
    R.N. 
Payr. (actg. Staff Payr.) Arthur Collett Painter 
    R.N. 
Lieut.-Cdr Alexander Riddel, R.N.R. 
Lieut. (actg. Lieut.-Cdr.) John Easton Nicol, 
    R.N.V.R. 
The Revd. Alexius Calderbank (Roman  
    Catholic Chaplain) 
Lieut. Bertram Harold Davies, R.N.R. 
Lieut. Edwin Frederick McLeod, R.N.R. 
Lieut. David Alexander Jack, R.N.R.  
Lieut. Alexander Henderson Boyd, R.N.R. 
Lieut. John Manford McEwan, R.N.V.R. 
Lt. John Alexander Douglas, R.N.V.R. 
Payr. Reginald Stephen Willoughby, R.N.R. 
Actg. Lieut. George Raleigh Gray Worcester 
    R.N.R. 
Actg. Lieut. Thomas Frank Balkwill, R.N.R. 
Asst. Payr. Peter Clark Ingram, R.N.R. 
Ch.Carp. (tempy. Warrt. Offr.) Frank     
    Gallagher, M.M. 
C.P.O. John Edward Addicott, O.N. 180883  
    (Dev.). 
Greaser William Allen, M.M.R., No. 788027 
Ldg. Sea. Alfred Dunford Ashdown, O.N. 
    201935 (R.F.R. Po./B4812). 
C.P.O. Stephen Bible, O.N. 134636 (R.F.R. 
    Po./A2801). 
Sto. 1st Cl., Clive Bradley, O.N.S.S. 108758 
    (R.F.R. Po./B6919). 
Sto. 1st Cl., Harry Capewell, O.N. 104331 
    (R.F.R. Po./B4934). 
P.O.James Clements, O.N. 229164 (Dev.). 
Sea. Abraham Collings, R.N.R. (Newfound- 
    land), O.N. 1179X). 
Ldg. Sea. Richard John Francis, O.N. 201202 
    (R.F.R. Ch./B3686). 
Sea. Michael Floody, R.N.R., O.N. 3171B 
Actg. Ch. Yeo. Sigs. Thomas Hannaford, O.N. 
     185636 (Dev.). 
Pte. Leslie George Ireland, R.M.L.I., No. 
      Ply./20063. 
Ord. Sea. Charles Lambert, O.N. J32946 (Dev.). 
Sea. Donald McLeod, R.N.R., O.N. 4220B 
Sergt. William Henry Middleton, R.M.L.I., No. 
       Ply./14254 
Elect.Art., 2nd Cl., Arthur Edwin Parker,  
        O.N. M1709 (Dev.). 
C.P.O. Frederick Reeds, O.N. 130964 (R.F.R. 
         Po./A2732). 
P.O. William Staples, R.N.R., O.N. 3681B. 
E.R.A., 3rd Cl.,Frederick Charles Valentine 
         Waldern, O.N. M6183 (Dev.). 
2nd Engmn.Oliver Wilkinson 
C.P.O. John Willey, D.S.M., O.N. 117899 
         (R.F.R. Po./A1137). 
P.O.Teleg. John Henry Worsley, O.N. 240204 (Dev)
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1
 Source: Tupper Reminiscences  288 
2
 Oceanic included for completeness 
Ship 1  
 
 
Gross 
Tons. 
Date 
of 
Loss  
Cause of Loss Killed 
of 
Officers 
Or Died 
Wounds 
         Men 
Viknor 
(Ex Viking) 
5,386 13.1.15 Lost off Irish Coast 22 272 
Clan 
MacNaughton 
5,000  3.2.15 
 
Believed to have 
foundered in N.Atlantic 
20 257 
Bayano 
 
5,948 11.3.15 
 
Sunk by Submarine off 
Corsewall Pt. Galloway 
15 182 
India 
 
7,940 
 
 8.8.15 
 
Sunk by Submarine off 
Norwegian Coast 
10 113 
Alcantara 
 
16,034 29.2.16 Sunk in action with the 
raider  Greif in  
 /DW¶1 
/RQJ¶( 
5 69 
Hilary 6,329 25.5.17 
 
Sunk by Submarine in 
Atlantic 
-- 4 
Avenger 
 
15,000 14.6.17 Torpedoed by U-69 in 
N. Atlantic on passage 
to Scapa Flow 
-- 1 
Otway 
 
12,077 23.7.17 Sunk by Submarine in 
N. Atlantic 
-- 10 
Oropesa 
(Re-named 
Champagne) 
5,360 9.10.17 
 
Sunk by Submarine in 
Irish Sea. 
5 50 
Totals  9 
$0&¶V 
78,235 --------- 6 Sunk by Submarines 
1 Sunk in action 
2 Lost 
77 
26 
     103  + 
= 
958 
104 
1062 
1165 
Oceanic 2 
 
17,274 8.9.14 Ran aground east of 
Foula Island and broke 
up there. 
Nil Nil 
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Memorials  
  
No specific memorial exists for the Tenth Cruiser Squadron. Probably the most tangible   
and poignant memorial is the derelict  guns guarding the mouth of the Northern Base  
Swarbacks Minn on page 126.   
 
Royal Navy 
 
An Admiralty committee recommended that the three manning ports in Great Britain - 
Chatham, Plymouth and Portsmouth - should each have an identical memorial of 
unmistakable naval form, an obelisk, which would serve as a leading mark for shipping. The 
memorials were designed by Sir Robert Lorimer. They record the names of personnel 
belonging to these base ports and who have no grave but the sea. Memorial Books also exist 
recording the name information. Thus any Squadron losses from the RN, RNR and RNVR 
will be recorded on the memorial in the manning port of a particular ship.  
 
Newfoundland Royal Naval Reserve 
 
The Newfoundland Royal Naval Reserve are well remembered for in addition to entries on 
the Port Naval War Memorials there is a tablet in Newfoundland.  Only those who have no 
grave but the sea are recorded. It can be deduced from one of the websites listed that 76 
Newfoundland Royal Naval Reservists perished in the service of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron. 
 
Merchant Navy War Memorial 
 
Located at Tower Hill, London the Merchant Navy Memorial records the names of merchant 
seafarers who have no grave but the sea. Their names are recorded under the names of their 
ships which are displayed in alphabetical order. A Memorial Book is available in the nearby 
Trinity House Office.  None of the Squadron ships are recorded there. A likely reason is that,  
when lost they were armed merchant cruisers in the Navy List therefore not at merchant ships.  
The remembrance of seafarer losses varied enormously between companies, since often they 
ZHUHSHUFHLYHGDVµFDVXDOODERXU¶HPSOR\HGIRUWKHYR\DJHRQO\ All staff of the Royal Mail 
6WHDP3DFNHW&RPSDQ\DUHUHFRUGHGRQWKHFRPSDQ\¶VPHPRULDOV(See Page 252) However, 
Veterans Association  
 
Royal Naval Association (RNA) 
 
Unlike the centrally organised Royal British Legion, the RNA post World War 1 consisted of 
a collection of branches known as the RN Comrades Associations which sprang up where 
there proved to be a demand. It was not until 1954 when a Royal Charter was granted that the 
RNA took on its present form.  The RNA does not grant membership to Merchant Navy 
veterans. However, a few RNA branches do allow do H[PHUFKDQWVHDIDUHUVDVµ$VVRFLDWHV¶ 
 
Merchant Navy Association (MNA) 
 
The MNA was not formed until 1989. By then the British Merchant Fleet was probably at its 
lowest and numbers of British seafarers employed was a similar level. The aim is to raise 
public awareness of our maritime heritage and seek more recognition for seafaring veterans. 
There are some 40 branches in the UK. Together with support from Lord Prescott, the 
Association succeeded in having September 3rd designated as Merchant Navy Day, 
commemorating the loss of the Athenia on the first day of World War 2. 
 
Further details of each of the above can be traced in the Bibliography under the list of 
websites accessed. 
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Abeam. 
When any place or object is at right angles to the fore and aft line of a ship. 
   
Astern.  
Behind or backwards. 
 
Awash Condition. 
When a submarine, although partly submerged, keeps the conning tower clear of the 
VHD VXUIDFH WKLV LV NQRZQ DV WKH µDZDVK FRQGLWLRQ¶  This allows the higher surface 
speed to be maintained and enjoy better visibility whilst minimising her own silhouette 
WRDVXUIDFHVKLS¶VORRNRXW 
 
Ballast. 
Weights SODFHGLQDVKLS¶VKROGLQVWHDGRIFDUJRWRHQVXUHVWDELOLW\ 
 
Binnacle. 
A brass bowl which contains the compass, and which has a brass protecting cover with 
a glass front and lighting arrangements inside. Usually mounted on a pedestal stand. 
 
Bow. 
The front end of a ship. 
 
Buffer Spring. 
A type of shock absorber. 
 
Bulkheads. 
Partitions or inside walls dividing sections or spaces in a ship. 
 
Bulwarks. 
That SURWHFWLQJSDUWRIDVKLS¶VWKDWUXQVURXQGDERYHWKHOHYHORIWKHXSSHUGHFNOLNHD
low wall.  
 
Compass Error.  
The net effect of combining the values for variation and deviation. It is the number of 
degrees, either East or West to be applied to the True Course to establish the Compass 
Course to steer.   
 
Dead  Reckoning.  
Position assumed by courses and distances run when observations are unobtainable. 
 
Decoy Ships 
A naval ship designed to look like ordinary merchant ships but hiding guns which were 
revealed and opened fire on the intercepting vessel when it came close to launch its 
boarding boat. E.g. Alcantara and Greif  
 
Derricks. 
These are swivelling booms attached to the heel of a mast to act as a crane jibs for the 
loading and discharge of cargo or other weights e.g. boarding boats.  
µTopping GHUULFNV¶ is the work of raising the derricks from their normal horizontal 
position to the required angle for working when they are the secured in that position. 
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Deviation.  
The angle between compass North and magnetic North is known as deviation. It is 
named either East or West and is one of the components of the error on a magnetic 
compass. It is caused by local magnetic fields VHWXSIURPWKHVKLS¶VVWUXFWXUHSRVVLEO\
cargo and equipment. The value variHVDV WKHVKLS¶VFRXUVHFKDQJHVDQG VRGHYLDWLRQ
must be checked on each alteration of course.  
 
Divisions. 
Daily muster aboard a warship of all officers and men when orders and prayers are read  
out. 
 
Down To Her Marks. 
When a ship is loaded so as to bring the Plimsoll mark, painted on her hull, down to the 
waterline. 
 
Draft/Draught 
7KHGHSWKWRZKLFKWKHVKLS¶VKXOOlies beneath her waterline.   
 
Estimated  Position.  
This is the most accurate position that can be calculated utilising all the known factors 
WKDWFDQDIIHFWWKHVKLS¶VSURJUHVVVXFKDVOHHZD\ZLQGFXUUHQWDQGtidal streams.  
 
Evening Quarters. 
A muster of the men at the end of the afternoon when daily work ceases and activity is 
confined to watch keepers. 
 
Falls 
The blocks and tackle (pulley system) used to raise and lower a lifeboat. The lower 
block has a hook. 
 
Fathom. 
Length of six feet. 
 
Fix.  
This is the position obtained by the intersection of two or more bearings from either 
terrestrial or celestial objects obtained simultaneously. The position lines can be from 
visual compass bearings, sextant observations or by means of radio aids.   
 
)RUZDUGRU)RU¶UG 
Towards the bow of the ship. 
 
Freeboard 
The distance that the statutory deck line is above the water line 
 
Galley. 
Kitchen aboard a ship. 
 
Gyro Compass. 
The gyro compass uses the properties of gyroscopic inertia and precession and seeks to 
align itself in the true north-south direction. It is a mechanical device and subject to 
small errors which must be allowed for when in use. This type of  compass was the 
exception in 1914-1917. 
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Helm and Wheel Orders. 
7KHSUHVHQWSUDFWLFHRIJLYLQJZKHHORUGHUVLQWKHIRUPµ3RUW¶RUµ6WDUERDUG¶ 
was not brought into standard practice until 19128. All the 10thCS ships had a steering 
ZKHHO EXW RIWHQ FRPPDQGLQJ RIILFHU¶V UHSRUW XVH WKH KHOP RU WLOOHU WHUPLQRORJ\
DVVRFLDWHGVDLOLQJVKLSVHJµ,RUGHUHGWKHKHOPWRSRUW¶. Thus if the tiller was moved to 
port the rudder moveV WR VWDUERDUG DQG WKH VKLS ZLOO WXUQ WR WKH ULJKW¶  ,W ZDV D
confusing legacy from the days of sail and care should be taken when reading reports of 
actions taken. 
    
Knot. 
 A measure of speed expressing the number of nautical miles per hour.  
e.g. A speed of 10 knots means a speed of 10 nautical miles per hour. 
 
Lead Lines.   
Used to establish the depth of water in which a ship floats. The Hand Lead  weighs 
between 7 to 14 lbs and a line is marked up to 20 fathoms (One fathom = 6 feet): 
modern marking is up to 50 metres, The Deep Sea Lead weighs from 28-30 lbs., and is 
marked up to 100 fathoms.  
 
Lee Side. 
The side of ship away or sheltered from the wind. 
 
Leeway.  
The DQJOHEHWZHHQWKHVKLS¶VIRUHDQGDIW OLQHDQGWKHGLUHFWLRQPDGHJRRGLV WHUPHG
WKH µOHHZD\¶ ,W LV DVVHVVHGE\YLVXDOO\ HVWLPDWLQJ WKH DQJOHEHWZHHQ WKH IRUH DQG DIW
OLQHDQGWKHVKLS¶VZDNH   
 
Magnetic Compass.  
The magnetic compass uses the inherent magnetic forces within and encircling the 
earth in order to establish direction. A magnetic needle, when freely suspended, is 
LQIOXHQFHGE\WKHHDUWK¶VPDJQHWLFILHOGDQGDOLJQVLWVHOIDSSUR[LPDWHO\LQDQRUWK-south 
direction.  The compass is affected by the variation and deviation.  The latter influence 
is partly compensated by corrector maJQHWV VRIW LURQ VSKHUHV DQG D )OLQGHU¶V %DU RI
vertical cylindrical soft iron.  This was the only type of compass aboard the armed 
merchant cruisers of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron.   
 
Mercantile Marine.  
The collective name given to commercially owned and operated ships, together with 
the professional officers and ratings employed aboard. The ships are operated under 
government regulations DQG LQVXUHU¶V requirements. The personnel, although paid by 
individual shipowners, are subject to government control in respect of licensing and 
medical standards, as well as overall administration by the Registrar General of 
Shipping and Seamen.     
 
Metacentric Height.  
Is the distance between the centre of gravity and the metacentre. This is closely 
connected with the sKLS¶VULJKWLQJPRPHQWor righting lever which is a measure of the 
YHVVHO¶VDELOLW\WRUHWXrn to her original position.   
 
 
Mousing 
A temporary rope lashing placed across a hook to prevent the slings holding a load 
from being accidentally jerked clear of the hook, often causing damage or injury. 
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Observed Position.  
This usually is a fix from the intersection or two or more astronomical position lines 
established by sextant altitudes and calculation.  
  
 
Paravane. 
A special float mechanism which streams an H[WUDVWURQJZLUHIURPDVKLS¶VERZDQGLV
capable of cutting mine moorings underwater. 
 
Patent Log.  
Effectively a milometer which records the distance run through the water and is reset to 
zero daily at noon. The register is a µclock¶ usually mounted on WKHVKLS¶VUDLOULJKWDIW
and a repeater was often fitted in the chartroom. Attached to the rail mechanism is a 
length of special line towed astern which is revolved by means of a rotator at the end.  
It was a standard fitting on all the armed merchant cruisers of the 10th CS.   
 
Racking. 
7KHWUDQVYHUVHVWUHVVHVRQWKHVKLS¶VVWUXFWXUHZKHQUROOLQJLQDVHDZD\7KHVHVWUHVVHV 
can be worsened if too much cargo is loaded in the lower holds.  
 
Radio Direction Finder. (R.D.F.) 
The principle of this type of radio aid is based on the fact that a plane vertical loop 
aerial possesses directive properties. These properties  are derived from the varying 
strengths of an induced signal in the aerial dependent upon the aspect of the plane of 
the loop to the transmitter. In this way, Alsatian established the direction of a Squadron 
ship which transmitted a signal, when instructed, to effect a rendezvous between the 
two ships concerned. This was the only electronic aid available to the Squadron and 
was little more than a development model. Post war the system was expanded but today 
more advanced electronics have replaced RDF and it no longer exists.   
 
Rangefinder. 
The principle of the rangefinder was that by looking at a distant object from the ends of 
a horizontal pole the lines joining the ends of the pole to the object converge to a small 
angle.  The Rangefinder was merely an instrument for measuring this angle and a 
mechanism inside the instrument converted the angle into a target range which was 
required for the gun sights.1 
 
Reciprocating Steam Engines. 
An engine which first admits steam above the piston then below the piston to return it 
WRWKHRULJLQDOSRVLWLRQUHDG\IRUWKHQH[WµGRZQ¶VWURNH¶, when steam is admitted above 
the piston again.  This vertical movement is converted to a rotary movement to drive a 
propeller by a crankshaft and connecting rod arrangement.  
 
Royal Fleet Reserve. (R.F.R.)  
A naval reserve force drawn from former naval ratings who, after completing 
contractual service with the Royal Navy, were liable to recall by Royal Proclamation in 
times of emergency. The liability lasted for a specified numbers of years after leaving 
active service in the Navy. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Admiralty, Notes on Gunnery for Defensively Equipped Merchant Ships  
   (London, 1939) 58 
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Royal Naval Reserve. (R.N.R.)  
A naval reserve force drawn from professional officers and ratings of the Mercantile 
Marine. Membership was voluntary but many major mail steamer companies 
encouraged their employees to join. After basic training, further periodic training with 
the fleet was undertaken. A Royal Proclamation was required to call up the personnel in 
times of emergency.   
 
Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. (R.N.V.R.)  
A naval reserve force of men drawn from civilian occupations ashore.  They were 
volunteers and not professional seafarers, somewhat similar to the Territorial Army.  
The volunteers carried out training in the evenings, at weekends and two weeks annual 
training aboard naval ships or at naval establishments. All officers were promoted from 
the lower deck. A Royal Proclamation was required to call up the personnel in times of 
emergency.   
 
Righting Lever. 
See Metacentric Height above. 
 
Runner. 
The wire rope supported by the derrick head and leading to a cargo winch. The runner 
has a hook and the load is suspended from it.  
 
Sounding Machine.  
The deep sea sounding machine consists of DVPDOOµKDQGZLQFK¶ZLWKDGUXPKROGLQJ
about 300 fathoms of piano wire. To the end of the wire a sinker or lead of about 28 
lbs. weight is secured. Normally fitted amidships and near the navigating bridge, the 
sounding wire is streamed from the end of a boom ZHOOFOHDURI WKH VKLS¶V VLGHThe 
machine would have been a standard fitting in the 10th CS, the method is now obsolete.  
 
Stiff or Crank 
A condition whereby a ship has a rapid and almost violent roll. It indicates a centre of 
gravity lower than optimum usually too much weight lower down in the ship. It can 
cause excessive racking. 
 
Tender. 
A condition whereby a ship has a slow gentle roll. Whilst comfortable for crew it 
indicates a raised centre of gravity, SRVVLEO\E\WRRPXFKZHLJKWLQWKHµWZHHQGecks  
or on the upper deck. 
 
Union Purchase. 
A system using a pair of derricks.  The derricks are topped to the correct angles and the 
two runners are joined with a proper union purchase swivel hook. One derrick plumbs 
the hold or deck and the other plumbs RYHUWKHVKLS¶VVLGH%\FRQWUROOHGXVHRIWKH
GHUULFNV¶ZLQFKHVDZHLJKWVXFKDVFDUJRRUDERDUGLQJERDWFDQEHKRLVWHGXSWKHQ
transferred clear of the ship to be landed on the dockside or the water in the case of a 
boat. 
 
Variation.  
At any point on WKH HDUWK¶V VXUIDFH YDULDWLRQ LV WKH DQJOH EHWZHHQ WKH PDJQHWLF
meridian and true North. It is a value which is known and named either East or West 
and is one of the components of the error on a magnetic compass.  
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Wardroom. 
The room in a warship for the messing of all officers of commissioned rank below the 
commanding officer.  Also used as a casualty station or operating theatre when in 
action.  
 
Watches. 
3HULRGVRIGXW\RUIUHHGRPµ:DWFKRQGHFN¶SHULRGRIGXW\RQGHFNµ:DWFKEHORZ¶
period of freedom. 
 
Waterline. 
The line which the surface of the water describes on a ship when she is loaded or ready 
for sea.  
 
Whips. 
A fall or rope rigged through blocks (pulleys) to form a tackle. If one block is used then 
it is a single whip. If two blocks are used then the mechanical advantage is increased. 
Whips were used as ammunition hoists in the 10thCS.  
 
Worn Superior. 
Worn above. 
 
----------------- 
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I.  PRIMARY SOURCES 
 
a) Manuscript Sources 
 
Imperial War Museum,  (IWM) 
 
DS/MISC/87    Journal of Cdr H.T. Bowen  RN                       H.M.S. Edgar 
PP/MCR/237    Cdr B.T.Brewster RN                                      H.M.S. Virginian  
PP/MCR/53      Capt  H.C.R. Brocklebank RN                       H.M.S. Changuinola      
96/47/1             Culme-Seymour E.V.                                       H.M.S. Alsatian  
DEC 3/1           De Chair manuscripts  PP/MCR/C4 
02/2/1               Journal of Leading Signalman Driscoll, J.,        H.M.S. Arlanza    
96/47/1             Grayson.T.,                                                        H.M.S. Ebro 
P43                   Diary Cdr F.H.Grenfell RN                              H.M.S. Cedric 
P 389                Journal of Midshipman F.L. McKeag RNR    H.M.S. India 
P214                 Capt T.W.A.Masterman  Notes on Tenth Cruiser Squadron 
DS/MISC/98    Microfilm  Mid. Francis Poole  RNR               H.M.S. Alcantara    
P190                 Diary Mid. Francis Poole  RNR                       H.M.S. Alcantara    
JAS/1/1            Diary  John Shuter                                            H.M.S. Changuinola    
82/24/1             Capt F.A.Slocum  RN                                       H.M.S.  Almanzora 
 
National Maritime Museum, (NMM) 
 
Admiral D.T. Norris Collection 
NOR/1   H.M.S. Arlanza  May-October 1915  
 
Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company archives. (P&O) 
P&O /1/119  Minutes of Meetings of Board of Directors 7th Oct. 1914 ± 11 Dec. 1929  
P&O /11/30  Merchant Vessels in Wartime. Sutherland/Battenberg  Correspondence 
                       1903 
P&O /69/1    Trooping  1854-1955  
P&O /69/2    Armed Merchant Cruisers 1887-1894    
P&O /69/3    Armed Cruisers or Transports. Transcript of Naval Estimates Debate   
                      House of  Commons.    7 Sep. 1887  
P&O /69/2/3 Interview with Sir Thomas Sutherland M.P. with Pall Mall Gazette  Nov.1880? 
P&O /98/62   Press Cuttings             Dec. 1915 ± Dec.1921  
 
P&O ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron 
P&O /65/164  India   
P&O /65/206  Mantua  Contains diary record  20 Aug.1914-30 Nov.1914 by Ben Dack  
                       Rutland, Bedchamber  Steward  
P&O /65/216  Moldavia  
   
Royal Mail Steam Packet Company Collection  (RMS) 
RMS /1/17  Minutes of the Court of Directors Jan.1913 ± Nov. 1916   
RMS /1/18  Minutes of the Court of Directors Dec.1916 ± Jul. 1922  
RMS/6/8     In  Letter Book from Public Departments   
RMS/6/14   In  Letter Book from Public Departments  
RMS/38/4   Instructions for MastHUVRQERDUG+HU0DMHVW\¶V7UDQVSRUWV1855  HMSO. 
RMS /51/8  Newspapers Cuttings Book   
 
Papers of Captain G. W .Vivian R.N.  (VIV) 
VIV /4 Vivian   (H.M.S. Patia) to Rear Admiral 10th Cruiser Squadron               2 February 1915    
VIV /4  Vivian  (H.M.S. Patia) to Secretary of the Admiralty                                     4 May 1915         
VIV /4  Vivian  (H.M.S. Patia) to Rear Admiral 10th Cruiser Squadron                      6 May 1915  
VIV /4  Vivian  (H.M.S. Patia) to Rear Admiral 10th Cruiser Squadron                20 August1915   
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VIV /4  Vivian  (H.M.S. Patia) to Rear Admiral 10th Cruiser Squadron            3 September 1915   
VIV /13 Vivian to Secretary of the Navy.                                                                   30 June 1914       
VIV /14  Vivian  Sundry papers and notes on convoy  and Aiming Rifle Practice.  
    
Capt. A.H.Smyth R.N. 
80/033   H.M.S. Teutonic  Patrol Report by Capt. A.H.Smyth RN               18 Nov. 1915   
 
342.537 International Convention relative to the conversion of merchant ships into    
              warships signed at The Hague 18 October 1907 (London HMSO 1910)    
  
The National Archives : Public Record Office  (TNA) 
 
ADM 1/8368/35  Amalgamation of Wireless Telegraphy and                                    1914  
                             Signal Branches RN.                                               
ADM 1/8369/50  Proposals for patenting a Detector for Wireless Telegraphy.          1914 
                             Lt.Col. U.J.C.Dennis, RA 
ADM 1/8373/80   Training fees to RNR Officers ± time in charge of guns                1914  
                              on Armed Merchant Cruisers to count as training time  
                              for payment of.. 
 
ADM 1/8374/103  Functions of Armed Merchant Cruisers on trade routes.             1914   
                               War Staff paper on future policy. 
ADM 1/8376/112  Training of Gunlayers RNR and gun crews of Armed                1914     
                               Merchant Cruisers.                    
ADM 1/8388/236  Mercantile Fleet Auxiliaries and Armed Merchant                     1914   
                               Cruisers. Complete nominal up to date List. 
ADM 1/8395/335 Establishment of Reserve of Wireless Telegraphy                        1914  
                              Operators ± Conditions of service 
ADM 1/8405/463  Armed Merchant Cruisers. Issue of documents for                      1914   
                               information and guidance.         
 
ADM 1/8490/134  Alphabetical List of Armed Merchant Cruisers,                           1914 
                               Fleet Auxiliaries, Hospital  Ships and various craft    
                               (1915 and 1917).   
ADM 1/8412/50     Method of ship painting to render invisibility         13 February 1915 
ADM 1/8415/80     C-in-C Home Fleets to Admiral Orkneys and             28 March 1915 
                                Shetlands and Rear-Admiral 10th CS.  
ADM 1/8415/80     C-in-C Home Fleets to Admiral Orkneys and                21 June 1915 
                                Shetlands and Rear-Admiral 10th CS.   
ADM 1/8415/80     C-in-C Home Fleets to Admiralty                              28 August 1916 
 
ADM 1/8415/80     Minute by Anderson                                                7 September 1915 
ADM 1/8452/69     Loss of H.M.S. Alcantara. Court martial.                                    1916 
ADM 1/8453/78     H.M.S. Ebro. Loss of Armed Guard                          14 January 1916 
ADM 1/8729/183   Proposals for stiffening armed merchant cruisers.                        1928                                 
 
ADM 1/29126       :LUHOHVV7HOHJUDSK\FROODERUDWLRQEHWZHHQ0DUFRQL¶V-1933 
                               Wireless Company Ltd and the Admiralty 
ADM 1/29127        :LUHOHVV7HOHJUDSK\FROODERUDWLRQEHWZHHQ0DUFRQL¶V-1933 
                                Wireless Company Ltd and the Admiralty 
 
ADM 53   33260  - 33269    Alcantara 
ADM 53   33355  - 33359    Almanzora 
ADM 53   33378  - 33384    Alsatian 
ADM 53   33488  - 33515    Ambrose 
ADM 53   33654  - 33672    Andes 
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ADM 53   34111  - 34152   Arlanza 
ADM 53   34153  - 34170   Armadale Castle 
ADM 53   34525  - 34540   Avenger 
ADM 53   34905  - 34906   Bayano 
ADM 53   36739  - 36759   Calyx 
                                             (Calypso) 
 
ADM 53   37068  - 37072   Caribbean 
ADM 53   37364  - 37372   Cedric 
ADM 53   37552  - 37556   Changuinola 
No logs held                        Clan McNaughton      
ADM 53    38276  - 38296  Columbella 
 
ADM 53    39947  - 39955   Digby 
ADM 53    34191  - 34196   (Digby as Artois) 
ADM 53    40533  - 40535   Ebro 
ADM 53    41013  - 41014   Eskimo 
ADM 53    43084  - 43092   Gloucestershire 
   
ADM 53    44317  - 44342   Hilary 
ADM 53    44343  - 44347   Hildebrand 
ADM 53    44825  - 44827   India 
ADM 53    45661  - 45689   Kildonan Castle 
ADM 53    48273  - 48313   Mantua   
 
ADM 53    49754  - 49778   Moldavia  
ADM 53    50069  - 50107   Motagua 
ADM 53    53135  - 53137   Oceanic 
ADM 53    53561  - 53606   Orcoma       
ADM 53    53764  - 53776    Oropesa (Champagne) 
 
ADM 53    53780  - 53822   Orotava 
ADM 53    53866  - 53910   Orvieto                         
ADM 53    54144  - 54171   Otway    
ADM 53    54543  - 54581   Patia 
ADM 53    54670  - 54679   Patuca 
 
ADM 53    62720  - 62758   Teutonic 
ADM 53    67374  - 67418   Victorian 
ADM 53    67502  - 67511   Viknor   (Viking) 
ADM 53    67702  - 67745   Virginian 
 
ADM 101/405       H.M.S. Almanzora  6XUJHRQ¶V-RXUQDO              22 Apr.1915 to 28 Aug. 1915 
ADM 101/405       H.M.S. Alsatian      6XUJHRQ¶V-RXUQDl                  1Jan. 1916 to 31 Dec. 1916  
ADM 101/431       H.M.S. Motagua     6XUJHRQ¶V-RXUQDO'HFWR'HF 
 
ADM 116/965      Royal Naval Reserves                                                                    1903 - 1905 
ADM 116/1231A   Naval Prize Manual ± Revision                                                     1900 - 1916 
ADM 116/1232      Naval Prize Manual ± Revision                                                     1913 - 1914 
ADM 116/1613      Findings of the Court Martial H.M.S. Champagne                14 October 1915 
ADM 120/224        Regulations for the Royal Naval Reserve (Men)                                      1921      
                                Subseries within ADM 120  Royal Naval Reserve Returns 
ADM 128/109        The Newfoundland Royal Naval Reserve                       Apr 1899 - Oct 1909                    
ADM 128/112        Newfoundland Royal Naval Reserve                              Aug 1902 ± Jan 1913 
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ADM 137/138   Auxiliary Patrol Areas ± Shetlands and Orkneys                                          1915 
ADM 137/185   Revised Arrangement for Cruiser Force B                                 19  August  1914 
ADM 137/185   de Chair to Admiralty                                                                 27  August  1914 
ADM 137/185   de Chair to Admiralty                                                               1 November  1914 
ADM 137/185   de Chair to Admiralty                                                               3  December 1914 
ADM 137/185   de Chair to Admiralty                                                                  25 January 1915 
ADM 137/185   de Chair to Admiralty                                                                      9 March 1915 
ADM 137/185   de Chair to Admiralty                                                                         9  July 1915  
ADM 137/185   de Chair to Admiralty                                                                   21 August 1915  
ADM 137/185   de Chair to C-in-C Grand Fleet                                                     2 January 1916 
 
ADM 137/292   Information Concerning Mines                                                  15  January 1915  
ADM 137/298   de Chair to Admiralty                                                               28 February 1916 
ADM 137/298   Benson to SNO Liverpool 170-3                                                  28 March 1916 
ADM 137/298   Tupper to Admiralty                                                                       25 April 1916 
ADM 137/298   Brooks to First Sea Lord 214-215                                                     9 May 1916  
ADM 137/298   Tupper to Admiralty                                                                         16 July 1916  
ADM 137/298   Tupper to Admiralty                                                                         25 July 1916  
ADM 137/298   Tupper to Admiralty                                                               22 September 1916 
ADM 137/298   Tupper to Admiralty                                                                  5 November 1916 
ADM 137/299   Tupper to Admiralty                                                                      29 March 1917  
ADM 137/299   Tupper to Admiralty                                                                          9 April 1917  
ADM 137/299   Tupper to Admiralty                                                                        24 April 1917 
 
ADM 137/299   Diary of 10th CS events   304-12 
ADM 137/342   Grand Fleet W.T Memoranda                                                  1 November  1915 
ADM 137/401   Boarding Merchantmen ± Signal Tables                                16 September 1914 
ADM 137/466   C-in-C Home Fleet to Flag Officers etc.,                                  29 February 1916   
ADM 137/822   Tenth Cruiser Squadron Orders.                                                        15 July 1915 
ADM 137/873   Grand Fleet,  Report of Proceedings                                    January to May 1916    
ADM 137/969   AMC Policy re Boy Seamen.                                                       September 1914 
ADM 137/997   Rosoman to Miller                                                                       17 October 1914 
ADM 137/989   Admiralty to C-in-C Home Fleet                                            18 November 1914 
ADM 137/989   Memorandum by Webb                                                           24 December 1914  
 
ADM 137/989     Walter to Rear Admiral 10th CS                                                  9 January 1915    
ADM 137/1081   Whiting to First Sea Lord                                                        10 February 1914  
ADM 137/1081   Third Sea Lord to Superintendent of  Contract Work             13 February 1915 
ADM 137/1081    de Chair to Admiralty                                                             23 February 1915  
ADM 137/1081    C-in-C Home Fleet to Admiralty                                                1 January 1915 
ADM 137/1081    C-in-C Home Fleets to Admiralty                                                16 April 1915   
ADM 137/1081    Extract from Memorandum of Hudson                                        25 April 1915  
ADM 137/1081    de Chair to Oliver                                                                            5 May 1915 
ADM 137/1081    Admiralty to C-in-C Home Fleet                                                   21 May 1915 
ADM 137/1081    Note by Dumas                                                                                3 May 1915    
ADM 137/1081    Note by Learmonth                                                                        15 May 1915  
ADM 137/1081    MacLure to Down                                                                         26 May 1915 
ADM 137/1081    R.A.10th CS to C-in-C Home Fleets                                                7 June 1915 
ADM 137/1101    Crawford to Rear-Admiral H.M.S. Cyclops                                   29 July 1915 
ADM 137/1275    Minute by Webb                                                                              2 June 1917  
ADM 137/1275    Wrightson to Vice-Admiral 10th CS                                                5 June 1917 
ADM 137/1275    Tupper to Wrightson                                                                       6 June 1917 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                   Bibliography. 
  
 
 
 
318 
ADM 137/1910    Admiralty to Beatty                                                                       24 June 1917 
ADM 137/1910    Tupper to Admiralty                                                                    7 August 1917 
ADM 137/1910    Vice Admiral 10th CS to C-in-C Grand Fleet                       15 November 1917 
ADM 137/1915    Beatty to C-in-C Home Fleet                                                     1 October 1914  
ADM 137/1915    Goodenough to C-in-C Home Fleet                                         11 October 1914 
 
ADM 137/1915    Jellicoe to Admiralty                                                            13 November 1914 
ADM 137/1915    Admiralty to Jellicoe                                                            14 November 1914 
ADM 137/1915    Secret Pack: Operations of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron           28 August 1915 
                              and the Policy of NormalAllowances.  
                              Lt. E Hilton Young RNVR 
ADM 137/1915    Secret Pack of the Commander in Chief                               1 September 1915 
ADM 137/1915    Secret Pack:Minute by Chairman of the Contraband            6 September 1915 
                             Committee. 
ADM 137/1915    Secret Pack: Jellicoe to Admiralty                                       14 September 1915 
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